The Super Summary of World History (91 page)

General
MacArthur
had been put in charge of the UN forces after the invasion, and he hatched a brilliant but risky plan to change the course of the conflict.

The fighting around Pusan was as hard as any in history. General MacArthur realized trying to attack up the Korean peninsula from Pusan would be World War I all over again. A frontal assault on a numerically superior dug-in enemy in mountainous terrain would be costly, and winter was on the way. Take too much time moving north and the harsh Korean winter and rough terrain would make offensive action daunting. By using the amphibious ability of the US Navy and Marine Corps (or what was left of it), General MacArthur thought he could dramatically change the course of the war with a landing behind the enemy lines about half way up the west Korean coast near
Seoul,
the nation’s capital. The US
Joint
Chiefs
of
Staff
thought the plan too risky and wanted to land farther south; however, MacArthur pointed out such a landing would accomplish little. By landing at
Inchon
near Seoul the Allies could deal the invaders a lethal blow and force a North Korean retreat without attacking at Pusan. President Truman sided with MacArthur, and the invasion was on. Both the Joint Chiefs and the president had missed one critical point in MacArthur’s plan.
He
clearly
said
that
after
the
capture
of
Seoul
the
troops
would
move
north.
This aspect of his plan should have been thoroughly discussed, however, because of the focus on the risk of landing at Inchon the other major risk—moving north of the thirty-eighth parallel—was ignored.

Inchon
The
UN
Allies
Strike
Back

September
15,
1950

Far up the west side of the mountainous Korean peninsula was a port just to the west of Seoul. The port was
Inchon
, a very unusual place. The harbor’s tides were very high and mud flats appeared for hours every day when the tide went out, and these mud flats prevented ship movement. As the tide came back to cover the mud flats ships could once more move up Flying Fish Channel. MacArthur wanted to go ashore there and drive east to Seoul. Seoul was the road and rail junction for everything going south; thus, control of Seoul equaled control of
all
supplies
trying to move south. Acute obstacles faced an amphibious assault at Inchon, and one severe problem was the condition of the once-mighty amphibious arm of the US Navy. Most of the assault craft and naval gunfire support ships were gone, and those that remained were in poor shape. Nonetheless, the navy and marines thought they could do it.

MacArthur’s plan was brilliant. Risky as it was, if it worked the achievement would be colossal. The war could be won in a month rather than years. The communist army to the south would be cut off by the invasion and then destroyed by an attack out of Pusan that would push them against the waiting army at Seoul. It was a classic hammer and anvil move which could totally destroy the foe. The problem was winning on the beach and pushing quickly to Seoul. If the communists could thwart the amphibious landing, the UN forces would face a devolving military and political situation.
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The US Marines landed at Inchon at 6:30 a.m. on September 15, 1950
.
Wolmi-Do Island at the center beachhead had to be taken, and the marines took Wolmi-Do in less than two hours. The soldiers of the sea held on while the tide was out, and after it rose once again other US Marine units landed on beaches to either side of the island. The landings were a complete surprise and a complete success. The US Marines and army units moved inland toward Seoul. Far to the south, UN units at Pusan simultaneously attacked the communist lines and broke through. The resulting rout was one of the greatest military victories of modern times. The Inchon landings with the coinciding counterattacks at Pusan eradicated the North Korean army.

UN forces quickly drove to the thirty-eighth parallel
and
then
kept
going
. If they would have stopped at or near the thirty-eighth parallel, the war may have ended right there and then; however, MacArthur pressed on with the idea of punishing the communist north for its invasion. The US Government and the UN approved the push north, but they did not fully consider the reaction of the Chinese communists who would not stand by and let a client state be conquered (especially when they had agreed to the invasion), and the United States was devoid of accurate intelligence on the Chinese and their intentions.
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Figure 77 MacArthur’s Advance North

China
Enters
the
War

October
1950

Now MacArthur matched his horrific errors in defending the Philippines during World War II. The advance north was haphazard. His advance was in four widely separated columns with a lot of space for infiltration, plus the columns were not mutually supporting. In addition, he ignored the fact that the Chinese were in the war even after his troops had captured numerous Chinese communist troops as they approached the Yalu River which separated China from North Korea. Chairman Mao, the tyrant leader of communist China, warned the United States through neutral nations that he would intervene if the United Nations approached the Yalu River. The nationalist regime on Taiwan warned the United States of Chinese intervention.
All
these
warnings
were
ignored.

US Intelligence failed to recognize the potential entry of the Red China into the war.
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The massive Chinese assault caught MacArthur completely by surprise. MacArthur would go from genius to idiot overnight. The UN forces absorbed a massive blow as Chinese forces rolled back the defenders of democracy like waves running up a California beach (so much for MacArthur’s concept of winter offensives being difficult). As the United Nations retreated below the thirty-eighth parallel, Seoul fell into communist hands again.
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Prior to the communist assault, the First Marine Division had landed near the Chosin Reservoir far above the thirty-eighth parallel, and when the Chinese offensive began they were trapped in the mountains by seven or more communist divisions intent on destroying them. In freezing weather, against thousands of fresh Chinese troops, the marines attacked toward the coastal port of Hungnam and deliverance.

Figure 78 US Marine March from Chosen

Clear weather, at least clear enough at times, allowed US Navy and air force planes to bomb, napalm, and strafe communist belligerents attacking the marines. Air control and tough men were the key to getting the marines out. Chinese troops threw massed assaults at marine positions, but the extra firepower placed at the squad level by the marines paid off as Chinese attacks were repelled with staggering communist losses. The First Marine Division made it to Hungnam and embarked with their wounded, their KIAs, and their serviceable equipment. The Chinese communists subtracted nearly seven divisions from their order of battle because of casualties sustained trying to destroy the surrounded US Marines. For the rest of the war the Chinese would not frontally assault a US Marine position.

The UN line stabilized well south of the thirty-eighth parallel as the Chinese assault ran out of steam. It was impossible for the Chinese to keep their troops supplied since they were moving by foot and bicycle over mountainous terrain in the winter, mostly at night, and getting hit with constant air attacks. Nonetheless, they had recaptured the South Korean capitol and pushed the UN forces about two-thirds of the way down the snow-covered peninsula. The Chinese success centered on night assaults using infiltration tactics to disrupt the UN units’ group cohesiveness. Using this method, large groups of Chinese soldiers would get past UN front lines and attack at night from the flanks using submachine guns with large capacity magazines to spray the UN positions with rounds
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while other units assaulted the front of the UN positions with submachine guns, grenades, and mortars. The frontal attack held the defenders in place while the flank attacks surprised the defenders, forcing them to guard several axes of advance at once. These tactics confused the troops and small units lost cohesion, often scattering under fire or hunkering down lessening the defensive firepower of the unit. At the same time these attacks on the front lines were proceeding, other Chinese troops got past the UN lines and placed themselves on routes used by reinforcements; thus, as the reinforcements moved forward they would be ambushed and have to fight their way to the unit they were supposed to be saving. It took some time for the UN soldiers to adapt to these tactics; however, once they did the communists had a far harder time achieving success.

After the stunning defeat, MacArthur began publicly calling for bombing Manchuria and perhaps going to war with China. President Truman loathed this because he wanted to limit the war, and he did not want his military commander publicly demanding different strategies. Truman also thought MacArthur had sabotaged a possible peace deal presented by the Chinese. After some acrimonious exchanges Truman
fired
MacArthur
and eventually appointed General Ridgeway as the overall commander of the UN forces in Korea. This turn of events caused a public outcry in America. MacArthur was a favorite general, and many in America thought he was correct to question Truman’s strategy of limited war even if it did mean war with China.

MacArthur had blundered intolerably in defending the Philippines, costing the lives of thousands of men. For his efforts, he was given command of the Army’s Pacific Theater. He stumbled again in his defense and his original offensive actions in New Guinea, once more killing troops unnecessarily. Then he blundered in Korea by ignoring the warning of a Chinese offensive and failing to advance with mutually supporting formations, again costing thousands of lives. In spite of these egregious errors in judgment he remained in command. Only when he openly disagreed with the president was he dismissed. It would appear that slaughtering thousands of your troops isn’t much of a problem, but disagreeing with a politician is a titanic problem.
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After General Ridgeway took command of the UN forces he investigated the disaster. General Ridgeway was disappointed in the performance of US Army troops during the Chinese communist offensive. After some study solutions surfaced. Communist tactics were dissected and ways were fashioned to counteract their effectiveness through new training. Once the troops were told what the Reds were doing, and how to thwart enemy efforts, UN combat capability increased dramatically. Another problem was firepower at the squad level, so firepower was improved for the US Army squads. Once these flaws were remedied, the US Army performed well against the experienced Chinese troops who were veterans of the wars with the Nationalist Chinese. Other adjustments in artillery and air support also enabled outnumbered UN units to survive the Chinese and North Korean assaults as well as advance against fanatic resistance.

The New Air War

For the last years of WWII, the Allies dominated the skies, but Allied air superiority was challenged in Korea. The United States was not prepared for another war just five years after the end of WWII, and its equipment illustrated that lack of readiness. In the skies over Korea, the United States was at first flying World War II aircraft like B-29 bombers and P-51 mustangs. Out of nowhere, the communists showed up with jet aircraft that blew the propeller aircraft and jets of the United States out of the sky. The MIG 15, which first appeared over Korea, was an excellent aircraft.
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The United States had jets (the F-80 Shooting Star, Panther, etc.), but they were no match for this communist jet. In addition, the MIGs were being flown by veteran Soviet pilots and well-trained Chinese pilots. The United States rushed to produce an aircraft to match the MIG 15 and quickly concocted the North American F-86 saber jet. This aircraft was a lucky combination of components that flew wonderfully and proved to be an excellent answer to the MIG 15. In the hands of US Air Force veterans it soon achieved a remarkable kill ratio (10:1 or better) against the MIGs. The challenge for control of the sky above Korea had been answered, and the US Air Force had won (on behalf of the United Nations, of course).