The Other Side of the Night (28 page)

“Further reference to this chart will show plotted a hypothetical position of the
Californian
. On the hypothesis that the
Californian
was in this position, a dotted line is drawn on the chart on the bearing given by the captain of the
Californian
as that on which the steamer was sighted. This bearing is drawn on the chart to intersect the track of the
Titanic
. Another dotted line is drawn parallel thereto from a point on the course of the
Titanic
where she apparently was at 10:06 p.m., New York time, April 14, that being 11:56 p.m. of that date of the
Californian
’s time, at which Ernest Gill, a member of the crew of the
Californian
, in his testimony before your committee, stated that the large steamer was seen by him. If the
Californian
was in the hypothetical position shown on the chart, the
Titanic
could have been seen by the officers and crew of the
Californian
at the time mentioned.”

At this, Smith, who had a comprehension of technical discussions which surpassed that of most people, invited Knapp to put his conclusion in terms even a layman could understand. “Captain, are you able to state to the committee whether there was any vessel between the position of the
Titanic
just preceding and following the accident and the position of the
Californian
at that time?”

“From being present at hearings before your committee and from reading the printed testimony of witnesses examined by the committee I am led to the conclusion that if there was any vessel between the
Californian
and the
Titanic
at the time referred to she does not seem to have been seen by any of the ships near there on the following morning, nor have there been any reports submitted to the Hydrographic Office which would indicate that there was any such steamer in that locality. The evidence does not indicate to me that there was any such third steamer in those waters, especially in view of the fact that no such steamer was seen by other steamers or by those in the lifeboats the following morning, and as the ice barrier, from all reports, between the reported position of the
Californian
and that of the
Titanic
was impassable to a vessel proceeding to the westward.”

Smith had heard enough; such was the worldwide stature of the United States Navy’s Hydrographic Office that there was no individual or institution possessed of the authority to convincingly gainsay it—even the Royal Naval Observatory in Greenwich, England had been known to defer to its American counterpart on questions of navigation. Knapp’s personal and official credentials and the thoroughness of his work made as great an impression on the Senator as had Arthur Rostron’s courage.

One of the most critical parts of Knapp’s testimony was his determination of the
Californian
’s actual position (Knapp, conscious of the legal proprieties, called it her “hypothetical” position), as opposed to the patently false position entered in the
Californian
’s log. “Patently false” is strong language, yet it’s the only appropriate description of the position Stanley Lord recorded in his log, for it was quite simply impossible for his ship to be where he said it was on the night of April 14–15, 1912. In the
Californian
’s log, her stated position when she stopped for the night at 10:20 p.m., April 14, 1912, was 42E5’N, 50E7’W. This would have put her 19 miles to the northeast of the position Boxhall had worked out for the
Titanic
, conveniently distant enough to support Lord’s contention that the
Titanic
was not visible from his ship. Even when the
Titanic
’s correct position is taken into consideration, the
Californian
would still have been nearly twenty miles away. But the
Californian
’s logged position, which was calculated by dead reckoning in much the same manner as Boxhall had worked out that of the
Titanic
, was based on a sun-sighting taken almost six hours earlier.

When Cyril Evans relayed an ice warning to the
Titanic
at 7:30 p.m., he gave her position as 42E3’N., 49E9’W. At this time the
Californian
was on a west-by-south course (S 89E W true), yet when the
Californian
stopped three hours later,
the position recorded in the log put her well to the north of where that course would have taken her
, and there is no indication that Captain Lord ever ordered a course change. Even had he done so, it would have been to the south—changing course to the north would only have carried the
Californian
into even heavier ice than what had compelled her to stop.

Just as important, the logged position of the
Californian
did not allow for the 1½-knot current from the north-northwest that caused the ship to drift to the south-southeast as she was steaming, a drift which continued after she stopped at the edge of the icefield, which would in any case have pushed her nearly nine miles to the south of her “estimated” position. Factoring that drift into the
Californian
’s position leaves her less than eleven miles from the
Titanic
, a position where the sinking White Star liner would have been clearly visible.

There is also a nagging doubt—and a very strong one—about the truth of
any
of the entries in the
Californian
’s log for April 14 and 15,1912. A ship’s master is ultimately responsible for the contents of his vessel’s log, and nothing is entered in it without his approval and permission. For this reason and to avoid errors in log entries, ships keep what is called a “scrap log.” This is a record kept during a watch of everything that occurs on board relating to the handling of the ship, including helm and engine orders, signal and navigational information, and status of the crew and stores. It also records sea conditions and the presence of ice when it occurs, along with any sightings of other vessels, and a record of any signals observed being sent from those ships.

It is a captain’s responsibility to review the contents of the scrap log daily and approve, amend, or correct the entries, after which they are entered into the ship’s formal log. The scrap log is kept as a backup, though, and rarely disposed of during a voyage. It was noted with consternation by both the U.S. Senate Inquiry and the British Board of Trade Investigation that the
Californian
’s scrap log for the night of April 14–15, 1912 had vanished, and that the formal log contained no references whatsoever to the ship seen by three of Lord’s officers, the rockets that ship fired, or Lord’s order to attempt to contact the ship by Morse lamp—glaring omissions under any circumstances. The missing sections of the scrap log and the absence of any entries for the night in question would never be adequately explained by Captain Lord at either inquest.

With the last witness heard on May 9, Senator Smith began sifting through the testimony and trying to arrive at some conclusion about who was responsible for the
Titanic
disaster. To his utter astonishment, he found that despite the lax and almost reckless way most of the transatlantic liners were run, under the existing laws no one—not IMM, nor the White Star Line, nor the
Titanic
’s officers and crew—could be found negligent in a legal sense, so the whole tragedy fell into the category of an “Act of God.” To William Alden Smith, it was unthinkable that 1,500 men, women, and children should lose their lives because of carelessness and bureaucratic inertia and no one could be called to account for it. Very well, then—it wouldn’t happen again.

When Senator Smith presented his report to the full Senate on May 18, 1912, the gallery was packed and every Senator was present to hear his summation. Smith gave one of the best speeches of his career, reasoned yet filled with emotion. He outlined the events leading up to the collision, retold the tale of the sinking liner, and described how the
Carpathia
had rushed at her own peril to come to the survivors’ rescue. Then he presented his conclusions.

As much as he admired the
Titanic
’s Captain Smith, the Senator could not hold him blameless. There had been no clear-cut procedure for handling wireless messages on the bridge, so that most of the warnings the
Titanic
had received on April 14 had gone unnoticed. Although Captain Smith was aware of some danger of ice ahead of his ship, he had no idea of the magnitude of the icefield stretching across the
Titanic
’s course, and so took only minimal precautions to avoid it. The general attitude of “get on or get out” that prevailed in the North Atlantic steamship lines created an atmosphere that caused ships’ masters to maintain high speeds in order to hold to their schedules in even the most dangerous conditions. That no serious accident or incident had yet happened caused a certain air of complacency to surround the navigational practices of the passenger liners. What Senator Smith discovered was that although Captain Smith had handled the
Titanic
no differently than he had every other ship under his command, and had followed the accepted practices on the North Atlantic, “standard operating procedure” had been a disaster waiting to happen.

The years of safe navigation had caused the captain to become complacent, Senator Smith said, just when he needed to be his most cautious. The
Titanic
had been going too fast, with inadequate precautions taken, when she entered the area where the ice was known to be waiting. While the Senator would not go very far in criticizing the man who had paid for his mistakes with his life, he hoped that the lesson was clear—accepted practice on the North Atlantic shipping lanes was no longer acceptable. Ships should be required to reduce speed and post extra lookouts when conditions became hazardous, and strict procedures for bringing wireless messages to the bridge and posting them properly once there would need to be implemented.

The question of lifeboats was dealt with summarily: there would be no more formulas or computations. The outdated Board of Trade regulations with its absurd methods of calculating and computing lifeboat requirements was hopelessly out of touch with the realities of shipping on the North Atlantic. The solution was painfully obvious, though no one had seen the necessity until now: ships would carry enough lifeboats to hold every passenger and crewman they were certified to carry.

Likewise, wireless couldn’t be treated as just another business anymore, for there were now too many lives at stake. The instantaneous communications capability that wireless bestowed on ships at sea now meant that it could no longer be treated as a mere toy for the amusement of a handful of passengers or ignored by officers who didn’t understand it. There would be a requirement for twenty-four-hour wireless watches to be maintained on all ships equipped with a wireless set. The need for a round-the-clock wireless watch had been driven home as no argument could have done by the public image of Cyril Evans sleeping peacefully in his bunk while the
Titanic
sank just a few miles away, simply because his captain was too lazy—or too cowardly—to wake him up.

For all his supposed ineptitude, Senator Smith had correctly divined the causes of the disaster and suggested intelligent measures to prevent a similar tragedy in the future. His recommendations, including one to create an international patrol of the North Atlantic areas commonly threatened by ice hazards, were seen on both sides of the Atlantic as clear-headed and reasonable. Even the British press was generally approving in tone, although a few papers, refusing to moderate their hostility, suggested that the recommendations had actually come from other members of the committee, implying that the investigation had been productive only in spite of Senator Smith.

Congress and the assembled gallery held its collective breath when Smith addressed the subject of Captain Lord and the
Californian
. There was no hesitation on the Senator’s part: after extensively reviewing all the testimony of Lord and Evans, of Assistant Engineer Gill, of the
Titanic
’s officers concerning the unknown ship they saw, and coupled with the expert findings of the U.S. Navy’s Hydrographers’ Office, Smith came to a devastating conclusion:

Smith soundly condemned Captain Lord for failing to come to the
Titanic
’s assistance “in accordance with the dictates of humanity, international usage, and the requirements of law,” and he called upon Great Britain to take action against the owners and master of the
Californian.
Then by way of emphasizing his point, he loudly praised Captain Rostron of the
Carpathia
for his heroism, eventually introducing a resolution to award Rostron a Congressional Gold Medal, which Congress passed by acclamation.