The Super Summary of World History (69 page)

Studying this battle extensively, the stunned Japanese determined that competing against the Soviets required a complete reworking of their armed forces, its equipment, battle tactics, and strategy. Japanese generals calculated it might take five years plus millions of dollars to remake its army. This was too much time and far too much money. Thus
,
Japan decided it must
avoid
attacking
the
Soviet
Union
. The push into China would continue, but to attack north was simply out of the question. The Japanese looked south after this battle for conquests.
This
decision
held
great
consequences
for the Western Democracies, especially the United States of America.

Japan’s military believed the war with China would be over within a few months after the Marco Polo Bridge incident, but China snubbed surrender and territorial concessions. Chiang Kai-Shek, the Nationalist Chinese leader, retreated into China’s hinterland, fought delaying battles, and allowed China to swallow the Japanese. Chinese Nationalist troops were poorly armed and led, and were often loyal to the local warlord rather than the central government. However, Chiang realized he did not have to defeat the Japanese. He only had to avoid a total defeat himself. The Chinese Communists were also present in force; nonetheless, they chose to sit out the war in their strongholds in the Northern provinces while allowing their Nationalist opponents and the Japanese to destroy one another. Later, they could step in, destroy the “winners,” and claim China as a communist state (it worked). The communists and the Nationalist had been fighting a brutal civil war for years before the Japanese invasion, which is one reason China was so weak.

The United States, concerned about Japanese aggression against China, put continual diplomatic pressure on Tokyo to end the war. Tokyo refused. As tensions grew Japan gained permission (through German persuasion) from the Vichy French to occupy French Indochina. Japan had also signed the Tripartite Pact in September 1940. America was incensed at these moves, and in August of 1941 put an
embargo
on
oil
shipments to Japan.
[253]
This was a disaster for the Japanese because they obtained about 80 percent of their oil from the United States.
[254]

Japan decided war with the west was the only course open to them, and they began meticulous preparations for attacking the United States, British, Dutch, and Australian military units in the Pacific. The plan was to damage the US Fleet at Pearl Harbor then systematically move south, capturing the oil and resource-rich areas of the South Pacific and Southeast Asia. Realizing the impossibility of successfully invading Australia or America, the plan required seizing large regions of the Pacific around their main objectives (Java, Singapore, Malaya, Borneo), thereby forcing the Americans and their allies to attack through the perimeter and march island by island to the Japanese homeland. Japan beleived Americans ought to tire of the war quickly, especially with defeats at sea and bloody island invasions sapping their morale, causing them to seek a negotiated peace. Japan would retain China plus whatever remained of her island empire. Many Japanese leaders realized a long war doomed Japan, but they hoped their calculations were correct and the United States and its Allies would quit after a short but bloody war.

Some historians argue the United States forced the Japanese into war with its oil embargo. These historians think the US left the Japanese no choice; therefore, the United States brought the war on itself with short sighted polices leaving the Japanese without options.

This position is brainless.
All
t
he
United
States
was
asking
of
Japan
was
to
stop
slaughtering
the
Chinese
. Is that so hard? The Japanese simply desired war, even though many other options were open to them. If Japan pulled back from Indochina and stopped attacking in mainland China, the United States probably would have kept the oil flowing. America was deeply isolationist, and President Franklin Roosevelt wanted to avoid a war with Japan. Of the many courses of action open to Japan she decided only one was valid; thus, by absolutely rejecting all US demands she left war as the only option.
National
honor
and the transition from a “have not” to a “have” nation all played key roles in Japanese thinking, but no matter how one slices it America was not threatening Japan or trying to expand American territory in the east. Expansion and war were Japanese national policies long before 1941, and China was the main target. It is interesting to note the USA had no plans to attack Japan over China. Because of isolationist sentiments, if Japan did nothing the USA’s only recourse was to economic sanctions.

The decision for war in 1941 may have revolved around intelligence gained from the German seizure of a British ship carrying memos from a British war cabinet meeting. In the memos Britain stated it had no resources for defending its Asian Empire. Japan may have acted because this allowed them to capture Britain’s Imperial holdings and limited them to one bona fide adversary, the US Navy.

Japan’s history included conducting surprise attacks before declaring war. Historically, these surprise attacks, such as Port Arthur before the Russo-Japanese War, heavily damaged the enemy’s naval capabilities giving Japan the edge. In 1905, Russia’s fleet had to sail long distances from the Black Sea to Japanese home waters and only then was able to engage Japan’s fleet. The Japanese were waiting, and they sallied forth at the best moment for
the decisive battle
with a tired and demoralized Russian enemy. After one splendid victory, shattering the enemy’s fleet, Russia requested terms. Knowing this, the US prepared for a surprise attack . . . right?

Deciding
Factors
In
the
Pacific

The Japanese would lose the war based on some of the factors
listed
below
in
no
particular
order:

1.
    
Japan’s
false
assumptions
were the foundations of defeat. For example, Japan believed its fighting spirit was superior to the West. Japan viewed war as a spiritual fight most of all, and only Japan possessed the necessary spirit to win. Japan, limited by its prewar assumptions, stuck with their original war plan; however, the US Navy came up with stunning new ways of advancing across the Pacific which the Japanese failed to match.
All
their
major
prewar
assumptions
proved
false.

2.
    
The
Americans
broke
the
Japanese
codes
which led to American victories at Midway, the Battle of the Philippine Sea, and other critical engagements.
Assume
Japan broke the American codes while the Japanese codes remained secure and the importance of code breaking becomes clear. Japan would know the US Fleet’s location, thus giving Japan a major advantage in each battle. Midway would turn into a terrible American loss, as would Guadalcanal and other crucial engagements.

3.
    
Lack
of
Japanese
war-production
capability
. The island nation of Japan had a good ability to turn out war materials; however, that capacity was far below that of the United States alone. Add in the production of Britain and Japan was completely outclassed. For example, this chart is the merchant ship tonnage produced during the war:

USA    33,993,230 tons

Japan    4,152,361

UK    6,378,899

Italy    469,606

4.
    
Lack
of
production
flexibility
in developing better aircraft types, ships, or even small arms during the war. Japan could not effectively bring its war experience to its production lines, and failed to design newer and better weapons to place in the field.

5.
    
Lack
of
doctrinal
flexibility
. Once the Japanese decided how to fight the war they stuck with those ideas. Meanwhile, the Allies changed war itself. Island hopping was one innovation destroying the Japanese assumption that each occupied island must fall for the Allies to reach their homeland. Japan’s planners also failed to account for the effect of submarine warfare on their merchant fleet. Japan’s merchant fleet incurred heavy damaged before the Japanese responded, and even the late response remained insufficient.

6.
    
Staying
with
traditions
too
long
. Because of the Japanese traditional belief in the decisive battle (one all or nothing battle), it became axiomatic to think about naval warfare those terms. The idea became an
unstated
assumption
—which is the worst kind of supposition. This tradition (unstated assumption) remained unexamined and therefore unchallenged. Recognizing such an assumption is necessary for unclouded thinking. In fact, in a modern naval war the size of World War II many battles would take place and no one of them would be completely decisive. Another unstated, but natural, assumption was Japan would
win
the decisive battle. Even after several losses Japanese admirals kept saying that if they could bring the Americans into
the
decisive battle Japan could win the war. Japan’s leaders needed to recognize there were “decisive” battles, but Japan had lost them. In the Japanese mind this failed to compute, as Japan
must
win
the
decisive battle.

The Japanese assumptions about America refusing to fight long wars were closer to reality in 1940 than one might think. In
War
Plan
Orange
, the battle plan for war with Japan, US Naval planners assumed a war must be won quickly or US citizens would revolt. Even in 1919, Orange planners assumed the war must be won in less than two years or voters would tire of the effort and make the political decision to quit. The redoubtable Admiral Mahan concluded the American public could not even tolerate a two year conflict. He believed, as did the Japanese, that American society was fickle and had no stomach for hardships. Naval planners predicted that Orange (Japan) would wage a war of endurance trying to outlast the US. It is plain that the original Japanese assumptions were near the mark. It was the sneak attack at Pearl Harbor, Japanese brutality, and effective propaganda management that allowed the US to fight on past two years. (P. 26-30,
War
Plan
Orange,
Miller, 1991, US Naval Institute).

The stage was set for the largest naval war in world history, and it started with the United States, Britain, Holland, and Australia being frequently humiliated at the hands of the experienced and well prepared Japanese.

PEARL HARBOR and the
JAPANESE CENTRIFICAL OFFENSIVE

1941
&
1942

In
my
opinion,
war
is
the
art
of
ambush,
and Admiral Yamamoto’s attack on
Pearl
Harbor
was an excellent ambush.
[255]
Redact out Japanese bad luck at Pearl Harbor and the war’s history is different. Most documentaries covering the Japanese attack detail US errors, bad luck, and missed clues to the coming surprise attack. Seldom do such programs point out the Japanese errors or their extremely poor luck.
[256]
The key Japanese error was
failing
to
launch
a
planned
third
wave
attack against oil and dry dock installations at Pearl Harbor. Their bad luck included
not
finding
the
American
carriers
in
port
and
not
getting
the
declaration
of
war
delivered
on
time
. Japanese errors and bad luck actually exceeded the bad luck and errors of the Americans.

Overwhelming US errors are well summarized in congressional investigations concluding there was a lack of “air mindedness” among American commanders. Also, while many calculated Japan would strike they assumed the strike location was the Philippines. Because of this false assumption when information came in suggesting an air attack on American units people were thinking Manila (in the Philippines) rather than Pearl Harbor. As a result surprise was total. The United States paid a heavy price for this surprise in men and material at Pearl Harbor.