The Sword And The Olive (75 page)
Read The Sword And The Olive Online
Authors: Martin van Creveld
29
Weizman,
On Eagle’s Wings
, p. 101.
Weizman,
On Eagle’s Wings
, p. 101.
30
For details see Tsiddon,
Ba-yom, Ba-layil, Ba-arafel
, pp. 322-324. Tsiddon, incidentally, claims to have developed the weapon himself.
For details see Tsiddon,
Ba-yom, Ba-layil, Ba-arafel
, pp. 322-324. Tsiddon, incidentally, claims to have developed the weapon himself.
31
For the mechanics see Luttwak and Horowitz,
The Israeli Army
, pp. 196-197.
For the mechanics see Luttwak and Horowitz,
The Israeli Army
, pp. 196-197.
32
Cf. R. S. and W. S. Churchill,
The Six Day War
(London: Heinemann, 1967), p. 66, for a graphic description of the IAF’s methods.
Cf. R. S. and W. S. Churchill,
The Six Day War
(London: Heinemann, 1967), p. 66, for a graphic description of the IAF’s methods.
33
E. Haber,
Ha-yom Tifrots Milchama
[Today War Will Break Out] (Tel Aviv: Idanim, 1987), p. 125.
E. Haber,
Ha-yom Tifrots Milchama
[Today War Will Break Out] (Tel Aviv: Idanim, 1987), p. 125.
34
S. Peres,
Lech im Anashim
[Go with People] (Jerusalem: Idanim, 1978), p. 47.
S. Peres,
Lech im Anashim
[Go with People] (Jerusalem: Idanim, 1978), p. 47.
35
This and the following episode are described in Naor,
Laskov
, p. 283 ff.
This and the following episode are described in Naor,
Laskov
, p. 283 ff.
36
S. Rolbant,
The Israeli Soldier: Profile of an Army
(New York: Barnes, 1970); Z. Schiff,
A History of the Israeli Army
(San Francisco: Straight Arrow Books, 1974); J. Larteguy,
The Walls of Israel
, p. 161.
S. Rolbant,
The Israeli Soldier: Profile of an Army
(New York: Barnes, 1970); Z. Schiff,
A History of the Israeli Army
(San Francisco: Straight Arrow Books, 1974); J. Larteguy,
The Walls of Israel
, p. 161.
37
For the failure of the Egyptian efforts see Saad el Shazly,
The Crossing of the Suez
(San Francisco: American Mideast Research, 1980), pp. 79-80.
For the failure of the Egyptian efforts see Saad el Shazly,
The Crossing of the Suez
(San Francisco: American Mideast Research, 1980), pp. 79-80.
38
Y. Melman and D. Raviv,
Meraglim lo Mushlamim
[Imperfect Spies] (Tel Aviv: Maariv, 1990), pp. 117-120.
Y. Melman and D. Raviv,
Meraglim lo Mushlamim
[Imperfect Spies] (Tel Aviv: Maariv, 1990), pp. 117-120.
39
Haber,
Ha-yom Tifrots Milchama
, p. 61.
Haber,
Ha-yom Tifrots Milchama
, p. 61.
40
Peres interview with
Der Spiegel
, February 24, 1965.
Peres interview with
Der Spiegel
, February 24, 1965.
41
For an account of his reasoning see S. Aronson,
The Politics and Strategy of Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East
(New York: State University of New York, 1992), p. 48 ff.
For an account of his reasoning see S. Aronson,
The Politics and Strategy of Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East
(New York: State University of New York, 1992), p. 48 ff.
42
Cf. S. Hersh,
The Samson Option: Israel’s Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy
(New York: Random House, 1991), chap. 2.
Cf. S. Hersh,
The Samson Option: Israel’s Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy
(New York: Random House, 1991), chap. 2.
43
Peres on Israel TV, October 30, 1996.
Peres on Israel TV, October 30, 1996.
44
Cf. Y. Allon,
Masach shel Chol
[A Curtain of Sand] (Tel Aviv: Ha-kibbuts Ha-meuchad, 1959). This is the most sustained argument in favor of a conventional strategy ever written by an Israeli.
Cf. Y. Allon,
Masach shel Chol
[A Curtain of Sand] (Tel Aviv: Ha-kibbuts Ha-meuchad, 1959). This is the most sustained argument in favor of a conventional strategy ever written by an Israeli.
45
Hersh,
The Samson Option,
p. 71 ff.
Hersh,
The Samson Option,
p. 71 ff.
46
P. Pean,
Les deux bombes
(Paris: Fayard, 1982), pp. 113-121
.
P. Pean,
Les deux bombes
(Paris: Fayard, 1982), pp. 113-121
.
47
For discussions of Eshkol’s performance as minister of defense see Haber,
Ha-yom Tifrots Milchama
, pp. 42, 48, 133; Y. Rabin,
Pinkas Sherut
[A Service Record] (Tel Aviv: Maariv), vol. 1, pp. 112-114, 121; Perlmutter,
Military and Politics in Israel
, pp. 106-107.
For discussions of Eshkol’s performance as minister of defense see Haber,
Ha-yom Tifrots Milchama
, pp. 42, 48, 133; Y. Rabin,
Pinkas Sherut
[A Service Record] (Tel Aviv: Maariv), vol. 1, pp. 112-114, 121; Perlmutter,
Military and Politics in Israel
, pp. 106-107.
48
S. Peres,
Battling for Peace
(London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1995), p. 166.
S. Peres,
Battling for Peace
(London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1995), p. 166.
49
Haber,
Ha-yom Tifrots Milchama
, p. 42; M. Brecher,
The Foreign Policy System of Israel
(London: Oxford University Press, 1972), pp. 215, 220
.
Haber,
Ha-yom Tifrots Milchama
, p. 42; M. Brecher,
The Foreign Policy System of Israel
(London: Oxford University Press, 1972), pp. 215, 220
.
50
Cf. Y. Chasdai,
Emet Be-tsel Ha-milchama
[Truth in the Shadow of War] (Tel Aviv: Zmora Bitan, 1978), p. 19.
Cf. Y. Chasdai,
Emet Be-tsel Ha-milchama
[Truth in the Shadow of War] (Tel Aviv: Zmora Bitan, 1978), p. 19.
51
D. Ben Gurion,
Yoman Ha-milchama, 1948-1949
[War Diary, 1948-1949] (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense, 1982), vol. 1, p. 270, entry for March 29, 1948.
D. Ben Gurion,
Yoman Ha-milchama, 1948-1949
[War Diary, 1948-1949] (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense, 1982), vol. 1, p. 270, entry for March 29, 1948.
52
Bar Kochva,
Merkevot Ha-plada
, p. 515.
Bar Kochva,
Merkevot Ha-plada
, p. 515.
53
U. Narkis,
Chayal shel Yerushalayim
[A Soldier for Jerusalem] (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense, 1991), p. 297.
U. Narkis,
Chayal shel Yerushalayim
[A Soldier for Jerusalem] (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense, 1991), p. 297.
54
Chasdai,
Emet Be-tsel Ha-milchama
, p. 21.
Chasdai,
Emet Be-tsel Ha-milchama
, p. 21.
55
Larteguy,
The Walls of Israel
, p. 145.
Larteguy,
The Walls of Israel
, p. 145.
56
D. Ben Gurion,
Yichud Ve-yeud: Devarim al Bitchon Yisrael
[A Unique Destiny: Notes on Israeli Defense] (Tel Aviv: Maarachot, 1971), p. 176.
D. Ben Gurion,
Yichud Ve-yeud: Devarim al Bitchon Yisrael
[A Unique Destiny: Notes on Israeli Defense] (Tel Aviv: Maarachot, 1971), p. 176.
57
Cf. D. Horowitz, “Flexible Responsiveness and Military Strategy: The Case of the Israeli Army,”
Policy Science
1 (1970): 191-205; also M. van Creveld,
Command in War
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 198-199.
Cf. D. Horowitz, “Flexible Responsiveness and Military Strategy: The Case of the Israeli Army,”
Policy Science
1 (1970): 191-205; also M. van Creveld,
Command in War
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 198-199.
58
Y. Rabin, “Acharei Ha-timron Ha-gadol” [After the Great Maneuvers],
Maarachot
special issue (August 1960): 6-9.
Y. Rabin, “Acharei Ha-timron Ha-gadol” [After the Great Maneuvers],
Maarachot
special issue (August 1960): 6-9.
59
Cf. W. Laqueur,
The Road to War 1967: The Origins of the Arab-Israel Conflict
(London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969 ed.), chap. 2.
Cf. W. Laqueur,
The Road to War 1967: The Origins of the Arab-Israel Conflict
(London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969 ed.), chap. 2.
60
The Samua raid is analyzed in great detail in A. Ayalon, “Mivtsa Magressa” [Operation Shredder],
Maarachot
261/262 (March-April 1978): 27-38.
The Samua raid is analyzed in great detail in A. Ayalon, “Mivtsa Magressa” [Operation Shredder],
Maarachot
261/262 (March-April 1978): 27-38.
61
Rabin,
Pinkas Sherut
, vol. 1, p. 121.
Rabin,
Pinkas Sherut
, vol. 1, p. 121.
62
A blow-by-blow description of this and the following incidents may be found in O. Bull,
War and Peace in the Middle East: The Experience and Views of a U.N. Observer
(London: Cooper, 1973), p. 75 ff.
A blow-by-blow description of this and the following incidents may be found in O. Bull,
War and Peace in the Middle East: The Experience and Views of a U.N. Observer
(London: Cooper, 1973), p. 75 ff.
63
The incidents are described in Rabin,
Pinkas Sherut
, vol. 1, pp. 121-123; cf. also S. Teveth,
The Tanks of Tammuz
(London: Sphere Books, 1970), p. 56 ff., and N. Bar Tov,
Dado
:
Arbaim U-smoneh Shanim Ve-esrim Yom
[Dado: Forty-Eight Years and Twenty Days] (Tel Aviv: Maariv, 1978), vol. 1, pp. 106-107.
The incidents are described in Rabin,
Pinkas Sherut
, vol. 1, pp. 121-123; cf. also S. Teveth,
The Tanks of Tammuz
(London: Sphere Books, 1970), p. 56 ff., and N. Bar Tov,
Dado
:
Arbaim U-smoneh Shanim Ve-esrim Yom
[Dado: Forty-Eight Years and Twenty Days] (Tel Aviv: Maariv, 1978), vol. 1, pp. 106-107.
64
Rabin,
Pinkas Sherut
, vol. 1, p. 125. Here the chief of staff mistakenly says that the Syrians had given up
two
years before the 1967 war rather than one.
Rabin,
Pinkas Sherut
, vol. 1, p. 125. Here the chief of staff mistakenly says that the Syrians had given up
two
years before the 1967 war rather than one.
65
Bull,
War and Peace in the Middle East
, p. 101. In the last interview he ever gave, Dayan even claimed that 80 percent of the incidents had been deliberately provoked by Israel;
Yediot Acharonot
, April 27, 1997, p. 3.
Bull,
War and Peace in the Middle East
, p. 101. In the last interview he ever gave, Dayan even claimed that 80 percent of the incidents had been deliberately provoked by Israel;
Yediot Acharonot
, April 27, 1997, p. 3.
66
Bull,
War and Peace in the Middle East
, pp. 109-110
.
Bull,
War and Peace in the Middle East
, pp. 109-110
.
67
Weizman,
On Eagle’s Wings
, p. 197; also Peres,
Battling for Peace
, p. 101.
Weizman,
On Eagle’s Wings
, p. 197; also Peres,
Battling for Peace
, p. 101.
68
Rabin,
Pinkas Sherut
, vol. 1, p. 125.
Rabin,
Pinkas Sherut
, vol. 1, p. 125.
69
Yediot Acharonot
, April 8, 1967, p. 5.
Yediot Acharonot
, April 8, 1967, p. 5.
70
For the role played by the Soviets see Laqueur,
The Road to War
, pp. 40-41.
For the role played by the Soviets see Laqueur,
The Road to War
, pp. 40-41.
71
British Foreign Office memo, March 16, 1966, Public Record Office, Kew, FO/371/18684.
British Foreign Office memo, March 16, 1966, Public Record Office, Kew, FO/371/18684.
72
For the details see Hersh,
The Samson Option
, chaps. 8 and 9; also McG. Bundy,
Danger and Survival: The Political History of the Nuclear Weapon
(New York: Random House, 1988), p. 510.
For the details see Hersh,
The Samson Option
, chaps. 8 and 9; also McG. Bundy,
Danger and Survival: The Political History of the Nuclear Weapon
(New York: Random House, 1988), p. 510.
73
The most detailed account of these events is O. Brosh, “Tfissot shel Ha-meimad Ha-garini Be-sichsuchim Ezoriyim Rav-Tsdadiyim Ve-emdot Be-inyanan” [Perceptions and Public Attitudes Toward the Nuclear Dimension in Multinational Regional Conflicts] (Ph.D. thesis, Hebrew University, Jersualem, 1990), vol. 1, pp. 63-66.
The most detailed account of these events is O. Brosh, “Tfissot shel Ha-meimad Ha-garini Be-sichsuchim Ezoriyim Rav-Tsdadiyim Ve-emdot Be-inyanan” [Perceptions and Public Attitudes Toward the Nuclear Dimension in Multinational Regional Conflicts] (Ph.D. thesis, Hebrew University, Jersualem, 1990), vol. 1, pp. 63-66.
74
For these events, as well as the relevant sources, see M. van Creveld,
Nuclear Proliferation and the Future of Conflict
(New York: Free Press, 1993), pp. 107-108.
For these events, as well as the relevant sources, see M. van Creveld,
Nuclear Proliferation and the Future of Conflict
(New York: Free Press, 1993), pp. 107-108.
75
Al-Difa
[Amman, Arabic], May 12, 1966;
New York Times
, January 4, 1966. The story was later confirmed by Ismail Fahmi in
Al Shab
[Cairo, Arabic], February 17, 1971, and in
Al Aharam
[Cairo, Arabic], February 26, 1971.
Al-Difa
[Amman, Arabic], May 12, 1966;
New York Times
, January 4, 1966. The story was later confirmed by Ismail Fahmi in
Al Shab
[Cairo, Arabic], February 17, 1971, and in
Al Aharam
[Cairo, Arabic], February 26, 1971.
76
Telegram, U.S. Ambassador, Cairo, to State Department, April 11, 1964, No. A 737, LBJ Library, NSF Country File UAR, Box 158, item 39; quoted in Aronson,
The Politics and Strategy of Nuclear Weapons
, pp. 198-199.
Telegram, U.S. Ambassador, Cairo, to State Department, April 11, 1964, No. A 737, LBJ Library, NSF Country File UAR, Box 158, item 39; quoted in Aronson,
The Politics and Strategy of Nuclear Weapons
, pp. 198-199.
77
E.g.,
Al Achbar
[Cairo], February 5, 1965;
Al-Thwara Arabia
[Baghdad], February 7, 1966; Radio Baghdad, May 6 and 10, 1966; and
Al-Manar
[Amman], February 14, 1967.
E.g.,
Al Achbar
[Cairo], February 5, 1965;
Al-Thwara Arabia
[Baghdad], February 7, 1966; Radio Baghdad, May 6 and 10, 1966; and
Al-Manar
[Amman], February 14, 1967.
78
Al Nahar
[Beirut], May 21, 1963, quoted in
Maarachot
155 (November 1963): 10;
Al Aharam
[Cairo], August 20, 1965 and January 8, 1966.
Al Nahar
[Beirut], May 21, 1963, quoted in
Maarachot
155 (November 1963): 10;
Al Aharam
[Cairo], August 20, 1965 and January 8, 1966.
79
Cf. Abdel Ghani el Gamasy,
The October War
(Cairo: American University Press, 1993), p. 23; also A. E. Levite and E. B. Landau,
Be-einei Ha-aravim: Dimuya Ha-garini shel Yisrael
[In Arab Eyes: Israel’s Nuclear Image] (Tel Aviv: Papyrus, 1994), p. 42, and the sources therein quoted.
Cf. Abdel Ghani el Gamasy,
The October War
(Cairo: American University Press, 1993), p. 23; also A. E. Levite and E. B. Landau,
Be-einei Ha-aravim: Dimuya Ha-garini shel Yisrael
[In Arab Eyes: Israel’s Nuclear Image] (Tel Aviv: Papyrus, 1994), p. 42, and the sources therein quoted.
80
Ibid., p. 41.
Ibid., p. 41.
81
Ha-arets
, August 8, 1996, p. 1. This is based on a statement by a TAAS man, M. Merdor.
Ha-arets
, August 8, 1996, p. 1. This is based on a statement by a TAAS man, M. Merdor.
82
Peres,
Battling for Peace
, p. 167.
Peres,
Battling for Peace
, p. 167.
83
Ibid., p. 101
.
Ibid., p. 101
.
84
The various statements are summarized in M. Gilboa,
Shesh Shanim Ve-shisha Yamim: Mekoroteah Ve-koroteah shel Michlemet Sheshet Ha-yamim
[Six Years and Six Days: The Origins and Course of the Six Day War] (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1969), pp. 98 and 101.
The various statements are summarized in M. Gilboa,
Shesh Shanim Ve-shisha Yamim: Mekoroteah Ve-koroteah shel Michlemet Sheshet Ha-yamim
[Six Years and Six Days: The Origins and Course of the Six Day War] (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1969), pp. 98 and 101.
85
Haber,
Ha-yom Tifrots Milchama
, p. 54.
Haber,
Ha-yom Tifrots Milchama
, p. 54.
86
Cf. Dayan,
Avnei Derech
, p. 396.
Cf. Dayan,
Avnei Derech
, p. 396.
87
M. Zak,
Hussein Osse Shalom
[Hussein Makes Peace] (Ramat Gan: Bar Illan University Press), p. 35 ff.
M. Zak,
Hussein Osse Shalom
[Hussein Makes Peace] (Ramat Gan: Bar Illan University Press), p. 35 ff.
88
Rabin,
Pinkas Sherut
, vol. 1, p. 136; Weizman,
On Eagle’s Wings
, pp. 199-200.
Rabin,
Pinkas Sherut
, vol. 1, p. 136; Weizman,
On Eagle’s Wings
, pp. 199-200.
89
Weizman,
On Eagle’s Wings
, pp. 202-203.
Weizman,
On Eagle’s Wings
, pp. 202-203.
90
L. Rabin,
Kol Ha-zman Ishto
[Always His Wife] (Tel Aviv: Idanim, 1988), p. 112.
L. Rabin,
Kol Ha-zman Ishto
[Always His Wife] (Tel Aviv: Idanim, 1988), p. 112.
91
Figures on the IDF’s strength in this period range from 180,000 (Haber,
Ha-yom Tifrots Milchama
, p. 202) to 300,000 (S. Ali El-Edroos,
The Hassemite Arab Army, 1909-1979
[Amman: The Publishing Committee, 1980], p. 350). The last-named figure is probably inflated to show how heroic Jordan’s army was; the former was understated in order to disguise Israel’s true strength.
Figures on the IDF’s strength in this period range from 180,000 (Haber,
Ha-yom Tifrots Milchama
, p. 202) to 300,000 (S. Ali El-Edroos,
The Hassemite Arab Army, 1909-1979
[Amman: The Publishing Committee, 1980], p. 350). The last-named figure is probably inflated to show how heroic Jordan’s army was; the former was understated in order to disguise Israel’s true strength.
92
Y. Tal,
Bitachon Leumi—Meatim Mul Rabim
[National Defense—the Few Against the Many] (Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1996), p. 142. Some confirmation that this was indeed the true figure may be found in A. Braun,
Moshe Dayan Be-milchemt Yom Ha-kippurim
[Moshe Dayan in the Yom Kippur War] (Tel Aviv: Idanim, 1993), pp. 131, 137. According to him, Dayan on October 9, 1973, said that the IDF, having lost about 500 tanks (100 in the north, 400 in the south), was back to the number it had had in 1967.
Y. Tal,
Bitachon Leumi—Meatim Mul Rabim
[National Defense—the Few Against the Many] (Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1996), p. 142. Some confirmation that this was indeed the true figure may be found in A. Braun,
Moshe Dayan Be-milchemt Yom Ha-kippurim
[Moshe Dayan in the Yom Kippur War] (Tel Aviv: Idanim, 1993), pp. 131, 137. According to him, Dayan on October 9, 1973, said that the IDF, having lost about 500 tanks (100 in the north, 400 in the south), was back to the number it had had in 1967.
93
E.g., R. S. and W. Churchill,
The Six Day War
, p. 27; Luttwak and Horowitz,
The Israeli Army
, p. 215; Laqueur,
The Road to War
, p. 68.
E.g., R. S. and W. Churchill,
The Six Day War
, p. 27; Luttwak and Horowitz,
The Israeli Army
, p. 215; Laqueur,
The Road to War
, p. 68.
94
Rabin,
Pinkas Sherut
, vol. 1, p. 150.
Rabin,
Pinkas Sherut
, vol. 1, p. 150.
95
For this episode see Gilboa,
Shesh Shanim Ve-shisha Yamim
, p. 168.
For this episode see Gilboa,
Shesh Shanim Ve-shisha Yamim
, p. 168.
96
Haber,
Ha-yom Tifrots Milchama
, p. 203.
Haber,
Ha-yom Tifrots Milchama
, p. 203.
97
Ibid., p. 162.
CHAPTER 11Ibid., p. 162.
1
Y. Rabin,
Pinkas Sherut
[A Service Record] (Tel Aviv: Maariv), vol. 1, p. 142; also Abdel Ghani el Gamasy,
The October War
(Cairo: American University Press, 1993), p. 38.
Y. Rabin,
Pinkas Sherut
[A Service Record] (Tel Aviv: Maariv), vol. 1, p. 142; also Abdel Ghani el Gamasy,
The October War
(Cairo: American University Press, 1993), p. 38.
2
Dr. S. Mutawi, Jordanian representative to a Washington, D.C., conference, June 1992, quoted in interview with Maj. Gen. (ret.) M. Amit,
Maarachot
325 (June-July 1992): 15.
Dr. S. Mutawi, Jordanian representative to a Washington, D.C., conference, June 1992, quoted in interview with Maj. Gen. (ret.) M. Amit,
Maarachot
325 (June-July 1992): 15.
3
M. Zak,
Hussein Osse Shalom
[Hussein Makes Peace] (Ramat Gan: Bar Illan University Press), p. 106.
M. Zak,
Hussein Osse Shalom
[Hussein Makes Peace] (Ramat Gan: Bar Illan University Press), p. 106.
4
S. Ali El-Edroos,
The Hassemite Arab Army, 1909-1979
(Amman: The Publishing Committee, 1980), p. 362.
S. Ali El-Edroos,
The Hassemite Arab Army, 1909-1979
(Amman: The Publishing Committee, 1980), p. 362.
5
According to M. Dayan,
Avnei Derech
[Memoirs] (Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1976), p. 473, they did have a plan for invading the upper Jordan Valley but cancelled it during the night of June 5-6 when the extent of the Egyptian defeat became clear.
According to M. Dayan,
Avnei Derech
[Memoirs] (Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1976), p. 473, they did have a plan for invading the upper Jordan Valley but cancelled it during the night of June 5-6 when the extent of the Egyptian defeat became clear.
6
Damascus Radio, July 7, 1966; and the Syrian newspaper
Al-Mussawar
, December 16, 1966. On Syrian support for PLO terrorism inside Israel see also W. Laqueur,
The Road to War 1967: The Origins of the Arab-Israel Conflict
(London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969 ed.), p. 55 ff.
Damascus Radio, July 7, 1966; and the Syrian newspaper
Al-Mussawar
, December 16, 1966. On Syrian support for PLO terrorism inside Israel see also W. Laqueur,
The Road to War 1967: The Origins of the Arab-Israel Conflict
(London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969 ed.), p. 55 ff.
7
International Institute for Strategic Studies,
The Military Balance, 1967-1968
(London: IISS, 1968), pp. 40-41.
International Institute for Strategic Studies,
The Military Balance, 1967-1968
(London: IISS, 1968), pp. 40-41.
8
Military Attaché, Damascus, “Annual Report on Syrian Armed Forces,” January 21, 1966, FO/371/186923.
Military Attaché, Damascus, “Annual Report on Syrian Armed Forces,” January 21, 1966, FO/371/186923.
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