1812: The Navy's War (61 page)
Impressment was the issue that had sustained the war. The British considered it essential to their security and would never give it up, nor would they retreat on any other maritime question. The American delegation was presented with the choice of either accepting the British position on all maritime matters, including impressment, or ending the negotiations before they got started.
Monroe’s latest dispatch permitted them to simply ignore the entire question of maritime rights. Free trade with liberated Europe had already been restored, and the Admiralty no longer needed impressment to man its warships. The president felt that with Europe at peace the issues of neutral trading rights and impressment could safely be set aside in the interests of obtaining peace. The British were also amenable to the idea of remaining silent on the maritime issues. Thus, from the start of the negotiations, the disagreements that started the war and sustained it were acknowledged by both parties to be no longer important. Neither country was giving up its positions; they were just not going to engage in a fruitless, abstract argument and ruin the talks before they began.
If the issues that caused the war could be so easily set aside, it would seem that a peace treaty could be just as easily arranged. But that was not the case. The British wished for far more than the recognition of their maritime rights. They wanted to extend their territory in North America and permanently weaken a potential rival. With this in mind, Liverpool intended to extend the talks until results from the battlefield arrived. He expected them soon. It’s true that he had become less sanguine than he had been in the spring about what he could obtain in America, but having committed all the resources he had to that theater, he wanted to try for as much as he could get. He wrote to Castlereagh, “I think it not unlikely after our note has been delivered in, that the American commissioners will propose to refer the subject to their Government. In that case the negotiation may be adjourned till the answer is received, and we shall know the result of the campaign before it can be resumed. If our commander [Prevost] does his duty, I am persuaded that we shall have acquired by our arms every point on the Canadian frontier which we ought to insist on keeping.”
In the course of the first few meetings, while London waited impatiently for news from the battlefield, Goulburn put forth demands reminiscent of what the
Times
proposed back in May when the editors and the country were intoxicated with Britain’s power. The
Times
had expected the government to insist on the following: full security against renewal of attacks on Canada, undivided possession of the Great Lakes, abandonment of the Newfoundland fishery, restitution (to Spain) of Louisiana and the usurped territory of Florida, an amicable arrangement with the Eastern States (which meant secession of New England), a new boundary line restoring Nova Scotia and New Brunswick to their ancient limits, the exclusion of America from the St. Lawrence and its tributary waters, and providing Canada with access to the navigable part of the Mississippi. The
Courier
, Liverpool’s mouthpiece, proposed similar terms on May 21. In addition, the cabinet wanted a huge Indian buffer state created out of American territory in the Northwest.
Times
proposed back in May when the editors and the country were intoxicated with Britain’s power. The
Times
had expected the government to insist on the following: full security against renewal of attacks on Canada, undivided possession of the Great Lakes, abandonment of the Newfoundland fishery, restitution (to Spain) of Louisiana and the usurped territory of Florida, an amicable arrangement with the Eastern States (which meant secession of New England), a new boundary line restoring Nova Scotia and New Brunswick to their ancient limits, the exclusion of America from the St. Lawrence and its tributary waters, and providing Canada with access to the navigable part of the Mississippi. The
Courier
, Liverpool’s mouthpiece, proposed similar terms on May 21. In addition, the cabinet wanted a huge Indian buffer state created out of American territory in the Northwest.
At the very first meeting with the American delegation, Goulburn had begun by putting forth the breathtaking proposal for an Indian buffer state to be carved out of existing American territory and set aside forever as Indian country under British guaranty. The proposed state would encompass the whole of the Northwest, including one-third of Ohio, two-thirds of Indiana, and nearly the entire region from which the states of Illinois, Wisconsin, and Michigan were afterward created. It would be larger than England, Scotland, Wales, and Ireland combined. Such a state would blunt forever the westward expansion of the United States and incidentally guarantee British control of the all-important fur trade with the Indians. Goulburn presented the demand as a sine qua non, which meant that it must be in the treaty or the British would not sign it.
Liverpool’s demand was obviously meant to cripple the United States. No American president could agree to it. Nor could he accept the further British demands as they were made in subsequent meetings. John Quincy Adams wrote to Ambassador William H. Crawford in Paris, “Great Britain has opened to us the alternative of a long, expensive, sanguinary war, or of submission to disgraceful conditions and sacrifices little short of independence itself.”
Not surprisingly, when the American commissioners rejected the Indian state, the negotiations nearly broke down, but Adams and his colleagues had no intention of bearing the responsibility for breaking them off; they wanted the British to bear the onus for that. Liverpool was not about to end the talks, however. He was probing, seeing how far he could push.
On August 17 the Americans sent a dispatch to Washington specifying British demands. The
Chauncey
sailed with it on August 25. Adams and the others expected that when the extent of Liverpool’s territorial demands were known, they would shock and outrage the entire country.
Chauncey
sailed with it on August 25. Adams and the others expected that when the extent of Liverpool’s territorial demands were known, they would shock and outrage the entire country.
On August 18, the day after the Americans penned the dispatch, Lord and Lady Castlereagh arrived in Ghent. They were on their way to Paris and then Austria for the opening of the Congress of Vienna on October 1. Castlereagh remained at Ghent until the morning of August 20. He conferred with the British commissioners, but not with Adams or any of his colleagues. On August 19, the British envoys met with the Americans and again insisted on a permanent Indian state as a sine qua non. They also insisted that the United States have no naval force on the Great Lakes or any forts on their shores. And they demanded a revision of the boundary line west of Lake Superior down to the Mississippi, along with a treaty right of navigation on the Mississippi. In addition, they wanted a revision of the boundary line of Maine to permit a direct communication between Halifax, New Brunswick, and Quebec. These demands were immediately sent to Washington on the
John Adams
.
John Adams
.
At this point the American commissioners were naturally pessimistic about the chances for an agreement. They did not intend to give up any territory. “The prospect of peace has disappeared,” Henry Clay wrote to Ambassador Crawford on August 22. “Nothing remains for us but to formally close the abortive negotiations.”
On August 25 the Americans sent a note to the British, dated the day before, formally rejecting Liverpool’s proposals. On the Indian question they said, “To surrender both the rights of sovereignty and of soil over nearly one-third of the territorial dominions of the United States to a number of Indians, not probably exceeding twenty thousand” was beyond the powers of the commissioners. Gallatin asked what provision had been made for the 100,000 white settlers living in the proposed Indian territory, and the answer was: the settlers would have to shift for themselves as best they could. The American delegation made it plain that if the British insisted on this item, the negotiations were over. The Americans also rejected the demands concerning the Great Lakes and any boundary changes in Maine or anyplace else.
Ten days passed while the British delegates referred the matter to London. By that time Castlereagh had arrived in Vienna, and he was being kept informed, but he was fully occupied with the congress. Liverpool, and to a lesser extent Bathurst, had full responsibility for the negotiations. The prime minister did not want to break them off. He was expecting to hear soon of military victories, and he waited for them to move Adams and his colleagues.
On September 4 the British sent Adams another note insisting on the demands made previously. They were making no changes. The Americans replied on September 9, rejecting the proposals again but not breaking off negotiations. They still wanted to make Liverpool responsible for ending them. As usual, Goulburn sent the American refusal back to London.
Liverpool’s answer arrived in Ghent on September 19. The demand for a permanent fixed boundary for an Indian buffer state and an end to the purchase of Indian lands was no longer included. Since the Americans were adamant on the question, and it was one that had the potential to unite the American people, the prime minister simply dropped it. But the rest of the note enunciated the other British terms more forcefully, leading the Americans to conclude that the talks were still going nowhere. Adams, Gallatin, and the others drew up a reply on September 25 and delivered it the following day. Once again, Goulburn forwarded the message to London.
Before Liverpool could reply, the good news from the battlefield that he had long expected arrived in London. The most exhilarating was the burning of Washington. He learned of it on September 27 and rejoiced, along with the rest of his country. Popular enthusiasm for the war surged in England. Liverpool now expected great things from General Prevost’s invasion. He hoped it would move the negotiations along quickly. He needed to wrap them up, for conditions in France and among the great powers gathering at Vienna were deteriorating. The
Times
talked of time running out for the Americans; it was running out for Liverpool as well.
Times
talked of time running out for the Americans; it was running out for Liverpool as well.
News of the burning of Washington reached Ghent on October 1. A gleeful Henry Goulburn, carrying out instructions from Bathurst, brought the newspapers to the Americans. Other bad news was reported as well: the capitulation of eastern Maine, the burning of the
Adams
, and the failure of Colonel Croghan at Michilimackinac. On October 8 the British presented a note that went beyond anything they had submitted before and questioned the legality of the Louisiana Purchase, while continuing all the demands made previously and doing it in an insulting tone. The U.S. commissioners answered with a note on October 18, rejecting the British proposals out of hand.
Adams
, and the failure of Colonel Croghan at Michilimackinac. On October 8 the British presented a note that went beyond anything they had submitted before and questioned the legality of the Louisiana Purchase, while continuing all the demands made previously and doing it in an insulting tone. The U.S. commissioners answered with a note on October 18, rejecting the British proposals out of hand.
Gloom spread over the American delegation. The burning of Washington was a crushing blow. “What . . . wounds me to the very soul,” Henry Clay wrote to Ambassador Crawford, “is that a set of pirates and incendiaries should have been permitted to pollute our soil, conflagrate our capital, and return unpunished to their ships.... I tremble indeed whenever I take up a late newspaper.”
Adams wrote to his wife, “There can be no possible advantage to us in continuing [to negotiate] any longer.”
ON OCTOBER 5, George M. Dallas arrived in New York aboard the
Chauncey
with dispatches from Ghent, recounting Liverpool’s initial outrageous demands for an Indian buffer state. Three days later, Dallas presented them to the president, who was furious at British arrogance. Two days later, Madison transmitted the dispatches to Congress, which had been called into session early on September 20. The House was as angry as the president and immediately had 10,000 copies printed and widely distributed. The reaction around the country—especially, but not exclusively, in the regions that supported the war—was great indignation.
Chauncey
with dispatches from Ghent, recounting Liverpool’s initial outrageous demands for an Indian buffer state. Three days later, Dallas presented them to the president, who was furious at British arrogance. Two days later, Madison transmitted the dispatches to Congress, which had been called into session early on September 20. The House was as angry as the president and immediately had 10,000 copies printed and widely distributed. The reaction around the country—especially, but not exclusively, in the regions that supported the war—was great indignation.
Madison had always expected British demands to range far beyond maritime issues, and he was determined to resist them. The Indian buffer state idea came as a surprise, but not the ministry’s ambitions. On August 11, before the administration knew what the British were going to propose, Monroe gave the commissioners the president’s estimate of Liverpool’s objects in the war: “If Great Britain does not terminate the war on the conditions which you are authorized to adopt, she has other objects in it than those for which she has hitherto professed to contend. That such are entertained, there is much reason to presume. These, whatever they may be, must and will be resisted by the United States. The conflict may be severe, but it will be borne with firmness, and, as we confidently believe, be attended with success.”
Adams and his colleagues, although unaware of a good deal of what was transpiring in Europe, and particularly in London, reflected the president’s views and held firm, not giving in to any of Liverpool’s territorial demands, even though it meant the war would continue.
On October 19 Monroe wrote to the commissioners, indicating that the
status quo ante bellum
would be a satisfactory basis for a settlement. Gallatin had already written to Secretary Monroe on June 13 suggesting the administration adopt this position. Indeed, the American team had been negotiating on this basis from the start. It meant that both sides would return to the borders that existed before the war.
status quo ante bellum
would be a satisfactory basis for a settlement. Gallatin had already written to Secretary Monroe on June 13 suggesting the administration adopt this position. Indeed, the American team had been negotiating on this basis from the start. It meant that both sides would return to the borders that existed before the war.
After the success of British arms at Washington, Liverpool grew more confident about what could be obtained in America. He wrote to Castlereagh on September 27 that Cochrane and Ross “are very sanguine about . . . future operations. They intend, on account of the season, to proceed in the first instance to the northward, and to occupy Rhode Island, where they propose remaining and living upon the country until about the first of November. They will then proceed southward, destroy Baltimore, if they should find it practicable without too much risk, occupy several important points on the coast of Georgia and the Carolinas, take possession of Mobile in the Floridas, and close the campaign with an attack on New Orleans.”
Liverpool and Bathurst were so confident about what was now obtainable that they dispatched Major General John Lambert with 2,200 additional troops for the campaign against New Orleans, bringing the total number for use there to 10,000.
CHAPTER TWENTY-SEVEN
Baltimore
A
FTER ADMIRAL COCHRANE’S successes at Washington and Alexandria, Bal-A timore appeared to be the next major target on his list in September. The city was in a panic. Philadelphia, New York, Norfolk, and Richmond felt threatened as well. Even Portsmouth, New Hampshire, and Newport, Rhode Island did. In fact, as Liverpool intimated, Cochrane preferred leaving the Chesapeake’s sickly climate and invading Rhode Island.
FTER ADMIRAL COCHRANE’S successes at Washington and Alexandria, Bal-A timore appeared to be the next major target on his list in September. The city was in a panic. Philadelphia, New York, Norfolk, and Richmond felt threatened as well. Even Portsmouth, New Hampshire, and Newport, Rhode Island did. In fact, as Liverpool intimated, Cochrane preferred leaving the Chesapeake’s sickly climate and invading Rhode Island.
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