The Sword And The Olive (68 page)
Read The Sword And The Olive Online
Authors: Martin van Creveld
Even as Israel’s conventional military might increased during the late seventies and early eighties, its entire strategic position was being revolutionized by the widely reported introduction of nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles. Though their existence has never been officially acknowledged, from the early sixties on, the widespread expectation that they would be introduced into the region represented one factor in the strategic calculus both of Israel and its neighbors. By 1973, at the latest, they were playing a critical part in shaping the plans of the Egyptians and the Syrians; subsequently, and as has also happened in
every
other part of the world where states possess nuclear weapons, their presence made the outbreak of another large-scale interstate war less and less likely. During the early nineties it even led to the first tentative exchange of views concerning eventual arms control.
2
every
other part of the world where states possess nuclear weapons, their presence made the outbreak of another large-scale interstate war less and less likely. During the early nineties it even led to the first tentative exchange of views concerning eventual arms control.
2
Following the economic crisis that struck Israel in the mid-eighties, the IDF’s quantitative growth in terms of formations and hardware has ended. Not so qualitative progress; although during the years since 1986 the research and development budget has been cut almost in half,
3
continuing U.S. assistance and burgeoning native defense industries still allowed the introduction of many new weapons and weapons systems, some of which are the envy of the world. Yet when the Gulf War came it turned out that some of Israel’s security problems were simply beyond the IDF’s reach. They could be solved, if at all, only within a larger framework of an alliance with the United States, which alone possessed the necessary means for surveillance, reconnaissance, early warning, and command and control, and which, as the Gulf War demonstrated, might or might not be inclined to put them at Israel’s disposal.
4
Since then, not only has the number and sophistication of surface-to-surface missiles available to various Arab countries grown; the Iranians too were reported to be experimenting with missiles capable of reaching Israel.
5
The development of the Chets notwithstanding, one may conclude as Rabin did
6
that Israel will almost certainly never again enjoy the luxury of waging a war against one or more of its neighbors without its rear being threatened by weapons of mass destruction; indeed in 1997 there were disturbing reports about as many as 120 Syrian missiles standing ready for near-instantaneous launch as well as attempts to develop a new poison gas for them.
7
3
continuing U.S. assistance and burgeoning native defense industries still allowed the introduction of many new weapons and weapons systems, some of which are the envy of the world. Yet when the Gulf War came it turned out that some of Israel’s security problems were simply beyond the IDF’s reach. They could be solved, if at all, only within a larger framework of an alliance with the United States, which alone possessed the necessary means for surveillance, reconnaissance, early warning, and command and control, and which, as the Gulf War demonstrated, might or might not be inclined to put them at Israel’s disposal.
4
Since then, not only has the number and sophistication of surface-to-surface missiles available to various Arab countries grown; the Iranians too were reported to be experimenting with missiles capable of reaching Israel.
5
The development of the Chets notwithstanding, one may conclude as Rabin did
6
that Israel will almost certainly never again enjoy the luxury of waging a war against one or more of its neighbors without its rear being threatened by weapons of mass destruction; indeed in 1997 there were disturbing reports about as many as 120 Syrian missiles standing ready for near-instantaneous launch as well as attempts to develop a new poison gas for them.
7
At the time of this writing the size of the IDF and the weaponry at its disposal remain very impressive, both absolutely and, even more so, relative to the country’s size. Since Egypt and Jordan are at peace with Israel, on paper it has little to fear from its principal remaining enemy, Syria; underneath, though, it is affected by dry rot. Hindsight allows us to identify the beginning of the decline during the mid- to late seventies. Breakneck expansion, triggered by the 1973 October War, was causing the available manpower resources to be stretched to the limit—and beyond. The rate of “churning” increased; organization became more complex and more cumbersome. The results showed themselves in 1982. The Lebanese adventure saw a superbly prepared and equipped but clumsy and heavy-handed armed force that, except in the air, failed to perform as well as expected. Next that force floundered helplessly in the face of a nasty guerrilla war, one that (no doubt because it trusted to a short “operation”) it had neither foreseen nor prepared to counter. This in turn was followed by the IDF’s Indian summer, lasting from the late eighties to the early nineties. As three successive chiefs of staff have admitted, it was during this period that TSAHAL was transformed into a soft, bloated, top-heavy force brimming with surplus and underemployed manpower.
One of the causes as well as symptoms of the decline was the evolving position of female soldiers. As has happened in countless uprisings that took place in other countries, even Muslim ones, so long as it was a matter of fighting the mighty British occupant, the participation of women in the struggle presented no problem. As in other countries, too, no sooner had open warfare broken out before Israeli women were withdrawn from combat units and sent to the rear. Later Israel became the only country in history to subject women to conscription, which, supposing the purpose of waging war is to protect the weak, constitutes a doubtful honor. What saved the situation was the fact that until the late seventies women were secluded in CHEN and their position was marginal. This permitted the IDF to have the best of both worlds, in other words, to make use of women
and
maintain itself as a high-prestige (i.e., male-dominated) institution.
and
maintain itself as a high-prestige (i.e., male-dominated) institution.
From the late seventies on, manpower shortages and then feminist pressures—which, as in other Western countries, were supported by the courts—caused women to become more prominent. By 1997 even the air force was beginning to suffer as female pilot trainees who, despite having been given special privileges (bathing, etc.) failed to complete the course, accused the IDF of discriminating against them and enlisted the support of the Knesset women’s lobby.
8
Elsewhere the growing use of women in nontraditional roles caused all sorts of problems. Pressed from outside, the IDF even experimented with putting women and men destined for noncombat slots into mixed companies and passing them through the same basic training.
9
Should this experiment be judged a success and extended, then it can only lead to a situation where the majority of the IDF’s troops are as well prepared to fight as its women used to be.
8
Elsewhere the growing use of women in nontraditional roles caused all sorts of problems. Pressed from outside, the IDF even experimented with putting women and men destined for noncombat slots into mixed companies and passing them through the same basic training.
9
Should this experiment be judged a success and extended, then it can only lead to a situation where the majority of the IDF’s troops are as well prepared to fight as its women used to be.
Developing from humble beginnings into a magnificent instrument of war, for many years after 1948 the IDF met every military challenge the Arabs presented. Either it won great victories—as in 1956 and 1967—or at least it fought its enemies to a standstill, as in 1969-1970 and (arguably) 1973. During the first week of “Operation Peace for Galilee” it still did fairly well, but not so during the rest of that ill-fated campaign. Much worse was the effect of its attempt to put down the Palestinian
Intifada
that began in late 1987 and in one way or another continues today. Here numerical strength and technical superiority in weapons and weapons systems conferred no considerable advantage. On the contrary: Precisely because it was incomparably stronger than its opponents, the IDF was caught in moral dilemmas with which it could not cope and which continue to haunt it day and night. Though some of the dirtiest work was shifted to Shin Bet and the Frontier Guard, as could have been foreseen and should have been foreseen and was foreseen by some, the longer the struggle, the greater the impact on fighting power.
Intifada
that began in late 1987 and in one way or another continues today. Here numerical strength and technical superiority in weapons and weapons systems conferred no considerable advantage. On the contrary: Precisely because it was incomparably stronger than its opponents, the IDF was caught in moral dilemmas with which it could not cope and which continue to haunt it day and night. Though some of the dirtiest work was shifted to Shin Bet and the Frontier Guard, as could have been foreseen and should have been foreseen and was foreseen by some, the longer the struggle, the greater the impact on fighting power.
In a country that had always prided itself on its citizens’ patriotism, beginning in the early eighties hundreds simply refused to serve and declared themselves prepared to accept the consequences. In addition tens of thousands evaded service by one means or another without the state feeling powerful enough to do something; instead of being denounced, they saw growing social approval of their actions.
10
By 1996 the number of the medically and mentally fit who did not join the conscript force had grown to 7 percent of each age group.
11
Yet for years on end the army averted its eyes, insisting that things were going well and even going so far as to fire officers who called attention to the facts. Cover-ups—real and alleged—trials, accusations, and counteraccusations multiplied; one popular joke even claimed that the reason why retired generals so often served on commissions of investigation was they were used to
fashlot
. All this was to the benefit of nobody but a growing host of lawyers, who proved (not for the first time) that the acronym LIC (low-intensity conflict) really stood for lawyer-infested conflict.
10
By 1996 the number of the medically and mentally fit who did not join the conscript force had grown to 7 percent of each age group.
11
Yet for years on end the army averted its eyes, insisting that things were going well and even going so far as to fire officers who called attention to the facts. Cover-ups—real and alleged—trials, accusations, and counteraccusations multiplied; one popular joke even claimed that the reason why retired generals so often served on commissions of investigation was they were used to
fashlot
. All this was to the benefit of nobody but a growing host of lawyers, who proved (not for the first time) that the acronym LIC (low-intensity conflict) really stood for lawyer-infested conflict.
By the mid-nineties the faith of Israeli society in its military had been broken. As every move came under the closest scrutiny, serious training often became all but impossible, and commanders were afraid of taking responsibility ;
12
things got to the point that each time the IDF warned about a possible war with Syria the media took it as an attempt by commanders to protect salaries and benefits against possible cuts.
13
In response to the barrage of criticism the sons and daughters of the social elite no longer wanted to join the corps of professionals, leaving the field to the less well educated and to the
kippot sruggot
. Those already on active service huddled together and adopted a defensive attitude to the outside world. They closed their eyes to evidence that might have revealed the IDF’s declining prestige,
14
took care to avoid attending civilian symposia dealing with the army and its problems, and hired public-relations experts to make their case for them. In this way the development theory of the sixties was stood on its head. A military that used to regard itself—and was regarded by others—as the vanguard of the nation in many ways has turned into a social anachronism.
12
things got to the point that each time the IDF warned about a possible war with Syria the media took it as an attempt by commanders to protect salaries and benefits against possible cuts.
13
In response to the barrage of criticism the sons and daughters of the social elite no longer wanted to join the corps of professionals, leaving the field to the less well educated and to the
kippot sruggot
. Those already on active service huddled together and adopted a defensive attitude to the outside world. They closed their eyes to evidence that might have revealed the IDF’s declining prestige,
14
took care to avoid attending civilian symposia dealing with the army and its problems, and hired public-relations experts to make their case for them. In this way the development theory of the sixties was stood on its head. A military that used to regard itself—and was regarded by others—as the vanguard of the nation in many ways has turned into a social anachronism.
Worst of all, there is every reason to believe that ten years of trying to deal with the
Intifada
has sapped the IDF’s strength by causing troops and commanders to adapt to the enemy. The troops now look upon mostly empty-handed Palestinian men, women, and children as if they were in fact a serious military threat.
15
Among the commanders, the great majority can barely remember when they trained for and engaged in anything more dangerous than police-type operations; in the entire IDF there is now hardly an officer left who has commanded so much as a brigade in a
real
war. Taking the behavior of the Argentines in the Falklands as our example, one shudders to think what IDF commanders and troops would do if under full-scale attack by real-life soldiers armed not with rocks and knives but with missiles, cannons, and tanks.
Intifada
has sapped the IDF’s strength by causing troops and commanders to adapt to the enemy. The troops now look upon mostly empty-handed Palestinian men, women, and children as if they were in fact a serious military threat.
15
Among the commanders, the great majority can barely remember when they trained for and engaged in anything more dangerous than police-type operations; in the entire IDF there is now hardly an officer left who has commanded so much as a brigade in a
real
war. Taking the behavior of the Argentines in the Falklands as our example, one shudders to think what IDF commanders and troops would do if under full-scale attack by real-life soldiers armed not with rocks and knives but with missiles, cannons, and tanks.
Finally, the internal problems that IDF experiences have not spared Israeli society as a whole—if, indeed, the process has not worked the other way around. Along with faith in the military, faith in the state itself is being undermined.
16
This is shown inter alia by the phenomenal number of injunctions served by citizens against the government in the High Court, as well as the latter’s growing tendency to act as a kind of unelected supergovernment. None of this should come as a surprise. After all, the Soviets’ war in Afghanistan was one of the main factors that led to the disintegration of the USSR. Following the Christmas bombings of December 1972 during the Vietnam War, 250,000 people tried to storm the Pentagon, and the credibility gap that arose from that war has never since closed.
17
In 1958 the Algerian conflict brought France to the verge of civil war, which was averted only by de Gaulle and the establishment of the Fifth Republic. Three years later the generals commanding the army in Algeria rose in revolt. To protect the National Assembly in Paris against an eventual landing by the paras, tanks had to be stationed in front.
16
This is shown inter alia by the phenomenal number of injunctions served by citizens against the government in the High Court, as well as the latter’s growing tendency to act as a kind of unelected supergovernment. None of this should come as a surprise. After all, the Soviets’ war in Afghanistan was one of the main factors that led to the disintegration of the USSR. Following the Christmas bombings of December 1972 during the Vietnam War, 250,000 people tried to storm the Pentagon, and the credibility gap that arose from that war has never since closed.
17
In 1958 the Algerian conflict brought France to the verge of civil war, which was averted only by de Gaulle and the establishment of the Fifth Republic. Three years later the generals commanding the army in Algeria rose in revolt. To protect the National Assembly in Paris against an eventual landing by the paras, tanks had to be stationed in front.
Rabin’s assassination was the warning light. Should Israel persist on its current course of trying to hold on to the Occupied Territories and their inhabitants, in the long run it very likely will come down to civil war, not only of Jew against Jew but of some Jews and some Arabs against some other Jews and some other Arabs; unlike France and the United States, it has neither the Mediterranean Sea nor the Pacific Ocean to provide space and save it from its fate. He who is wise should never engage the weak for any length of time. He who, whether through his fault or that of others, already is involved in such a situation should consider ways to end it as fast as possible. One thinks of
Deuteronomy
, chapter 3, 15-20:
Deuteronomy
, chapter 3, 15-20:
Lo I set before thee today life and the good, death and evil ... and thou shalt choose the good ... so that thou and thine offspring mayest live ... in the country which God the Lord has sworn unto thine fathers Abraham and Yitschak and Yakov to give unto thee.
NOTES
1
D. Ben Gurion,
Yoman Ha-milchama, 1948-1949
[War Diary, 1948-1949] (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense, 1982), vol. 3, p. 1019.
CHAPTER 1D. Ben Gurion,
Yoman Ha-milchama, 1948-1949
[War Diary, 1948-1949] (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense, 1982), vol. 3, p. 1019.
1
M. Naor, ed.,
Al Saf Mea Chadasha: Erets Yisrael Ba-shanim 1897-1902
[On the Threshold of a New Century: Palestine in the Years 1897-1902] (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense, 1979), p. 39.
M. Naor, ed.,
Al Saf Mea Chadasha: Erets Yisrael Ba-shanim 1897-1902
[On the Threshold of a New Century: Palestine in the Years 1897-1902] (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense, 1979), p. 39.
2
Such a journey is described in A. Krinitsi,
Be-Koach Ha-maase
[By the Deed] (Tel Aviv: Masada, 1959), pp. 45-46.
Such a journey is described in A. Krinitsi,
Be-Koach Ha-maase
[By the Deed] (Tel Aviv: Masada, 1959), pp. 45-46.
3
B. Jaffe,
Djokana shel Erets-Yisrael 1840-1914
[A Portrait of Palestine, 1840-1914] (Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1983), p. 200.
B. Jaffe,
Djokana shel Erets-Yisrael 1840-1914
[A Portrait of Palestine, 1840-1914] (Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1983), p. 200.
4
Lord Kinross,
The Ottoman Centuries: The Rise and Fall of the Turkish Empire
(New York: Morrow Quill, 1977), p. 381.
Lord Kinross,
The Ottoman Centuries: The Rise and Fall of the Turkish Empire
(New York: Morrow Quill, 1977), p. 381.
5
A. Blumberg,
Zion Before Zionism, 1838-1880
(Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1985), p. 139.
A. Blumberg,
Zion Before Zionism, 1838-1880
(Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1985), p. 139.
6
G. Biger,
An Empire in the Holy Land: Historical Geography of the British Administration in Palestine, 1917-1919
(New York: St. Martin’s, 1994), p. 154.
G. Biger,
An Empire in the Holy Land: Historical Geography of the British Administration in Palestine, 1917-1919
(New York: St. Martin’s, 1994), p. 154.
7
This and subsequent figures on Jewish demography from M. Eliav,
Erets Yisrael Veyishuvah Ba-mea Ha-tshaesre
[The Settlement of the Land of Israel During the Nineteenth Century] (Jerusalem: Keter, 1978), p. 335.
This and subsequent figures on Jewish demography from M. Eliav,
Erets Yisrael Veyishuvah Ba-mea Ha-tshaesre
[The Settlement of the Land of Israel During the Nineteenth Century] (Jerusalem: Keter, 1978), p. 335.
8
The size of the Arab population is discussed in detail in M. Asaf,
Ha-yechasim ben Aravim Ve-yehudim Be-erets Yisrael, 1860-1948
[The Relationships Between Arabs and Jews in Palestine, 1860-1948] (Tel Aviv: Tarbut Ve-chinuch, 1967), p. 121 ff.
The size of the Arab population is discussed in detail in M. Asaf,
Ha-yechasim ben Aravim Ve-yehudim Be-erets Yisrael, 1860-1948
[The Relationships Between Arabs and Jews in Palestine, 1860-1948] (Tel Aviv: Tarbut Ve-chinuch, 1967), p. 121 ff.
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