Read The Nixon Defense: What He Knew and When He Knew It Online
Authors: John W. Dean
The Nixon Defense: What He Knew and When He Knew It (132 page)
Woods, Rose Mary,
8
,
71
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94
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137
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159
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192
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328
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348
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365
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516
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548
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,
623
,
627
,
708
n28,
713
n79,
716
–17
n101
Wright, Charles Alan,
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634
Young, David,
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n,
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–46,
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n11,
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n165
Ellsberg break-in and,
546
Young, Lawrence,
169
Ziegler, Ron,
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n5,
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n104
Dean and,
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–55,
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–58,
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Dean report and,
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n11
Ehrlichman and,
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FBI agents and,
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Haldeman and Ehrlichman’s resignations and,
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and first Watergate-related press conference,
47
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and Nixon’s statement on Dean’s investigation,
146
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Segretti and,
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Senate Watergate committee and,
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“Statements About the Watergate Investigations” white paper and,
578
–81
and telephone in plumbers’ office,
191
n
Washington Post
and,
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–71,
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–76
Watergate trial and,
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*
It is clear today what was erased and why, but as to who did it, while the list of candidates can be narrowed, the actual culprit cannot be established beyond a reasonable doubt. The gap story is 99.9 percent news media hype and 0.1 percent significant to understanding Watergate. See
Appendix B
.
*
This information had to come from Ehrlichman, Mitchell or Magruder, because it had not been reported in the newspapers. Before hearing this tape, I was unaware of this information.
*
Haldeman was referring to the White House staff only, namely himself and aides Larry Higby and Alex Butterfield. The Secret Service, which installed and monitored the recording system, similarly kept knowledge restricted to only those who were needed to keep it functioning properly.
*
There are many Johns who come up during the recorded conversations: John Ehrlichman, John Mitchell, John Connally, John Dean, etc. Typically both the president and Haldeman refer only to Ehrlichman as John, while for others they use the last name. For clarity, when confusion is possible I have either replaced the “John” with the appropriate last name or added it in brackets.
*
Haldeman, who was still sorting out the facts, had this particular one wrong. He would later learn it was Alfred Baldwin, who worked for James McCord, who used this line-of-sight room. After the arrests on June 17, Hunt went there to give Baldwin instructions to pack up the listening equipment and get out of town. Hunt and Liddy had been in the Watergate Hotel rooms that had been occupied by the Miami-based burglars.
*
Often there are misstatements in the conversations, and I have not given them a
sic
; rather, when it is an important fact, or a clear effort to mislead, I have noted it either in the narrative or a in footnote.
*
See
Appendix A
.
*
Ehrlichman would be indicted and convicted for perjury for his grand jury testimony on May 3, 1973, when he denied any knowledge of Liddy’s name coming up during any meetings he attended during the week following the arrests at the Watergate. The prosecutors, however, did not have this remarkable information recorded by Haldeman. Count Eleven, Indictment,
U.S. v. Mitchell et al.
(March 1, 1974).
*
Liddy falsely claimed I had made the commitment, but I told Mardian and LaRue that it was untrue, not to mention that I certainly had no such authority. Today I realize this was a standard Liddy manipulative tactic.
*
According to the telephone logs of acting FBI director Patrick Gray, Ehrlichman called him at 9:35
A.M.
, as Haldeman was meeting with the president. Gray later said that Ehrlichman simply told him (which I had not in fact been informed of): “John Dean is going to be handling an inquiry into this thing for the White House. He’s expecting your call.” Gray further claims he told Ehrlichman, “As far as the FBI is concerned, we’re treating this as a major special with all our normal procedures in effect. It’s going to be an aggressive and thorough investigation, and I expect we will be interviewing people at the White House. We’ll need to set up procedural safeguards against leaks.” L. Patrick Gray III with Ed Gray,
In Nixon’s Web: A Year in the Crosshairs of Watergate
(New York: Times Books, 2008), 63. Gray’s reconstruction is highly doubtful: There was no White House inquiry conducted by me, and if Gray was bracing the White House for an aggressive “major special” investigation, Ehrlichman would likely have shared this fact with someone—which he did not—for he would very much be subject to it. At the time, Gray hoped to be nominated director, and such a statement to Ehrlichman would have assured that he would not get it. Ed Gray, who authored this book, relied on the reconstructed conversation in his father’s testimony. This was surely a conversation both Gray and Ehrlichman later wanted to forget had taken place.
*
This information could only have come from Mitchell, and it appears, at best, to have been pure speculation. When Liddy had spoken with Mardian and LaRue on the afternoon of June 20, 1972, his position was that his involvement would never be discovered, and he resisted Mardian’s suggestion that he give himself up. See testimony of Robert Mardian, 6 Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities (SSC), 2359. Rather than confessing, Liddy was busy creating new problems—a conspiracy to obstruct justice by demanding money to take care of all those involved in the mess he had created.
*
The National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) tape for this telephone conversation, No. 25-116, is inaudible, so only the EOB room recording of the conversation is available.
*
A navy yeoman, Charles Radford, had taken documents from the National Security Council and Henry Kissinger’s office and given them to officials at the Pentagon, who wanted to know what was occurring inside Nixon’s NSA. Some of this information had later appeared in Jack Anderson’s syndicated column and became the focus of a major investigation by David Young for the Special Investigations Unit, aka the plumbers. Haldeman, though, was not certain anything had actually been taken, as opposed to copies having been made.
*
When revealed by order of the U.S. Supreme Court in late July 1974, this became known as the “smoking gun” conversation, because it was viewed as hard evidence, demonstrating beyond question, that Nixon’s final defense about the Watergate break-in in his April 30, 1973, speech, followed by his May 22, 1973, statement, was bogus, which doomed the Nixon presidency. Ironically, this conversation has been mistakenly understood as an effort by Nixon and Haldeman to shut down the FBI’s entire Watergate investigation. This appears to be the case only when viewed out of context. In August 1974, when the converstion was revealed, and Nixon and his lawyers had to focus on this conversation, he had long forgotten what was actually involved; they assumed it had the same meaning as everyone else did. In reality, it was only an effort by Haldeman to stop the FBI from investigating an anonymous campaign contribution from Mexico that the Justice Department prosecutors had already agreed was outside the scope of the Watergate investigation. In approving this action, however, Nixon slightly expanded the request, saying that the FBI should also stay out of Howard Hunt’s CIA-related activities. In fact, this conversation did not put the lie to Nixon’s April 30 and May 22, 1973, statements, and had Nixon known that he might have survived its disclosure to fight another day. This is not to say, however, that Nixon’s April 30 and May 22, 1973, statements were not a lie, as countless other conversations later revealed. In short, the smoking gun was only firing blanks.
*
The president’s U.S. Supreme Court nominee, Harrold Carswell, was rejected by the U.S. Senate.
*
In January 1971, Mitchell’s Justice Department indicted Philip Berrigan and others (known as the “Harrisburg Seven”) for purportedly trying to kidnap Henry Kissinger and blow up federal buildings. The jury did not believe the charges and acquitted all.
*
In August 1971, black intellectual and radical Angela Davis was indicted by Mitchell’s Justice Department for murder, kidnapping and conspiracy, charges relating to an escape of prisoners from a federal courtroom, only to be later found not guilty on all counts by an all-white jury.
*
On December 29, 1971, Daniel Ellsberg and Anthony Russo were indicted by Mitchell’s Justice Department on fifteen counts of theft of government documents and espionage in connection with leaking the Pentagon Papers. The case was pending in federal court in California, and the fact that Haldeman and the president believed the case would fail is a striking admission.
*
The audio quality here is worse than usual, because they were seated for lunch at a small conference table a good distance from the microphones in the president’s desk. Although approximately thirty-five minutes of this seventy-five-minute meeting has been withdrawn by NARA, because of personal material, the gist of the conversation can be determined.
*
This NARA recording literally runs out here, resulting in a gap of unknown length. When the conversation resumes, Haldeman and Nixon are still addressing the same general topic
*
When we were meeting earlier, in Haldeman’s office, Mitchell had asked me to write out a bogus Liddy scenario, but I resisted, explaining that I did not have the time or knowledge. Haldeman saw what Mitchell was doing and backed me up.
*
A statement like this further confirms that Nixon did not believe he was closing down the FBI’s investigation of Watergate on June 23, 1972, in authorizing Haldeman to have the CIA intervene with the FBI’s investigation of the Mexican check and Hunt’s activities.
*
This would equal more than $1 million in today’s dollars.
*
During the Truman presidency the Senate investigated charges that presidential aide Harry H. Vaughan and others were charging a 5 percent commission for their influence in securing government contracts.
*
This is a reference to the reelection committee, whose office was at 1701 Pennsylvania Avenue.
*
The wires were carrying the story from Carl Bernstein and Bob Woodward, “Bug Suspect Got Campaign Funds” (
The Washington Post
, August 1, 1972, A-1), about the twenty-five-thousand-dollar check from Kenneth Dahlberg (an official with CRP) found in the bank account of Bernard Barker.
*
On Monday, July 31, 1972, Ehrlichman requested I join him for lunch with Kleindienst. We met in the attorney general’s office suite and private dining room at the Justice Department from 11:30
A.M.
until approximately 1:30
P.M.
Ehrlichman had called for the meeting. It was at this time that Kleindienst brought Ehrlichman up to date on the likely outcome of the Watergate investigation. But Haldeman’s report to the president shows far more knowledge than Ehrlichman received from Kleindienst at that meeting; rather, it appears they had also spoken with Mitchell, who had information about Hunt’s plans. Also, tellingly, Ehrlichman’s calendar for the evening of July 31, 1972, shows that he attended a “Youth Reception” in the White House mess to which Jeb Magruder had been invited. Keeping Jeb happy was on everyone’s mind.