The Super Summary of World History (75 page)

With Sicily seized, the Allies quickly invaded Italy at the bottom of the boot and at the beaches of
Salerno
just south of Naples on the west coast. (See Figure 62) Montgomery proceeded to land at the toe of Italy’s boot and at the east near the top of the heel, while the Americans went ashore at Salerno. At Salerno, Kesselring’s troops put up a stiff defense from the heights overlooking the beaches. Following up with effective counterattacks, Kesselring nearly drove the Americans into the sea. Luftwaffe attacks on the fleet damaged several ships while German tanks drove within shouting range of the beach; nevertheless, naval gunfire broke the Nazi offensives, and Allied air power soon captured the sky over the beaches. After securing the beaches, the Americans struggled to expand the pocket and requested Montgomery hurry his advance; however, Montgomery did no such thing. When Montgomery did arrive the Germans were already pulling back to new and very well prepared lines of defense south of Rome—
the
Gustov
line
.

Figure 63 Italy—Allied Assaults on Gustov Line and Anzio 1943-4

Advancing past Salerno, the Allies ran into exceptionally well-chosen and prepared German positions on the Gustov line south of Rome. Kesselring and his German engineers chose this mountainous area because of its ideal defensive terrain features. After numerous bloody attempts to breach the line had failed, the Allies mounted an amphibious assault behind the Gustov line at
Anzio
on the western side of Italy just north of the Gustov Line and south of Rome. (See Figure 63) Unfortunately, the invasion’s commander was under specific orders from General Clark to attain the beach and then
dig
in.
Following these orders doomed the Allied invasion to bloody stagnation. If the troops had moved inland at once, behind the Gustov line, a forced German retreat was axiomatic. This is one of the best ways to wage war, force your enemy out of superb positions without an assault as Sherman consistently accomplished on his march to Atlanta (see the US Civil War). Kesselring responded to Allied sluggishness by swiftly placing his men on the invaluable high ground above the beaches; thus, preventing a breakout and subjecting the trapped troops to monumental artillery poundings. It became clear that to get off those beaches help was necessary from the Allied troops along the Gustov line. The tables were turned, and the men originally assigned to get the help now had to give help if the Allies were going to hang on at Anzio.

The breakthrough came when the overall commander in Italy, British
General
Alexander
, rejected General Mark Clark’s ideas, adopted his own direction, and mounted an offensive all along the Gustov line. The French colonial forces found that the Germans had severely thinned out of the center of their line to reinforce the troops fighting at Monty Casino itself. The Nazi line was quickly breached and the advance northward began. Then Mark Clark threw another monkey wrench into the gears. Alexander ordered Clark to take his forces, which were on the left flank of the advance, and turn right (east) to cut off the German retreat. Clark
disobeyed
these
orders
and instead made north for Rome and the glory of “liberating” the city. Rome fell on June 4, 1944, but the battle for Italy continued. The German forces escaped AGAIN to delay the Allied advance for additional months.

The problems in Italy were multiple, but poor leadership for the Allies is at the top of the list. Only after Alexander began to exercise more control over his subordinates did matters improve somewhat. General Clark disobeyed orders and moved on Rome rather than blocking the German retreat to a new defensive zone, but nothing was done to Clark. The fact that his actions would cost the lives of Allied troops assaulting yet another of Kesselring’s defensive lines to the north of Rome seems to have counted for little. All these years later it seems the original US thoughts were correct. The Italian campaign would continue until the end of the war with little to show for all the sacrifices of the troops involved on both sides.

Planning D-Day

With the Allies advancing up the Italian boot the Western Mediterranean was firmly in Allied hands, and planning for the invasion of Nazi occupied France could begin in earnest.
General
Eisenhower
was appointed as overall commander, and Ike appointed British General Montgomery as ground unit commander. This was a massive undertaking and the largest amphibious assault ever mounted.
[292]

The planning for Operation
Overlord
, as it would be termed, started long before the appointment of General Eisenhower. The pre-Eisenhower planners chose
Normandy
as the best area for invasion. They decided on May for the invasion because of the moon, tides, weather, and other considerations, and they called for three divisions to cross the channel supported by a large naval armada. Although the plan would undergo considerable change, the foundations were poured. The moment Eisenhower and Montgomery examined the plan they expanded the landing force to
five
divisions
landing from the sea and
three
more
airborne
divisions
airdropped behind the beaches on the first day. This expansion to well over one hundred thousand men increased the need for shipping, equipment, aircraft, and everything else by more than double. While it increased the chances for success it also increased the risk, because information leaks, increases in errors, and a host of other “friction of war” problems would naturally proliferate. The need for secrecy increased exponentially. If the Germans figured out the time and place of the landings the resulting slaughter would be indescribable. The raid on
Dieppe
was well remembered, and if the Germans could repeat that Allied disaster the consequences would be immense.
[293]
Allied failure at Normandy would mean, under reasonable presumptions, the Soviets would seek a separate peace with Hitler, which they had already tried. (Yes, we know about the A-bomb, but that discussion is too long and speculative for The Super Summary).

Midpoint
in
the
Second
World
War—Pacific:

1943
&
1944

After the victory at Guadalcanal in 1943, US forces began to move up the Solomon island chain. In a series of bloody encounters the US Navy, Marines, and Army pushed north against fanatic Japanese resistance. On New Guinea, Australian forces pushed the Japanese back over the rugged Owen Stanley mountains in one of the most difficult campaigns of the war. American and Australian forces then began leapfrogging up the eastern coast, landing where the Japanese were not present, thus cutting off the Japanese garrisons they bypassed.
[294]

At sea, Japan started feeling the full weight of American air power and innovation. In the
Battle
of
the
Bismarck
Sea
in
March
1943
, a Japanese troop convoy sailing to New Guinea from Rabaul harbor on New Britain was located at sea and totally destroyed by air attacks. B-25 aircraft (same type that bombed Tokyo) with six .50-caliber machine guns mounted to the nose for strafing ships, tackled the convoy. The pilots also used new skip-bombing methods to slam the bombs into the sides of the transports. The attackers sank all the transport ships and most of the escorts. The US Army Air Force under General McKinney developed these new techniques
.
[295]

“
Island
hopping”
was the key to US strategy in the Pacific. The idea was simple. The Allies did not have to conquer every island held by the Japanese. By taking only a few vital islands, and cutting off support for the rest, the Americans smashed the original Japanese assumptions about fighting the war. With each passing month the speed of the American advance increased. Japan faced an enemy with techniques of war undreamed of in 1941. Knocked off balance by Allied methods and technology Japan’s leadership never regained its footing.

By November of 1943 the US Navy was prepared to start an advance across the
Central
Pacific
. This line of attack was
in
addition
to MacArthur’s line of advance in the South Pacific. The first target was the Gilbert Islands, and the key to this group of island atolls was
Tarawa
(Betio). The island’s importance came from its air base. The Japanese anticipated an attack and studded the island with defensive fortifications, including a tremendous number of protected machine gun emplacements (pillboxes), large caliber cannons, huge bunkers, and barbed-wire entanglements defending every approach to the island.

Throughout the Pacific campaign, the islands seized had enemy air bases or land areas where the Americans could build air bases. Tactically, the Pacific War was fought over who held what air base.
The
airplane
was
the
centerpiece
of
the
Pacific
War.
The goal of the Central Pacific advance was winning islands within air range of Japan, and starting a bombing campaign to destroy Japan’s infrastructure. The goal of the South Pacific advance was winning back the Philippines, and cutting Japanese supply lines to the home islands.

We must talk about storming a defended beach for a moment. Before World War II, invaders avoided going ashore at a defended beach. From the Trojan War through the first part of World War II, the way one combatant invaded another’s territory from the sea entailed going ashore on an undefended beach away from the target and then advancing on the objective overland. In World War I, the British invasion of Turkey at Gallipoli proved the point that an amphibious operation against defended shores was suicide. The Japanese commanders knew the history of offensive actions against defended beaches, and they knew the assaults were usually failures. They noted that
many
small
islands
in
the
Central
Pacific
had
no
place
for
an
unopposed
landing.
In addition, airstrips could be placed on the islands with ample aircraft to defend them. The Japanese believed an island was an unsinkable aircraft carrier endangering any fleet sailing within range of its aircraft. At first the US thought the same thing.

Figure 64 American Dual Offensives Against Japan

By 1943 US Navy carrier forces had combined their air units for overwhelming aerial assaults razing Japanese air power on the island fortresses. Then the fleet sailed up and disgorged the troops who took the island. These actions punctured Japanese assumptions about defending their empire. The fact that the Americans quickly took heavily defended Pacific islands shocked Japan’s high command. Japan confronted an enemy doing the impossible, and doing it very well. The Japanese commander at Tarawa had stated that, “A million men could not take this island in a thousand years” (or something close to that), but the US Marine Second Division took it in
three
days
. To be fair, the Japanese commander never heard of Amtracs (boats with tank treads). If he had known his confidence might have ebbed.