The Sword And The Olive (51 page)
Read The Sword And The Olive Online
Authors: Martin van Creveld
Grenades into Mushroom Clouds: Israeli missile boats on maneuver, 1979.
CHAPTER 16
GRENADES INTO MUSHROOM CLOUDS
I
SRAEL’S MILITARY industries originated during prestate days.
1
During World War I attempts were made to manufacture hand grenades, the necessary molds having been stolen from the Ottoman army. During the period 1919-1939 Hagana also made more or less sporadic efforts to manufacture explosives, small arms ammunition, copies of the Sten submachine gun, and more hand grenades—though some of them were so primitive that they scarcely deserved the name, having casings of concrete instead of steel.
2
From the beginning, manufacture was inseparable from repair and maintenance. Not only were many of the arms smuggled in defective, but once reconditioned they had to be kept in good order. All of this required setting up a certain infrastructure of engineers and technicians that, however, had to operate clandestinely and away from prying British eyes.
SRAEL’S MILITARY industries originated during prestate days.
1
During World War I attempts were made to manufacture hand grenades, the necessary molds having been stolen from the Ottoman army. During the period 1919-1939 Hagana also made more or less sporadic efforts to manufacture explosives, small arms ammunition, copies of the Sten submachine gun, and more hand grenades—though some of them were so primitive that they scarcely deserved the name, having casings of concrete instead of steel.
2
From the beginning, manufacture was inseparable from repair and maintenance. Not only were many of the arms smuggled in defective, but once reconditioned they had to be kept in good order. All of this required setting up a certain infrastructure of engineers and technicians that, however, had to operate clandestinely and away from prying British eyes.
As British troops flooded Erets Yisrael during World War II, Jewish industry was given a tremendous boost. The number of workshops more than doubled to about 1,800; during the war their output was $180,000,000, with military orders accounting for two-thirds.
3
Compared to production in the main industrialized countries at the time, these figures counted for nothing, the more so because heavy industry was almost entirely absent. Compared to local Palestinians, however, the
Yishuv
was already beginning to draw lightyears ahead. Thus in 1947 some 27 percent of the Jewish labor force was engaged in industry and another 60 percent in construction and services, leaving only 13 percent to till the land. At a time when Europe (including the USSR) and the United States still enjoyed a near monopoly on world higher education, much of the Jewish population was European-educated. In the form of the Hebrew University, the Technion, and the Weizman Institute the
Yishuv
possessed institutes of higher learning capable of training first-class engineers and scientists. By contrast, among the Arab population fully 60 percent of the employed population was in agriculture,
4
mostly
felaheen
living in hundreds of miserable villages without a penny to their name, with some Bedouins possessing even less.
3
Compared to production in the main industrialized countries at the time, these figures counted for nothing, the more so because heavy industry was almost entirely absent. Compared to local Palestinians, however, the
Yishuv
was already beginning to draw lightyears ahead. Thus in 1947 some 27 percent of the Jewish labor force was engaged in industry and another 60 percent in construction and services, leaving only 13 percent to till the land. At a time when Europe (including the USSR) and the United States still enjoyed a near monopoly on world higher education, much of the Jewish population was European-educated. In the form of the Hebrew University, the Technion, and the Weizman Institute the
Yishuv
possessed institutes of higher learning capable of training first-class engineers and scientists. By contrast, among the Arab population fully 60 percent of the employed population was in agriculture,
4
mostly
felaheen
living in hundreds of miserable villages without a penny to their name, with some Bedouins possessing even less.
As the War for Independence appeared on the horizon during the last years of the mandate, Hagana’s arms industry expanded. In 1948 it was already manufacturing explosives, fuses, percussion caps, rifle grenades, PIATs, mortars, crude submachine guns, flamethrowers, mortars, various types of mines, and every kind of small arms ammunition used by the IDF. Yet the limits of its capacity are indicated by the fact that it could not undertake to produce a “complex” weapon such as the British Bren medium machine gun, let alone crew-operated weapons systems with internal combustion engines and transmissions consisting of thousands of precision parts. As important as production, repair and maintenance of the arms that now flowed into the country from abroad were required. Not all could be successfully absorbed: Some tanks and artillery arrived in such poor shape that they were never deployed, and the serviceability of IAF aircraft in particular was always rather low. Still it was higher than among the enemy and, at any rate, sufficient to win the war.
This is hardly the place to follow the growth of the military industries during the fifties and sixties, progressing as they did at an equal rate with the Israeli economy as a whole. Suffice it to say that, although by world standards it was still a pygmy, TAAS at the time of the October War was manufacturing most types of ammunition in use by the IDF, from small arms bullets to rockets and bombs for aircraft to 105mm rounds for tank guns, 106mm rounds for recoilless rifles, and 155mm artillery shells.
5
Barrels for these guns, as well as the 30mm aircraft gun used by the IAF, were just beginning to be manufactured by Soltam, a privately owned heavymetal-working company. Yet another company was using German know-how in order to produce gasmasks.
5
Barrels for these guns, as well as the 30mm aircraft gun used by the IAF, were just beginning to be manufactured by Soltam, a privately owned heavymetal-working company. Yet another company was using German know-how in order to produce gasmasks.
In addition to TAAS the ministry of defense turned to RAFAEL (Rashut Le-pituach Emtsaei Luchama, the Weapon Development Authority). Founded during the fifties, it at first had built primitive radio-guided motorboats for use against shipping. When the 1967 crisis broke, it was hard at work on the first generation of Shafrir air-to-air missiles as well as the Gavriel sea-to-sea missile; however, a short-range surface-to-surface missile it tried to develop suffered from guidance problems and was not a success.
6
Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI), founded by Shimon Peres during the mid-fifties,
7
was doing maintenance work and manufacturing the Fouga Magister trainer under license from France, adding rockets and machine guns so it could double as a light close-support aircraft. A few years later Peres also helped set up a variety of electronics industries. Starting with batteries and transistors, they progressed over time to greater things. Among them were communications gear, radar, computers, and, increasingly, guidance systems for families of missiles.
6
Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI), founded by Shimon Peres during the mid-fifties,
7
was doing maintenance work and manufacturing the Fouga Magister trainer under license from France, adding rockets and machine guns so it could double as a light close-support aircraft. A few years later Peres also helped set up a variety of electronics industries. Starting with batteries and transistors, they progressed over time to greater things. Among them were communications gear, radar, computers, and, increasingly, guidance systems for families of missiles.
Many kinds of equipment being produced were standard issue and could be purchased elsewhere. Others, particularly the runway-busting Durendal bomb (see Chapter 11), various types of missiles, and the Uzi submachine gun, were original—the latter even became something of a national symbol. Long before 1967 some equipment was being exported, including, besides the Uzi, mortars, ammunition, and detachable fuel tanks developed to increase the range of IAF fighters.
8
Even more important for the future (as there still could be no question of manufacturing major weapons such as tanks or combat aircraft), the ministry of defense was acquiring an impressive capability for modifying and upgrading the systems it possessed. Perhaps the most visible achievements in this field were the upgraded Super Sherman tanks—ultimately provided with a French lowvelocity 105mm gun instead of the original 75mm gun—as well as the 105mm self-propelled “Priest” artillery piece. The former probably explains the vast discrepancy between the size of the armored corps as it appears in published international sources and its actual strength as given by General Tal—if that was in fact its actual strength. The latter played an important role in the capture of Abu Ageila during the June 1967 war and thus in bringing about the Egyptians’ collapse.
8
Even more important for the future (as there still could be no question of manufacturing major weapons such as tanks or combat aircraft), the ministry of defense was acquiring an impressive capability for modifying and upgrading the systems it possessed. Perhaps the most visible achievements in this field were the upgraded Super Sherman tanks—ultimately provided with a French lowvelocity 105mm gun instead of the original 75mm gun—as well as the 105mm self-propelled “Priest” artillery piece. The former probably explains the vast discrepancy between the size of the armored corps as it appears in published international sources and its actual strength as given by General Tal—if that was in fact its actual strength. The latter played an important role in the capture of Abu Ageila during the June 1967 war and thus in bringing about the Egyptians’ collapse.
By that time, according to an official statement, Israel was self-producing about one-fifth of its defense requirements.
9
This does not mean that building up the military industries was always easy. During the fifties and sixties Israel was—and regarded itself—as a small, dirt-poor, out-of-the-way country, with the result that those trying to build a native manufacturing capability were often perceived as visionaries or worse. The IDF itself was not always cooperative; from the Gavriel missile in the sixties through the Lavi fighter in the eighties to the Chets antiballistic missile in the early nineties, it doubted the ability of native industry to provide it and preferred to look abroad for its requirements. Other bones of contention that arose included the division of tasks between the IDF and industry; for example, whether third-echelon maintenance should be carried out by the IAF or IAI and whether RAFAEL should be allowed to go into manufacturing and thereby occupy a niche competing with other firms. Finally, as the arms industry expanded and became more sophisticated during the seventies and eighties, it sometimes excited the ire of its U.S. counterpart. The Americans feared, not entirely without justification, that by helping the Israelis develop technology, the United States was simply financing its own competition.
10
9
This does not mean that building up the military industries was always easy. During the fifties and sixties Israel was—and regarded itself—as a small, dirt-poor, out-of-the-way country, with the result that those trying to build a native manufacturing capability were often perceived as visionaries or worse. The IDF itself was not always cooperative; from the Gavriel missile in the sixties through the Lavi fighter in the eighties to the Chets antiballistic missile in the early nineties, it doubted the ability of native industry to provide it and preferred to look abroad for its requirements. Other bones of contention that arose included the division of tasks between the IDF and industry; for example, whether third-echelon maintenance should be carried out by the IAF or IAI and whether RAFAEL should be allowed to go into manufacturing and thereby occupy a niche competing with other firms. Finally, as the arms industry expanded and became more sophisticated during the seventies and eighties, it sometimes excited the ire of its U.S. counterpart. The Americans feared, not entirely without justification, that by helping the Israelis develop technology, the United States was simply financing its own competition.
10
Yet the factor that caused the greatest expansion of the arms industry was the Six Day War of June 1967, which left the IDF with a large amount of captured Soviet weapons including tanks, light armored vehicles, artillery, and small arms—not to mention mountains of miscellaneous equipment. Not all proved suitable for Israeli use, but some did, and soon after the war TAAS started producing ammunition for Kalashnikov assault rifles as well as shells for 130mm field guns; by 1970, according to Peres, self-sufficiency in all sorts of ammunition had been achieved.
11
Adapting captured T-54 and T-55 tanks to carry the armored corps’s standard 105mm gun was more difficult; it too was accomplished, albeit at the cost of reducing the tanks’ already limited ammunition payload. Other major tasks carried out in the wake of the Six Day War included the conversion of gasoline-engine tanks to diesel and 90mm guns to 105mm guns.
11
Adapting captured T-54 and T-55 tanks to carry the armored corps’s standard 105mm gun was more difficult; it too was accomplished, albeit at the cost of reducing the tanks’ already limited ammunition payload. Other major tasks carried out in the wake of the Six Day War included the conversion of gasoline-engine tanks to diesel and 90mm guns to 105mm guns.
From the industry’s point of view, an even more important outcome of the Six Day War was the imposition of a French arms embargo, which was later extended to near total. This gave the proponents of native development the rationale they had been looking for.
12
Israel and the IDF, it was argued, constituted a large enough market to justify efforts aimed at attaining self-sufficiency in a very large number of fields, from webbing and ammunition to spare parts to small and even medium arms. As to major weapons systems, complete autonomy clearly was out of reach; even much larger and richer countries such as Britain, Italy, and Germany began pooling their resources during the seventies to develop such systems as the Tornado fighter-bomber. With outside help, however, it might be possible to develop one major weapons system for each field. Since Israeli labor costs remained lower than elsewhere the price was expected to be bearable. Apart from the political advantages of extending the country’s breadth in case of embargo, it would develop the economy, provide employment, and save hard currency (Israel was always short).
12
Israel and the IDF, it was argued, constituted a large enough market to justify efforts aimed at attaining self-sufficiency in a very large number of fields, from webbing and ammunition to spare parts to small and even medium arms. As to major weapons systems, complete autonomy clearly was out of reach; even much larger and richer countries such as Britain, Italy, and Germany began pooling their resources during the seventies to develop such systems as the Tornado fighter-bomber. With outside help, however, it might be possible to develop one major weapons system for each field. Since Israeli labor costs remained lower than elsewhere the price was expected to be bearable. Apart from the political advantages of extending the country’s breadth in case of embargo, it would develop the economy, provide employment, and save hard currency (Israel was always short).
In fact, Israel during these years was flexing its military manufacturing muscle on a scale that had a very significant impact on its own economy (although still small by world standards). As a result, between 1966 and 1968, TAAS’s sales alone rose 74 percent.
13
By 1972 investment in the arms industry was three and a half times greater than in 1967, and between 1968 and 1974 the electronics and metal-working industries together absorbed one-third of all industrial investments made in Israel.
14
Simultaneously the proportion of industrial workers employed in defense doubled from under 10 percent to 19 percent. Even this was nothing compared to what followed: The value of military industrial output rose from $500 million in 1974 to $1,400 million in 1980 to $2,250 million in 1984.
15
By that time defense took up 40 percent of metal demand and 50 percent of electronics demand;
16
having doubled since 1972, the number of employees reached 62,500 and accounted for one-quarter of all employees in industry.
17
13
By 1972 investment in the arms industry was three and a half times greater than in 1967, and between 1968 and 1974 the electronics and metal-working industries together absorbed one-third of all industrial investments made in Israel.
14
Simultaneously the proportion of industrial workers employed in defense doubled from under 10 percent to 19 percent. Even this was nothing compared to what followed: The value of military industrial output rose from $500 million in 1974 to $1,400 million in 1980 to $2,250 million in 1984.
15
By that time defense took up 40 percent of metal demand and 50 percent of electronics demand;
16
having doubled since 1972, the number of employees reached 62,500 and accounted for one-quarter of all employees in industry.
17
Compared to its foreign competitors, Israel’s military industries enjoyed several advantages. Though tucked away in the Middle East and by no means a First World country, from an educational and professional point of view Israel was far ahead of the developing world. Its scientific and engineering elite was better than anything to be found between Rome and Tokyo but cost much less to train and maintain than its counterparts in the West.
18
General conscription, the existence of the reserve system, and the country’s small size meant that this elite was not detached from military affairs, often the case in Western countries in particular. Instead it was intimately involved with the defense establishment; if the scientist or engineer no longer served in the IDF, his or her children almost certainly did. Finally, the October War in 1973 and the numerous skirmishes that followed provided combat experience unmatched by other countries in scale and modernity. In effect, Israel during the mid- to late seventies had become one huge military laboratory.
18
General conscription, the existence of the reserve system, and the country’s small size meant that this elite was not detached from military affairs, often the case in Western countries in particular. Instead it was intimately involved with the defense establishment; if the scientist or engineer no longer served in the IDF, his or her children almost certainly did. Finally, the October War in 1973 and the numerous skirmishes that followed provided combat experience unmatched by other countries in scale and modernity. In effect, Israel during the mid- to late seventies had become one huge military laboratory.
Owing to the high cost of research and development, which has to be spread among as many products as possible, the modern economics of arms production often depends on the ability to export. However, exporting major weapons systems from Israel was difficult given its position as a pariah state; after the 1973 war so many countries had severed diplomatic relations with Israel that the number of foreign embassies fell to around thirty. In the event a handful of Kfir fighter-bombers were sold to several bargain-hunting Latin American countries. A few more Kfirs went to the United States, which substituted them for MIG-21s in air-to-air combat simulations, the characteristics of the two being remarkably similar. That apart, the fact that many foreign military establishments simply could not afford to display the “Made in Israel” label placed a damper on the export of major weapons systems.
But these factors did not apply with the same force to sale of other military equipment. The list of direct customers included dozens of countries on every continent; the list of products, everything from patrol boats, missiles, and electronic equipment down to humble small arms, pistols, and ammunition.
19
Like the notorious arms dealer Sir Basil Zaharoff decades earlier, Israel often did business with both sides of a conflict: Taiwan and Communist China, Chile and Argentina, and Peru and Ecuador, for example.
20
The upgrade kits that Israeli industry developed for aircraft and tanks also showed a potential for export. They appealed to Third World countries, which sought to modernize their own order of battle without breaking the bank; for example, providing active armor for an old tank cost only $10,000, compared to $1-2 million for a new unit.
21
Quantitatively speaking the total export sales in question are said to have risen from $200 million in 1974 to $1,200 million in 1980 (how this may be reconciled with the previously cited
total
output of $1,400 million in the same year is not clear) to $1,400 million in 1984. By that time defense accounted for 40 percent of all industrial exports, excluding diamonds.
22
19
Like the notorious arms dealer Sir Basil Zaharoff decades earlier, Israel often did business with both sides of a conflict: Taiwan and Communist China, Chile and Argentina, and Peru and Ecuador, for example.
20
The upgrade kits that Israeli industry developed for aircraft and tanks also showed a potential for export. They appealed to Third World countries, which sought to modernize their own order of battle without breaking the bank; for example, providing active armor for an old tank cost only $10,000, compared to $1-2 million for a new unit.
21
Quantitatively speaking the total export sales in question are said to have risen from $200 million in 1974 to $1,200 million in 1980 (how this may be reconciled with the previously cited
total
output of $1,400 million in the same year is not clear) to $1,400 million in 1984. By that time defense accounted for 40 percent of all industrial exports, excluding diamonds.
22
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