The Super Summary of World History (94 page)

During the presidential race between Kennedy and Nixon they held, for the first time, a series of televised debates. These debates were critical in determining the winner of a very close contest between the two men. One significant issue was whether or not the United States should defend two small islands off the coast of Red China, Quemoy and Matsu, controlled by the Nationalist Chinese. These islands had been shelled by the communists, but no invasion had been attempted. If such an attempt did come, should the United States commit troops to defend these two small islands? Nixon, taking the approach of a seasoned diplomat’s evaluation of vital national interest, said no. They were not a vital national interest because the survival of the US did not depend upon them, so no blood and treasure should be spent for the islands. Kennedy took the position that not one foot of free soil should be surrendered to the communists. Polls showed Kennedy had won on that issue. Somehow, the larger implications of this “fight for every foot of free soil” doctrine were not appreciated. This was an open commitment to fight communism anywhere and everywhere at any time. It constituted a total rejection of the vital national interest analysis. No one discerned that this idea could lead the United States into wearisome and unnecessary conflicts.

John F. Kennedy won a close election. After taking office, he began a new and far reaching foreign policy change which required a more active role for the United States in foreign affairs. The Cold War with the communists was running full blast, and Kennedy decided (along with his entire administration—including his brother Bobby Kennedy who was appointed the US Attorney General) that the United States would enact regime change if necessary to achieve victories over communism. An active role in the internal operations of foreign governments had rarely been tried before by American presidents,
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but Kennedy wanted to do even more. It was a radical departure with the past, and it set an unfortunate precedent for the future.
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It was Kennedy who decided that the current president of South Vietnam (Diem) must go, and he helped coordinate a military coup that deposed and murdered Diem on November 1, 1963. It was also Kennedy who decided to commit American combat troops to Vietnam, although at the time they were called advisors and not many were sent. But the United States was in the war, and its involvement would intensify significantly.

In the United States another election was drawing near in 1964, and the debate over Vietnam had deepened. There were those in the US government who wanted a large commitment of US troops to Vietnam with the goal of achieving victory over the communists. Others were advising no increase in troops and perhaps a withdrawal of those who were there. Even the Joint Chiefs of Staffs for the US military were saying the war was unwinnable without a massive intervention, which no one wanted. According to some advisors close to President Kennedy at the time (1963), the president was planning a drawdown of troops to start right after the election in November of 1964 and a complete withdrawal was planned within a year or so thereafter. Was this true? It is very difficult to tell. The men close to Kennedy were loyalists and wanted to present him in a favorable light. The idea of an early withdrawal by Kennedy would add to his legend. The truth will never be known because the two men who knew what was next on the Kennedy agenda for Vietnam were both assassinated. The president was murdered on November 22, 1963, in Dallas, Texas, and his brother Bobby died by assassination on June 5, 1968, in Los Angeles, California. Robert F. Kennedy (Bobby) had campaigned on withdrawal from Vietnam, so there is no doubt what he was going to do if elected; however, this campaign was taking place for the election of 1968, and what changed in those intervening years was the mood of the American public. Support for the Vietnam War had badly waned, and the democrats were running on a platform of ending the war. What President Kennedy would have done after 1964, assuming he won the election, is unknown.

Johnson
Commits
US
Troops—1964

Lyndon B. Johnson took over as president after President Kennedy’s death, and won the presidency in his own right in 1964.
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Immediately after assuming the presidency Johnson began to increase the troop levels in Vietnam. After the so-called Gulf of Tonkin incident, Johnson gained plenary power to commit troops to the war, and he did so in spades. Before Johnson left office he had placed
500,000
Americans into Vietnam. It is widely thought that Johnson lied about the attack in the Gulf of Tonkin to gain congressional authorization to widen the war.
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By 1967, the war was not going well for the United States of America. Although American units were consistently defeating both North Vietnamese regular army units and the local Vietcong, nothing was resolved. In the few all-out battles against US troops, such as in the Ia Drang Valley in 1965, the communists learned US firepower was potent, and the US won total victories. With control of the air over South Vietnam, and lots of artillery, the US forces decimated the communists in anything like a set peace engagement. But the infiltration from North Vietnam, the ambushes, and the limited assaults went on; thus, control of the countryside and the road system was constantly in flux. Like the French, the United States and the South Vietnam military tried to protect all vital points and thereby spread their combat power. Without the support of the peasants the government of South Vietnam, even with massive American help, was not winning.

Figure 80 Vietnam & Ho Chi Minh Trail

General
Westmoreland,
commander of US forces in South Vietnam, was aggressive in his pursuit of the Red forces. He ordered “search and destroy” missions to sweep rural areas and keep the pressure on the communists. He rejected the strategy of establishing a line from DMZ across South Vietnam and Laos to stop enemy troops and supplies from moving south. Such aggressive search and destroy tactics put US troops at high risk because the communists knew, through spies ensconced in every corner of the South Vietnamese government, when the US patrols were going out and by what routes. The communist units could avoid the search and destroy operations whenever they wanted, but in many instances US troops were ambushed and had to fight against long odds to escape without being destroyed. US firepower, plus close air and artillery support, saved the day many times. The American problem was that no matter how many communists they managed to kill more would come down from the North. Casualties were meaningless to Ho (or his backers, China and the USSR). He had murdered hundreds of thousands after he came into power in the North, hence added deaths had no meaning to the communist leadership.

The real need was for a new kind of US strategy that would cut North Vietnam’s ability to move troops and supplies south, thereby isolating the battlefield in South Vietnam. Cambodia and Laos were not neutral countries, and the US allowing this fiction to exist doomed all other efforts. South Vietnam was being invaded from North Vietnam, and the US needed to deploy its troops from the coast of South Vietnam along the DMZ through Laos to Thailand in order to cut the Ho Chie Minh trail. This would allow the ARVIN (South Vietnam’s army) to pacify its own nation as the US had done in South Korea. During the Korean War, North Korea had tried to start problems in the south with guerrilla units, but the US let the South Korean Army handle that problem and concentrated on stopping the invasion from the North. At the outset of the conflict in Vietnam, President Kennedy had determined this was a new kind of war and must be fought on new terms; however, Clausewitz was not out of date and his precepts clearly told military commanders how to win this type of war (see: American Strategy in Vietnam, by H. G. Summers, Dover Publications, 2007). By isolating the battlefield in the south winning was at least possible. Without it the war would never end because North Vietnam would never stop sending troops south.

Robert
McNamara
, US Secretary of Defense during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, played a key role in confusing US military goals. He implemented a complex budgeting and progress measurement system that completely disregarded the strategy and basic military principles of war (Clausewitz again) needed to focus US strategy and tactics on striking at the enemy’s center of gravity, its movement of forces south.

Figure 81 US Helicopters lift off

Another problem for the Americans was
corruption
in
the
South
Vietnamese
government.
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The peasants did not want to fight for such a government making recruitment of good soldiers hard. In addition, the government was rife with communist spies. Every American operation had to be cleared through the South Vietnamese; thus, every operation was known to the Reds. In spite of these numerous disadvantages, the Americans were still “winning” in the traditional sense. More and more areas in South Vietnam were free of communist domination. The Americans also protected the harvest from communist theft and taxation, and this had impacts on the ability of the Reds to maintain control of the countryside. Nonetheless, the murders, ambushes, and coercion went on so the countryside was never secure.

American air power was having a negative impact on the communists.
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From carriers offshore and airbases in Vietnam and Thailand, the United States could apply air power quickly and effectively at any point in the South. In addition, the United States used air power to try and cut the communist supply lines from North Vietnam to the South. The Ho Chi Minh Trail traversed the area of Laos and Cambodia
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all the way to the southern tip of South Vietnam. The United States tried to interdict this supply route with air power all through the war; however, even though tons of supplies were destroyed, the trail was never cut. In spite of the bombing attacks on the Ho Chi Minh Trail, and the other efforts to cut supply lines from North Vietnam, the communists in the South remained well supplied throughout the war. This again demonstrates the critical nature of the loss of China to the Reds. If the United States could have cut the supply lines to the battlefields in South Vietnam the communists may have lost. It was the endless movement of supplies from Russia through Red China to North Vietnam and then, after the addition of numerous men, to South Vietnam that determined the outcome of the war as much as any other factor.

President Johnson wanted the war to end, and after being rebuffed by the North in his call for negotiations he began bombing North Vietnam with the goal of forcing them to the negotiation table. Unfortunately for the United States, Johnson insisted on a list of politically correct targets that hamstrung the ability of the US Air Force and US Navy to successfully destroy the North’s war-making ability. Their main harbor, Haiphong, was allowed to operate without any interference during the Johnson years. Russia, China, and other nations brought supplies openly to North Vietnam through this harbor, which made US Airmen furious. Because of US Bombing restrictions the communists soon developed, again without interference (American airmen could see the facilities being constructed), a sophisticated air-defense system in the North. The US attacks on ground targets became predictable (because of White House interference), so the communists had a simple time arranging their air defenses. Surface to air missiles (SAMs) and triple canopy flack brought down many US pilots. In addition, the North was flying excellent MIGs with good pilots against US airmen. The resulting air war over North Vietnam was intense. The United States was losing aircraft, and the results of the bombing were less than satisfactory. The Johnson White House restrictions allowed prime military targets to go untouched. Oil storage, hydroelectric power plants, harbor equipment (cranes, piers, etc.), and other vital installations were not bombed.