The Politics of Climate Change (14 page)
Read The Politics of Climate Change Online
Authors: Anthony Giddens
The introduction of the two pieces of legislation shows a determination to confront the twin problems of climate change and energy security; the bills received a high degree of cross-party support in their passage through Parliament. Although some climate change sceptics used the opportunity to air their views during the debates, it turned out that the main clauses in the Acts were strengthened rather than weakened.
In December 2008, the Climate Change Committee published its first report on how the country should go about reaching its emissions reductions targets. The report included recommendations covering the first three budgets defining the path to emissions reductions to be followed up to 2022. Wind, solar, tidal and nuclear power, together with carbon capture and storage of âclean coal', were the principal technologies listed as needing expansion. Home and office insulation together with increased vehicle efficiency also brooked large.
The Committee followed up with a further authoritative report in 2009.
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In tracing out pathways towards the country's long-term emissions reductions targets, the report argued that a âstep-change' was needed from current practices and policies. The recession made it easier to meet the next carbon reduction budget, but deep structural changes are needed. A pathway to âdeep decarbonization of the power sector' by 2030, the Committee concluded, was demanding but feasible.
Figure 4.1Â Â Per capita CO2 emissions for select major emitters, 2007 and 2030 (projected)
Source:
World Resources Institute:
http://www.wri.org/chart/capita-co2-emissions-select-major-emitters-2007-and-2030-projected
In May 2010 a coalition government of Conservatives and Liberal Democrats came to power. The new government retained, and vowed to further develop, the framework that its predecessor had left. The prime minister, David Cameron, promised to lead âthe greenest government ever'. Although the Liberal Democrats had been hostile to nuclear power, as part of the coalition they agreed to the building of new nuclear power stations, as long as they were not subsidized with public money. A new Energy Bill was introduced in 2011, with the objectives of increasing energy efficiency and promoting investment in low-carbon technologies. Other measures were promised, including placing a floor price on carbon.
On the face of things, the UK has the most robust framework for reducing carbon emissions in the world, supported by a cross-party consensus. Because the country has lessened its dependence on coal, it is in some ways in a more favourable position than, for instance, Germany. Yet as with every other country with ambitious aspirations to reduce emissions, the practical difficulties are formidable. As far as renewable energy is concerned, Britain at the moment lags far behind. Among the 27 EU countries, in such terms it is near the bottom of the league.
Looking at where the countries discussed above stand drives home how far there is to go in order to make significant progress towards major emissions reductions. The nations discussed are among the best performers in the world and even their progress is relatively limited. Germanwatch and Climate Action Network produce an annual ranking comparing 59 countries in terms of the effectiveness of their climate change policies. Sweden is top of the list, but the organizers of the ranking say that no country in the world is so far on a path compatible with keeping temperature rise below 2ºC. An interesting feature of the ranking is that Brazil was placed second, largely because of progress made in reducing deforestation. (For more on Brazil's climate change policies, see below, pp. 225â6.) The index of the 10 largest emitters of CO
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is alarming because some countries one might expect to take the lead rank very low down. The United States and Canada place very poorly, with the US in 53rd position and Canada last, at position 59.
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It is worth commenting at this point on climate change policy in the United States. The US may or may not be a fading power in global terms, but its importance in respect of climate change is enormous. With 4 per cent of the world's population, the United States consumes 25 per cent of global energy each year and generates over 20 per cent of the world's carbon emissions. Yet far from being in the forefront in seeking to reduce its emissions, it has been a laggard in climate change policy, especially at a federal level. Of course, the US is far larger and more diverse than those countries discussed earlier in the chapter, and on a regional and state level the picture is more complicated.
The Clinton administration played a part in negotiating the Kyoto agreements (see below, pp. 186â8). However, it was not possible to persuade Congress to ratify US participation. Carbon markets originated in the US, but neither the Clinton administration nor any subsequent one has managed to get a
national scheme endorsed â or any other significant climate change legislation.
In 2002 George W. Bush set the goal of reducing the greenhouse gas intensity of the country by 18 per cent over the period 2002â12. This policy amounted to a 4 per cent reduction in total emissions over a business-as-usual trend and was in line with the decarbonizing trend already present in the US economy. The Bush administration did introduce some tax incentives for renewables, nuclear power and CCS, as well as energy conservation; and in 2007 Bush signed an Act aimed at improving the fuel efficiency of cars. However, these measures were largely driven by energy security considerations, not by a concern with climate change.
Because of the unwillingness or inability of successive US presidents to enact significant climate change legislation, the most important domestic initiatives emanated from the Congress. John McCain and Joseph Lieberman championed a Climate Stewardship Act in 2003, which was defeated in the Senate. It was followed by the Lieberman-Warner Bill introduced in 2007. The initiative provoked a deep schism between the Democrats, who mostly supported the legislation, and the Republicans, who were solidly against. It was also defeated.
When he was elected in 2008, President Obama spoke forcefully of the need for far-reaching climate change legislation, both on a national and international level. He supported the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (also known as the Waxman-Markey Bill, after its authors, Henry Waxman and Edward Markey). The bill set out a cap and trade system (see below, pp. 198â202) and would have introduced subsidies for nuclear power, CCS and other technologies. It was criticized by many environmentalists for not being radical enough; and by the political right on the grounds that it would be expensive and would cost the US economy jobs.
The bill was passed by the House of Representatives with a measure of cross-party support, but was abandoned in the Senate. In November 2010, in the congressional elections, the Democrats lost control of the House and with it any chance of getting climate change legislation enacted at a federal level for the time being.
In his State of the Union Address of January 2011, President Obama gave considerable space to clean energy. The US, he asserted, needs to invest in research and development in low-carbon technologies on a level not seen since the space race. He envisaged âclean energy breakthroughs', âthat will translate into clean energy jobs'.
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In so doing, he appealed for a renewal of bipartisan support, on the grounds that the drive for clean energy could renew the American sense of purpose. He also spoke of asking Congress to âeliminate the billions in taxpayer dollars we currently give to oil companies'. However, in his speech he did not once mention global warming, let alone a policy package that would help to contain it.
At present, the US, the country with the greatest responsibility to develop a far-reaching climate change policy, has done nothing at all on a national level. It is almost alone among industrial states in this respect. How can this be? There would seem to be three reasons. First, the separation of powers in the American constitution, which requires the President to negotiate with Congress on almost all matters of domestic policy. Second, the ability of well-funded lobbies to have an enormous influence upon individual members of Congress. Running for office normally means spending large amounts of money, which quite often places candidates in the hands of corporations or well-funded interest groups. The fossil fuel and other extractive industries are highly organized, with access to influence through their support of congressmen and women.
Third, and partly as a consequence of the first and second points, is the fact that climate change has become so polarized politically. President Obama concentrated his energies on getting his Health Care Reform Bill through Congress. Although successful, the process increased the gulf between Democrats and Republicans. The Republican right views anything to do with expanding the powers of government with suspicion. Healthcare, intervention in the economy and efforts to combat climate change: all fall into that category as far as many Republican leaders and voters are concerned.
In no other country is opinion about climate change so acutely divided as in the US today. A poll taken by the Pew
Foundation late in 2010 showed that only 16 per cent of Republican voters agreed that climate change is real, caused by human activity and dangerous, compared to over 50 per cent of Democratic voters.
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(See below,
figure 5.1
, p. 106.)
In some regions, states and cities in the US, the situation contrasts quite dramatically with that on the federal level â although the large majority of initiatives have been led by Democrat-dominated state or local leaderships. A recent study looked at climate action plans developed in 16 different states, and extrapolated the findings to the national level.
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If the actions in question were implemented in all US states, American carbon emissions would fall to 27 per cent below 1990 levels by 2020. Of course, as things stand it is extremely unlikely that such an extrapolation could become a reality.
At the time of writing, yet another cap and trade bill is before the Congress, initiated by John Kerry and Joe Lieberman. The driving force of the initiative is once again primarily clean energy. The terms of the bill are quite modest â far short of what would be needed seriously to reverse the high level of emissions per person displayed by the US.
Some points of general interest emerge from the material discussed in this chapter:
to move much more quickly. The reasons are that there is past experience to draw upon, for example, in introducing relevant tax breaks; and that the technologies involved have advanced.
2Â Â The leftâright dimension can significantly affect the continuity of energy and climate change policies. Thus far, effective policies have mostly been driven by left-of-centre regimes. The Scandinavian countries, for example, are in a prime position largely because they have had long periods of left-of-centre government. Germany provides a better model for the future, since there has been something of a consensus among the parties about environmental measures. The same is true of the UK. The case of the United States shows how paralysing it can be for climate change policy when the issue becomes seriously politically polarized.
3Â Â Carbon taxes do work â although, as I shall discuss at a later point, they are rarely straightforward to implement. Putting a price on carbon is an essential component of climate change policy. Carbon taxes have the great advantage over other strategies in that they are universal and binding, although ways have to be found to reconcile them with issues of social justice, since the poor are very often the hardest hit. It is essential for the state to subsidize renewable technologies if they are to make an impact, and revenue from carbon taxes can be used to achieve this. One reason is the need to preserve a stable basis for investment, even as oil and other fossil fuel prices fluctuate. Subsidies can also be used to provide positive motivation for the take-up of possibilities on offer. The feed-in tariffs made available in Germany and in some other countries provide a model which can and should be copied elsewhere.
4Â Â As far as limiting their emissions are concerned, most countries, even the leading ones, remain heavily contradictory. Germany is a case in point, with its continued strong reliance upon coal. Climate change policy has to be holistic. Policies that are potentially valuable may have little impact if pursued in isolation. Examples are investment in clean (low-carbon) technology, the pursuit of energy efficiency and the quest for greater energy security. Each can contribute greatly to reducing carbon emissions.
Each can be part of the âpositives' that help secure business and public support for policies that reduce emissions. Yet if taken in isolation they will not necessarily reduce emissions within a given national economy or wider economic sector. It is entirely possible to have a society, as the example of Spain and Portugal shows, in which there is quite a high proportion of renewables in the energy mix, but where carbon emissions continue to climb, perhaps even steeply.