The Third World War (13 page)

The effectiveness of our intelligence on the battlefield has sharply increased with the introduction of the Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (
JTIDS
). We are still running this system in. It has never yet taken a full operational load and we shall not know how best to exploit it until it has. But in this, as in other fields where electronics are of vital importance, we are conscious of an enormous potential which is a powerful source of confidence at every level.

I am glad to be able to report improved operational procedures and capabilities for Joint air-land warfare. Joint action is now effective in reconnaissance and surveillance operations, to a lesser extent in suppression of enemy air defenses, battlefield interdiction and electronic warfare, but above all in joint control of close air support using artillery forward observers with laser designators.

The drawdown of theater stocks in support of operations elsewhere by other nationalities (of which those by the Israelis were at one time typical) have long since been made good, as you know. Propositioned stocks of equipment for reinforcing units are complete, and there will be little difficulty in bringing up to combat level, for example, the heavy divisions expected at an early stage. One of these is even now in process of being lifted in. Ammunition stocks are now up to scale and, even more important perhaps than that, negotiations with the
FRG
, actively pursued in 1980 for the re-siting of certain major installations east of the Rhine, were successfully concluded nearly two years ago, and vital stocks are now no longer so likely to be denied to forward troops by interruption of lines of communication. Similar advantages will be generated by the substitution of a theater line of communication through the Low Countries for that through Bremerhaven in north Germany, though this is not yet complete and the new air defense problem it has thrown up has not yet been completely resolved. Movement towards fuller integration of Allied logistic systems has made progress. We are fortunate in having fewer problems here in
CENTAG
in this respect than they have in
NORTHAG
.

1 have further to report continual improvement in command and control systems, in air defense and control, and in measures to avoid surprise.

Finally 1 have to report, in answer to two questions raised by Senators, that although, of course, French national policy is still to remain outside
NATO
, the participation in our own planning of command and staff of 11 French Corps with its two divisions and supporting troops stationed in the
FRG
is close, if highly confidential. The two US brigades that were deployed in north Germany to make good weaknesses in depth in
NORTHAG
have now been redeployed because
NORTHAG
has recently taken encouraging steps towards the remedying of the weaknesses there. Each of these US brigades is the basis of one of the reinforcement divisions which will form a very important element in the regional reserves now being developed by
AFCENT
[Allied Forces Central Europe].

The Chief of Staff came to an end and stepped aside. The Commander-in-Chief, the Commanding General of the United States Army in Europe, then rose. He was a tall, good-looking man in his middle fifties, trim of figure, clean-shaven, well-groomed, with dark hair just beginning to turn grey. His manner was quiet, his speech deliberate.
A11 generals are always on the stage,’ said Frederick the Great, who knew a good deal about generals. The C-in-C
USAREUR
was no exception. He was playing a part and knew it, and because he was his own producer and wa&an efficient, intelligent and quite ambitious man it was a very well produced part, as well as being well played. He was also, like very many generals, a brave, sincere and selfless person. He knew what was required and he knew a good deal about how to get it done.

Your army in Europe [he began] is in better shape than anyone, I think, has realized, especially the Russians.

The Vietnam experience is out of our system. We are rejuvenated and modernized. Our indoctrination to battle has been pressed hard.

The main focus of the US Army’s doctrine and training has been for these several years past the Central Region of NATO—right where we are now. Almost every combatant member of the officer corps of the United States Army has served at least once in Germany. We know the terrain. We know the weather. We know our enemy.

US divisions have been optimized for combat in Europe against the tank-heavy forces of the Warsaw Pact. They have been trained to believe that even when outnumbered they can win.

Our tank crews have been taught to shoot first and to hit with the first shot, 60 or even 70 per cent of the time, out to ranges of a mile or more.

Combat teams of infantry and tanks, working closely together, have been trained to use the rolling terrain and hill country in our sector, with its plentiful forests and towns, for cover and concealment.

Our troops have been exercised against forces set up to represent most closely Soviet strength, equipment and tactics.

Colonels and generals are expected to fight moving, active battles, always seeking an advantage from the use of terrain, surprise and mobility.

Generals are expected to concentrate defending forces in front of the main thrusts of the enemy so thai the fighting troops do not have to meet a greater ratio of strength against them than three or four to one.

Colonels have been taught to fight in forward defense alongside their German allies.

The captains and their troops have learned that modem weapons in the defense can and should inflict losses on an attacker, in comparison to their own, of well over three to one, They have learned, in short, that a successful defense against considerable odds is possible.

It is with convictions and tactical concepts such as these that the US forces in the Central Army Group are prepared to meet a Soviet attack.

Let me only add a word about our German allies. The two German corps in
CENTAG
are of similar strength and composition to our own. Some of their equipment is of the same pattern as ours. Most of it is of their own design. They have lately in service, for example, a new tank, the Leopard If. It represents a different tank philosophy from that upon which our own XM-1 is designed, or the British Chieftain for that matter, but I can tell you that it is very good. All their equipment is good. The German Army has also made great headway in the organizing and training of Home Defense units of the reserve. These can be expected to play a very important part in the defense of their country, particularly against internal dangers.

We are very close to our German allies. Joint German-American tactical exercises, war games, demonstrations and discussions have led to a remarkable unanimity between two national armies whose last battle experience in Europe was against each other.

There are, of course, differences between us, some small, some not so small. There is, for example, the greater reliance placed by US forces on air support. The greatest difference, whose significance only battle will reveal, is that a war here will be fought among Germans in Germany.

If the Commanding General had it in mind to say more, he did not say it. The door of the briefing room opened and a staff officer hurried in, handing to the General a slip of paper in what had become a highly charged silence.

I am informed,’ said the General, ‘that Soviet troops crossed the frontier into Yugoslavia in some strength a few hours ago.’

The senior Senator rose.

‘General/ he said,
you will have enough to do without having us around here. it’s about time we all got home, anyway.’

The situation in the early summer of 1985 was fraught with crises and uncertainties of many kinds. The year had begun with the Soviet exercise in the use of military power to achieve political ends in the demotion of the US from its world role. The resulting instability had, however, shown up at least as many weaknesses on the Soviet side as on the American. And the Russians had to fear that alt these sources of anxiety might culminate together in some way—Chinese pressure in the central Asian republics, the collapse of the Middle Eastern house of cards, Yugoslav tendencies to move closer to the West, and the cumulative effects on the Soviet-controlled regimes in Eastern Europe of an oil shortage, higher food prices and increased military effort at the expense of civil consumption.

The comparatively cautious policy hitherto pursued, which might be described by the slogan ‘proxy and periphery’, had not yet produced the promised results. The attempt to turn the Eurasian landmass into a base for worldwide naval operations had suffered the inescapable setbacks of geography and temperament. The choice now lay more clearly between accepting an unwelcome and even humiliating return to previous spheres of influence, and making violent and rapid use of the remaining real Soviet assets in the shape of its truly formidable conventional attack capability in Europe and its ruthless ability to suppress dissent wherever the Red Army was present.

The West was not wholly unaware of the debate now being conducted in the Kremlin. The belief that one of the Soviet options must be war in Europe, including the recapture of Yugoslavia, had led at last to a real effort to make good deficiences in the conventional forces available to Allied Command Europe in
NATO
and in the all-important air defence of the United Kingdom as the bridgehead for US reinforcements. (For the action taken to improve the UK defence capabilities, see Appendix 1.) Means of counter-action in Yugoslavia were depressingly small, but at least from the Western political point of view conditions were more favourable. The Italian Communist Party, whose general allegiance to
NATO
had remained somewhat qualified, could be relied upon (it was hoped) to support the defence of an independent communist regime finding its own way to socialism against the forcible imposition of Soviet control. Yugoslavia was historically a prototype of Euro-communism and geographically a bastion against Soviet pressure to conform. Some preparations could therefore be made by US forces in Italy to counter a possible pro-Soviet coup supported by Red Army troops from Hungary.

In the final stages of the Soviet debate, opinion varied as to whether Yugoslavia should be dealt with in isolation or whether there should be a Soviet advance on a broad front in Europe. Those advocating more general action not only emphasized the importance of prosecuting Soviet foreign policy as a coherent whole but saw this in particular as bringing a series of advantages. Acquisition of the greater part of Western Europe would extend still further the glacis hitherto provided only by the communist states of Eastern Europe. It could remove, perhaps for years, the possibility of US action on the Western flank. It might be best to do this before China was ready, before the Soviet position in the Middle East deteriorated too greatly, and before improvements in
NATO
defences went much further. It would allow, and indeed necessitate, strong measures against those in Poland and Czechoslovakia who were now demanding not only freedom of expression but also cheaper food. The destruction which war would cause in both Germanics would buy a further breathing space before the German problem once more posed a threat to the Soviet Union. In a major conflict with
NATO
Yugoslavia would be unimportant and could be dealt with en passant. Limited Soviet action in response to an appeal for help from within the country was in any case attractive. Effective US counter-intervention was unlikely, but if it took place it could be used to justify a more general attack upon the West through Poland, East Germany and Czechoslovakia.

In the end events as usual took control. The Soviet-inspired Committee for the Defence of Yugoslavia staged an abortive foray into Slovenia, precipitating a collision between the Slovenian provincial government and the federal government in Belgrade. The Committee called for Soviet help. At the same time some bakeries closed in Gdansk and Dresden due to diversion of fuel to factories producing military transport, and the resultant riots threatened to get out of hand. Soviet reaction was seen to be unavoidable. The hard-liners won the day.

Meanwhile, the manoeuvre season had arrived. The Soviet command was staging two major exercises, one in Hungary and one of unprecedented size in East Germany. The Final Act signed at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe required notification of manoeuvres over a certain size and encouraged states holding them to invite observers from other countries. The Russians played this in two ways. On grounds that they were of relatively little importance they failed to notify the Hungarian manoeuvres, believing that these might be the first to be converted into the real thing, but notified the German exercise through the normal channels.

On 27 July 1985 a Soviet airborne division in an unopposed landing secured the approaches to Belgrade. At the same time a Soviet motor-rifle division from Hungary crossed the Yugoslav border on the Budapest-Zagreb road, followed by another. The pro-Soviet’ Committee was recognized as the provisional government of Yugoslavia, and Yugoslav frontier forces, after a short engagement, were quickly obliged to withdraw towards Zagreb. The Soviet plan was to occupy Zagreb and thence link up with the airborne troops east to Belgrade and fan out west to Ljubljana. Meanwhile, the exercises in East Germany intensified, with more formations moving forward from the Western Military Districts of the Soviet Union through Poland.

The
NATO
side, in spite of many warnings, had failed to make specific provision for this kind of threat in Yugoslavia. That country had remained the “grey area par excellence. It was not covered by the
NATO
commitment to automatic defence. But equally the West had not renounced interest in what happened there, as they had by implication in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. The continued neutrality of Yugoslavia was obviously a Western interest of prime importance. But it is difficult to guarantee a country whose foreign policy is based on non-commitment, as Britain and France had found with Belgium prior to 1939. Therefore greyness was made a virtue: the very uncertainty of Western reaction was made a principle of deterrence.