1812: The Navy's War (19 page)
The president was aware that dividing America’s small army to invade a vast country at four widely separated points made no strategic sense. Concentrating his forces and striking directly at Montreal was a far better strategy. Once in control of Montreal, the army could choke off provisions flowing west to Upper Canada by way of the St. Lawrence River and the Great Lakes. Supply lines stretched all the way back to England; Canada produced almost nothing of her own, except raw materials. Everything else came from the mother country or from the United States. Cut off from the eastern provinces, Upper Canada would soon fall without the need for an invasion.
Quebec remained the most important target in Canada, but given the size of the American army and the political disposition of New England, Madison thought it made more sense to attack Montreal first. Instead of doing this, however, the president, for political reasons, decided to divide his forces and attack Detroit and the Niagara area first in order to take advantage, as he told Jefferson, “of the unanimity and ardor of Kentucky and Ohio.” He also believed that concentrating on Montreal alone would risk “sacrificing the Western and Northwestern frontier, threatened with an inundation of savages under the influence of the British establishment near Detroit.”
Madison appeared unaware of how important naval supremacy on lakes Erie, Ontario, and Champlain was to his Canadian project. In June 1812 the British had control of all three lakes, albeit with weak provincial forces. The only American warships on the Great Lakes were the 6-gun
Adams—
an old army transport built in 1800 but still serviceable—at Detroit and the 18-gun brig
Oneida
at Oswego on Lake Ontario, under Lieutenant Melancthon Woolsley. The
Oneida
had been stationed there originally to enforce Jefferson’s embargo.
Adams—
an old army transport built in 1800 but still serviceable—at Detroit and the 18-gun brig
Oneida
at Oswego on Lake Ontario, under Lieutenant Melancthon Woolsley. The
Oneida
had been stationed there originally to enforce Jefferson’s embargo.
The Canadian Provincial Marine, on the other hand, had the 16-gun
Queen Charlotte
, the 12-gun
Hunter
, and the 12-gun
Lady Prevost
on Lake Erie, and the 22-gun
Royal George
, the 18-gun
Earl of Moira
, the 14-gun armed schooner
Duke of Gloucester
, and the recently launched 18-gun
Prince Regent
on Lake Ontario. With command of both lakes the British could use their fleet of 190 bateaux (flat-bottomed river craft from twenty-four feet to forty feet in length and tapered at both ends) to ferry men and supplies between Montreal and Amherstburg.
Queen Charlotte
, the 12-gun
Hunter
, and the 12-gun
Lady Prevost
on Lake Erie, and the 22-gun
Royal George
, the 18-gun
Earl of Moira
, the 14-gun armed schooner
Duke of Gloucester
, and the recently launched 18-gun
Prince Regent
on Lake Ontario. With command of both lakes the British could use their fleet of 190 bateaux (flat-bottomed river craft from twenty-four feet to forty feet in length and tapered at both ends) to ferry men and supplies between Montreal and Amherstburg.
“The decided superiority I have obtained on the Lakes in consequence of the precautionary measures adopted the last winter,” Prevost wrote to Henry Bathurst, the secretary of state for war and the colonies, “has permitted me to move without interruption . . . both troops and supplies of every description toward Amherstburg, while those for General Hull, having several hundred miles of wilderness to pass before they can reach Detroit, are exposed to be harassed and destroyed by the Indians.”
SECRETARY EUSTIS LOOKED to Ohio’s governor, Return J. Meigs, to supply significant numbers of militiamen to supplement the 400 regulars the administration was sending to Hull. Meigs was able to call up 1,800, but this was only half what Hull said he needed. The prospect of invading Canada and ending British support for the Indian nations was very popular in Ohio, but finding men to fight was still difficult.
Hull was compelled to organize his army at Urbana, Ohio, and hack a road for two hundred miles through dense forests, creeks, and swamps to Detroit. He began putting together his men at Dayton and then marched them to Urbana, where he picked up the rest of his army, and proceeded north to the rapids of the Maumee River, cutting through the wilderness terrain with enormous difficulty.
When Hull reached the Maumee, his army consisted of 1,800 inexperienced, unruly Ohio militiamen, augmented by 400 regular army troops. Three colonels, Duncan McArthur, James Finlay, and Lewis Cass, led the militia. They were in competition with each other and had no respect for the aged Hull.
From the rapids of the Maumee, Hull moved slowly toward Detroit. On June 26, when he was about halfway there, he received a letter from Eustis, dated June 18, ordering him to move quickly to Detroit and await further instructions. Incredibly, the secretary made no mention of the declaration of war. Hull was lulled into thinking he had nothing to fear from the British strongpoint at Amherstburg on the Canadian side of the Detroit River. Since he was beyond the rapids of the Maumee, he chartered the
Cuyahoga Packet
and put his papers, heavy baggage, and sick troops aboard for a quick passage down the Maumee to Lake Erie and then to Detroit. As the unsuspecting packet attempted to pass by the town of Amherstburg, the Provincial Marine’s 12-gun brig
Hunter
easily captured it. Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Bligh St. George, the commander at Fort Malden in Amherstburg, now had full details of Hull’s plans and his state of readiness. St. George passed the information on to General Brock, who relayed it to General Prevost in Quebec.
Cuyahoga Packet
and put his papers, heavy baggage, and sick troops aboard for a quick passage down the Maumee to Lake Erie and then to Detroit. As the unsuspecting packet attempted to pass by the town of Amherstburg, the Provincial Marine’s 12-gun brig
Hunter
easily captured it. Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Bligh St. George, the commander at Fort Malden in Amherstburg, now had full details of Hull’s plans and his state of readiness. St. George passed the information on to General Brock, who relayed it to General Prevost in Quebec.
Hull arrived at Detroit on July 5, concerned about his shrinking supplies. The population of the town and fort was 1,200, and he judged the food supply there would last only a few weeks. He sent an urgent message to Governor Meigs for provisions, and Meigs responded handsomely, organizing a huge supply train of pack horses loaded with flour and other essential goods, along with a small herd of cattle and ninety-five guards. Getting them to Detroit, however, was no easy matter. They had to trudge two hundred difficult miles through the same forest and swamps that Hull had, and then travel overland, avoiding the western shore of Lake Erie, where the cruisers of the Provincial Marine patrolled. If that were not difficult enough, the pack train would be subject to Indian attack along the entire route, particularly when it neared Lake Erie and Fort Malden.
On July 9, four days after arriving at Detroit, Hull received instructions from Eustis to invade Canada. Given the precarious state of his army and supplies, he warned Washington not to be too sanguine about what he could accomplish. Nonetheless, in obedience to his orders, he crossed the Detroit River into Canada on July 12, and easily took the small village of Sandwich (now Windsor), lying directly across the river from Detroit and sixteen miles north of Fort Malden.
The Canadian militiamen at Sandwich fled without a fight, much to the annoyance of General Brock. Sandwich’s few inhabitants welcomed the Americans, which Hull took as an indication that most of the citizens of Upper Canada would cross over to his side. Flush from his first victory, he issued a proclamation promising the people, “You will be emancipated from tyranny and oppression and restored to the dignified station of free men.”
Dozens of deserters appeared at his camp every day, giving him the feeling that Fort Malden would fall easily. He was further buoyed by the expectation that General Dearborn had already launched an attack in the Niagara area, diverting some, if not all, of Brock’s available forces there, making a reinforcement of Malden unlikely.
Meanwhile, the British commander at Malden, Lieutenant Colonel St. George, was making his own preparations to resist the American invasion. He formed a defense line on the southern bank of the Canard River seven miles north of the fort and requested reinforcements. His force of three hundred regulars, four hundred fifty militiamen, and four hundred of Tecumseh’s warriors would not be enough to withstand Hull’s army.
The 6-gun army brig
Adams
added to Hull’s force. He had men working on her for some time in a yard above Detroit, and while he was away, the work was completed. She was launched on July 4 and brought at night to the Detroit waterfront for arming under the guns of the fort.
Adams
added to Hull’s force. He had men working on her for some time in a yard above Detroit, and while he was away, the work was completed. She was launched on July 4 and brought at night to the Detroit waterfront for arming under the guns of the fort.
Despite having an overwhelming advantage, Hull did not attack Fort Malden immediately. He inexplicably wasted days preparing two twenty-four pounders and three howitzers, while raiding the countryside for supplies, enraging the farmers he took them from. The delay puzzled his men and made them restless. They feared the old man did not have the stomach for a fight.
Hull was still preparing when, on July 26, the captured American schooners
Salina
and
Mary
appeared suddenly at Detroit, carrying Lieutenant Hanks and his party of soldiers and citizens from Fort Michilimackinac. Hull was aghast. “The surrender opened the Northern hive of Indians,” he wrote to Secretary Eustis, “and they were swarming down in every direction.”
Salina
and
Mary
appeared suddenly at Detroit, carrying Lieutenant Hanks and his party of soldiers and citizens from Fort Michilimackinac. Hull was aghast. “The surrender opened the Northern hive of Indians,” he wrote to Secretary Eustis, “and they were swarming down in every direction.”
Instead of immediately moving on Malden before it could be reinforced, Hull continued to wait at Sandwich, frustrating his officers, who wanted to attack right away. Morale in the ranks deteriorated as day after day of inaction followed. General Brock, meanwhile, was trying hard to take advantage of Hull’s lethargy by raising five hundred militiamen to strengthen Fort Malden.
Hull continued to vacillate. He sent a detachment of two hundred men under Major Thomas Van Horne to find the supply train Governor Meigs had sent from Chillicothe (Ohio’s capital) under militia Captain Henry Brush. Overcoming near impossible terrain, Brush had reached the rapids of the Maumee on August 5, but he did not dare go farther because he would have to pass too close to Fort Malden and the British warships on Lake Erie.
Tecumseh was keeping a close eye on Hull, and he convinced the Wyandot—who were heavily influenced by the easy British victory at Michilimackinac—to join him in a surprise attack on Van Horne’s column. Tecumseh struck on August 5 at the village of Brownstone, about twenty miles south of Detroit. Taken completely by surprise, the Americans were scared out of their wits, and they ran wildly.
Even before Hull received word of the Brownstone debacle, he called a council of war to discuss the possibility of retreating. After a stormy session with officers who had lost all confidence in him, he reluctantly agreed to attack Fort Malden in three days. When he received word of the disaster at Brownstone, however, he changed his mind again. He was further rattled when two days later he heard that Brock had succeeded in sending reinforcements to Malden under Colonel Henry Proctor, who assumed command of the fort. The British position at Amherstburg was further strengthened by Wyandot and other Indians, whom the Provincial Marine ferried across Lake Erie. Even more disconcerting was intelligence that arrived on August 6, reporting that the diversion Hull was expecting General Dearborn to initiate in the Niagara area had not yet taken place.
Hull would have been shocked had he known what Major General Dearborn was actually doing. Instead of creating a diversion, he was at his headquarters in Greenbush outside Albany on August 9, discussing an armistice with Sir George Prevost’s representative, Colonel Edward Baynes, the British adjutant general in Canada. Baynes explained to Dearborn that Lord Liverpool had repealed the Orders in Council in June and was seeking a temporary armistice to give the American government time to respond.
Even though he had known since the spring that Madison expected simultaneous attacks along the Canadian border at Detroit, Niagara, Kingston, and Montreal, and Secretary Eustis had issued orders again on August 1 to begin the offensive at once, Dearborn decided to accept the armistice. It did not seem to matter that by doing so he was leaving General Hull in the lurch. Since Dearborn was not in the least ready to invade anyway (partly because of his own lack of initiative), he viewed the armistice as a godsend. It would give him time to prepare, something he should have been doing for weeks.
Ignoring instructions from Secretary Eustis was a habit of General Dearborn’s. He had been secretary of war for eight years under Jefferson, and he had trouble accepting Eustis as his superior. Earlier, when he was supposed to be at his headquarters assembling the army of invasion, he was in New England, and remained there until late July, discussing coastal defense and the calling up and use of militia with the antiwar Federalist governors of Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island. Eustis wrote to him saying that the president wanted him at Albany, but Dearborn remained in Massachusetts.
As part of the armistice, Dearborn agreed to put whatever invasion plans he had on hold and act only on the defensive until Washington could respond to London’s peace initiative. To say the least, he was acting far beyond his authority. He knew, of course, that no invasion was going to take place anyway, whether he agreed to an armistice or not. The U. S. Army was utterly unprepared for an invasion. Dearborn was simply adjusting Madison’s dreams to reality. He wrote to Secretary Eustis, “I consider the agreement as favorable . . . for we could not act offensively except at Detroit for some time, and there will probably [be no] effect on General Hull or his movements.”
His claim that his actions would have no effect on Hull was astonishing. Dearborn was acting as if Hull’s command was somehow independent of his own, despite the fact that the president had clearly placed Dearborn in charge of the entire northern front. The armistice technically did not even apply to Hull. Dearborn did send a message to Hull informing him of the armistice, but it never reached him.
Not only did Dearborn disregard Hull, but he gave no thought to how the armistice would influence General Brock’s calculations. Brock had already set out for Fort Malden with reinforcements, but when he later heard of the armistice, he considered it a great boon. It would allow him time to complete his business at Detroit and return to the Niagara area and direct the defense there.
Dearborn’s letter to Eustis announcing the armistice arrived in Washington on August 13. Madison was flabbergasted and rejected it out of hand. Not only did it emasculate his whole war strategy, but he had already turned down the idea of an armistice when Ambassador Foster and Chargé Baker had proposed it in Washington earlier. Furthermore, Madison did not want to hear that his grand scheme to drive into Canada was, to say the least, unrealistic. Eustis, reflecting the president’s exasperation, fired back to Dearborn, “you will inform Sir George Prevost [that the armistice is terminated, and then] you will proceed with the utmost vigor in your operations.”
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