Zionism: The Real Enemy of the Jews, Volume 1 (60 page)

In that context Marshall believed that Roosevelt Junior was irresponsible beyond polite description. The purpose of his call was to ask Forrestal for suggestions about how to stop the Roosevelt statement being made.

Forrestal’s diary entry for that dramatic day included the following: “The sensational factor here, of course, was the implication of revolt, led by the late President’s son.”
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The date (26 March) was the key to understanding. It was after Ambassador Austin’s announcement of the U.S. policy reversal—the decision to shelve partition, and four days before he was due to introduce a new resolution calling for Palestine to become a UN trusteeship with Jerusalem an international city.

Forrestal told Marshall he would be glad to talk to “young Roosevelt” but did not believe that anything he could say to him would be effective. The Secretary of Defence then suggested that he should call Eisenhower and ask him to speak to Roosevelt Junior. The Secretary of State thought that was a good idea.

For background it is essential to know that two months previously Eisenhower had asked Forrestal for advice about a statement he had drafted and wanted to release. It was Eisenhower’s announcement that he would “not permit his name to be put forward for the presidency.”
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(Without consulting Eisenhower, somebody had entered his name for the New Hampshire primaries). When he showed the statement to Forrestal, Eisenhower said it was entirely his own work—he had not asked anybody to help with the drafting of it, and that he had come to Forrestal because he didn’t know anybody else he could turn to for advice. Eisenhower then told Forrestal that his only misgiving about ruling himself out as a candidate for the presidency had been that “a construction could be put upon it of its constituting a refusal to respond to a duty.” What did Eisenhower mean? His whole life had been built around responding to the call of duty and there were many youngsters in the country who, whether with reason or not, had made him more or less a symbol of the duties and obligations, as well as the opportunities, open to American youth, and he was truly worried about the responsibility of, in effect, telling them that there was a limit to any man’s conception of his obligation to respond to the call of duty. In his diary for the day Forrestal said there was no question in his mind about Eisenhower’s sincerity, and that his proposed statement reflected “the outcome of a genuine moral struggle within himself.” Forrestal told Eisenhower that his statement would put him in a position of tremendous influence, “above the battle”, and that in this role he could still perform a great service to the country. “I told him that I thought the letter, both in its content and style, was splendid, and that I would not recommend changing anything in it.” Eisenhower released the text of his statement the following day, 24 January.

On 26 March, convinced that Roosevelt Junior would take no notice of him, Forrestal telephoned Eisenhower and asked him to tell the late President’s son not to make his statement. The General was very reluctant to call Roosevelt Junior. He feared that if he had any contact with him at that moment in time, some people would say that he was party to a conspiracy to dump Truman. On that basis Forrestal was reluctant to press Eisenhower and did not do so. There was, however, some comfort in what Eisenhower had said. If Forrestal called Roosevelt Junior, he could quote the General as saying that he would be “greatly distressed” if the late President’s son made any such move and public declaration.
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Forrestal then telephoned Senator McGrath. That was not an easy thing for the Secretary of Defence to do because McGrath had not delivered on his promise to give a considered reply to Forrestal’s plea for the Democrats to play their part in lifting the Palestine problem out of U.S. domestic politics.

McGrath said there was no point in Forrestal calling Roosevelt Junior. Nothing the Secretary of Defence could say would have any affect because Roosevelt Junior was “very set in his ideas and determined to go ahead.” Translated that meant: “
The Party needs a winner and that ain’t going to be Truman if he does not reverse the policy reversal and stick with the partition plan
.”

I imagine Forrestal consulted with Marshall before taking his next step.

At 2.15 p.m. Forrestal called Eisenhower again, reported the situation to him, and said, in effect “You’ve got to make that call.”

Eisenhower said, “Okay. I’ll do it.”

And ten minutes later he called back to say he’d done it.

From Eisenhower’s report to Forrestal it was clear that the former Supreme Commander of Allied Forces had been as forceful as he could be. He told Roosevelt Junior that any action now of the kind he was proposing, in the middle of delicate situations in various countries abroad, could have “dangerous consequences and might negate American policy.” Any statement which might be interpreted abroad as implying failure to support the President at this most critical time, or indicate deep and serious splits in public opinion would be “detrimental to the country.” Eisenhower also told Roosevelt Junior that he was giving his thoughts without reference to any political considerations, particularly as they affected himself. He had added: “When I made my public statement some weeks ago, I meant what I said, I am sorry some people don’t believe me.”

Roosevelt Junior still went ahead and made his statement.

Fortunately the repercussions abroad and at home were less serious than Marshall, Forrestal, Eisenhower and Truman himself had feared they could be.

Unless he was stupid, Roosevelt Junior knew there was no prospect of drafting Eisenhower for the election then only eight months away. So why did he still go public with his call? There is only one possible answer. He was firing a warning shot across President Truman’s bows. Effectively he was saying to the man in the White House: “Stick with partition or you’ll take the party down with you. Some of us are not prepared to let that happen.”

As we have seen, Truman stuck with partition.

When Eisenhower allowed himself to be persuaded to run for the presidency in 1952 it was on the Republican not the Democratic ticket. Whether or not such a thought crossed his mind, it was effectively a magnificent and mighty “Screw you” gesture to Roosevelt Junior and other Democrats who had raised the flag of revolt against President Truman when they feared he was not going to do Zionism’s bidding.

I also think it is not difficult to imagine that Eisenhower was profoundly disturbed by the Democratic Party’s complicity in the destruction of one of America’s most outstanding public servants. Suicide implies self-destruction but there was much more to Forrestal’s death than that, as Eisenhower, because of the nature of his professional and personal relationship with the first U.S. Secretary of Defence, would have known better than most.

Forrestal plunged to his death from the 16th floor of the Naval Hospital at Bethesda, Maryland, at about 1:45 am on 22 May 1949.

Perhaps because he had been informed that President Truman was intending to remove him from office in response to Zionist pressure for his removal, Forrestal had resigned as Secretary of Defense seven weeks earlier. By then there were warning signs of disturbance in his mind. According to
Who Killed James Forrestal?
the Internet file of David Martin, also known as DCDave (more about him later), Forrestal, officially said to be suffering from “nervous and physical exhaustion” with a condition diagnosed as “depression” or “reactive depression”, was committed to the Bethesda Naval Hospital “apparently against his will”.

On the night of 21–22 May, according to the story proclaimed by the media before there had been any kind of investigation and which the media still promotes today, Forrestal had obviously been unable to sleep and was reading Mark Van Doren’s Anthology of World Poetry. In what were to be the last moments of his life, he was copying or transcribing from it Praed’s version of Sophocles’s dark and solemn Chorus from Ajax:

Fair Salamis, the billows’ roar

Wander, around thee yet;

And sailors gaze upon thy shore

Firm in the ocean set.

Thy son is in a foreign clime

Where Ida feeds her countless flocks,

Far from thy dear, remembered rocks,

Worn by the waste of time—

Comfortless, nameless, hopeless—save

In the dark prospect of the yawning grave…

Woe to the mother, in her close of day,

Woe to her desolate heart, and temples grey,

When she shall hear

Her loved one’s story whispered into her ear!

‘Woe, woe!’ will be the cry—

No quiet murmur like the tremulous wail

Of the lone bird, the querulous nightingale.

At that point Forrestal was said by some—media people at the time and a number of authors later—to have stopped writing, walked to a small kitchen on the same floor and, as Millis put it, “fell to his death from its unguarded window.”
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If the media’s version of the story is to be believed, one possible interpretation is that the poem triggered an unconscious impulse and that he went unwittingly to his death.

Another possible interpretation is that he had taken a conscious decision to end his life and had been searching for a poem that reflected his inner feelings and even, perhaps, justified to himself what he was about to do. Some evidence that the latter might have been the case is that he was responding well to treatment. By the end of April he had seemed to be his old self to the friends and associates, including President Truman, who visited him. Millis wrote that he was still having moods of depression but with decreasing frequency and severity; and that was the reason why his brother Henry was due to arrive on what turned out to be the day of his death to take James out of the hospital.

I think there can be no doubt that a contributing cause of the depression that led to Forrestal’s breakdown was a Zionist campaign, conducted through the media as well as behind closed doors, for his resignation after Truman’s re-election—when American Zionism believed itself to be, and actually was, more influential than ever because of its contributions to Truman’s unexpected victory. The fact that some Zionists wanted revenge in the shape of Forrestal’s resignation really got to him. It is not hard to imagine why, given that all he had been trying to do to the best of his ability was his patriotic duty—protecting the national interest and preventing the spread of Soviet communism.

But the main cause of the turmoil in his mind was, I speculate, the fact that doing what was necessary to protect America’s best longer term interests had not been possible, especially with regard to the Middle East, because of the pork-barrel nature of American politics, which Zionism was (and still is) exploiting so brilliantly.

It is possible that in Forrestal’s mind the most pertinent line in the poem was “Thy son is in a foreign clime”; the meaning for him being that he felt like a foreigner in his own homeland because he had not been allowed by the politics of expediency to do his job to the best of his ability. The real madness, he might well have told himself, was putting the nation’s security at risk for the sake of Zionist-organised Jewish campaign funds and votes.

If (it bears repeating) the media version of events is to be believed, it’s not unreasonable to speculate that Forrestal might have decided, consciously, to commit suicide for a combination of two reasons.

One might have been his realisation that by selling out to Zionism, America’s pork-barrel politicians, the Democrats especially, had created a situation in which for decades to come, and possibly for all time, the United States of America would be a hostage to conflict in the Middle East. By definition America as hostage would not be free to make the decisions necessary for the best protection of its own security.

I think Forrestal would not have been surprised, as I was not, by the events in New York and Washington on 11 September 2001. While he lived he could not have imagined that anti-Americanism would manifest itself in such a spectacular and horrific way, but he was aware, as were many of those with whom he worked at executive level, that, given the opposition of just about the entire Arab and Muslim world (its masses, not their leaders), America might pay one day a terrible price for its support of Zionism right or wrong.

I also think that Forrestal would have endorsed the words of the courageous columnist, William Pfaff, writing in the
International Herald Tribune
of Wednesday 12 September 2001. Under the headline ATTACKS SHOW THAT COURAGE IS THE ONLY REAL DEFENCE, he wrote this (emphasis added):

For more than 30 years the United States has refused to make a genuinely impartial effort to find a resolution to that (Israeli-Palestinian) conflict. It has involved itself in the Middle East in a thousand ways, but has never accepted a responsibility for dealing impartially with the two sides —locked in their shared agony and their mutual tragedy…
If current speculation about these bombings proves to be true, the United States has now been awarded its share in that Middle Eastern tragedy
.

A second and related reason for Forrestal’s decision to end his life might well have been his belief that as the first U.S. Secretary of Defence he could and should have done more to try to prevent the surrender to Zionism. By his own standards—the highest possible—he had failed in his patriotic duty.