46 Y. Amir, “Bnei Kibbutsim Be-TSAHAL” [ Kibbuts Children in the IDF], Megamot 15:2-3 (August 1967): 250-258.
47 For details about the arrangement see S. Cohen, The Scroll or the Sword? Dilemmas of Religion and Military Service in Israel (Amsterdam: Harwood, 1997), p. 105 ff.
48 Y. Peri, “Ofyah Ha-idiologi shel Ha-elita Ha-tsvait Ha-yisraelit” [The Ideological Character of Israel’s Military Elite], Medina, Mimshal Ve-yechasim Benleumiyim 6 (Autumn 1974): 146-155.
49 Yediot Acharonot weekend magazine, August 30, 1996, p. 5.
50 Bitaon Chel Ha-avir 103 (June 1995): 8, and ibid. 109 (June 1996): 12; interview with Brig. Gen. Yair Nave, chief infantry and parachute officer, Ha-tsofe , September 13, 1996, p. 2
51 E.g., cf. Dudi Shalom, Ech Ossim Chidush Irguni: Hakamat Mifkedet Chelot Ha-sadeh (MAFCHASH) Be-TSAHAL [The Making of Organizational Innovation: Setting up MAFCHASH] (Tel Aviv: The Institute for Management, 1995), pp. 40-41, 145.
52 For Dan Shomron’s views on this subject see A. Levite, “Changes of the Guard in Israel,” Armed Forces Journal International (June 1987): 50-51.
54 Yediot Acharonot , September 7, 1997, p. 1. In fact, since a problem with a glider prevented the lieutenant from reaching the scene on time, the mission was carried out by a senior NCO.
55 A. Fishman, “Yoter Miday Generalim” [A Surfeit of Generals], Yediot Acharonot weekend magazine, October 6, 1995, pp. 12-13, 26. The existence of a problem is admitted in Brigadier X, “Koach Ha-adam Be-TSAHAL” [IDF Manpower], Maarachot 330 (May-June 1993): 2-4.
56 D. Kochav, “The Economics of Defense—Israel,” in L. Williams, ed., Military Aspects of the Israeli-Arab Conflict (Tel Aviv: University Publishing Projects, 1975), p. 181.
57 Fishman, “Yoter Midday Generalim,” p. 13; also Cohen, Towards a New Portrait , p. 109.
58 Data about the pay of Israeli officers in E. Blanche, “Middle East: Is the Myth Fading for the Israeli Army?” Jane’s Intelligence Review , October 1, 1996.
59 E. Klein, “Taasiyot Bitchoniyot al Shulchan Ha-nituchim” [Defense Industries on the Operating Table], Yediot Acharonot , August 23, 1994, pp. 10-11.
60 A. Egozi, “Ech Mochrim ‘Migim’ le-Zambia” [Selling MIGs to Zambia], Yediot Acharonot , November 29, 1996.
61 The most recent list of Israeli-made missiles is A. Fishman, “Tilim Chachamim Le-lo Shlita” [Smart Missiles Out of Control], Yediot Acharonot , February 28, 1997, pp. 12-13.
62 Y. Melman, “Ha-shorashim Ha-polaniyim shel Ha-iska Ha-surit” [The Polish Roots of the Syrian Arms Deal], Ha-arets , February 26, 1997, p. B3.
63 See most recently anonymous, “European Defence,” Worldlink (March-April 1997): 36-42.
64 See for these developments A. Cordesman, After the Storm: The Changing Military Balance in the Middle East (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), p. 236 ff.
65 M. Pail, “Tachbulla, Ruach Lechima Ve-technologia” [Tactics, Fighting Spirit, and Technology), in Ofer and Kover, eds., Echut Ve - kamut , pp. 361-372.
66 Lt. Col. R., “Hearot La-manhigut Ha-technologit shel TSAHAL” [Notes re the IDF’s Technological Leadership], Maarachot 323 (March 1992): 37.
CHAPTER 19
1 Cf. e.g., Z. Schiff, “Ha-kavim Ha-adumim shel Sharon” [Sharon’s Red Lines], Haarets , November 22, 1981.
2 See Z. Eytan, “Ha-iyum Ha-iraqi al Yisrael Acahrei Milchemet Ha-mifrats” [The Iraqi Threat to Israel After the Gulf War], in Jaffee Center, ed., Milchama Ba-mifrats, Hashlachot al-Yisrael [The Gulf War, Implications for Israel] (Tel Aviv: Papyrus, 1991), p. 138, table 1; also A. Cordesman, After the Storm: The Changing Military Balance in the Middle East (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), pp. 457-458.
3 A good appreciation of the Iraqi performance may be found in A. H. Cordesman, The Gulf and the Search for Strategic Stability (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), p. 695 ff.
4 For the exchange see Ha-arets , April 4, 5, and 6, 1990.
6 E. Karsh, “Regional Strategic Implications of the Iran-Iraq War,” in S. Gazit et al., eds., The Middle East Military Balance, 1988-1989 (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center, 1989), pp. 106, 109-110.
7 Foreign Minster Tareq Abd’el Aziz, as quoted in The Washington Post , January 10, 1991.
8 M. Arens, Milchama Ve-shalom Ba-mizrach Ha-tichon, 1988-1992 [War and Peace in the Middle East, 1988-1992] (Tel Aviv: Yediot Acharonot, 1995), pp. 163-164.
10 Y. Melman and D. Raviv, Meraglim lo Mushlamim [Imperfect Spies] (Tel Aviv: Maariv, 1990), p. 340; R. Pedatzur, “Milchemet Ha-mifrats, Iyun Bikorti Rishoni” [The Gulf War: A Preliminary Critical Assessment], Maarachot 321 (May-June 1991), p. 11; Y. Harkabi, “Rosh Ha-modiin Ke-ezer La-kvarnit” [The Chief of Intelligence as an Aid to the Decisionmaker], Maarachot 326 (August-September 1992), p. 49.
11 For these shortcomings see R. Pedatzur, “Milchemet Ha-mifrats,” pp. 9-10.
12 M. Yaavets as quoted on Israel Radio, January 13, 1991. In fairness it should also be said that Yaavets was the only commentator who foresaw a quick, easy victory over Iraq with hardly any losses for the Coalition.
13 For the details see J. A. Baker III, The Politics of Diplomacy, Revolution, War, and Peace, 1989-1992 (New York: Putnam’s, 1995), pp. 355-365.
14 Cf. L. Freedman and E. Karsh, The Gulf Conflict (London: Faber and Faber, 1993), pp. 331-332.
15 Arens, Milchama Ve-shalom , p. 159. In fact, experience since 1940 has shown that no considerable modern armed force can get away more than 200 or so miles from base without running into serious logistic trouble.
23 Cf. R. Werman, Notes from a Sealed Room: An Israeli View of the Gulf War (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1991), p. 135.
24 D. Leshem, “Tilei Karka-Karka Be-Iraq” [Iraqi Surface-to-Surface Missiles], Jaffee Center, Monograph No. 33, November 1990, p. 15.
25 Figures from Werman, Notes from a Sealed Room , pp. 173-174.
26 For this debate see R. Pedatzur, “Evolving Ballistic Missile Capabilities and Theater Missile Defense: The Israeli Predicament,” Security Studies 3:3 (1994): 544-545.
28 A. Levite, “Lekachim Tsvaiyim Le-yisrael” [Israeli Military Lessons], in Jaffee Center, ed., Milchama Ba-mifrats, p. 142 ff., represents the best discussion.
29 Private information from a participant who has asked to remain unidentified.
30 State Comptroller’s Report for 1996, as quoted in Yediot Acharonot , May 8, 1997, p. 2.
31 Dov Raviv, “father” of the Chets, in Yediot Acharonot , April 19, 1996, pp. 20-21.
32 In March 1997 one test successfully intercepted the target missile but failed to destroy it as the Chets warhead did not explode; A. Egozi, “Paga Bull” [A Bull’s-Eye Hit], Yediot Acharonot , March 12, 1997, p. 9.
33 Pedatzur, “Evolving Ballistic Missile Capabilities,” pp. 551-552.
34 H. Howe, “Suriya Mechina Optsia shel Mahalumat Peta Chimit al Arei Yisrael” [Syria Is Preparing for a Chemical Surprise Attack Against Israel’s Cities], Yediot Achanronot weekend magazine, September 12, 1997, pp. 4-7.
35 Cf. Y. Evron, Israel’s Nuclear Dilemma (London: Routledge, 1994), p. 211 ff.
36 On April 7, 1998, Israel TV announced an abortive launch of a Chets II. This failure was the sixth of its kind.
38 See above all D. Irving, Und Deutschlands Staedte Starben Nicht (Zurich: Schweizer Druck, 1963).
39 D. Ben Gurion, Yoman Ha-milchama, 1948-1949 [War Diary, 1948-1949] (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense, 1982), vol. 2, p. 428, entry for 16.5.48.
40 Rabin speech to the Forum for Security, Judaism, and Society, Tel Aviv, January 8, 1995.
CHAPTER 20
1 For Dayan’s ideas on administering the territories see S. Teveth, Killelat Ha-bracha [The Cursed Blessing] (Jerusalem: Schocken, 1968), p. 64 ff.
2 A. Sharon, Warrior (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989), p. 251 ff.
3 On the undercover units engaged in Gaza see Y. Serena and G. Leshem, “Ha-chisulim Ha-rishonim” [The First Liquidations], Yediot Acharonot , September 26, 1997, pp. 1-12.
4 Figure from A. Hess, Li-shtot Me-ha-yam shel Aza [Drinking from Gaza’s Sea] (Tel Aviv: Ha-kibbuts Ma-meuchad, 1996), p. 185.
5 He who killed thirty Muslim worshippers in Hebron before being killed himself.
6 For the building plan see E. Efrat, Geography and Politics in Israel Since 1967 (London: Cass, 1988), chap. 6.
7 For this policy cf. M. Palumbo, Imperial Israel (London: Bloomsbury, 1990), pp. 40 ff., 82 ff.
8 Sharon speech as reported in Yediot Acharonot , June 18, 1982, p. 1.
9 Compared to 1986 the number of riots had grown by 133 percent, that of tireburnings by 178 percent, that of rock-throwings by 140 percent, and that of roadblocks by 68 percent. The figures, which refer to the Gaza Strip only, are from Z. Schiff and E. Yaari, Intifada [Hebrew] (Jerusalem: Schocken, 1990), p. 26.
10 Quote from Yediot Acharonot special supplement, “Helem-Ha-shtachim” [The Shock of the Territories], January 14, 1988.
16 Quoted in Yediot Acharonot special supplement, January 14, 1988, p. 4.
17 M. Begin, The Revolt (New York: Dell, 1977), p. 92.
18 For this entire episode cf. Schiff and Yaari, Intifada , pp. 18-19.
19 Quote from chief of staff’s directive on the use of physical force, IDF Chief Education Officer, November 1989, p. 16.
20 Quoted from Z. Segal, Chofesh Ha-itonut: Ben Mitos Le-metsiut [Freedom of the Press: Between Myth and Reality] (Tel Aviv: Papyrus, 1996), p. 63, n. 24.