The Sword And The Olive (22 page)
Read The Sword And The Olive Online
Authors: Martin van Creveld
The entire question of territorial defense was reopened with the 1967 war and the subsequent expansion of Israel’s borders. Since then public opinion has remained divided. In a curious reversal of roles, the right—particularly the national religious right—now insists that the “settlements” (meaning those located in the Occupied Territories) were a vital aid to the country’s defense. By contrast the left, denying what had previously been a pillar of its own thought, insists only settlements in the Jordan Valley are of any value and that the rest merely represent “a strategic burden” that itself requires protection by the IDF. The debate, which has profound implications for the future of Israel and its security, persists (see Chapters 12 and 20).
In the early 1950s, however, this role reversal was in the future. Meanwhile the government implemented Yadin’s basic lessons in regard to the need for a single organization with a unified command and strict top-tobottom authority. Ben Gurion’s 1948 victory over Galili, as well as the dismemberment of the
Yishuv
’s other fighting organizations (ETSEL and PALMACH), had ensured that the Jewish state would have a single army unreservedly subordinate to a single civilian government. Although that relationship was not explicitly embodied in law until 1976,
15
it has never been questioned. In the half-century since the Israeli state was established it is virtually impossible to find a case where the military openly challenged the civilian authorities.
16
Yishuv
’s other fighting organizations (ETSEL and PALMACH), had ensured that the Jewish state would have a single army unreservedly subordinate to a single civilian government. Although that relationship was not explicitly embodied in law until 1976,
15
it has never been questioned. In the half-century since the Israeli state was established it is virtually impossible to find a case where the military openly challenged the civilian authorities.
16
In theory the top-level chain of command was and remains clear, running from prime minister to minister of defense to chief of staff. In practice, however—the Agranat Commission investigated the question in the wake of the 1973 war
17
—the exact division of labor among the three has never been clearly defined. The result is that much depended on personalities. Some prime ministers (David Ben Gurion, Levi Eshkol, Menachem Begin, Yitschak Rabin during his second term, and Shimon Peres) preferred to act as their own ministers of defense. Others inserted a third person between themselves and the COS; he in turn might be civilian (Pinchas Lavon, Shimon Peres, Moshe Arens) or former military (Moshe Dayan, Yitschak Rabin, Ezer Weizman, Ariel Sharon, Yitschak Mordechai). Some prime ministers felt confident about defense matters and kept the military on a short leash (Ben Gurion, Eshkol until 1967, and Rabin). One (Golda Meir) refrained from doing so while frankly admitting she did not know exactly what a division was.
18
Another (Menachem Begin) kept meddling even though his military knowledge had been acquired during his kindergarten years and barely developed thereafter.
17
—the exact division of labor among the three has never been clearly defined. The result is that much depended on personalities. Some prime ministers (David Ben Gurion, Levi Eshkol, Menachem Begin, Yitschak Rabin during his second term, and Shimon Peres) preferred to act as their own ministers of defense. Others inserted a third person between themselves and the COS; he in turn might be civilian (Pinchas Lavon, Shimon Peres, Moshe Arens) or former military (Moshe Dayan, Yitschak Rabin, Ezer Weizman, Ariel Sharon, Yitschak Mordechai). Some prime ministers felt confident about defense matters and kept the military on a short leash (Ben Gurion, Eshkol until 1967, and Rabin). One (Golda Meir) refrained from doing so while frankly admitting she did not know exactly what a division was.
18
Another (Menachem Begin) kept meddling even though his military knowledge had been acquired during his kindergarten years and barely developed thereafter.
The fact that the IDF obeyed its political masters did not mean it was without influence on defense planning and, through it, Israeli policy as a whole. In fact the opposite was the case. Defense minister Ben Gurion had a weakness for uniformed personnel and was inclined to belittle the importance of the civilian ministry itself. The Israeli defense ministry had grown haphazardly out of Rechesh, Hagana’s arms-acquisition agency, and Ben Gurion at least initially saw it as no more than an organization charged with providing whatever the IDF wanted;
19
during 1952-1954 he even received proposals aimed at abolishing the ministry and transferring its functions to the General Staff. Though these ideas were rejected, compared to its modern counterparts Israel’s civilian defense establishment remained rather underdeveloped. Thus, it was not until 1958 that the defense ministry succeeded in wrenching control of the defense budget from the General Staff financial department.
20
Even then, long-range planning and force development continued to be the responsibility of the IDF. The latter in turn entrusted those tasks to relatively junior officers— lieutenant colonels and lower—who were not even members of the Plenary General Staff (
forum
MATKAL).
19
during 1952-1954 he even received proposals aimed at abolishing the ministry and transferring its functions to the General Staff. Though these ideas were rejected, compared to its modern counterparts Israel’s civilian defense establishment remained rather underdeveloped. Thus, it was not until 1958 that the defense ministry succeeded in wrenching control of the defense budget from the General Staff financial department.
20
Even then, long-range planning and force development continued to be the responsibility of the IDF. The latter in turn entrusted those tasks to relatively junior officers— lieutenant colonels and lower—who were not even members of the Plenary General Staff (
forum
MATKAL).
Worse, Israel does not have a national security council or an intelligence czar responsible for coordinating internal and external, civilian and military, and strategic, political and economic intelligence. As a result, the IDF’s intelligence division not only is the principal provider of enemy intelligence—along with Mossad (Institution), Israel’s foreign secret service—but also is responsible for preparing the National Intelligence Estimate. In fact the head of military intelligence is a frequent participant in Cabinet meetings, a situation unheard of in other democratic countries. Imagine if Pres. George Bush, preparing for Desert Storm, had nobody to turn to for advice except the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—who in turn entrusted his G-2 (chief of intelligence) to produce not only the services’ but the
national
intelligence estimates.
national
intelligence estimates.
Such arrangements—as demonstrated by the IDF’s surprise by the 1973 October War and again by its preparations for the unsuccessful 1982 Lebanon War—did not always make for sound planning. In fact it could be argued that but for the undisputed (if not always clearly defined) authority of the prime minister and minister of defense the IDF during much of its history has been all but immune to civilian criticism and control. Information on defense matters is provided by the prime minister and minister of defense only to the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee. Not only is that committee sworn to secrecy; it lacks any sort of independent research organization. Furthermore, and unlike the U.S. Congress, for example, Israel’s legislators do not have authority to subpoena officials (or anybody else) to testify under oath or otherwise. Hence even today neither the Knesset nor the committee exercises effective control over the defense budget; indeed so clueless was the committee that as late as February 1974 Dayan told it that Israel did not possess nuclear weapons.
21
Nor has the committee ever been able to seriously oversee issues such as orders of battle, organization, arms procurement, research and development, personnel, contingency plans, foreign deals of the arms industry, and the like.
21
Nor has the committee ever been able to seriously oversee issues such as orders of battle, organization, arms procurement, research and development, personnel, contingency plans, foreign deals of the arms industry, and the like.
In this supposedly democratic country the situation was routinely justified by referring to
ha-medina be-matsor
(the idea that the state was permanently under siege and could not afford to stoop to the kind of parliamentary controls that are common elsewhere). Israel’s Declaration of Independence, which contains ringing phrases about the equality of all citizens regardless of gender and religion, does not say a word about the freedom of information. Enforcing the public’s duty not to know is the job of the IDF officer in charge of military censorship. This institution was originally established by the British mandatory authorities under the Defense (Emergency) Regulations of 1945 with the intent of combating the unfolding terrorism of those years; once the state was founded Ben Gurion found them so to his taste that he left them unaltered and never got around to replacing them with a more democratic system. The censor exercises draconian power over content in the media, licenses newspapers, and fines and suspends newspapers if, in his view, they have violated secrecy. He does not have to explain the reasons for his decision; indeed one paragraph in the law obliges newspapers to publish free ads by the military censor denying or correcting information that the papers themselves published.
22
ha-medina be-matsor
(the idea that the state was permanently under siege and could not afford to stoop to the kind of parliamentary controls that are common elsewhere). Israel’s Declaration of Independence, which contains ringing phrases about the equality of all citizens regardless of gender and religion, does not say a word about the freedom of information. Enforcing the public’s duty not to know is the job of the IDF officer in charge of military censorship. This institution was originally established by the British mandatory authorities under the Defense (Emergency) Regulations of 1945 with the intent of combating the unfolding terrorism of those years; once the state was founded Ben Gurion found them so to his taste that he left them unaltered and never got around to replacing them with a more democratic system. The censor exercises draconian power over content in the media, licenses newspapers, and fines and suspends newspapers if, in his view, they have violated secrecy. He does not have to explain the reasons for his decision; indeed one paragraph in the law obliges newspapers to publish free ads by the military censor denying or correcting information that the papers themselves published.
22
From time to time the law savagely bares its fangs. In 1986 a technician named Mordechai Vanunu leaked nuclear secrets to a British newspaper. He was kidnapped by Mossad agents, brought home, put on trial behind closed doors, and sentenced to sixteen years’ solitary confinement (none of which prevented him from being put on the shortlist of candidates for the 1996 Nobel Prize). His case represents the best-known but by no means sole instance of this kind. Yet the veil of secrecy would never have stayed in place had not most of Israel’s media cooperated. From the early fifties on, Vaadat Ha-orchim, a forum of leaders in the print and broadcast media, would regularly meet to receive private briefings from top officials, from the prime minister down. In return they undertook
not
to inform their audiences, a unique arrangement that reflected the public consensus concerning the need for censorship and the goals it strives to achieve.
23
Naturally the arrangement did not apply to foreign journalists who, in practice if not in theory, were nearly free to write and broadcast what they pleased; in the worst scenario they would lose their accreditation. Thus one of the censor’s main functions is to keep Israelis ignorant of what everybody else already knows. This practice applied to the numerous armed reconnaissances of the Sinai and West Bank during the fifties; the decision of the 1965 Arab summit at Rabat to consider the construction of a nuclear reactor at Dimona as a casus belli; the talks held with King Hussein of Jordan during the years after 1967;
24
and, to this day, numerous incidents that take place in Lebanon and elsewhere.
not
to inform their audiences, a unique arrangement that reflected the public consensus concerning the need for censorship and the goals it strives to achieve.
23
Naturally the arrangement did not apply to foreign journalists who, in practice if not in theory, were nearly free to write and broadcast what they pleased; in the worst scenario they would lose their accreditation. Thus one of the censor’s main functions is to keep Israelis ignorant of what everybody else already knows. This practice applied to the numerous armed reconnaissances of the Sinai and West Bank during the fifties; the decision of the 1965 Arab summit at Rabat to consider the construction of a nuclear reactor at Dimona as a casus belli; the talks held with King Hussein of Jordan during the years after 1967;
24
and, to this day, numerous incidents that take place in Lebanon and elsewhere.
Another factor that enabled the IDF to play a major (some would say excessive) role in national decisionmaking is its unified structure.
25
In countries such as the United States, Britain, and Germany the ground forces and navy grew separately. Often each one had a centuries-old tradition behind it—thus not only creating problems coordination but enabling political masters to divide and rule. Not so in Israel, where the air force and navy originally formed an integral part of PALMACH and, through it, Hagana
.
While speaking for all three services, the IDF’s General Staff was also in charge of ground forces, which incidentally has meant that to date, ground officers only have held the position of chief of staff. The commanders of the air force and navy are responsible for looking after their services in peacetime and have considerable latitude in planning, force development, manpower organization, logistics, and intelligence. In wartime they command in accordance with the directives of the COS. They also participate in the meetings of the Plenary General Staff, where rank and status are no different from that of the front and division commanders. However, it has never been made clear whether they do so primarily as General Staff members or as representatives of their respective services.
25
In countries such as the United States, Britain, and Germany the ground forces and navy grew separately. Often each one had a centuries-old tradition behind it—thus not only creating problems coordination but enabling political masters to divide and rule. Not so in Israel, where the air force and navy originally formed an integral part of PALMACH and, through it, Hagana
.
While speaking for all three services, the IDF’s General Staff was also in charge of ground forces, which incidentally has meant that to date, ground officers only have held the position of chief of staff. The commanders of the air force and navy are responsible for looking after their services in peacetime and have considerable latitude in planning, force development, manpower organization, logistics, and intelligence. In wartime they command in accordance with the directives of the COS. They also participate in the meetings of the Plenary General Staff, where rank and status are no different from that of the front and division commanders. However, it has never been made clear whether they do so primarily as General Staff members or as representatives of their respective services.
As this structure indicates, and indeed as was the case during the War of Independence, the bulk of the IDF was formed by the ground forces, which were also regarded as the decisive arm—
zroa ha-hachraa
in Hebrew. They were divided into three regional commands—north, central, and south. In peacetime the commanding officers were responsible for their respective regions. In wartime they turned into operational commanders, taking charge of forces assigned them by the General Staff. As during 1948-1949 the largest permanent formation was the self-contained brigade, the idea being that divisions—let alone corps—were too cumbersome for a comparatively small army. At first there may have been some confusion as to exactly how these forces were to be used. As doctrine crystallized, however, from at least 1954 on they were systematically developed with an eye toward waging offensive or blitzkrieg-style warfare even though the means for doing so were at first primitive and inadequate.
26
zroa ha-hachraa
in Hebrew. They were divided into three regional commands—north, central, and south. In peacetime the commanding officers were responsible for their respective regions. In wartime they turned into operational commanders, taking charge of forces assigned them by the General Staff. As during 1948-1949 the largest permanent formation was the self-contained brigade, the idea being that divisions—let alone corps—were too cumbersome for a comparatively small army. At first there may have been some confusion as to exactly how these forces were to be used. As doctrine crystallized, however, from at least 1954 on they were systematically developed with an eye toward waging offensive or blitzkrieg-style warfare even though the means for doing so were at first primitive and inadequate.
26
Given Israel’s small size—300 miles long, nowhere more than 80 miles wide—inevitably the air force was centralized, subject to a single command, and given control over “everything that flies,” including helicopters. Though much smaller than the ground forces, in terms of budget and owing to the high quality of its personnel the air force claimed priority, hence the considerable rivalry between the “greens” and the “blues” among the ground forces that has characterized the IDF during much of its history. Initially the air force was compelled to use whatever machines Hagana’s foreign agents could lay hands on. This included an incredible assortment of light aircraft (British Austers, American Piper Cubs and Harvards); fighters (German Messerschmidts, British Spitfires and Mosquitoes, American Mustangs), and transports (American-built Constellations, Dakotas, and Stratocruisers). Thanks especially to the U.S. arms embargo (enforced against Israel in 1948 due to political factors), many were purchased not at source but from scrap yards where they had been left at the end of World War II. For example, no fewer than 250 twin-engine Mosquitoes were cannibalized to put together an operational force of some twenty aircraft. In what was to become a grand old IDF tradition, others were modified to carry out missions for which they were never intended; the B-17s ended their days as naval patrol aircraft, a suitable role by virtue of their long ranges.
The paramount mission of the air force has always been to maintain air superiority within Israeli airspace; the importance of this task was made clear by the Egyptian bombing campaign of May 1948, and until the Gulf War of 1991, Israel has been almost completely successful in it. With this goal achieved, it was designed, as the German Luftwaffe had been,
27
to dominate the battlefield. Early doctrinal statements still spoke of “strategic bombing,” but that mission was later dropped, and the IAF became an almost purely operational force meant to strike the enemy’s armed forces and lines of communication.
28
Short distances and the nature of the terrain, much of which consists of desert and does not offer cover, favored these missions. After the early bombers were retired the result was a force that centered almost entirely on its squadrons of fighter-bombers plus maritime patrol, transport, and light aircraft for liaison, rescue, and other missions.
27
to dominate the battlefield. Early doctrinal statements still spoke of “strategic bombing,” but that mission was later dropped, and the IAF became an almost purely operational force meant to strike the enemy’s armed forces and lines of communication.
28
Short distances and the nature of the terrain, much of which consists of desert and does not offer cover, favored these missions. After the early bombers were retired the result was a force that centered almost entirely on its squadrons of fighter-bombers plus maritime patrol, transport, and light aircraft for liaison, rescue, and other missions.
Once the War of Independence ended, foreign-born pilots who had flown for Israel went home, leaving the IAF desperately short of personnel. Aharon Remez, who had been a warrant officer in the Royal Air Force and gained considerable combat experience, was selected as its first commander. Evidently the General Staff felt it had no other qualified airmen,
29
and hence his first replacement was a navy man (Shlomo Shamir, 1950), the second a ground man (Chayim Laskov, 1951). Nevertheless, it did not degenerate into a handmaiden of the ground forces.
30
Instead it argued for a considerable degree of autonomy to conduct its own campaigns and allocated only a limited number of sorties to the ground commanders, who used them as they saw fit by way of their air liaison officers. On the whole, and as long as the opponent consisted of regular forces, these arrangements have worked admirably and enabled the IAF to play a major, even critical role in each of Israel’s major wars. (It should not be forgotten, however, that in 1973 on the southern front, air-to-ground coordination was initially almost absent and that IAF attacks on Israeli units—meaning friendly fire—took place in both the 1956 and 1982 campaigns.)
29
and hence his first replacement was a navy man (Shlomo Shamir, 1950), the second a ground man (Chayim Laskov, 1951). Nevertheless, it did not degenerate into a handmaiden of the ground forces.
30
Instead it argued for a considerable degree of autonomy to conduct its own campaigns and allocated only a limited number of sorties to the ground commanders, who used them as they saw fit by way of their air liaison officers. On the whole, and as long as the opponent consisted of regular forces, these arrangements have worked admirably and enabled the IAF to play a major, even critical role in each of Israel’s major wars. (It should not be forgotten, however, that in 1973 on the southern front, air-to-ground coordination was initially almost absent and that IAF attacks on Israeli units—meaning friendly fire—took place in both the 1956 and 1982 campaigns.)
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