Unthinkable (19 page)

In 1995 and again in 1997–2000, the personality and policies of the Iranian presidents also played an important role in their efforts to reach out to the United States. Still, it seems more than coincidental that they
made such far-reaching bids at a time when Iran had suddenly come under much greater American pressure. It is not necessarily that threatening American behavior is more likely to produce Iranian concessions, although this claim is consistent with the evidence. It is simply that, as a matter of evidence, Iran did not make its greatest concessions at times when the United States was trying to diminish its pressure and threats on Iran. Quite the contrary.

There are at least four other good reasons to set aside any consideration of pure engagement of Iran without sanctions. First, there is evidence that the sanctions have sparked a debate among the Iranian leadership, with more pragmatic figures arguing for making some concessions in return for a lifting of the sanctions. This debate is what the sanctions were intended to produce, and constitutes some evidence that they are having the desired effect. Second, whether they convince the Iranians to negotiate or not, the sanctions are critical to making clear to Iranians and other would-be proliferators that defying the international community comes at a price. Third, even if the sanctions do not cause Tehran to change its behavior, they are critical as a foundation to contain a nuclear Iran in the future.

The last reason that, wrong or right, it is not worthwhile to consider this option is that the sanctions on Iran are a reality. They are not going to be repealed short of a deal with Iran on its nuclear program. The U.S. Congress, the U.S. president, the European Union, and the UN Security Council will not do so. Period. Even if there were still reason to believe that engagement without sanctions, or penalties of any kind, might work better, it is not realistic to posit that as an option. We might as well argue that the best way to handle Iran's nuclear program would be to have never assisted in Mosaddeq's overthrow, but that too is a reality that cannot be undone merely by wishing it were so.

T
he obvious place to start to assess the options to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability is with the policy in place. The United States settled on a carrot-and-stick strategy toward Iran after toying with others. None offered the same payoff of convincing Tehran to forgo its nuclear program at a reasonable cost to the United States with minimal risks. It is the “Goldilocks” solution: it fits just right for most Americans. It fits so well that it is hard to imagine that there was a time when its few advocates (including this author) were excoriated by both the left and the right. Many assume that it has been our policy all along.

The problem with this policy option, therefore, is not that it does not fit, but that it may not work. This idea may seem bizarre given how well the policy seems to be working. After all, as the Obama administration rightly argues, the United States has built an unprecedented international coalition of states all cooperating—to a greater or lesser extent—with this
approach. That has led to unprecedented international and multilateral sanctions on Iran, which in turn has created unprecedented economic problems for the Islamic Republic. However, just because the policy has successfully attained these intermediate goals does not mean that it will succeed in achieving its ultimate objective.

As isolated and besieged as Iran may be, there is real reason to doubt that its government will make meaningful compromises on its nuclear program despite the painful impact of the sanctions. So far, Tehran has resisted, and while even some Iranian hardliners are suggesting at least a tactical retreat, the Supreme Leader has insisted that Iran will never give in. He believes the United States is only interested in the overthrow of his regime.
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In his own words after talks with the IAEA collapsed in February 2012, “With God's help, and without paying attention to propaganda, Iran's nuclear course should continue firmly and seriously. Pressures, sanctions and assassinations will bear no fruit. No obstacles can stop Iran's nuclear work.”
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Despite all of the tactical successes that the carrot-and-stick strategy has racked up so far, the realization of its strategic goal remains out of reach. Many people are beginning to ask what else the United States could do, and whether it is time to shift to more extreme measures, such as the use of force.

But before we conclude that the patient is dead, it is worth asking whether he can be resuscitated and reinvigorated. The carrot-and-stick strategy is perfectly tailored to America's needs when it comes to Iran. We should be loath to abandon it. That has been the conclusion of the Obama administration, and their initial response at the start of their second term was to ask if they could pursue the same policy but do it better, by doing it bigger: a renewed offer of engagement, a more enticing deal on Iran's nuclear program, and the threat of even harsher punishments if Iran remains recalcitrant. Once again, this policy is not stupid. Politically, it makes good sense, and from a strategic perspective, it would be ideal if Washington could pull it off. The only question is whether we can.
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The carrot-and-stick approach, or what the Obama administration has called its “Dual Track” policy to Iran, relies on the debate within Iran over the relative importance of its nuclear program compared to the country's economic and political well-being.
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On the one side of this debate are Iran's moderates, including figures such as former presidents ‘Ali Akbar Rafsanjani and Khatami, and now President Rowhani; and on the other, radical hardliners such as Guardian Council head Mohammad Jannati and the leadership of the Revolutionary Guard. The moderates have argued that while it would be great for Iran to have a nuclear deterrent, the country's highest priority is its decrepit economy. They argue that the only way for the regime to maintain its control over the country is to rebuild its legitimacy, which in turn will require demonstrating to the Iranian people that they can deliver prosperity and good governance. Not surprisingly, the moderates have indicated a willingness to compromise on the nuclear program so as to rebuild Iran's ties to the global economy. For their part, the more ideologically minded hardliners have downplayed the importance of the economy and instead emphasized Iran's role as regional hegemon, spreading the Islamic Revolution, and their deep-seated fear that the United States is seeking to overturn the regime—all of which, in their minds, argue for the continuation of the nuclear program and even the acquisition of a nuclear deterrent.
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Poised at the fulcrum of this debate is the Supreme Leader, Ali Khamene'i. Khamene'i is unquestionably the deciding vote. The key assumption of this policy, and it is nothing but an unproven although not unreasonable assumption, is that even though Khamene'i has shown sympathy for the hardline position, he is capable of being swayed to side with the moderates. Thus, the idea is to design a comprehensive incentive structure that will convince Khamene'i and his closest advisors that Iran would be better off agreeing to compromise on the nuclear program. It is a strategy intended to help bolster the arguments of Tehran's moderates against those of its hardliners by reinforcing the formers' argument that
Iran will enjoy huge benefits for agreeing to compromise, and will suffer excessive harm by refusing.

The practical aspects of the strategy are meant to offer Iran a series of attractive rewards if it agrees to compromise and impose an ever more stringent string of punishments on Iran if it resists—hence a “carrot-and-stick” strategy. The “sticks” portion of the policy are well understood: they are the sanctions that have been imposed unilaterally by the United States, multilaterally by the West, and internationally by the UN Security Council since 2003. These sanctions have prohibited arms sales to Iran, severed its ties to the international financial system, choked off aid and foreign investment, and curtailed its oil exports and thus its government revenues. The “carrots” piece of the strategy is both less understood and less practiced. In theory, the carrots could have included not just the lifting of the sanctions, but economic assistance, an end to Iran's international isolation, and mechanisms to address Iran's legitimate security concerns. They could also include a comprehensive rapprochement with the United States.

The carrot-and-stick approach became the guiding principle of America's Iran policy during the George W. Bush administration, albeit grudgingly. At first, the Bush administration did not have a defined Iran policy. In current American politics, it is often the case that one side or the other will dismiss its rivals' approach to an issue by claiming that they “don't have a policy.” That is rarely the case, and what the partisans typically mean is that they don't like their rivals' policy on a given issue. However, in the early years of the Bush 43 administration, for Iran this lack of a policy was literally true. The administration was divided between its neoconservative wing, which wanted to overthrow the Iranian regime—either militarily as they had done with the Taliban and Saddam Husayn, or by an aggressive covert action campaign—and its realist wing, which had no interest in taking on another challenge beyond Afghanistan and
Iraq. Moreover, none of these courses of action seemed simple, easy, or even plausible given the complexities of Iranian politics. Consequently, they relegated Iran to the “too hard box.”

Not surprisingly, the Bush administration's early moves toward Iran were often contradictory. They accepted covert Iranian help against the Taliban and al-Qa'ida after the 9/11 attacks, but then President Bush named Iran as part of the infamous “Axis of Evil” in his 2002 State of the Union address. Many of his neoconservative underlings even mused indiscreetly about bringing regime change to Tehran after Kabul and Baghdad.

Only after the surprising progress of Iran's nuclear program was revealed in 2002–2004 did Washington adopt a deliberate approach to Tehran. When it did, it chose a version of the carrot-and-stick, albeit one much heavier on the stick than the carrot, in keeping with the administration's conservative proclivities. Nevertheless, the U.S. officials charged with implementing the administration's policy of diplomatic pressure on Iran played a weak hand well. Despite the constraints placed on them—particularly their inability to offer significant positive incentives to Iran or to other key international actors to secure their cooperation—they devised novel financial sanctions that caused real pain in Tehran and convinced reluctant foreign governments to apply ever greater pressure, including six UN Security Council resolutions enacted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

OBAMA TAKES OVER.
When the Obama administration took office in January 2009, they too adopted a carrot-and-stick approach, but they did so readily, even eagerly. In unsurprising contrast with their predecessors, the new administration initially favored the carrots over the sticks.

It seems that engagement was President Obama's preferred approach toward Iran. He raised the idea during the election campaign, and his Democratic and Republican rivals alike lambasted him for it.
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When Obama took office, he embraced engagement as the principal focus of his Iran policy, although he also made clear that his policy was one of
carrot-and-stick and that he would turn to sanctions and other forms of punishment if Tehran proved uninterested in his offers of engagement. He spoke of establishing direct discussions with the Iranian government, stressed that he wanted a relationship of mutual respect, and offered to renounce any efforts to overturn the Iranian regime.
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He wrote two private letters to Khamene'i offering a sincere effort at reconciliation and indicating he had no goal to overthrow the Iranian government.
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He offered to open an American interests section (a small diplomatic mission, much smaller than a full embassy and without an ambassador) in Tehran as a tangible sign of the administration's determination to repair relations with Iran. He offered conciliatory gestures to Tehran, including calling the regime by its preferred name—something no American president had done before—and broadcast them on all channels, in public and in private, and through a wide variety of interlocutors.
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As late as the fall and winter of 2012, Washington was still sending private messages to Iran that it wanted direct talks to try to resolve the nuclear impasse and begin a process of more general reconciliation.
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After Obama's reelection in November 2012, Washington again reached out to Tehran and offered to resume the nuclear talks.
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There are those who argue that the Obama administration's effort at engagement was only a brief, halfhearted flirtation. My friend Trita Parsi has disparaged Obama's approach to engagement with Iran as “a single roll of the dice.”
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While I respect Trita's erudition, I disagree with his characterization of the administration's thinking and its conduct.
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My own experience of their approach was that they were sincere in their desire to secure a rapprochement with Iran and sustained this effort for at least a year before refocusing on sanctions. I saw this determination time and again in my own conversations and arguments with senior Obama administration officials, certainly throughout 2009, but well after then, too.