The Sword And The Olive (58 page)
Read The Sword And The Olive Online
Authors: Martin van Creveld
At the time of this writing hostilities in Lebanon continue and cost the Israelis one or two casualties every fortnight. Countless raids by some of the world’s best troops—including commandos who serve as long as a year in the area
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—two massive invasions, and the repeated use of some of the most technologically advanced weapons in history have failed to silence the guerrillas. Hence, according to press reports,
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the IDF is now much more careful not to target civilians, even if that means fire cannot be returned to the source. Meanwhile the relationship between the number of casualties on both sides has begun to change. It stood at 1:5.2 in the IDF’s favor in 1990, 1:2 in 1991, and was down to 1:1.71 in 1992 and the first months of 1993 .
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Since then, reliable figures have been impossible to obtain; it is worth noting that from 1992 to 1993 the number of incidents more than doubled.
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—two massive invasions, and the repeated use of some of the most technologically advanced weapons in history have failed to silence the guerrillas. Hence, according to press reports,
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the IDF is now much more careful not to target civilians, even if that means fire cannot be returned to the source. Meanwhile the relationship between the number of casualties on both sides has begun to change. It stood at 1:5.2 in the IDF’s favor in 1990, 1:2 in 1991, and was down to 1:1.71 in 1992 and the first months of 1993 .
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Since then, reliable figures have been impossible to obtain; it is worth noting that from 1992 to 1993 the number of incidents more than doubled.
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On the positive side, Israeli public opinion recognizes the fact that its army in southern Lebanon is to some extent being held hostage by the Syrians.
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Hence, and in spite of voices to the contrary, it seems resigned to continuing the struggle as long as necessary and did not waver in its determination following a helicopter crash in February 1997 that killed 73 troops. Above all, in Lebanon the IDF is facing an opponent who, although numerically weak and falling well short of a regular army, consists of uniformed, armed troops rather than of unarmed civilians—many of them women and children, as was usually the case in the Occupied Territories. Therefore, if fighting them is scarcely glorious, at any rate it is not demeaning, and morale, though perhaps not great, has not declined to the point where it constitutes an insuperable problem.
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Judging by its own past performance as well as that of other armies, the IDF will almost certainly be unable to win. Then again, barring a crisis of confidence inside Israel there is no reason why it should lose.
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Hence, and in spite of voices to the contrary, it seems resigned to continuing the struggle as long as necessary and did not waver in its determination following a helicopter crash in February 1997 that killed 73 troops. Above all, in Lebanon the IDF is facing an opponent who, although numerically weak and falling well short of a regular army, consists of uniformed, armed troops rather than of unarmed civilians—many of them women and children, as was usually the case in the Occupied Territories. Therefore, if fighting them is scarcely glorious, at any rate it is not demeaning, and morale, though perhaps not great, has not declined to the point where it constitutes an insuperable problem.
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Judging by its own past performance as well as that of other armies, the IDF will almost certainly be unable to win. Then again, barring a crisis of confidence inside Israel there is no reason why it should lose.
CHAPTER 18
AN INDIAN SUMMER
D
URING ITS three-year adventure in Lebanon, the IDF suffered approximately 650 fatalities, approximately one in 1,700 of the Jewish population per year. During its eight-year adventure in Afghanistan the Soviet army suffered approximately 13,000 fatalities, approximately one in 18,000 of the population per year.
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Following the withdrawal from Afghanistan the Red Army and the USSR disintegrated. Following withdrawal from Lebanon the IDF, though it had taken a beating, survived and, for a time at any rate, appeared to prosper. That it did so is a tribute to its sound structure and, even more so, the patriotism of the Israeli people.
URING ITS three-year adventure in Lebanon, the IDF suffered approximately 650 fatalities, approximately one in 1,700 of the Jewish population per year. During its eight-year adventure in Afghanistan the Soviet army suffered approximately 13,000 fatalities, approximately one in 18,000 of the population per year.
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Following the withdrawal from Afghanistan the Red Army and the USSR disintegrated. Following withdrawal from Lebanon the IDF, though it had taken a beating, survived and, for a time at any rate, appeared to prosper. That it did so is a tribute to its sound structure and, even more so, the patriotism of the Israeli people.
Israel’s efforts to put the Lebanese debacle behind were facilitated by a marked improvement in the international situation. Viewing Israel as an ally in its global fight against communism as well as that against fundamentalist Islam as spread by Iran, the U.S. administration under Pres. Ronald Reagan was as friendly as any since 1948 and much more friendly than Jimmy Carter’s preceding administration. In 1981 it signed the “Agreement for Strategic Cooperation,” undertaking to pre-position some arms on Israeli soil, conduct joint exercises, share some types of intelligence, engage in joint research and development on selected weapons systems, and purchase $200 million (later raised to $300 million) in military equipment each year from the Israeli arms industry.
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The political significance of the agreement was perhaps even greater, for it marked the first time Israel, long accustomed to isolation, entered into something like a formal alliance with another country.
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The political significance of the agreement was perhaps even greater, for it marked the first time Israel, long accustomed to isolation, entered into something like a formal alliance with another country.
Three years later, foreign aid peaked at $4.5 billion per year, which at the time represented no less than 20 percent of Israel’s GNP.
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U.S. support also helped Israel start emerging from its post-1973 isolation as a pariah state. Meanwhile, during much of the 1980s, Egyptian military power stagnated as the country concentrated on combating the internal threat posed by fundamentalist Islam. As for Syria, between 1982 and 1985 it rebuilt its forces with Soviet support. Syria’s grip on Lebanon if anything became even stronger as Assad’s forces destroyed or disarmed the militias of Michel Aoun and Samir Jaja, brought civil war to an end, and made the Arab countries recognize their presence. However, after 1987, Syria found itself increasingly isolated as new Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev signaled that he would not support another war in the Middle East.
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As a result, sources of cheap military technology dried up and Syria’s armed forces became increasingly obsolete. Finally, the ongoing Iran-Iraq War showed no signs of abating, thus taking what was fast becoming the strongest Arab state (Iraq) clean out of the equation.
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U.S. support also helped Israel start emerging from its post-1973 isolation as a pariah state. Meanwhile, during much of the 1980s, Egyptian military power stagnated as the country concentrated on combating the internal threat posed by fundamentalist Islam. As for Syria, between 1982 and 1985 it rebuilt its forces with Soviet support. Syria’s grip on Lebanon if anything became even stronger as Assad’s forces destroyed or disarmed the militias of Michel Aoun and Samir Jaja, brought civil war to an end, and made the Arab countries recognize their presence. However, after 1987, Syria found itself increasingly isolated as new Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev signaled that he would not support another war in the Middle East.
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As a result, sources of cheap military technology dried up and Syria’s armed forces became increasingly obsolete. Finally, the ongoing Iran-Iraq War showed no signs of abating, thus taking what was fast becoming the strongest Arab state (Iraq) clean out of the equation.
An Indian Summer: While the Palestinian uprising was brewing, the IAF practiced air-to-air refueling.
In Israel, following the July 1984 elections, the Government of National Unity was set up. First Shimon Peres, then Yitschak Shamir, became prime minister. Whereas Peres was an excellent diplomat who did much to improve Israel’s international status, Shamir was an introverted, ever suspicious former LECHI member who had risen through the ranks of Mossad and served as minister of foreign affairs under Begin. Whatever their differences, both supported Yitschak Rabin as minister of defense: Peres because he had no choice—as number two on the Labor list Rabin had almost as many adherents as himself—and Shamir because he was aware of his own inexperience in military affairs and because he greatly respected the former chief of staff’s abilities.
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Later, having spent two years in the opposition—during 1990 to 1992—Rabin took over as prime minister while acting as his own minister of defense. Thus, with the exception of those two years, Rabin dominated Israeli defense for a full decade.
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Later, having spent two years in the opposition—during 1990 to 1992—Rabin took over as prime minister while acting as his own minister of defense. Thus, with the exception of those two years, Rabin dominated Israeli defense for a full decade.
As before, Rabin’s ability to get along with the Americans on whom so much depended was an important asset and represented a welcome change from the time when Ariel Sharon, trying to get his way in Lebanon, pounded the table in front of Reagan’s secretary of defense, Caspar Weinberger. As before, by and large Rabin and Peres used this renewed goodwill to the best effect, obtaining first an extra $1.5 billion in aid to fight inflation (in 1985) and then no less than $10 billion in loan guarantees approved by Congress (in autumn 1992). Assisted by falling oil prices from 1986 on, economic growth resumed. In particular, high-tech industries were given a tremendous boost; by the early 1990s the sixty-mile corridor between Tel Aviv and Haifa boasted the second largest concentration of software firms in the world. By 1996, GDP stood at $99.3 billion and per-capita income had reached $16,980. A strong shekel, held up by the U.S. loan guarantees as well as high interest rates, encouraged a flood of imports. For the first time Israel began to feel and look more or less like a Western developed country. Compared to events in neighboring countries, Israel’s economic transformation was dramatic. It produced more than Jordan, Syria, and Egypt combined; the gap in per-capita product stood at 9: 1, 14: 1, and 15 : 1 respectively.
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As the economy expanded, the military budget was cut. Its share of GNP fell from 21.8 percent in 1985 to 19.4 percent in 1987, 16.4 percent in 1988, and 14 percent in 1989. Since then it has continued to decline until it leveled out at approximately 11-12 percent during the early 1990s.
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The share of defense imports went down from 8 percent to 1.5 percent of GNP,
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that of military pay from 40.4 percent of all public salaries (1980) to 34 percent (1995).
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To be sure, these figures tend to underestimate the true cost because they exclude “hidden” factors such as the cost of servicing military debts and the pay of reservists, which is provided by Social Security; it is also not clear if, and where, the cost of the nuclear establishment is tucked in. By international standards the share of defense in GNP and per-capita military expenditures have remained rather high, the latter at $1,300 (1992), roughly equal to the U.S. figure and twice that of a typical West European country.
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The share of defense imports went down from 8 percent to 1.5 percent of GNP,
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that of military pay from 40.4 percent of all public salaries (1980) to 34 percent (1995).
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To be sure, these figures tend to underestimate the true cost because they exclude “hidden” factors such as the cost of servicing military debts and the pay of reservists, which is provided by Social Security; it is also not clear if, and where, the cost of the nuclear establishment is tucked in. By international standards the share of defense in GNP and per-capita military expenditures have remained rather high, the latter at $1,300 (1992), roughly equal to the U.S. figure and twice that of a typical West European country.
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Against this background, the breakneck expansion that characterized the military from 1973 to 1982 could not be sustained. Relative to its neighbors the size of the IDF declined somewhat as progress toward peace lessened the threat of war; in absolute terms, the size of the ground forces steadied as did the number of major formations.
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The air force order of battle also stagnated as older aircraft (Skyhawks) were sold or put into storage.
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The end to growth was accompanied by a spectacular rise in the sizes of the age groups available for service. Between 1960 and 1974 the Jewish population grew by a third, from about 2.2 million to 2.9 million. During the same years the annual birthrate per thousand increased from 22.9 to 36.3.
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Assuming all other factors remained unchanged, this meant that the class of 1992 was twice as large as that of 1978. This does not even account for some 750,000 immigrants who entered the country from 1989 on, about 20 percent being of a military age.
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The air force order of battle also stagnated as older aircraft (Skyhawks) were sold or put into storage.
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The end to growth was accompanied by a spectacular rise in the sizes of the age groups available for service. Between 1960 and 1974 the Jewish population grew by a third, from about 2.2 million to 2.9 million. During the same years the annual birthrate per thousand increased from 22.9 to 36.3.
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Assuming all other factors remained unchanged, this meant that the class of 1992 was twice as large as that of 1978. This does not even account for some 750,000 immigrants who entered the country from 1989 on, about 20 percent being of a military age.
As a result, during the late eighties the manpower shortage that existed during the seventies was transforming into a glut. Though there are no published data, presumably standards rose as it was no longer necessary to scrape the bottom of the barrel and conscript the unwilling, the mentally marginal, and the physically unfit.
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Obtaining a discharge became much easier, and some of the social stigma attached to it lessened as did various restrictions incurred by those who are exempt. Entire groups that used to be called up no longer were (for example, male and female immigrants more than twenty-four and seventeen years old, respectively).
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Moreover, the surplus of young people made it possible to release older classes of reservists, leading to a rejuvenation of the army.
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Obtaining a discharge became much easier, and some of the social stigma attached to it lessened as did various restrictions incurred by those who are exempt. Entire groups that used to be called up no longer were (for example, male and female immigrants more than twenty-four and seventeen years old, respectively).
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Moreover, the surplus of young people made it possible to release older classes of reservists, leading to a rejuvenation of the army.
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The increase in the number of youths inducted each year has had certain negative consequences. From the sixties on, most developed countries have been moving away from universal service toward some form of all-volunteer army because their security was guaranteed by nuclear capability and because such a force structure is more suitable to a modern world where high technology requires lengthy training.
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On the face of it both considerations apply to Israel. On the one hand it too is a nuclear country whose ultimate security rests not with the IDF but with a very few technicians who sit at consoles, fingers on the keys or triggers or whatever. On the other hand the conventional technology is becoming much more sophisticated and tends to demand better training. Although the question has been extensively debated,
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so far a change has been prevented by the desire to retain a large force of trained reservists.
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On the face of it both considerations apply to Israel. On the one hand it too is a nuclear country whose ultimate security rests not with the IDF but with a very few technicians who sit at consoles, fingers on the keys or triggers or whatever. On the other hand the conventional technology is becoming much more sophisticated and tends to demand better training. Although the question has been extensively debated,
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so far a change has been prevented by the desire to retain a large force of trained reservists.
Cynics would add that from the army’s point of view both reservists and conscripts have the extra advantage of being cheap. The fact that reserve pay is provided not by the military but by Social Security has often come under critical fire; it means that IDF commanders do not have to worry about financial consequences when calling up men for duty. Most conscripts so long as they live are paid only around $90 per month. Should they die during active service, rarely are there widows or orphans to support. Apart from the expense of burial—a plot of land, a headstone, and a platoon firing blank cartridges—the state’s cost is substantially limited to $17,000 or so in life insurance. Thus a conscript’s life is valued at two months’ pay of a major general (without benefits); the premium is even deducted from their pay.
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In theory the problem of surplus manpower could have been met by switching to selective service, a system used by many countries particularly during the nineteenth century. Alternatively, the conscript service period could be cut, as in 1964-1965. Against a background of declining willingness to serve, in practice the first alternative is impossible thanks to the need to maintain “the equality of carrying the burden”; the second is impossible thanks to the lopsided relationship between training time and operational utilization that follows. Unable to escape the dilemma, the IDF during the late eighties and early nineties became enormously wasteful of manpower; its supporting services (the combat units, as we shall see, are a different story) are overflowing with conscripts without work. Judging from the fact that in 1995 it was proposed to cut the period of service of soldiers in noncombat units from three to two years, the surplus may be on the order of 30 percent. That proposal having been rejected, some soldiers spend as much as nine of fourteen days at home—a system colloquially known as “5/9.” Apparently it is welcomed by the IDF because it shifts the burden of supporting them to their parents.
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