The Super Summary of World History (72 page)

Many historians consider the Battle of Midway as the turning point of the Pacific War, and one of the most important naval battles of all time. It is a complex battle where decisions by Nagumo (same admiral who led the Pearl Harbor attack), and persistent bad luck doomed all four fleet carriers of the Japanese strike force. Instead of ambushing the Americans and sinking their carrier fleet, the opposite occurred. For the US Navy and its three available carriers the Battle of Midway was an immense gamble. Battle damage to the
USS
Yorktown
at the Battle of the Coral Sea, and six month repair estimates, only added to the risk. Nimitz ordered the repairs done in
three
days
. American construction crews accomplished this marvel, and the
Yorktown
was off to the battle.
[270]

We cannot go into all the details of the battle here, but the results were four Japanese fleet carriers burned and sunk, and one American fleet carrier (the damaged Yorktown) was lost to Japanese submarine action after being badly damaged by air attacks
.
Japanese personnel losses were high as well (over 2,000), and all of those lost were highly trained and experienced flight crew members. Some blame Admiral Nagumo for the loss, complaining he lacked aggressiveness; nevertheless, the planners were actually responsible for the loss, because they cut the striking power of the Japanese carrier fleet by one-half in side show actions at the Coral Sea and the Aleutian Islands. Better luck would have helped the Japanese. One of their critical search planes launched behind schedule and spotted the US fleet much too late. In carrier battles, the first carrier to spot the other fleet and launch its aircraft has an immense advantage. The Japanese search pattern was not as concentrated as it could have been because the Japanese were operating on the assumption the US Navy would be absent.
[271]
In the matter of searching for the other fleet the Americans enjoyed a large edge in its very-long-range Catalina seaplanes operating out of Midway, and American intelligence reports predicting the enemy fleet’s approach headings.

American luck, determination, and bravery played a large role in the battle. Commander Wade McClusky Jr, leader of a flight of
USS
Enterprise
Dauntless dive bombers (SBD) running low on fuel, spotted a lone Japanese destroyer traveling at high speed and changed course to mimic the destroyer’s heading.
[272]
He found the Japanese carrier fleet and, unplanned, arrived over the enemy carriers concurrently with a flight of
Yorktown’s
SBDs led by Commander Maxwell Leslie.
[273]
Both attacked simultaneously without coordinating the attack. Japanese air cover was missing in action. The Zero fighters were landing to refuel after annihilating two flights of outdated American torpedo planes. Up until this moment in the battle numerous American attacks had scored no hits while suffering large losses.

During this instant America’s only good weapon, the Dauntless dive-bomber, appeared above the Japanese carriers. Three Japanese fleet carriers became sinking infernos, helped along to their doom by their ordinance crews leaving bombs and torpedoes improperly stowed, adding to the damage when they detonated.
[274]
The remaining Japanese carrier, the
Hiryu
, struck back heavily damaging
Yorktown,
but
Hiryu
was sunk in turn by Dauntless strikes from the USS
Enterprise
.
[275]
The damaged Yorktown was later sunk by a Japanese submarine.

Losing four first class carriers and their crews was a massive blow to the Japanese navy.

In several books on the battle, the titles sum up most people’s views on the action:
Miracle
at
Midway
, by Gordon Prange, and
Incredible
Victory,
by W. Lord. Nimitz risked it all and won. After Midway, Yamamoto realized it was necessary to go over to the defensive and await the US Navy’s assault on the Empire’s vast new perimeter.

The South Pacific and Indochina

As all this transpired, the Japanese army was trying to conquer the rest of Indochina and New Guinea. The Japanese army and navy were also pushing south down the Solomon island chain toward Fiji and New Caledonia to establish air bases and make supplying Australia problematical for the Americans.

Since Japan was having trouble conquering China they decided to isolate the country by cutting off all outside help. To this end, they captured all of China’s major coastal harbors and towns by 1940. Japan attacked and gained control of Burma, cutting the
Burma
Road
that was bringing supplies to the Nationalist Chinese. The United States flew supplies over the Himalayan mountains to China month after month in an effort to keep China in the war.
Keeping
China
fighting
and tying down Japanese resources there was a major US war aim.

In Burma, the Japanese administered a resounding defeat upon the English. Now the Japanese controlled all of Indochina and its vital natural resources. Burma was lost because of superior Japanese jungle fighting methods, Japan’s complete control of the air, superior numbers where it counted, and the toughness of the Japanese soldiers.
[276]
Japan was now on the border of India, but with long supply lines. Many feared Japan would go forward and conquer at least part of India; however, Japan’s resources were stretched to the limit. In fact, she had overextended herself dramatically. This error would compound other Japanese mistakes, thus making the defense of her newly won empire much harder.

In New Guinea, the Japanese again proved their robust nature. Since the invasion convoy bound for Port Moresby turned back after the Battle of the Coral Sea, the Japanese decided to assault the port by crossing the Owen Stanly Mountains dominating the center of the island. The Allies, as usual, thought this mountain range was impassable because of height (over 6,000 feet high), extremely rugged terrain, and the uniquely hostile jungle. The Japanese thought otherwise, and attacked over the
Kokoda
Track
in July of 1942. The Australians fought all the way but fell back just the same. The Australians and Americans dug in just outside of Port Moresby, determined to make a last stand.
[277]
In January 1943, thirty two miles from Port Moresby, the Japanese force received orders to turn back because of events on Guadalcanal. Reluctantly, the Japanese began their retreat. Nonetheless, the accomplishment of crossing the Owen Stanly range against stiff Australian resistance was a remarkable military accomplishment. The retreat also showed the psychological effects of war, as the same Japanese soldiers who went forward eating grass while shrugging off disease and the effects of battle while they were winning, lay down and died after they started losing. Victory gives men hope and purpose while defeat saps them of life itself.

Port Moresby remained under Allied control. Later, after a fierce set of battles on the border between India and Burma, the British forces successfully blocked the threat to India. In the Solomon Islands the Japanese were still advancing south down the island chain, building airbases as they went and putting garrisons on each island. The code breakers found clues the Japanese were building an airbase on the island of
Guadalcanal.
Another chapter in the Pacific War was about to open.

Guadalcanal

August
7,
1942
to
February
9,
1943

This was the campaign
(note:
not
a
battle,
a
campaign
or
series
of
battles)
that broke the back of Japan’s offensive power
.
[278]
Midway certainly took the initiative away from the Japanese Empire, but Guadalcanal damaged their military nearly beyond repair. The Japanese losses in merchant shipping during the campaign were high, and this was one of the weakest areas of Japanese war preparation and production. Japanese and American losses in the campaign were steep. The difference was the Japanese faced a much harder task making up their losses in men (especially aircrew) and materials.

Ground
Losses
:

US—1,768 dead

Japan—25,600 plus another 9,000 dead of disease (estimates)

Naval
Personnel
Losses
:

US and Allies—4,911

Japan—3,543

Ship
Losses
:

Allied—29 (does not include merchant shipping)

Japanese—38 (does not include merchant shipping)

Aircrew
Losses
:

US—420

Japan—1,200 (estimates)

Aircraft
Losses
:

US—615

Japan—880 (estimates)

The campaign for Guadalcanal centered on Henderson Field and air control. The US Marines landed on the island of Guadalcanal
August
7,
1942
at the behest of
Admiral
King
, the US Chief of Naval Operations. Admiral King realized a Japanese airfield at Guadalcanal was a threat to Australian supply lines; conversely, the US lacked the resources for such an early offensive move. Accepting the risk of defeat, King ordered a US Marine assault. (Like all leaders, he accepted the risk of getting a lot of other people killed) After an unopposed landing the marines successfully captured the nearly completed Japanese airfield. Completion of the airfield by the troops and engineers was urgent because Japan was moving swiftly to annihilate the US effort.

On the night of 8 August 1942, the US Navy and its Allies suffered a signal defeat at the hands of a Japanese cruiser force commanded by Vice-Admiral Mikawa off
Savo
Island
. The Japanese skillfully avoided two Allied picket destroyers, completely surprising several Allied cruisers. Four Allied cruisers were sunk (one Australian, three American), plus one cruiser and two destroyers were damaged. 1,270 Allied sailors died, and 790 wounded.
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The Japanese suffered light damage on three of its cruisers and about fifty killed. The Japanese force was set to destroy the still loaded transports and the supplies stacked high on the beach when, mysteriously, Vice Admiral Mikawa withdrew as he was on the verge of total victory. Why he failed to bombard the unprotected transports is a hard question. Admiral Mikawa stated aircraft could attack his ships at first light unless he got out of flight range. The decision was a tide-turning event. If he sank the supply transports and bombarded the supply stacked beaches a swift withdrawal would have been the only choice for the Americans. To protect seven cruisers Vice-Admiral Mikawa sacrificed an early and decisive win at Guadalcanal.

Some people reading about naval warfare erroneously think warships are the key to victory. The king of the seas is the transport—the lowly supply ship—that trundles along without glory or much of anything else. The carrier may be the queen of the seas and all the other warships the royal entourage; however,
they
all
exist
to
get
the
cargo
ship
to
its
destination
quickly and safely. That is why the Germans knew they could win the war with England if they could sink enough transports. All the battleships, cruisers, destroyers, and carriers in the English naval inventory would mean nothing if the transports were sunk. Who can eat a battleship? Do the soldiers, no matter how brave and resourceful, stand a chance without bullets? As Japan found out on Guadalcanal, troops who are starving to the point of death seldom attack enemy positions acceptably.

Recall that the US code breakers were unable to read Japan’s codes for months because of cipher changes after Midway; however, the United States did have a unique source of intelligence during the Solomon campaign, the
Australian
Coast
Watchers
. Hiding in the jungle with radios they transmitted vital information to the Americans on Guadalcanal. To illustrate; if US Marine pilots knew early enough Japanese air attacks were on the way they could scramble their Wildcat fighters and climb above the incoming raiders, then dive down on them as they approached the island. This tactic inflicted additional Japanese losses because the Wildcat performed best in a dive. Failure to warn the Wildcats soon enough would mean much higher US losses. Without the Coast Watchers every Japanese raid would be a near surprise.

The numbers of naval and air assets favored Japan at the start. Because of the threat of continued Japanese assaults on the transports, Admiral Turner, in overall charge of the Guadalcanal operation, decided to withdraw the navy along with the precious transports that were still partially loaded. His decision left the marines in the lurch without sufficient supplies, ammunition, or equipment. For months the US Navy opted for small convoys delivering just enough ammunition and food to Guadalcanal for the troops and airmen to carry on.
[280]
Somehow, with a minimum of supplies and support, the US Marines and US Army held on halting several Japanese assaults on Henderson Field’s perimeter. If Japan’s troops broke through and took the airfield it would be over for the invaders. Henderson Field was the key to the campaign.