The Third World War (15 page)

Although it has been consistently and warmly denied in the West, we think there are plans to open offensive operations at some time against the Warsaw Pact with an attack on the German Democratic Republic. The Federal Republic is clearly having considerable difficulty in overcoming the reluctance of some of the Allies but might still succeed in staging an attack nol later than 1986. The policy of’forward defence’ makes no sense from a military point of view unless it involves action well to the east of the frontier, and it can be taken as no more than a cloak for the planning of an invasion oftheGDR, possibly already far advanced.*

China does not yet present the major threat which can be certainly expected to develop later.
NATO
must be reduced before this. What requires urgent attention now, however, is the Chinese action, with powerful US support, to stimulate dissidence in the Asiatic republics. This is sharply on the increase. It would appear that unless the question of
NATO
can be resolved before the autumn of 1986 a deteriorating security situation in the Military Districts of Central Asia and the Far East, and possibly in those of Siberia and the Trans-Baika! as well, might offer distraction from Europe and considerable temptation to the
FRG
to exploit the position.

There would thus clearly be advantage in action to eliminate the
FRG
and ensure the collapse of the Atlantic Alliance not later than the summer of 1986. The course of events, particularly in the light of a possible requirement to intervene in Yugoslavia. may compel earlier action, and arrangements for mobilization will. of course, be kept under constant review.

The greatest relative advantage to the West, as
NATO
studies

It is probably unnecessary to say that at no time was there any planning in
NATO
for an invasion of the
GDR
. The suggestion had some propaganda value in the
USSR
, and among Soviet sympathizers abroad.
confirm, will be if the Warsaw Pact can spend fourteen days in the mobilization process as against seven days for
NATO
. It shoold not be difficult to use summer exercises to conceal the first seven days. The utmost use will have to be made of deception arrangements, nevertheless, to indicate, once we are seen to be mobilizing for a possible attack, a date for it later than any that might be chosen.

!n spite of some recent improvement in NATO’s state of readiness, including arrangements to deploy two to four additional divisions in an emergency, further reinforcing formations cannot be expected to arrive in the European theatre, once hostilities have started, before D+16 at the earliest. Naval and air interdiction can be expected to reduce, but not entirely destroy, their effectiveness. It will be important to secure the stop-line before the arrival of major reinforcements.

Even more important, in the matter of duration of operations, is the question of nuclear release. The
USSR
will make it clear beyond any possible doubt that use of radiation to any significant degree in offensive weapons of war will be regarded as an open invitation to discard alt restraints on nuclear warfare. Escalation into strategic exchange, to use the Western mode of expression, will certainly follow battlefield applications.

There will unquestionably be doubts and hesitations in the Alliance over the initiation of nuclear release. Widespread unwillingness to allow the use of battlefield weapons on Federal territory can be counted on in the
FRG
, for the effect of battlefield weapons there would only differ in degree from that of strategic attack on the homelands of the
USSR
and
USA
. The
USSR
can count at the outset on a high superiority in non-nuclear capability. This would be largely offset if battlefield nuclear weapons were introduced. It would therefore be foolish in the extreme for the
USSR
to resolve NATO’s doubts on their introduction by introducing them first.

The earlier that military operations in Europe can be brought to a successful conclusion the lower will be the probability of the neutralization of Warsaw Pact conventional superiority by the arrival of major reinforcements or the introduction of nuclear weapons. The conclusion from a close study of all” these considerations is that the stop-line should be reached not later than the evening of D+9. The military plan will be framed accordingly.

The essence of the military plan to implement this policy, which can now be recognized as of quite unique importance in the study of the Third World War, has been distilled from captured documents and is summarized below. It deserves careful consideration.

Invasion from a standing start from normal locations, though attractive, is for ground forces of the Warsaw Pact not practicable-Even with exercise cover, and with an excuse for military movement in the shape of real or imaginary internal security difficulties in satellite countries, it would not be possible to count on complete surprise. Some degree of precautionary preparation on the part of
NATO
would have to be counted on. This could be expected to include the flying-in of the personnel of certainly one heavy division from the United States to marry up with its p repositioned equipment, and possibly of two, and the partial deployment to its emergency positions of much of
AFCENT
, including the Dutch and Belgian corps in
NORTHAG
and some of the entirely new II British Corps. It would also include the alerting of air defences.
NORTHAG
continues to offer the most attractive point of decisive entry, in spite of the lack of depth in the
CENTAG
sector, because of the inadequacy of reserves to fight the battle in.depth which will inevitably develop in the
NORTHAG
sector. Forward deployment (adopted in the
FRG
for purely political reasons) has made a main thrust against
NORTHAG
particularly inviting.

The cover pian must firmly indicate a date for the opening of the offensive not earlier than D+9 or 10. The actual offensive on D-Day will thus catch the defence not yet prepared for it.

On the night
D-I
there would be widespread attacks by undercover forces (some 400 KGB-controlled cells are already deployed) on suitable targets in the
FRG
, stiffened by expendable Soviet airborne units. Shortly before first light on D-day airborne formations, making the best use of undercover forces, would seal Hamburg, make good Bremen airfield and seize crossings over the Weser; if possible, over the Rhine as well. The securing of Bremen airfield as an airhead would be indispensable. The success of other airborne operations would be a bonus-Just before first light on D-day, and synchronized with the widest possible interference with US space reconnaissance satellites, an air operation of the very highest intensity, using both high explosive and chemical munitions, would be launched simultaneously against the Allied air force bases and control systems and the movement of AFCENT’s land forces to their main defensive positions. When the full shock of this had taken its effect, and a favourable air situation had been achieved-the weight of air effort would be shifted to direct support of a general offensive along the entire
AFCENT
front, exploiting both normal mass-attack tactics and deep penetration action. the latter intended primarily to pre-empt
NATO
anti-tank suppressive action. In ground action chemical weapons would be employed at army commanders’ discretion, with the emphasis on nerve gases, persistent or non-persistent. Airborne assaults on suitable targets, especially airfields, air defence sites, headquarters and obstacle crossings would continue. All ground force operations would have maximum tactical air support.

2 Guards Tank Army with two Polish divisions and some
GDR
troops would attack on the north of the
NORTHAG
sector, 3 Shock Army in the south of the same sector, followed by 20 Guards Army, with two
GDR
divisions under command.

8 Guards Army would attack on the
CENTAG
front, objective Frankfurt, 1 Guards Tank Army further south, objective Niirnberg.

One Polish and two Soviet divisions would move northwards through Schteswig-Holstein into Denmark, supported as necessary. The main thrust into
AFNORTH
would be out of the Leningrad Military District through Kola in the first instance. The follow-up would be by rail through Finland. All effective resistance in
AFNORTH
should cease by D+6. though difficult country may delay the southward advance in Norway.

By first light on D+l armoured columns in the north must reach the Dortmund-Ems Canal, making good all Weser crossings north of Minden soonest thereafter. In the
CENTAG
area Giessen must be secured, to develop an attack on the Frankfurt-Mainz complex, already under heavy pressure from the east.

Air-portable formations operating on the ground out of Bremen airhead should secure river crossings into Holland for rapid consolidation by following armour. Airborne troops will be used to extend the depth of the penetration in Holland. It is imperative to seize the Hilversum radio and tdevision complex intact at the earliest opportunity. By D+2 resistance in Holland is expected to be minimal. All Holland is to be occupied as far south as the River Waal by D+6.

While strong pressure continues on
CENTAG
from the northeast and east, the main effort will now be in an offensive north to south along the west bank of the Rhine. This is expected to be decisive in the outflanking of
CENTAG
and destruction of
AFCENT
.

There must be maximum exploitation of refugee movement everywhere. Civilian casualties are wholly irrelevant and may even be advantageous. Towns and cities are to be bypassed wherever possible for subsequent attention.

Berlin will be contained. Its early capitulation can be counted on when
AFCENT
breaks.

Resistance can be expected to continue in difficult country, such as the Harz. Spessart, Schwarzwald and Thuringer Wald and the Bavarian high country. This can be masked and ignored. It is also likely to continue in Rhineland and Ruhr cities. Here it must be ruthlessly eliminated.

NORTHAG
can be expected, when its forward defences have been penetrated, first of all to take up positions roughly east and west along the Teutoburger Wald, no doubt hoping to deny crossings across the Lower Rhine by a manoeuvre battle in depth. They will have insufficient troops for this. and there is no hope of their succeeding.

When the north-south offensive begins to develop
NOR-TH
AG can be expected to regroup, in an attempt to check it, on an east-west position west of the Rhine, between Bonn and Maastricht. No chances can be taken here. There will unquestionably be sufficient fresh Warsaw Pact formations and air resources to break through. At least three hitherto uncommitted divisions from 20 Guards Army will be available for a start. Success in this operation will lead to the rolling up of
CENTAG
from the rear and the collapse of the
NATO
defence of the Central Region.

This must be complete by D+7, at which time the only permissible pockets of continuing resistance (disregarding Berlin, if it has not yet been ordered to capitulate, and Hamburg) will be in the Bavarian Alps.

On D-day three Soviet divisions, from Hungary and Czechoslovakia, will start moving through Austria into Italy.

No Italian resistance is expected. This force may also, if necessary, furnish means of opening a flank attack on
CENTAG
through Bavaria.

ft is to be assumed that political pressure on the French government, with the guarantee that Warsaw Pact action will proceed no further than the stop-line, will cause France to refrain from hostile action and withdraw 11 French Corps from Germany.

The collapse of
AFCENT
(as well as the elimination of
AFNORTH
and
AFSOUTH
) will reduce Allied Command Europe to impotence and cause the disintegration of the Alliance. The United Stales will accept a ceasefire on or very soon after D+8, after which discussions can be initiated.

The neutralization of the Federal Republic of Germany, with the liquidation of hostile elements among the people and such population transfer as may be necessary, together with the dismantling of industrial plant for removal, or its destruction in situ, for all of which instructions have already been prepared, will proceed forthwith.

The plan for the invasion of the Central Region of
NATO
by the Warsaw Pact, of which this is a summary, assumed as a necessary condition a high degree of continuing control over the countries and peoples of Eastern Europe. This was quite likely to be threatened.

1; Dispositions in
GENTAG

By 2 August 1985 the four corps composing the Central Army Group in the Central Region of Allied Command Europe were already in their forward position in the
CENTAG
sector. This ran from near Kassel in the north, at the junction with I Belgian Corps on the right of the Northern Army Group, to the Austrian frontier south of Munchen—

The four corps of the Central Army Group lay from north to south as follows: 111 German. V US.
VII
US. II German.

II French Corps, stationed with some supporting army troops in south^west Germany, was still not under command to Allied Command Europe. It was not even certain how the French government, given its pronounced left-wing orientation in the recent past, would, in the event of hostilities with the Warsaw Pact, regard its obligations under the Atlantic Treaty. Relations between the French General Staff in Germany and
CENTAG
, however, were close and cordial, and communication between the two, though discreet, was fairly free.