Unthinkable (15 page)

That sounds ominous, and the risk of Saudi proliferation is real. But there are still a lot of “buts.” First, it is not entirely clear what Iran's crossing the “nuclear threshold” means, whether the Saudis would know it, and at what point they would act. Because the Iranians may be willing to halt their nuclear program once they have achieved a breakout capability, it may not be clear to outsiders for some time—perhaps years—exactly where the Iranian program stands. If Iran is willing to stop short of fielding an arsenal, the Saudis may feel less compelled to match them. Indeed, Saudi Arabia's response may be the most compelling reason for Iran to stop short of crossing that threshold, potentially far more persuasive than additional international sanctions in restraining Iran.

Riyadh is also a signatory to the NPT, and it has taken its commitment (indeed, all of its treaty obligations) more seriously than the Iranians. Although Israel has become far more comfortable with the Saudis in recent decades, Jerusalem has never forgotten Saudi support and even
participation in the various Arab-Israeli wars. Moreover, the Israelis fear that someday the House of Sa'ud may fall and any accumulated weapons will end up in the hands of far more radical successors or violent factions in an Arabian civil war. In addition to Israel's influence in Washington, American policymakers themselves have long opposed Saudi acquisition of a nuclear capability. In the 1980s, when the Kingdom acquired nuclear-capable intermediate-range ballistic missiles from China, the U.S. government weighed in heavily with Riyadh to ensure that no nuclear warheads would accompany the missiles.
¹³

The Saudis are often more subtle and creative than others give them credit for. They may not take the obvious path and buy a nuclear weapon itself. There are many ways that they could create ambiguity and make Iran (and others) wonder whether they had acquired a nuclear capability without declaring that the Kingdom had joined the nuclear club. Riyadh could build a nuclear plant of its own and begin to enrich uranium, perhaps even hiring large numbers of Pakistanis and other foreigners to do so quickly, in the same manner as the Iranians have. A favorite scenario of Israeli intelligence is that one day after Iran crosses the nuclear threshold, satellite imagery of Saudi Arabia would reveal the presence of a half dozen nuclear-capable Pakistani F-16s at a Saudi air base. Pakistan has long contributed military support, equipment, and even whole formations to Saudi defense, so a Pakistani air presence would not be extraordinary. Yet everyone would wonder whether the F-16s had brought nuclear weapons with them and the Saudis could simply ignore the question. Neither the Iranians nor anyone else would know, but Tehran would have to calculate that Riyadh had in effect acquired a nuclear weapon. Yet there would be no proof that the Kingdom had done so and therefore no particular basis to impose sanctions or otherwise punish the Saudis.

Only slightly less likely to proliferate than the Saudis are the Emiratis. Although the Iranians have never tried to overthrow the UAE government
(to our knowledge), the depth of fear and hatred in Abu Dhabi for the Islamic regime in Tehran is no less than in Riyadh. In 1971, Iran seized three small but strategically located islands from the UAE located in the midst of the shipping channel through the vital Strait of Hormuz. This has been a source of enmity ever since. Moreover, the UAE leadership shares the Saudi preference for the status quo and has seen Iran's efforts to stir up upheaval across the region as the greatest threat to their own interests.

To demonstrate their concern about Iran's nuclear program, the UAE has done something clever, but also potentially ominous. In 2008, the UAE announced it was developing its own nuclear industry to support a civilian nuclear energy program.
¹⁴
There is good reason for the Emiratis to pursue nuclear energy: the less that the UAE consumes its own oil production in powering its own economy, the more it will be able to export its finite hydrocarbon resources. However, the UAE has chosen to develop its own nuclear program within all of the guidelines of the NPT. Abu Dhabi's point in doing so has been to make clear that it is possible to develop a civilian nuclear program in conformity with the NPT as a way of highlighting the falsity of Iran's claims.

Of course, the UAE's program may serve another rationale. Although the Emiratis take care never to say so in public, in private they make clear that their program is not just a foil, but a warning to Iran.
¹⁵
If Abu Dhabi ever wanted, it could use its civilian program as the foundation for a nuclear weapons program, and Emirati officials will sometimes confirm in private that they want the Iranians to believe that if Tehran crossed that nuclear threshold, so too would the UAE.

Yet the UAE's procession down this path is also not a certainty, even if the Iranians do weaponize. Like Saudi Arabia, the UAE has not acquired nuclear weapons, even though its strategic circumstances have created powerful incentives for them to do so for a decade or more. The same set of counterpressures that operate on the Saudis affect the UAE, and perhaps to an even greater degree. The UAE is smaller than Saudi Arabia, its oil production is much less than that of the Saudis, and its income is
more tied to international finance than the Kingdom's, all of which makes it more difficult for Abu Dhabi to defy the international community than it is for Riyadh.

The Emiratis have another consideration, and that is Saudi Arabia itself. The dirty little secret of the Gulf region is that all of their governments are suspicious of one another. All have grievances, irredentist claims, and long-standing grudges against one another. And all of the small Gulf emirates have some fear of their massive Saudi neighbor, just as they rely on Riyadh as their leader and principal voice on the world stage. Riyadh and Abu Dhabi have been working in lockstep in recent years, but the Emiratis must still worry that the Saudis will not want to see them acquire a nuclear weapon of their own. Riyadh's perspective may well be that if any Gulf state gets a nuclear capability to balance Iran's, it should be Saudi Arabia itself, and not its “little brothers” in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). That may be the greatest constraint on the UAE: Abu Dhabi might be willing to ignore international protests, even sanctions (which it could assume would be much weaker than those imposed on Iran, because no one fears the UAE). But it probably will not be willing to defy a demand by Riyadh to cease and desist, because the Saudis have the capacity and potentially the willingness to take action in the UAE.

Egypt, another country often mentioned as a potential proliferant should Iran cross the nuclear threshold, is probably the least likely of the candidates to follow Iran down the proliferation path.
¹⁶
Egypt had an extensive nuclear development program of its own in the 1970s. It first delved into the nuclear realm in 1955, when Cairo inaugurated a civilian atomic energy program. At that time, the Egyptian military leadership suggested that Egypt begin research into nuclear weapons, but President Gamal ‘Abd al-Nasser turned them down.
¹⁷
Six years later, Nasser changed his mind. On December 21, 1960, Israeli prime minister David Ben-Gurion
confirmed that Israel was building a nuclear reactor at Dimona. In response, Nasser ordered a full-blown Egyptian effort to develop nuclear weapons. He insisted that Egypt would “secure atomic weapons at any cost.”
¹⁸

From 1961 to 1967, Egypt tried to make good on Nasser's pledge. Cairo tried purchasing them from the Soviets, in 1964 and again in 1965, but was rebuffed on both occasions.
¹⁹
Simultaneously, the focus of Egypt's indigenous nuclear program shifted from civilian power to weapons. Egypt began negotiations to augment its nuclear facilities to pursue a weapons capability. Cairo signed agreements with Yugoslavia, China, France, and India, and also negotiated with the Soviets, West Germans, and British for nuclear-related research and manufacturing capabilities.
²⁰

Yet Egypt never acquired a nuclear weapon. After the 1973 October War, President Anwar as-Sadat discontinued the program. He did so because the effort was a drain on Egypt's economy, it became unnecessary strategically when peace with Israel became a real alternative, and because Sadat felt that a good relationship with the United States—with all of the economic, political, and military aid it promised—was more important. The Americans insisted as a condition for improved relations that Egypt abandon its nuclear aspirations.
²¹

This history casts an important shadow on the notion that Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons would prompt Egypt to follow. Israel is Egypt's neighbor. It smashed Egyptian armies repeatedly between 1948 and 1973. Losses to Israel resulted in the overthrow of King Farouk's government in 1952, and threatened Nasser's regime in 1956 and again in 1967. Nasser feared the same in 1969, during the War of Attrition. These threats prompted Egypt to try to acquire a nuclear arsenal in the first place.

If this compelling strategic and political threat was not sufficient to cause Egypt to acquire nuclear weapons—even after so much time, effort, and money spent trying to do so—it seems unlikely that Egypt would do so in response to an Iranian nuclear capability. Iran is much farther away. Unlike Israel, it poses no threat to Egyptian territory, only a minor threat to the safety of Egyptian citizens, and not much more of one to the Egyptian
government. Today and for the foreseeable future, Egypt's own internal economic, social, and political problems are likely to prove a far more compelling priority for the new Egyptian government than an abstract threat from Iran. Since coming to power in 2012, Egypt's new president, Muhammad Morsi, has exchanged visits with his Iranian counterpart and his spokesmen have been talking about warming relations. This statecraft hardly suggests that the new Egypt sees Iran as a threat.

Former Egyptian autocrat Husni Mubarak believed Iran was one of his greatest foes. He saw Iran's hand in every unfortunate event to befall Egypt, including the failed assassination attempt against him in Addis Ababa in 1995. There were few greater foes of Iran among the Arabs than Mubarak, and he joined any effort that promised to hamstring the Islamic Republic. During Mubarak's rule over Egypt, Iran's nuclear program accelerated—enough to galvanize the Saudis, Emiratis, and other Arab states to action. And Mubarak openly admitted he was uncomfortable with Iran's nuclear pursuit, warning in a 2009 interview that “[a] nuclear armed Iran with hegemonic ambitions is the greatest threat to Arab nations today.”
²²
Despite that, Mubarak saw no need to bring back Egypt's nuclear program to try to match Tehran. If Mubarak did not feel the need for a nuclear weapon to defend against Iran, it is hard to imagine that his successors would, at least in the near term. One Israeli assessment posits that Egypt would be more likely to redouble its demands for a Nuclear-Weapons Free Zone in the Middle East than to try to obtain nukes of its own in the event Iran goes nuclear.
²³

Over time, this position may change. If Iran's acquisition of a nuclear capability results in nuclear dominoes falling across the region, and several more Middle Eastern states acquire nuclear weapons, Egypt may begin to feel otherwise. Egypt's desire to lead the Arab world could make Cairo feel that it must acquire nukes to command the prestige to play that role. Indeed, if the Saudis have a nuclear arsenal, the Egyptians may feel that they have to have one just to match the Al Sa'ud. Likewise, if a new, stable Egyptian state emerges from the postrevolutionary rubble, Cairo may feel that it can afford to do so and, in a more nuclearized Middle
East, that there will be fewer penalties for doing so. Even in this case, however, it is important to note that Egypt would be trying to acquire a nuclear capability to match its Arab brothers more than to confront its Persian rival.

Perhaps the most complicated case for proliferation arising from Iranian acquisition of nukes is Turkey.
²⁴
If it seems more likely than not that Saudi Arabia would try to acquire a nuclear capability of some kind, and that Egypt would probably refrain, Turkey could go either way.

Turkey has an important rivalry with Iran. There is a quip, usually attributed to the late Egyptian diplomat Tahseen Bashir, that in all the Middle East there are only three nations—Egypt, Iran, and Turkey—and all of the rest are mere “tribes with flags.” Just as Egypt seeks to be the leader of the Arab world, so too does Turkey see itself as one of the great powers of the region, as does Iran. This perception is especially keen after Turkey's reemergence on the Middle Eastern scene under Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Erdogan's foreign policy is often described as “neo-Ottoman,” reflecting the conscious desire on Ankara's part to play a leading role across the Middle East. Just as Iran seeks to dominate southwest Asia, so too does Turkey. And like Egypt, there is reason to suspect that if Iran were to acquire nuclear weapons, Turkey would desire to do the same if only to match Tehran's newfound status.
²⁵

Turkey's sense of threat from Iran goes beyond this abstract contest for leadership. Turkey shares a border with Iran—as well as an unhappy Kurdish population that would prefer to be independent. Yet Iran has at times supported Kurdish PKK terrorists against Ankara.
²⁶
Moreover, although Turkey's official ideology is secularism, it is a Sunni nation with a Sunni Islamist government. The rising tide of Sunni-Shi'a animosity also affects Iranian-Turkish relations, and shapes specific differences on policy matters. In Syria, Turkey backs the Sunni opposition while Iran just as staunchly backs the Shi'i/Alawi regime. Turkey sees the civil war
in Syria as a critical threat to its national security, and Iran's support for the regime infuriates Turkey. But Iran is just as enraged by what it sees as Turkey's efforts to extirpate Iran's last ally, Asad's Alawi regime. In Iraq, Turkey backs Mas'ud Barzani's Kurdistan Democratic Party and sees itself as a protector of Iraq's Sunni Arab community. Iran, of course, is the patron saint of all of Iraq's Shi'i groups and the two compete both directly and by proxy there. In almost every arena of conflict, Turkey lines up on one side and Iran on the other. As a result, Iran's potential acquisition of nuclear weapons does concern Turkey.
²⁷