Unthinkable (52 page)

Thus it is probably the case that balancing is not just the higher probability but the greater danger for the Gulf region, especially if the United States proves feckless in the face of a nuclear Iran. In that case, not only will GCC incentives to acquire nuclear weapons of their own soar, but they would probably try to
aggressively
balance against Iran to ensure that Iran understands that if it tries anything with the GCC, it is going to have a fight on its hands. Tehran may see such a reaction as either threatening or just arrogant, and it may try to subvert the GCC governments and stir up internal unrest against them in response. Inevitably, this would provoke the GCC to do the same to the Iranians, and at some point this war of subversion could boil over into one or more crises that they would have difficulty resolving on their own. Consequently, if the United States is not willing to back up the Gulf oil monarchies against Iran, the endemic instability of the region is likely to reemerge either in the form of bandwagoning that produces Iranian domination or, far more likely,
in aggressive balancing and possible proliferation that leads to renewed conflict.

There is a reasonable answer to this problem: responsible but assertive American involvement. It is not impossible for the United States to convince the GCC countries to avoid the perils of both accommodation and proliferation. The former should be relatively easy because of their natural preference and the massive American conventional and nuclear superiority over Iran. The latter will be more difficult. The key is that the GCC states will have to be reassured early and perhaps often that they can count on the United States in these significantly altered circumstances. That in turn will require constant American involvement in the region, especially when there is a challenge from Iran, and assurance that the United States can and will prevent Iran from realizing any gains from its nuclear arsenal.

Drawing on America's experiences from the Cold War, other experts have proposed additional steps that the United States might take to mollify the risks of both bandwagoning and balancing in response to a nuclear Iran. I see these measures as strategically unnecessary and even counterproductive; nevertheless they are important to address because they may ultimately prove to be diplomatically essential.

INCREASED CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN THE REGION.
A number of the advocates of air strikes argue that because the United States maintained a large conventional force in Europe during the Cold War as part of our effort to contain and deter the USSR, we would have to do the same to contain and deter the Iranians.
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They fear that the United States would have to engage in a massive force buildup in the Gulf. Militarily and strategically, there is no reason for us to do so.

The problem during the Cold War was that the Soviets fielded a massive
conventional military and the United States and NATO struggled to match it to avoid an overreliance on nuclear deterrence. During the Eisenhower administration, the United States relied on nuclear deterrence, and so we kept a relatively weak conventional force in Europe—and did so to save money. Under Kennedy, the United States and NATO decided that it would be better to create at least some possibility of defeating a Soviet invasion with conventional forces so that we did not have to ignite a nuclear holocaust to “save” Europe. From that point on, the United States built up much larger conventional forces in Europe (and northeast Asia), but it was because we were facing the enormous conventional might of the Red Army.

With Iran, the problem is absent. The current level of American forces is more than adequate to handle any Iranian conventional move against the GCC states. Typically, United States forces in the Gulf include an aircraft carrier battle group (often with a second nearby in the Arabian Sea, Indian Ocean, or Mediterranean); about a dozen other surface ships (including several minesweepers); two to three Air Force combat squadrons in Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE; and the equipment for two full-strength Army brigades and a Marine combat regiment.
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This force amounts to about forty thousand American soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines in the region on a routine basis, although the vast majority of these are administrative, headquarters, and other support personnel.
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In a crisis, the United States can fly in the troops to man the ground force equipment in a matter of days, along with Air Force bombers and tankers to Diego Garcia and additional fighter-bombers to the Gulf states. Even if the GCC militaries proved so hapless that they added no combat capability of their own, this level of force would be more than adequate to crush any Iranian conventional attack on any of the GCC states. There simply is no military need to augment these forces.

What's more, doing so could be counterproductive. Right now, the GCC states are very comfortable with the current American force level in the region. Although American troops are not terribly welcome in much of the Middle East, the smaller Gulf states recognize the strategic need for
them and have tolerated them at current, relatively low levels. Throughout nearly a decade of popular unrest in Bahrain, including major riots in 2011, none of that animosity has been directed at American forces there despite the presence of the headquarters of the U.S. Fifth Fleet and its five thousand personnel. There have been no attacks on American troops or facilities. That speaks to how comfortable the Gulf populations have become with current U.S. force levels. In the past, however, when U.S. forces were deployed in Saudi Arabia and at much greater force levels (for example, during the Persian Gulf War and the occupation of Iraq), there were problems, and GCC governments took greater heat both from the anti-American elements of their own societies and from other Arab populations. One of Osama bin Laden's principal grievances against the Al Sa'ud was that they had invited infidel soldiers into the Kingdom. In short, increasing American forces in the region is unnecessary and could create problems for the host governments.

TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS.
A second possibility to further reassure America's regional allies if Iran joins the nuclear club would be to preposition U.S. tactical nuclear forces in the Gulf. Again, this is a notion that advocates of air strikes have raised based on the Cold War experience. Once again, however, the logic that drove the United States to go this route during the Cold War does not apply to Iran. There were two different strategic rationales underlying the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons to Europe and East Asia then. Early on, both sides believed that tactical nuclear weapons were needed to “win” the conventional battle for Europe. In those early years, nuclear weapons were seen as little more than big conventional weapons, and both NATO and the Warsaw Pact integrated tactical nuclear weapons into their conventional force structures as a matter of routine.

Over time, however, both sides came to realize that nuclear weapons were categorically different from conventional forces, but that left NATO with the fundamental dilemma of Cold War extended deterrence: the Soviets had overwhelming conventional superiority, but it was not rational
for the United States to “trade Boston for Bonn.” Moreover, there was a fear that if one side could dominate the battlefield with tactical nuclear weapons, the other would have no choice but to escalate to strategic homeland exchanges—launching ICBMs against each other's home cities—which would be unacceptable to everyone. Consequently, the United States might have been forced to accept the loss of Europe instead. In addition, by retaining large numbers of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe (many with the range to strike Russian cities), the Americans forced the Soviets to worry that even if the American president did not want to escalate to strategic homeland attacks, either the troops on the ground (many of whose families were with them overseas and therefore vulnerable to Soviet armies) or the Europeans themselves would get control of the tactical nuclear forces and launch them at the Russian homeland. All of this might sound like madness (or MADness), and it was, but it was how we won the Cold War.

In the Persian Gulf, however, all of this is unnecessary. Unlike in Europe, the United States retains both conventional and strategic nuclear superiority over Iran and should be able to do so for the foreseeable future. This obviates any strategic or military need for tactical nuclear weapons. There is just no conceivable scenario in which the United States would need tactical nuclear weapons to do something that we could not do with our conventional forces or, at worst, with our strategic nuclear forces. Moreover, tactical nuclear weapons become a target for antinuclear activists wherever they have been deployed. In the Gulf, these forces would create unnecessary headaches both for Washington and the host nations.

BUILDING UP REGIONAL MILITARIES.
Some commentators have suggested that deterring and containing Iran will require a major augmentation of the armed forces of the Gulf states, Turkey, and Israel, in turn requiring huge new arms sales to the region. This is a bit more complicated than whether to add more conventional forces or tactical nuclear weapons to the region.

The GCC countries still have considerable room for improvement when it comes to their military capabilities, although they have made some important changes and acquisitions in the past decade or so. They have better integrated their air and air defense forces under American auspices, and are now doing the same for their ballistic missile defenses. At bottom, however, it is the U.S. military presence in the region and specifically in their own countries that provides their most important assurance against Iranian attack. The United States has major military bases in Kuwait, Bahrain, the UAE, and Qatar, as well as access to facilities in Saudi Arabia and Oman. As long as those bases are there, any Iranian attack on Kuwait, Bahrain, the UAE, or Qatar would engage the United States directly, as it would threaten the security of those troops. There are no longer American combat forces in Saudi Arabia, but no one doubts that United States forces would rush to Saudi Arabia's defense were they ever attacked by Iran.

It may well be that Iran's acquisition of a nuclear arsenal would result in further, massive arms sales to the GCC states. These sales would not be a
burden
on the United States, nor would Washington have to impose such sales on unwilling Gulf allies. The U.S. government tries to convince all kinds of countries, and the GCC states in particular, to buy American weapons. Helping American companies sell their wares is something that the U.S. government does all the time, whether it is American cars, corn, computers, or jet fighters. And it is particularly helpful with weapons, because foreign arms sales help drive down the costs when the U.S. military wants to buy those same weapons. Yet in the case of the GCC states, the real impetus does not come from the United States trying to force them to improve their military capabilities by buying our weapons. Exactly the opposite: The GCC states spend lavishly on American weapons to ensure the U.S. commitment to their defense.

That is why the Saudis, Emiratis, Kuwaitis, and Qataris spend tens of billions of dollars on American weapons: not because they really expect to use the weapons themselves, but because these purchases constitute
a contribution to the American economy, to the American military-industrial complex, and to every American administration to ensure that we will defend them if they are ever threatened. That's also why these countries buy weapons from France, Britain, and occasionally from Russia. They have even started to eye Chinese kit as well. Having different kinds of equipment from many countries creates logistical nightmares, so efficiency and effectiveness would argue for the opposite. While some have suggested that the Gulf states do it to diversify their sources, the truth is that they are rewarding the United States and its allies (and the other great powers) for having defended them in the past and to ensure that we will continue to do so in the future. The GCC states might go on another arms-buying spree after Iran acquires nuclear weapons, but it will most likely be driven not by an American effort to reassure the Gulf states, but by the Gulf states' desire to guarantee our commitment to their defense.

That said, there are some military systems that the United States would want the GCC to have. In particular, the GCC states need to continue to modernize and integrate their air, air defense, and ballistic missile defense forces to allow them to repel (or help the United States repel) any Iranian attack. The stronger these capabilities are, the less vulnerable the GCC states are, which in turn strengthens America's military advantages over Iran. It is equally important for their own peace of mind and to demonstrate to their domestic constituencies that they are contributing to their own defense—a source of pride for many Gulf populations.

Turkey would fall into a similar situation. Turkey's conventional forces are already more formidable than those of the GCC, and it has the added advantage of the forbidding mountains on its borders with Iran. But Turkey's greatest advantage, its ultimate trump card, is its membership in NATO. Any Iranian attack on Turkey is automatically an attack on the United States and Western Europe, making it highly unlikely Iran would ever attack Turkey. America's real incentive to build up Turkey's military capabilities lies in the potential to involve Turkey more closely in the
defense of the Gulf states.
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Because of Turkey's own relative strength and its NATO membership, involving it more in the defense of the Gulf could be helpful in reassuring the Gulf states. That it is a (Sunni) Muslim state might also make it more palatable. Thus, if Washington could find ways to bring Ankara into Gulf security matters in a constructive way, it might be worthwhile to help Turkey build up the power-projection capabilities to do so.