The Super Summary of World History (67 page)

Barbarossa

Hitler invades the USSR on the same month and day Napoleon invaded Russia,
June
22,
1812. This time it was 1941. The result was the same; the destruction of the invading army and its delusional leader, but how it came about was much different. The scale of conflict in the USSR was so immense that anything coming before it, or after, simply fades away in comparison. Millions of men were fighting across thousands of miles of terrain with every device of war available to them. Innumerable numbers of men, aircraft, tanks, trucks, horses, wagons, artillery, and a profusion of other equipment pushed the campaigns forward. Moreover, this war was personal. Hitler and Stalin despised one another and the governmental systems each man controlled. Murder and torture were commonplace. This was industrialized war set to the tune of uncompromising ideologies. Chaos was upon the world, and chaos had a name—
Operation
Barbarossa.

Hitler doomed his armies before his invasion was underway. Dread gripped the German generals upon Hitler’s announcement that an invasion of the USSR was set for launch in April or May of 1941. Britain remained unconquered, their navy and nation still intact, and her forces were trying to capture North Africa. How could Hitler even contemplate such a move since it would result in a two-front war?
[245]
Ever since Chancellor Bismarck’s time, Germany knew it was trapped between the power of Russia in the east, and France and England in the west. Because Germany was a central European land power, the generals understood war with the USSR and England would force expenditures of men and materials on two fronts simultaneously, thereby fatally diluting Germany’s combat power.

Orders being what they are, the German general staff dutifully drew up plans for the invasion and used war games to study them.
[246]
The plans were revised until they satisfied the general staff. In these initial plans, the German staff officers made
Moscow
the principal objective of the invasion. Taking Moscow would disrupt Russian command and control systems, because Moscow was the transportation and communication hub of the nation, and taking Moscow would make troop movements from one battlefield to another difficult.

The original OKH (German army headquarters) plans called for a drive on Moscow with large forces. Plan 1 used army group center to push to Moscow with smaller but ample forces moving to take Leningrad. In OKH plan 2, the drive to Leningrad employed fewer units, and the campaign for Moscow was even larger. Adolf Hitler dismissed both plans and
made
up
his
own
plan
—which was not war gamed or deeply scrutinized by knowledgeable military men. The Fuehrer’s plan targeted Leningrad by removing large numbers of troops from the critical Moscow drive; thus, vital disconnects began between Hitler and his Wehrmacht army headquarters over the grand strategy. By the way, Hitler’s planning headquarters was OKW. Yep, there were two planning organizations, and Hitler disliked OKH because they had the temerity to argue with him.

Hitler made these demands late in time
,
and the generals could not dissuade him from this unstudied course of action. Why he demanded these changes is unknown, but Hitler often thought in economic terms rather than military terms. Gaining valuable raw materials such as oil, or cutting off others from the same, often weighed on his mind. The generals concerned themselves with demolishing the enemy’s army as quickly and efficiently as possible. OKH (army headquarters) detested Hitler’s plan, and, when time came to order the armies forward, they often shunned Hitler’s wishes and surreptitiously kept Moscow as the prime objective. Later in the campaign, Hitler completely absorbed the general’s functions and began moving forces himself, and in detail, confusing the goals of the invasion. The lethal decision changing the carefully planned offensive was another dreadful foundational decision which was irreversible.

General
Guenther Blumentritt
stated that
Heinrich von Brauchitsch
,
Franz Halder
, and
Gerd von Rundstedt
were all against the plan to invade the
Soviet Union
in June 1941. According to General Blumentritt:

All
three
realized
the
difficulties
presented
by
the
nature
of
the
country
from
their
experiences
in
the
1914-1918
war—above
all,
the
difficulties
of
movement,
reinforcement,
and
supply.
Field
Marshal
von
Rundstedt
asked
Hitler
bluntly,
“Have
you
weighed
up
what
you
are
undertaking
in
an
attack
on
Russia?”

The original date for the invasion was May 15, 1941, but bad weather and Italy’s Balkans problem postponed the date. Mussolini decided to invade Greece, for prestige mostly, and purposefully failed to inform Hitler of his plan. Italy’s invasion ran into trouble right away, its troops fell back, and Greek forces were soon poised to invade Italian territory. Then the English landed troops in Greece. Unable to stand idly by while his weak ally (dumb too) was invaded and his oil supplies threatened, Hitler sent his panzers into Yugoslavia and Greece. The action ended quickly as Britain fled before the Wehrmacht. Greece surrendered after German troops neared Athens. This operation was an additional example of the Wehrmacht’s superb fighting ability in 1941. On the heels of this victory, Hitler allowed a German parachute army to invade
Crete
. The Germans won a close fight, but the losses were heavy.
[247]

Did this diversion cost precious time? The invasion date for Barbarossa moved to June 22; accordingly, about a month was lost on top of wear and tear on equipment, loss of men, fuel, and other resources. However, the German generals said
bad
weather
delayed
the
invasion
date
, and weather histories confirm their claim.

The battles in the USSR determined the outcome of WWII. Germany was tackling a giant. It needed an excellent plan of attack, outstanding leadership, and good luck at every turn. They received none of the above. The German leadership in the field was extraordinary, and the German generals and their troops performed skillfully; but, Hitler created a shoddy plan, made farcical decisions during the struggle, and the Soviets received the luck—like the worst winter in decades.

Barbarossa’s scale was unimaginable. Barbarossa easily overshadows the D-Day invasion, Battle of the Bulge, or the entire Pacific campaign. The Germans attacked the USSR with
3.5
million
men
, 3,400 tanks, and 1,945 aircraft. The Soviet forces comprised
2.5
to
4.7
million men, 20,000 tanks, and 7,700 aircraft. The Germans caught the USSR by surprise, which is astonishing in itself because Stalin received numerous warnings of the coming assault; however, great spies are one thing, believing their information is another. Whatever the cause, the Russian Army suffered shocking losses because Stalin lacked good sense. The USSR lost 1,200 aircraft the first day, and subsequent Luftwaffe operations continued to destroy numerous outdated Soviet aircraft. As the offensive went forward German close air support of their troops was the difference between victory and defeat in numerous battles. Entire armies of Soviet troops were surrounded by the Germans and forced to surrender (six hundred thousand plus at Kiev alone); however, the German encirclements never managed to bag enough Russian troops to shatter their ability to resist. Many Russians avoided capture because of porous Wehrmacht lines. The Soviet losses of men and equipment became staggering. Stalin’s orders to shoot any man falling back helped the Germans bag a lot more men.

In spite of these majestic German victories, the Russians continued to counterattack consistently. The Russian’s secret tank, the T-34, surprised and astounded the German troops. Initially, nothing stopped the clanking monster. After discovering the awe-inspiring 88 mm flack cannon could demolish the Soviet T-34, morale improved; nonetheless, meeting a squadron of T-34s set German commanders on edge. The well-developed combined arms doctrine, and the Wehrmacht’s superb leadership, carried the offensive forward.

At first, the German invasion went well, killing or capturing millions in Soviet troops and spectacular amounts of equipment. As the drive proceeded the generals became more optimistic, and they made statements that they won the war in the first six weeks. An impartial observer can understand why. The Germans killed, captured, or wounded perhaps
six
million
Russians and destroyed over one year’s worth of equipment production, enough to man and equip an army almost twice as large as the German invasion force. The estimates of USSR losses: 802,000 killed; 3,000,000 wounded; 3,300,000 captured; 21,200 aircraft destroyed; and 20,500 tanks destroyed. Major cities and industrial areas rich with raw materials fell to the invaders as well as thousands of square miles of farmland. This kind of damage would destroy any nation, right?

Figure 55 Operation Barbarossa 1941

After the war,
Gerd von Rundstedt
explained why the
German Army
failed to conquer the
Soviet Union
in 1941
:

“Long
before
winter
came
the
chances
had
been
diminished
owing
to
the
repeated
delays
in
the
advance
that
were
caused
by
bad
roads,
and
mud.
The
‘black
earth’
of
the
Ukraine
could
be
turned
into
mud
by
ten
minutes
rain—stopping
all
movement
until
it
dried.
That
was
a
heavy
handicap
in
a
race
with
time.
It
was
increased
by
a
lack
of
railways
in
Russia—for
bringing
up
supplies
to
our
advancing
troops.
Another
adverse
factor
was
the
way
the
Russians
received
continual
reinforcements
from
their
back
areas,
as
they
fell
back.
It
seemed
to
us
that
as
soon
as
one
force
was
wiped
out,
the
path
was
blocked
by
the
arrival
of
a
fresh
force.”

In spite of terrible losses the USSR continued to counterattack Nazi units, and Soviet troops defended mother Russia fanatically, but the diverging three German drives continued. Then Hitler ordered a halt to Army Group Center’s advance in October of 1941. For two months that summer, General Bock’s troops sat at the Desna river. Worse, Hitler ordered huge numbers of troops redirected away from the advance on Moscow to battles of encirclement far to the south. Hitler failed to understand how difficult it was to move thousands upon thousands of men and their equipment in a new direction over land with very poor roads. The encirclements worked and bagged large numbers of Soviet troops, but
the
drive
to
Moscow
stalled.