The Super Summary of World History (81 page)

On August 28, 1943, and October 14, 1943, the USAAF staged daylight attacks on the
Schweinfurt
ball bearing plants. Allied analysis of the Nazi war machine had shown these ball bearing plants were critical. An all-out effort might destroy the Achilles heel of Nazi industrial power. However, the ball bearing plants were deep within the Reich, and the raids were disasters.

“In
the
famous
and
much-discussed
second
attack
on
October
14,
1943,
when
the
plants
were
again
severely
damaged,
one
of
the
decisive
air
battles
of
the
war
took
place.
The
228
bombers
participating
were
strongly
attacked
by
German
fighters
when
beyond
the
range
of
their
fighter
escort.
Losses
to
fighters
and
to
flak
cost
the
United
States
forces
62
planes
with
another
138
damaged
in
varying
degree,
some
beyond
repair.
Repeated
losses
of
this
magnitude
could
not
be
sustained;
deep
penetrations
without
escort,
of
which
this
was
among
the
earliest,
were
suspended;
and
attacks
on
Schweinfurt
were
not
renewed
for
four
months.”
(US
Strategic
Bombing
Survey)

This report is an understatement. German radar detected the attack’s approach, and the course taken by the bombers allowed the Germans to deduce the target. Additional fighters quickly arrived at key airfields along the route to intercept the B-17s both on their way to Schweinfurt and back. The raiders were butchered. Until long-range escorts could be developed, deep raids into Germany were cancelled. By December of 1943, the P-51 Mustang was reaching the end of its development and started becoming part of the Eighth Army Air Force.
[318]
In a few months, they would arrive in sufficient numbers to influence the air battles in early 1944.

The British were not deterred. Bomber Harris planned a prodigious series of night raids on Berlin to win the war outright through bombing the Nazi capital. Germany had been working on deterrent measures and put together both an improved radar system and a night interceptor network before the powerful British operation was underway. When the raids began on Berlin the British bomber force suffered high losses, and the losses increased as the size of the raids increased. During the three and one-half month battle of Berlin, the RAF lost over 1,000 bombers. Finally, even Harris had to admit the losses were too high, and the Berlin bomber offensive finally came to a halt.

As the escorts began to make their numbers felt, the long-range daylight raids could begin once more. A new general was at the head of the Eighth USAAF,
General
Doolittle
, the same man who had led the daring raid on Tokyo, Japan, in 1942. General Doolittle saw at once that the use of US Air power was wrong. He changed the emphasis from attacking almost any German production facilities to attacking the German air force and its production facilities. General Doolittle sent the bombers up as bait to lure the German fighters into unequal contests with newer American and British fighters. The general also turned the Mustangs loose, in that he allowed some flights to fly apart from the bombers rather than close in to protect the larger aircraft. As a result, American and British pilots began to kill German aircraft at their airfields before they had even taken off. The resulting American air offensive against the German air force was a total success. Due largely to the genius of Doolittle, by June of 1944, the Luftwaffe was no longer a decisive factor in the war (recall this was the second objective of the Casablanca Conference).

After the defeat of the Luftwaffe, Allied bombers and fighters roamed the German skies at will, bombing and strafing everything. Doolittle had applied the precepts of the famous writer
Clausewitz
and his masterwork book
On
War
. By defeating the enemy’s army in the field first, the Luftwaffe being Germany’s air army, so to speak, afterward he could do whatever he wanted. He wanted to bomb and machine gun Germany into submission, and his pilots did their best to accomplish the objective. In the end, Germany did not fall because of the Allied air offensive. The German air force was destroyed, and that gave the Allies tactical air control over the battlefield—which made an enormous difference in the outcome of numerous battles. At the Battle of the Bulge, for example, Allied air power played a significant role in turning the tide against the German offensive. And without total control of the air, D-Day’s amphibious assault may have been impossible.

When studying modern wars, think about how many battles were won when the winner on the ground controlled the air. It is quickly seen that the side ruling the sky has an enormous edge. If one cannot rule the skies, the airspace must at least be contested; otherwise the combatant controlling the air wins the ground battle.
[319]

The problem with the bomber offensive was that the cost may not have justified the benefit gained. Of course, when people are saying the bomber will win the war there is a tendency to wonder if what was promised was delivered. In fact, it was not. The war in Europe was not won by air power. Troops still had to land and beat up the German Army to achieve victory. Air power severely damaged Germany’s ability to wage war, but the ground pounders won the war one step at a time just as they have done since Sargon conquered Ur in 2371 BC.

The United States Strategic Bombing Survey tried to assess the impact of the huge, and extremely expensive, bombing effort. In essence, the survey concluded that the air war failed to deliver on its war-winning promises. Yes, it had contributed, but so had the ships and all the rest of the combat arms support units. The USAAF and the Royal Air Force always considered themselves special, because they would do more to beat Germany than other Allied units. They were wrong. The fellow face down in the mud with bullets flying over his head was the ultimate key to victory. He always has been.

The result: the air war was important, but not of supreme importance. After the war, the major air forces of the world perked up because of the
atomic
bomb
. Now they possessed a war-winning weapon, and air power was king. At least for a while. No doubt the bomb could destroy armies as well as civilization, but who would use it? In small wars, such as Korea (only a million or more killed there—very “small”), the Communist guessed the United States would not deploy the weapon, and they were correct. American scruples tied its hands and gave the communists an edge. The USSR stole the bomb quickly and cheaply through effective spying, and two (and later three, and then four, and so on) nations aimed nuclear warheads at one another. Meanwhile, wars continue to start, and many almost never end (Vietnam, etc.). What good was the bomb?

The air force never wanted to be “flying artillery,” but that was why they were originally attached to the army. Reconnaissance and close air support WERE the missions of importance in the First World War, and it turned out they may have been the most important in the Second World War. Germany’s entire air force was constructed around the tasks of reconnaissance and close air support.
[320]
Allied air forces wanted to be more. Because of theories put forth after the First World War by many air theorists, such as Italian General
Giulio
Douhet
[321]
and Sir Hugh Trenchard of England, aviators thought by bombing civilians the enemy nations would cave in. They thought the bomber would always get through. However, radar and other modern inventions soon showed the bomber would be detected and shot down unless it got some help. Moreover, bombing did not cause civilian populations to demand peace. And why anyone thought a totalitarian nation would listen to its people is another unanswered question.

Some have concluded that indiscriminate bombing, as well as using the atomic bomb, was a war crime. This is based on the idea that killing civilians is illegal and immoral; however, ever since Sherman’s “March to the Sea” civilians have been fair game in modern war. The civilians support the war, manufacture the machines of war, produce the food that keeps the army in the field, and provides the soldiers necessary to fight the war. Destroy the workers and the nation’s ability to fight dissolves. Thus,
there
are
no
civilians
in
modern
war
. The Islamic terrorists know this, but many in the civilian world are loathe to admit this reality of our modern world.

Even with one thousand plane raids on Germany and around-the-clock bombing, air power did not work its predicted magic. It did kill many people and spread the misery of war far and wide. Now everyone suffered. Children and their mothers died right along with the soldiers. What a charming world we had invented.

The
Eastern
Front—After
Stalingrad

The
war
in
Europe
was
won
for
the
Allies
on
the
Eastern
Front
.
The Soviets knew about the German offensive in the Ardennes through their excellent spy network in Nazi Germany (and everywhere else). Typical of the Soviets, they did not alert the Allies about the planned attack. Instead, they gathered their forces for another push at Hitler after his reserves were committed in the West. As the war in the East progressed, Soviet attacks were launched over a wide front with great effectiveness.
[322]
The ability to achieve deep armored penetration and encirclement destroyed German Army Group Center in Operation Bagration
[323]
and constituted the final extinction of any German hope of shielding the homeland from the rapacious swarms rushing from the east. Germany was unable to supply its troops with enough of anything, and the harsh Russian winters continued taking their toll. The basic Soviet attack consisted of enormous numbers of troops and tanks, supported by large numbers of aircraft and artillery, falling upon German positions in all-out attacks of the most violent nature. The USSR had complete control of the air. With new aircraft types produced in enormous numbers, the Luftwaffe was simply being swept aside. Stalin’s orders included shooting commanders who failed, so Soviet commanders drove their troops inexorably forward while ignoring losses. Hitler’s orders hindered the German commanders and prevented proper troop dispositions with the net result of defeat after defeat for the Nazis.

Spies were everywhere in the Nazi regime, and they were working for the Soviets. As a result, Stalin knew Hitler’s every plan. Before the battle of
Kursk
on July 4 through 20, 1943, the last German offensive in the east, the Soviets knew about the attack through their Lucy Spy Ring, and constructed numerous and deep defensive lines in front of the German assault positions. The USSR assembled 1,300,000 men; 3,600 tanks; 20,000 artillery pieces; 2,400 aircraft; laid over 1 million mines; and had 23 antitank guns
per
kilometer
in the Kursk salient. The Soviets even knew the time of the German attack, and opened an artillery barrage on German positions just prior to the German assault. At Kursk, the Wehrmacht threw nearly fifty German divisions into the strike, but it was a tragedy for the German Army. The Soviets possessed so many men and tanks that losing twice as many as the Germans meant nothing.
[324]
After the attack was underway, the Soviets hit the German flanks and drove through them to endanger the starting positions of the Nazi attack, causing Hitler to break off the offensive. Germany’s losses were high, and they were losses the Reich could ill afford—in men or equipment.