Unthinkable (11 page)

Although we did not know it at the time, Khomeini himself apparently had issued a similar fatwa banning the development and use of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, only to reverse it and order Iran to develop these weapons when Saddam began using chemical warfare agents on Iranian troops in the Iran-Iraq War.
⁷⁵
Indeed, there are reports that, despite Khomeini's publicly published fatwa renouncing nuclear weapons as “unislamic,” in April 1984 Khamene'i (then president of Iran) told senior Iranian political and security officials that a nuclear deterrent was the only way to secure the “very essence of the Islamic Revolution from the schemes of its enemies, especially the United States and Israel.” He reportedly went on to say that a nuclear arsenal would serve Iran as a “deterrent in the hands of God's soldiers.”
⁷⁶
In February 1987, Khamene'i reportedly told Iran's nuclear scientists that Iran had to make a “tireless effort” to obtain “atomic energy . . . now,” so as to “let our enemies know that we can defend ourselves.”
⁷⁷
The next year, then–speaker of parliament Hashemi Rafsanjani gave a speech in which he proclaimed, “With regard to chemical, bacteriological, and radiological weapons, it was made very clear during the war that these weapons are very decisive. . . . We should fully equip ourselves both in the offensive and defensive use of chemical, bacteriological and radiological weapons.”
⁷⁸
We might ask why Iran ever had a weaponization program at all if Khomeini's and Khamene'i's fatwas prohibited the development of nuclear weapons? While we have no smoking gun and the Iraq example should make us cautious, the evidence seems strong that Iran had a program
to design, test, and build a nuclear weapon in the past, and may still be pursuing that end today. In the most comprehensive and balanced history yet written of Iran's nuclear program, journalist David Patrikarakos concluded of Iran's nuclear program in the 1980s that, “[t]aken together, Iran's considerable security concerns, the reported statements of regime officials and, most damningly, the scope and nature of its undeclared activities render the claim that all enrichment-related efforts were solely civil in intent, with no thought of the military applications, improbable to a degree that borders on the impossible.”
⁷⁹
If this is the case, it would appear to counter the fatwas' prohibition against the “production” of nuclear weapons.

There is a strong case that Iran may only be seeking a breakout capability and not an arsenal. The supposed fatwas may be part of that body of evidence, but they do not seem like the most compelling element of it.

GOING ALL IN FOR A BOMB.
The alternative position, that Iran will not be satisfied with only a breakout capability, but will break out of the NPT to field a nuclear arsenal once it is able to do so, has its proponents as well. First, they note that the Iranians feel that they have a compelling strategic need for a nuclear deterrent, having turned most of their neighbors into enemies, while also demonizing the United States and Israel. Since they face American military forces in the Persian Gulf and parts of Central Asia, and are within range of an Israeli strike, Iran's leaders might well see the need for a nuclear deterrent. The Iranian regime watched as Iraq and Libya tried to acquire nuclear weapons, but before either could detonate a bomb, they were attacked by the United States and their governments overthrown. In contrast, both Pakistan and North Korea were able to acquire nuclear weapons. Their governments remain in power.

Second, it is not clear that Iran would pay a higher price, at least in some ways, for fielding an arsenal than it already is paying for trying to acquire the latent capability to do so. As I discuss later, the West is running out of sanctions to impose on Iran. Some Iranians argue that once North Korea and Pakistan acquired nuclear weapons, the West had to
ease its sanctions and provide them with greater assistance to deter them from reckless behavior and prevent their collapse. Although this reading misrepresents the actual history of those two states, some Iranians appear to interpret it that way.
⁸⁰
Moreover, China and Russia have consistently opposed sanctions on North Korea and Pakistan (for geostrategic reasons) and so again, Iran may see little danger that they would increase sanctions on Iran if Tehran fielded an arsenal.

The Iranians complain of a double standard, arguing that no one reacted to Israel's and Pakistan's acquisitions of nuclear capabilities as they have to Iran's nuclear program. This interpretation misrepresents the actual history since the United States discouraged both countries from traveling the nuclear path, including imposing sanctions on Pakistan.
⁸¹
Ayatollah Mohammad Taqi Mesbah-Yazdi, one of the most hardline of Iran's senior clergymen, wrote a book in 2005 called
The Islamic Revolution: A Surge in Political Changes in History
, in which he argued, “The most advanced weapons must be produced inside our country even if our enemies don't like it. There is no reason that they have the right to produce a special type of weapons, while other countries are deprived of it.” He went on to write that Iran must acquire the “deterrent weapons” needed to stand up to its enemies. “From Islam's point of view, Muslims must make efforts to benefit from the most sophisticated military equipment and get specific weapons out of the monopoly of powerful countries.”
⁸²

Ayatollah Mesbah-Yazdi's writings are not the only statement by a senior Iranian official arguing the case for a nuclear arsenal. For instance, the conservative newspaper
Kayhan
, which often reflects the views of the Supreme Leader, called on Iran to acquire the “knowledge and ability to make nuclear weapons that are necessary in preparation for the next phase of the battlefield.”
⁸³
Still, such pronouncements are outnumbered by those of senior Iranian officials arguing that Iran is only interested in nuclear energy and has no interest in nuclear weapons.

Finally, there is probably some degree of both bureaucratic inertia and political pressure pushing Iran toward an arsenal. Its nuclear program has
been ongoing for at least twenty-five years, and some important members of the Iranian leadership—particularly within the Revolutionary Guard—support it. What's more, Iran has endured a considerable amount of pain and suffering to sustain it. All of those elements probably add pressure to see the program through to an ultimate conclusion, the acquisition of weapons themselves. In April 2013, after yet another round of fruitless talks between Iran and the P-5+1, Fereydoun Abbasi-Davani, the head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization, announced that Iran might have to enrich uranium to 45 or even 56 percent purity for use in nuclear-powered ships or subs. While still not adequate for a bomb, uranium of this purity could be quickly and easily enriched to weapons-grade. This may represent nothing more than Iranian negotiating tactics, but it also may signal an Iranian intent to move further toward full weaponization.
⁸⁴

THE LAST MYSTERY.
Assuming that Iran's nuclear program is a military one, there is at least one other possibility regarding their ultimate goal: they may not know themselves. At present, their current activities will give them the capability to break out of the NPT and manufacture nuclear weapons—likely in the next few years. Khamene'i may not have decided whether he will exercise that option, wait for a more propitious moment, or never exercise it at all.
⁸⁵
That seems to be the view of the U.S. intelligence community. In early 2012, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper said of the Iranians, “They are certainly moving on that path, but we don't believe that they have actually made the decision to go ahead with a nuclear weapon.”
⁸⁶
Shahram Chubin also suspects that Iran has not yet made up its mind: “Anticipating Iran's objectives is problematic as rhetoric is not tightly correlated with behavior. In all likelihood, the Iranians themselves do not know whether to build nuclear weapons or stop at the threshold.”
⁸⁷

Certainly there is no reason that would compel them to make that decision now. It is a decision that can be postponed. From my own experience, having served twice at the White House on the National Security Council staff under President Clinton, and having watched the Bush 41
administration make policy from my perch at CIA, I have observed that policymakers don't make hard decisions before it is necessary to do so (and sometimes not till well after they should). If a hard decision can be deferred, it will be. At a later date, the decision may be easier, the right choice may be more obvious, or the issue might be overtaken by other events. And Khamene'i's history throughout his rule as Supreme Leader is that he is not a man who likes to make hard decisions. He delays, dithers, and then makes half-decisions because he lacks the courage or the confidence to do otherwise. It seems likely that Khamene'i hasn't made a decision about whether to stop with a breakout capability or go the final distance and deploy nuclear weapons themselves. He probably won't until he has no choice but to do so. As always when we ask questions about Iran's thinking on issues of great import, the answer is usually “I don't know” or “it depends.” Except when it's both.

O
ne of the worst mistakes we make when we think about Iran is to assume that the problem we face is its nuclear program. However, it is not Iran's possession of nuclear weapons per se that creates a threat to American interests in the Middle East. The United States faced a wide range of threats from Iran when its nuclear program was moribund. Those problems have not changed or abated and may not even if Iran can be persuaded to give up its nuclear ambitions.

If Iran were a peaceful, secure, and satisfied country—one that did not support terrorism, subvert American allies, try to overturn the regional status quo, and inflict harm on the United States in a multiplicity of ways—its nuclear program would likely not concern us at all. We don't fret about what the French will do with their nuclear arsenal, or the British, or the Indians, or even the Russians for that matter. We worry about Iran acquiring that capability because Tehran means us harm, and acts on that intention. It is that intention and those acts that are the threat,
not the nuclear program in isolation. Iran's acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability may exacerbate that threat, but it is not the threat itself.

Nevertheless, we have become fixated on the Iranian nuclear program as if it were the entirety of the threat. That has badly distorted our approach to Iran over the past decade or more. Successive American administrations have refrained from acting in response to other harmful Iranian behavior—like encouraging and abetting the killing of American personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan, trying to kill the Saudi ambassador to the United States, oppressing the Iranian people, supporting the Syrian government's bloody crackdowns, and supporting terrorist attacks in Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen, and possibly Bahrain
¹
—so as not to jeopardize a possible deal on the nuclear issue.
²
This tendency makes it all the more imperative to understand the real threat of a nuclear Iran.

It may not be obvious, but at this moment, the Iranian nuclear program is actually a
benefit
to the United States. Tehran's determination to acquire a nuclear weapons capability has so far been helpful to the United States and harmful to Iran. Iran and the United States have been adversaries since 1979. However, at no time since then has Iran been so isolated, so internally divided, so crushed by sanctions, and so weak. As a result of its stubborn determination to continue down the nuclear path, Iran has limited its ability to influence the geopolitics of the Middle East, which was probably one of its paramount objectives for trying to acquire a nuclear capability in the first place. Iran is also in greater danger of being attacked, either by the United States or Israel, than at almost any time since the revolution (with the hostage crisis and the Tanker War being two possible exceptions). Obviously, there is a widespread fear that if Iran were to acquire a nuclear capability all of this would turn around and Iran would become stronger and more dangerous than ever before. But at present and until it acquires that capability, Tehran's pursuit of it is having exactly the opposite effect.

All of this should emphasize that our problem with Iran is
not
its simple acquisition of nuclear weapons. The problem is what the Iranian
regime might do when they have them, and how other countries might react under those circumstances.

Before considering what Iran might do with a nuclear weapons capability, it is important to consider what they almost certainly will
not
do. Nuclear weapons evoke an understandable sense of fear. It often snowballs into panic. Add the opaque workings and often unexpected behavior of the Iranian regime and it is easy to take counsel of one's worst fears when pondering a world with a nuclear Iran. As a result, nuclear weapons have caused people to focus on worst-case scenarios, particularly with Iran.