The Super Summary of World History (76 page)

Tarawa

We will use Tarawa as an example of Pacific island assaults. For adequate reconnaissance of the Marshall Islands, the next target, Tarawa’s airfield was necessary. Weeks before the US Marines landed on Tarawa long-range B-24 Liberator bombers cratered the island and its runways. This bombing effectively ended air threats to the US Navy.

The Japanese possessed a critical terrain advantage—
a
coral
reef
surrounded the island about eight hundred yards from the beach that could stop the Higgins
[296]
boats. To overcome this defensive advantage the marines decided to employ tracked landing vehicles (LVT-1:
L
anding
V
ehicle
T
racked), which could climb over the reef and continue to the shore. The marines discovered one hundred new LVT-2s in San Diego that were larger, faster, and carried a heaver payload than the LVT-1s. An all-out effort was undertaken to get these boats to Tarawa before the landing. They made it in the early morning hours on the day of the invasion. One hundred twenty-five LVTs assaulted Tarawa of which ninety were lost (72% casualty rate), but without them the invasion would have failed.

The Japanese planned a fleet counterattack (
Hei
Operation 3) once they determined the US Navy’s next objective, but the Japanese high command was guessing where the blow would fall. They failed to envision the United States mounting two simultaneous offensives, one already underway in the South Pacific, and another through the Central Pacific. To prepare for the expected offensive, Admiral Koga, Japan’s chief of naval operations since Yamamoto’s death, concluded the Central Pacific activity was a feint, and moved 173 carrier aircraft and several cruisers to Rabaul in the South Pacific. On November 5 and 11, US Carriers launched two large raids on Rabaul, shooting down about
100
Japanese
aircraft
and damaging several cruisers. The loss of so many carrier pilots ended all counterattack plans. At the time, no American knew the impact of these raids, but they were critical to the success of the Gilbert’s (Tarawa) operation.

Figure 65 Betio (Tarawa) Map

A surfeit of errors plagued the Tarawa assault. Some of the important failings were: the naval command ships were too far away and unable to receive needed information or see the action; the fleet’s big guns were fired at a low angle and failed to demolish enemy pill boxes or bunkers which required plunging fire to destroy; marine radios were not waterproof causing nearly all to fail; and there was
insufficient
firepower
at
the
squad
level
(flamethrowers and machine guns). A lot more went wrong, but this list is a sample of the problems.

The first two waves in Amtracs got ashore with acceptable losses; however, the low tide stopped the Higgins boats at the reef. The marines who were stuck at the reef had to either wait there under scalding enemy fire for an Amtrac to take them in, or attempt to wade ashore in chest deep water while receiving fearsome enemy fire. The Japanese 75mm dual-gun anti-boat cannons, along with the heavy 13mm machine guns, fired accurately and with devastating effects on the LVTs and the Higgins boats. Marine unit cohesion disappeared as men struggled ashore separated from their squads or companies without officers, radios, heavy weapons, or the ability to communicate with other units. Small packets of men under continuous fire huddled against a log seawall that was sticking up along the landing beaches a few feet from the ocean. LVTs burned all along the beach, splintered Higgins boats wallowed at the reef, and Japanese gunners scythed men down trying to wade ashore from the reef.

All
the
planning
had
gone
wrong
. The Japanese survived the naval and air bombardment; their guns were intact and firing accurately; hundreds of Japanese machine guns and cannons hammered at the marines; and the command structure ashore was disorganized. The commanders offshore lacked information. There was little or no communication even among the men who had reached the island, so assaults were uncoordinated. The Japanese suffered as well since the naval bombardment cut their communications, destroyed several key emplacements, and stunned the defenders; nevertheless, they successfully rallied and were directing enormous volumes of heavy and accurate fire onto the landing forces. The US Marines were in big trouble. The plans were useless now. In war, plans often fall apart leaving the troops alone to gain victory by their sacrifice
.
The marines on Tarawa, as individuals, determined to press forward into hell itself in search of triumph.

Slowly, with gallantry and fearlessness beyond comprehension, the US Marines inched forward. Marines by the hundreds died trying to reach that beach, but the United States Marine Corps kept coming. Once at the seawall, surviving men found enemy fire raining down, death everywhere, blinding smoke, confusion, and a lack of control. A couple of privates were all that remained of platoons. Corporals were in charge of the remains of companies. None of this mattered; the US Marines continued exchanging blows with the enemy. Tiny groups of men facing a torrent of enemy fire were scaling the sea wall and fighting inland. At Green Beach, the single remaining Sherman tank, name Colorado in marine scrawl, moved forward clearing a path for men to move inland. As the day wore on a recipe for catastrophe was cooking up. Disjointed units pinned on the beach without sufficient cover, stripped of heavy weapons, without communications between themselves or their ships, and lacking supporting fire, were facing their doom if the enemy counterattacked.

Then, a miracle. Before the first day was over, a group of Japanese standing atop a bunker was vaporized by naval gunfire. That group included the commander of the island, Rear Admiral Shibasaki and his staff. The Japanese were now without their top officers. This event was critical to the outcome of the battle.

As night descended the disorganized marines prepared for a counterattack aimed at driving them into the nauseating blood stained sea only a boot’s length away in places. Over one thousand Japanese and several tanks were available for the counterattack. A determined Japanese effort that first night, supported by tanks, could have destroyed the marines. The attack never came. Killing the Japanese commanders prevented the order from being given and probably saved the invasion. Over the next two days the marines completed the bloody capture of the island, enduring a well-planned counterattack during the night of the second day. When it was over,
997
marines
and
30
navy
corpsmen
died
taking
the
island,
and
4,183
Japanese
died
in
its
defense
. On this tiny rock in the vast Pacific, over five thousand men died battling for an airstrip.

This was a foretaste of the storm battles to come as the United States crossed the Central Pacific. Studies by the US Navy concerning errors at Tarawa changed future operations, lowering casualties in upcoming battles; yet, the cost was persistently high as each island invasion relentlessly devoured lives. Stunned by the swiftness of the American victory at Tarawa, the Japanese high command failed to effectively respond. By island hopping and a coordinated dual advance across the Pacific the United States kept the Japanese high command wondering where to commit their resources; and the Imperial Navy often guessed wrong. The Japanese expanded their defense zone too far, and being overstretched damaged their ability to respond to US initiatives.

After the seizure of the Gilbert Islands the United States used the bases to reconnoiter the islands in the Marshalls.
Kwajalein
was the next target of the Central Pacific campaign. Prior to the fleet move to the
Marshalls,
US Army, Air Force, and Navy carrier aircraft swept the islands free of Japanese air power, destroying 92 of 110 Japanese aircraft in the area. Using new firing methods, including plunging fire from battleships, the US Navy bombardment devastated Kwajalein. After Kwajalein, the Japanese abandoned the doctrine of a shoreline defense and opted for in-depth defenses in future battles.

Figure 66 Marines at Tarawa

Marianas and New Guinea

In May of 1944 the United States attacked the
Marianas
which included the islands of
Saipan,
Guam,
and
Tinian
. These were large islands with tough in-depth defenses, but the speed of the US advance precluded the proper and complete preparation Japan desired. At Saipan, fighting through difficult landings and rugged terrain, the US Army and Marine Corps pushed Saipan’s desperate defenders back. The Saipan struggle ended with a Bonsai attack by 3,000 Japanese troops that initially overwhelmed American lines and resulted in 650 US Marine dead. The fatal charge ended Japanese resistance on the island by July 9, 1944. On Guam, the Japanese chose to assault US lines repeatedly, thereby destroying their units. Japanese Imperial forces finally retreated into the jungle interior to continue their resistance. After intense jungle fighting, Guam was secured by August 8, 1944.

As US amphibious forces fought for the Central Pacific, Australian and US Army troops were conquering
New
Guinea
. Using code decrypts, MacArthur avoided Japanese strong points and landed in areas where US forces could set up a defense and cut off the isolated Japanese units. The campaign in New Guinea went on from 1942 through 1945, much of it fought by Australian troops under the worst possible conditions. The fighting was intense, bloody, and merciless. Japanese forces fought determined battles even when outnumbered and in poor tactical positions. General MacArthur never gave the tough Australians their due, mainly because he would not get all the credit for their accomplishments. Nonetheless, they were vital to Allied victory in the Pacific.

Figure 67 New Guinea & Rabaul Offensives

Storming the well-defended Central Pacific islands was costly for the marines and the army, but the advance was swift. The navy-marine-army team moved from Tarawa to Saipan in the Marianas in about
eight
months
against stiff enemy opposition. In just a few months, between November of 1943 and July of 1944, Japan lost vast amounts of its empire, and the Philippines were now ripe for invasion. The losses of Guam, Tinian, and Saipan in the Marianas were demoralizing blows to the Japanese empire. Admiral Nagumo
[297]
was in charge of Saipan’s defense. After the US Marines gained the shore he radioed Tokyo, saying, “
Hell
is
upon
us,
” and he did not mean his troops on Saipan. Nagumo knew that
B-29
aircraft would start bombing the home islands as soon as airfields were constructed in the Marianas. And the American Seabees worked fast.