The Sword And The Olive (55 page)
Read The Sword And The Olive Online
Authors: Martin van Creveld
Sharon may have been acting in the hope that the Syrians would abandon their positions as the IDF, bypassing them on the west, cut the Beirut-Damascus Road, which served as their main line of communications with the Lebanese capital. More likely, though, a clash with the Syrians was planned from the beginning; certainly when the time came ample forces for the purpose were available, ready, and willing. Whether Begin’s Cabinet was informed of the larger plan (as Sharon claims) or whether the former paratrooper commander was once again preparing to exceed instructions (as Begin’s son, Benyamin, says on the strength of alleged conversations he had with his father) is immaterial and almost certainly will never be known.
13
Another possibility that cannot be excluded: Begin, far from being misled, was using Sharon to do much more than he could reveal in public; whatever the prime minister’s faults, a fool he was not.
13
Another possibility that cannot be excluded: Begin, far from being misled, was using Sharon to do much more than he could reveal in public; whatever the prime minister’s faults, a fool he was not.
To carry out the operation Sharon had concentrated an enormous force, no fewer than six and a half divisions and yet another standing in readiness on the Golan Heights in case the Syrians should make a move on that front. Of those earmarked for Lebanon proper, and proceeding from west to east, two were positioned along the coastal road. Commanded by Brigadier Generals Mordechai (later to become minister of defense under Netanyahu) and Yaron, their mission was to link up with another brigade scheduled to carry out a landing at the mouth of the Awali River some thirty miles north of the border. Having done so, the combined force was to drive straight for Beirut, reaching the outskirts after only three days.
In the center a third division under Brigadier General Kahalani—in 1973 he stopped the Syrians at the Valley of Tears—stood ready to take the central route that led through the mountains toward Nabatiye and then toward Siddon on the road to Beirut. Behind him was positioned yet another division under Brigadier General Einan, the intent being to push through the road cleared by Kahalani to advance from Nabatiye and Jezzin toward the road from Beirut to Damascus; had he reached it the Syrian forces in Beirut and the Beqa Valley would have been cut off. Finally, in the Galilee panhandle near Metulla there was concentrated the IDF’s most powerful striking force, a two-division corps commanded by Major General Ben Gal. In October 1973 he had been highly successful as CO of 7th Armored Brigade on the Golan Heights; later he had served as CO Northern Command before going on study-leave. Shaggy, dour, subject to violent outbreaks of temper, he was regarded by Eytan as the IDF’s best field commander and a candidate for chief of staff. Now his mission was to advance toward the Syrian forces deployed in the Beqa Valley.
Otherwise put, the IDF’s plan of operations provided for the deployment of four independent divisions, an amphibious brigade, and a two-division corps (with yet another division standing in reserve). In charge of the whole machine—about twice as large as that in 1973, which had stopped Egypt’s entire army!—was the CO Northern Command, Maj. Gen. Amir Drori. Since this, unlike 1973, was a war on a single front, Eytan was free to control his forces at close quarters. Behind Eytan again stood Sharon, who also had a free hand and, between briefings to the Cabinet, kept visiting the front and acting as a kind of super chief of staff.
Thus the IDF’s command organization was top-heavy, what with Drori, Drori’s deputy, intelligence chief Yehosua Saguy, former intelligence chief Aharon Yariv (who was serving as “head of Northern Command’s think tank”), Refael Eytan, Moshe Levy (Eytan’s deputy), Maj. Gen. (ret.) Yona Efrat (Eytan’s assistant), and Sharon—and during the first two days Begin himself—crowding into the operations room of Northern Command for “Marathonian discussions” that went into the small hours of the night.
14
Remarkably enough it also succeeded in being insufficiently thought through at the lower level since the span of control proved too large for Drori to handle. As in 1973, generals who had nothing to do with the campai gn butted in. The most important one was Yekutiel Adam, former chief of the General Staff Division who was away on study-leave in New York. When war broke out he flew home, packed his gear, marched into Lebanon on some unspecified mission, and ended up getting killed under circumstances that remain unclear.
14
Remarkably enough it also succeeded in being insufficiently thought through at the lower level since the span of control proved too large for Drori to handle. As in 1973, generals who had nothing to do with the campai gn butted in. The most important one was Yekutiel Adam, former chief of the General Staff Division who was away on study-leave in New York. When war broke out he flew home, packed his gear, marched into Lebanon on some unspecified mission, and ended up getting killed under circumstances that remain unclear.
In part, the use of such huge forces in Lebanon—the country is mountainous and, except along the coast, has hardly any first-class highways—may have been dictated by the need to show the USSR, as Syria’s supporter, that any intervention would have to be massive and costly. In part, too, it may have resulted from a dispute between Sharon and Eytan as to where the operation’s center of gravity ought to be—west or east—and a consequent decision to be strong on both axes. Be this as it may, the result was overcrowding: Fuel convoys could not get through, the wounded could not be evacuated, and commanders who went forward to observe got caught in traffic jams and were unable to return to headquarters. Fearing casualties, the IDF did not use its helicopters for seizing key points such as bridges, defiles, and the like that might have enabled it to trap the PLO’s main forces. The latter’s retreat was facilitated by terrain that, except in the Beqa Valley, was either built up or mountainous and heavily wooded.
Along the coast Yaron’s and Mordechai’s forces drove forward ponderously. Whether because of stronger-than-expected Palestinian resistance (as the PLO claims) or because they wanted to save civilian lives by not using all the firepower of their artillery (as they claim), they got entangled in the maze of refugee camps surrounding Tyre and Siddon. Originally they were supposed to reach the Awali after one day;
15
in fact it took them the better part of three. The extra time was burned up in attempts to flush out guerrillas from among the civilian population, which was done by concentrating the latter on the beach and screening them. Eventually several thousand suspects were captured and brought to so-called detainee camps. Since the PLO did not constitute a state, the IDF insisted that its men did not deserve to be treated as POWs; yet since PLO members normally wore uniforms while fighting and had not been captured on Israeli territory, the IDF could not treat them as criminals either. This is as good a sign as any that something was very, very wrong with this war.
15
in fact it took them the better part of three. The extra time was burned up in attempts to flush out guerrillas from among the civilian population, which was done by concentrating the latter on the beach and screening them. Eventually several thousand suspects were captured and brought to so-called detainee camps. Since the PLO did not constitute a state, the IDF insisted that its men did not deserve to be treated as POWs; yet since PLO members normally wore uniforms while fighting and had not been captured on Israeli territory, the IDF could not treat them as criminals either. This is as good a sign as any that something was very, very wrong with this war.
During the night of June 6-7, Israel’s navy, covered by as many as seventeen missile boats and two submarines,
16
started landing what would eventually grow into a brigade at the mouth of the Awali. The landing was carried out practically without opposition; however, in the absence of surprise
17
it achieved little. Moreover, once on the beach the brigade, not having enough vehicles to carry all its troops, was slow to move, and during the next twenty-four hours it could do no more than extend its hold some nine miles to the north. Thereupon it halted, simply waiting for the ground forces to reach it. By the time the linkup was achieved on the morning of the fourth day of the campaign, the Palestinian bird, albeit plucked of its largest feathers, had long since flown. The two divisions then continued driving toward Beirut, reaching the southern outskirts after six days instead of three as planned.
16
started landing what would eventually grow into a brigade at the mouth of the Awali. The landing was carried out practically without opposition; however, in the absence of surprise
17
it achieved little. Moreover, once on the beach the brigade, not having enough vehicles to carry all its troops, was slow to move, and during the next twenty-four hours it could do no more than extend its hold some nine miles to the north. Thereupon it halted, simply waiting for the ground forces to reach it. By the time the linkup was achieved on the morning of the fourth day of the campaign, the Palestinian bird, albeit plucked of its largest feathers, had long since flown. The two divisions then continued driving toward Beirut, reaching the southern outskirts after six days instead of three as planned.
Progress along the central axis was also much slower than expected. First, it was necessary for a commando unit of the Golani Infantry Brigade to take the dominant Beaufort Crusader Castle, an operation that started during the late afternoon of June 6 and took most of the night before finally succeeding.
18
On the morning of June 7 Begin arrived by helicopter to inspect the “awesome monster,” as he called it. He told an Israeli TV audience that the assault had been carried out without loss, which turned out to be untrue (six soldiers had been killed and a number wounded), the result of a misunderstanding between him and GHQ. Then the feckless prime minister was overheard asking whether the guerrillas possessed machine guns, thus showing the world that he was still thinking in terms of the Poland of his youth, where such sophisticated weapons had presumably been few and far between.
18
On the morning of June 7 Begin arrived by helicopter to inspect the “awesome monster,” as he called it. He told an Israeli TV audience that the assault had been carried out without loss, which turned out to be untrue (six soldiers had been killed and a number wounded), the result of a misunderstanding between him and GHQ. Then the feckless prime minister was overheard asking whether the guerrillas possessed machine guns, thus showing the world that he was still thinking in terms of the Poland of his youth, where such sophisticated weapons had presumably been few and far between.
The fortress taken, Kahalani’s advance in this sector was held up less by enemy resistance (there was hardly any) than by the narrow, twisting road his division was navigating. Every time a few machine guns and bazookas opened up, the huge column—with several thousand vehicles to a division—halted; on other occasions delays were caused by tanks overturning and commanders being hit.
19
Behind Kahalani, Einan was on his way by June 8 but lost twelve hours because Kahalani had misunderstood his orders and failed to evacuate a bridge in time—a failure that would cost him his military career. Einan himself fought only one minor engagement against a Syrian commando battalion at Ayn Zachlata. Having crawled forward for three days, he discovered that resistance was becoming more tenacious. When the cease-fire went into effect he was still well short of the Beirut-Damascus highway as ordered; strategically speaking his achievement amounted to nothing.
19
Behind Kahalani, Einan was on his way by June 8 but lost twelve hours because Kahalani had misunderstood his orders and failed to evacuate a bridge in time—a failure that would cost him his military career. Einan himself fought only one minor engagement against a Syrian commando battalion at Ayn Zachlata. Having crawled forward for three days, he discovered that resistance was becoming more tenacious. When the cease-fire went into effect he was still well short of the Beirut-Damascus highway as ordered; strategically speaking his achievement amounted to nothing.
Starting at Metulla, Ben Gal’s corps drove northeast toward the Beqa Valley where the Syrians maintained a reinforced division (another division was stationed west of Damascus and was to start moving into Lebanon on June 10).
20
Even without Einan on his left he enjoyed 2:1 superiority; now he advanced gingerly, overrunning “Fatachland” and driving the PLO before him. However, even more so than along the coast (where there was at least an attempt to provide a blocking force in the form of the amphibious operation and the linkup with Kahalani) there could be no question of preventing hundreds of guerrillas from making good their escape into the Syrian lines. From there they continued to harass the IDF columns advancing from the south and seeking to outflank them from the west. As Palestinians and Syrians became intermixed a clash between the latter and the IDF became inevitable. On June 9 it came, regardless of whether it had been planned by Sharon.
20
Even without Einan on his left he enjoyed 2:1 superiority; now he advanced gingerly, overrunning “Fatachland” and driving the PLO before him. However, even more so than along the coast (where there was at least an attempt to provide a blocking force in the form of the amphibious operation and the linkup with Kahalani) there could be no question of preventing hundreds of guerrillas from making good their escape into the Syrian lines. From there they continued to harass the IDF columns advancing from the south and seeking to outflank them from the west. As Palestinians and Syrians became intermixed a clash between the latter and the IDF became inevitable. On June 9 it came, regardless of whether it had been planned by Sharon.
Throughout these days the IAF had been taking an active part in the campaign. It strafed and bombed targets along the coastal highway in particular but left little impression, for the enemy, having for the most part abandoned all vehicles, walked north in small parties. Now it was presented with the opportunity to show its mettle against the Syrian antiaircraft defenses in the Beqa: nineteen batteries of surface-to-air missiles with the usual support of deadly ZSU 23-4 (meaning four 23mm barrels), capable of spitting out four thousand shells per minute. The IAF for its part had been preparing at least a year, overflying the area in a cat-and-mouse game in order to pinpoint the batteries and discover the Syrian radar operating frequencies.
The details of the attack that began on the afternoon of June 9 have never been divulged.
21
Certainly there must have been a combination of various weapons, including RPVs (sent up to force the Syrians to switch on their radars) and Phantoms and F-16 fighter-bombers, which launched homing missiles at the sites; the missile batteries were probably attacked with cluster bombs, the proper weapon against such soft targets. Long-range artillery may have carried part of the load, the Israelis having developed a rocket-assisted round for the M-107 175mm guns that extended range to as far as twenty-five miles. As the attack began, Syria’s air force scrambled to intercept but found that its planes were identified ahead of time by IAF Hawkeyes and shot down. On June 9 and 10 there accordingly developed a series of massive air-to-air battles during which almost one hundred Syrian fighters were shot down against a single Israeli plane.
21
Certainly there must have been a combination of various weapons, including RPVs (sent up to force the Syrians to switch on their radars) and Phantoms and F-16 fighter-bombers, which launched homing missiles at the sites; the missile batteries were probably attacked with cluster bombs, the proper weapon against such soft targets. Long-range artillery may have carried part of the load, the Israelis having developed a rocket-assisted round for the M-107 175mm guns that extended range to as far as twenty-five miles. As the attack began, Syria’s air force scrambled to intercept but found that its planes were identified ahead of time by IAF Hawkeyes and shot down. On June 9 and 10 there accordingly developed a series of massive air-to-air battles during which almost one hundred Syrian fighters were shot down against a single Israeli plane.
The IAF destroyed the Syrian antiaircraft defense system in Lebanon and eliminated approximately one-fifth of Syria’s air force, which illustrates the IAF’s spectacularly successful engagements. The 100:1 kill-to-loss ratio was better than that in 1967 (30:1) and 1973 (50:1).
22
Yet the IAF’s ability to influence operations on the ground was limited. In the west and center its bombing and strafing sorties were fundamentally irrelevant owing to the nature of the terrain and the nature of the enemy. In the east it did somewhat better, preventing Assad from sending in another division to reinforce troops in the Beqa. Even there, however, the closed terrain apparently prevented the IAF from offering close support, its one attempt to do so ending in disaster on June 10 as its aircraft hit an Israeli armored battalion and thoroughly demolished it. The IAF was also unable to prevent the Syrians in this sector from successfully withdrawing their forces when the time came.
22
Yet the IAF’s ability to influence operations on the ground was limited. In the west and center its bombing and strafing sorties were fundamentally irrelevant owing to the nature of the terrain and the nature of the enemy. In the east it did somewhat better, preventing Assad from sending in another division to reinforce troops in the Beqa. Even there, however, the closed terrain apparently prevented the IAF from offering close support, its one attempt to do so ending in disaster on June 10 as its aircraft hit an Israeli armored battalion and thoroughly demolished it. The IAF was also unable to prevent the Syrians in this sector from successfully withdrawing their forces when the time came.
Meanwhile, cooped up as his corps was between the central massif on the left and the foothills of Mount Chermon on the right, Major General Ben Gal displayed little of the tactical finesse that had earned him his spurs on the Golan Heights in 1973. During the first three days he merely crawled forward, apparently so as not to involve the Syrians in an all-out clash. The Syrian antiaircraft defenses having been eliminated on the afternoon of the fourth day (June 9), he was finally given his head by Northern Command—with Sharon listening to the network and breaking in to tell Ben Gal that the Syrian border should on no account be crossed .
23
Though the IDF’s shortcomings in night-vision equipment had been corrected during the preceding years, evidently corps HQ did not feel it could move in darkness. Instead it allowed the night to be wasted before finally engaging Syrian 1st Division near Lake Karoun on the morning of June 10, destroying some of its tanks and pushing it back.
23
Though the IDF’s shortcomings in night-vision equipment had been corrected during the preceding years, evidently corps HQ did not feel it could move in darkness. Instead it allowed the night to be wasted before finally engaging Syrian 1st Division near Lake Karoun on the morning of June 10, destroying some of its tanks and pushing it back.
Next, Ben Gal’s attention was distracted by the above-mentioned bombing of one of his tank battalions by the IAF; later that afternoon a forward battalion drove forward without reconnaissance at Sultan Yakub, ran into an ambush, and had to be extricated at heavy loss. Though Drori did his best to put fire into Ben Gal, the latter complained that his troops were tired (after a mere single day of fighting) and his vehicles short on fuel;
24
consequently the second night was largely wasted. Granted a respite, the Syrians were able to withdraw in good order, for which Assad later awarded his commander a medal. When the cease-fire went into effect at noon on Friday, June 11, Ben Gal, like his remaining colleagues to the left, still had not reached the vital Beirut-Damascus highway.
24
consequently the second night was largely wasted. Granted a respite, the Syrians were able to withdraw in good order, for which Assad later awarded his commander a medal. When the cease-fire went into effect at noon on Friday, June 11, Ben Gal, like his remaining colleagues to the left, still had not reached the vital Beirut-Damascus highway.
Other books
The Burnt House by Faye Kellerman
Face the Wind and Fly by Jenny Harper
Survivor by Lesley Pearse
La voz de los muertos by Orson Scott Card
Dying for a Date by Cindy Sample
Dominated by the Ghost: An Alpha Ghost BBW Romance by Rebecca Swanson
The Guardian's Protector: The Chamber of Souls by Debbie Kowalczyk
The Girl in the City by Harris, Philip
Finding Mr. Right by Gwynne Forster
Unlucky in Love ( Lucky #1) by Jill Sanders