The Third World War (43 page)

This United States’ action on both sides of the continent was at once condemned by the Organization for African Unity, whose name continued as before to mock reality. A resolution confirming the African states’ determination to establish black majority rule in the Confederation of Africa South by force of arms—not just African arms but Soviet, Cuban, Jamaican and Arab arms as well—was reaffirmed.

The battle for Southern Africa, without US intervention, was to be a slow and inconclusive affair. But what it was to lack in speed, concentration and decision, it was to make up for in variety, complexity and malignity.

In the Middle East things were different. United States intervention there was decisive. The nature of the country, as well as of the conflict, enabled American firepower—land, sea and air—ranging far afield in reconnaissance and destruction, by sheer domination of communications to deter any serious counter-strokes by the
UAR
. It enabled Iran to remain free from invasion, it assisted the Arab Emirates to hold their own against somewhat half-hearted Saudi attempts to settle old scores, it facilitated the preparation in Oman of the counteroffensive forces which would sweep the Yemenis aside after one decisive battle.

Another of the most notable differences between the fighting in Southern Africa and that in the Middle East was that whereas almost all the African participants had had recent and bloody reminders of what battle was about, in Arabia the only contestants who had any experience of war with modern weapons—Egypt. Syria and Israel—were involved either very little or not at all in the fighting.

The Israelis had been continuously in a state of general alert, with reserves mobilized and the country on a war footing, since the time of the formation of the United Arab Republic in November 1984, but they were not, in the event, surprising as it seemed to many, involved in any fighting. A Soviet guarantee of immunity from attack by her neighbours, within her frontiers as then established, in return for a guarantee on the Israeli side of complete neutrality in any developments affecting the security of the Soviet Union, was offered in December 1984. On the advice of the United States Israel accepted. From that time on, through the world crises of the following summer and the general hostilities that ensued, Israel remained neutral.

Egypt played, in the event, in spite of possessing considerable armed forces, no more than a small and ineffective part in the fighting in the Middle East. Syria played virtually none.

In the Middle East, of course, the United States was simply allying itself with powerful indigenous forces in order to protect its own interests as well as theirs. Its firm base was Iran. Iran had 2,000 tanks, most of them Chieftains, an excellent armoury of
ATGW
, a huge infantry force which with reserves amounted to 200,000 men, more than 2,000
APC
, 1,000 guns and all the paraphernalia of supporting weapons and aircraft, including 400 Cobra attack helicopters. Her navy boasted over fifty operational warships,-including patrol boats, the air force 400 Combat aircraft. Such strength enabled Iran to position in the
UAE
and Oman the best part of three divisions—one armoured, one infantry with
APC
and two special brigades—all fully supported with
SAM
, guns, helicopters, logistic units and tactical air squadrons. At the same time more than enough remained to secure Iran itself from the threat of Kuwaiti or Iraqi adventures, and this still left the bulk of Iran’s armoured formations with 1,000 Chieftains in reserve—an unattractive fact for the Soviet Union’s army commanders in Turkestan or Trans-Caucasia to contemplate. In addition, the Union Defence Force of the
UAE
was of no small size or competence, with its total of 25,000 men, tanks,
SAM
,
ATGW
, patroi craft, helicopters and Mirage fighters. Finally, Omancould deploy regularforces of some 15,000 including armoured cars, guns and
ATGW
, with ten fast patrol boats and fifty combat aircraft.

The United States contribution was designed to fill the gaps. A strong Middle East naval task force was assembled mustering a total of two carriers and a dozen surface combatants. Ashore in Iran was the best part of a division of the US Marine Corps, a US airborne division and an air wing.

On the side of the Soviet Union the new United Arab Republic’s armed forces were by no means negligible in numbers. It was in their deployment and immobility that they were at a disadvantage. Egypt had a large and well-equipped army, nearly 300,000 men making up the equivalent of some twelve divisions, half of them armoured or mechanized, and ten independent brigades. Their equipment was largely Russian and included more than 2,000 tanks, with 2,500
APC
and over 3,000 guns and mortars. The Egyptian Air Defence Command and the air force between them could call on 700 combat aircraft and sixty transports. The relatively small navy had a dozen submarines, eight destroyers and escorts, and fifty smaller craft. The para-military forces totalled 120,000.

But the Egyptian Army’s experience of operating in distant Arab countries was an unhappy one, and the bulk of their forces remained at first in the traditional deployment areas—Sinai, the Canal, the Western Desert, the Red Sea, and Southern and Central Districts. The Field Force was organized into three armies, all stationed on Egyptian soil, one east, one west, one south.

Saudi Arabia, with her small population, had a small army—a mere five brigades, three of which were already deployed in Jordan, Syria and Lebanon as part of the Geneva Conference arrangements; the rest, together with the National Guard, Frontier Force and Coastguard would be adequate for internal security and for looking after sea and air bases but tittle more.

Kuwait’s efficient little army of about one division supported by some forty fighter aircraft and thirty patrol boats had neither the logistic resources nor the inclination to venture much beyond its frontiers.

The Libyan Army of 20,000 had more than enough to do keeping an eye on its own people.

To this prospect, the Soviet Union had little to add. Her sea and air bases in Eritrea, Socotra, Djibuti, Port Sudan, Suez, Jeddah, Berbera, Mogadishu, Kismayuand Dhahran were manned by some 50,000 armed technicians; her air forces including transports amounted to about 500 aircraft of all types; her naval strength in the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean was not great. For the Soviet Union it would be a matter of hanging on to what she had got rather than reaching out for more. If, however, the Soviet Union appeared to be adopting a defensive strategy in the Middle East, the same could not be said of Southern Africa, for here she had powerful and more adventurous allies.

It had been laid down by the High Command of the Confederation of Africa South People’s Army that the invasion of South Africa should be carried out from all four front-line states: Namibia, Botswana, Zimbabwe and Mozambique. Largely because of the difficulties of supporting logistically any more sophisticated operations of war, the forces from Botswana and Zimbabwe would be essentially operating as guerrillas, though on a very large scale. The two main thrusts would come from Namibia and Mozambique, with-the backing of west and east coast ports, air bases, better equipped armies both in combat and logistic units, and the opportunity for seaborne support. From Mozambique forces amounting to nearly 30,000 would take part, made up in the first place of the recently reconstituted Mozambique Liberation Front (
FRELIMO
) army, now swelled by more Makonde troops from the Mozambique United Front (
FUMO
). Second was the Somali contingent, a mechanized brigade with tanks,
APC
and guns. Third, there were the main regular forces of Zimbabwe, a strong brigade, to which Tanzania had added two battalions. The Cuban force amounted to now fewer than 10,000, and it was the Cubans who were charged with directing the operation, though under the nominal leadership of a Mozambique guerrilla general, the new strong-arm ally of FUMO’s head. General Chinde Inhambane (it was of course a nom de guerre) was a man who loved the petty details of military administration, who would have made a respectable quartermaster in a Stores Depot. He now determined to be not only commander-in-chief but also his own principal logistics adviser, with subsequently dire results for the whole expedition. The plan of campaign decided on by him and his Cuban advisers was nothing if not bold—an assault on the Transvaal aimed at Pretoria and Johannesburg, with a substantial diversionary push into Natal.

The expeditions from Zimbabwe itself and from Botswana were to be essentially huge distractions for the South African security forces, to whom the excellent communications southwards from Mbizi and Gaborone were important. As Botswana had so few men to spare, Namibia was to draft in a force of 20,000 guerrillas. The Zimbabwe force would be about the same size.

The other main operation would be the
SWAPO
, Angolan, Cuban and Nigerian attack from Namibia. One force was to head for Prieska, the other for Cape Town and Simonstown. The Nigerians had provided 30,000 men, the Cubans 10,000, the Angolan and
SWAPO
armies numbered 50,000 together—all in all a force not dissimilar in total to the eastern armies invading from Mozambique. Soviet ‘advisers’ and technicians were much in evidence.

What sort of enemy would these various contingents be likely to meet? In the first place there was South Africa’s regular army, swelled by former Rhodesians and refugees from Namibia—with a growing number of volunteers from Australasia—to a force of 90,000. A US naval force at sea, even if no US formations were involved in the fighting on land, would in effect be holding the ring. Behind the regular South African army there was the Volkssturm^ 200,000 strong, confident, well-trained and utterly dedicated to the idea of winning, or dying—a hard nut for
CASPA
to crack.

There was some convergence of views, but far more divergence, between those variously involved on either side as to what the whole thing would be about. Over-simplified, it was this. The United States wanted to hang on to what she regarded as two of her strategic interests: Middle Eastern oil and the ability to bring tankers and other shipping round the Cape. For the
USSR
the requirement was to keep a grip on Southern Africa, which would give her dominance of the sea routes, .and to control the Middle Eastand its oil. Those involved there had other ideas. The black African nations wanted to destroy the white hold on South Africa and have it for themselves, its riches, its land, its influence, its strategic potential. The white South Africans were equally intent on keeping what they had. Neither cared greatly for the broader issues beyond their own horizons. In the Middle East, Iran was concerned to preserve her own integrity and influence, an influence extending to southern Arabia;

the smaller states simply wanted to continue with their well-endowed development; the new
UAR
wished to become the centre and controller of the whole Arab world. For the time being the convergences of policy were sufficient to allow these sets of allies to work together. Their divergences would become more apparent as operations developed.

Policy is one thing, method another. The United States’ concept of how to maintain her foothold in Africa and support her allies in the Middle East was clear, simple and within her capacity. It had four main features: first, to break Soviet air and sea power in those areas whose strategic control was necessary to the United States;

second, to provide those elements of defensive power which her allies in the Middle East did not possess themselves and without which they would be unable to employ effectually the military power they did possess;

third, to keep these allies supplied logistically and to give further training to their armed forces when practicable;

fourth, to keep US forces out of the land fighting in Southern Africa except in so far as the security of Simonstown demanded.

Everything the U nited States hoped to do depended on winning the war at sea, which itself demanded ascendancy in the air. The course of the battle for the Atlantic has been traced in Chapter 17. What matters here is its outcome. The Soviet Navy’s defeat had two important effects on the battle in Africa. First, the severance of maritime connection with the Caribbean meant that no Jamaican or Cuban reinforcements or supplies could come by sea to West Africa. Second, the blockade of West Africa from Conakry to Walvis Bay ensured that no support could come by sea to the belligerent countries from anywhere else. The battle for the Indian Ocean had been less intense and less costly than the battle for the Atlantic, but it had been important. The United States Navy now had a strong presence along the east coast of Africa from Mombasa to Port Elizabeth and in the Arabian Sea and the Persian Gulf, and superiority in the Indian Ocean as a whole. The Red Sea remained under Soviet domination; so did the Eastern Mediterranean.

Mastery of the sea and air, as the United States had discovered in both Korea and Vietnam, did not necessarily mean mastery on land, but it helped a good dea!, particularly in the Middle East. Here there were four main areas of operations for ground forces. One was supremely important; the rest were sideshows. The first was a joint operation by the United States and Iran, supported by the United Arab Emirates and Oman. to seize complete control of the Persian Gulf. It involved the elimination of Kuwait and the destruction of all Soviet and
UAR
forces in the eastern part of Saudi Arabia. To start with, Kuwait was edged out of the game. The tacit neutrality of Iraq, whose relations with Syria had deteriorated almost to the point of military hostilities, enabled Iran to remove any threat from Kuwait without a fight. In the summer of 1985, powerful Iranian amphibious and air forces, poised for invasion, together with an unequivocal ultimatum, obliged the Kuwaiti ruling council to announce the severance of their new relationship with Egypt and Saudi Arabia. It was a volte face as total as that of Italy in 1943. From being the integrated ally of their
UAR
partners, the Kuwaitis suddenly became their declared enemies. Better, the ruling council had decided, a change of sides and a chance of survival than the certainty of destruction by Iran supported by US naval and air power. The
UAR
was without the means of arguing the toss.