1812: The Navy's War (63 page)
The heights he was referring to were Hampstead Hill and Rodgers’s Bastion, where the commodore and his seamen manned the guns. The entire defense, as Brooke could plainly see when he approached it that morning, was impressive. His army stood little chance. Had Cochrane’s message not given him a way out, he undoubtedly would have conducted a suicidal attack with Admiral Cockburn egging him on. Cochrane’s communication gave Brooke a perfect excuse to retreat, and he was quick to grasp it. Cockburn did not object. He knew that an early death awaited hundreds if they carried out Brooke’s plan.
Between one and two o’clock that morning, while Cochrane’s bombs continued bursting over Fort McHenry and his rockets lit up the night sky, Brooke left his campfires burning brightly and quietly retreated three miles, where he waited to see if Smith reacted. Smith was considering an attack, but a heavy rain storm broke, and he decided, given the fatigue of his men, not to leave the safety of his entrenchments. Seeing that Smith was staying put, Brooke moved his army another three miles and camped for the night. The following morning, September 15, he marched the troops to their transports at North Point and reembarked them.
ON THE NIGHT of September 13–14, not knowing how Brooke was faring, Admiral Cochrane sent Captain Charles Napier, skipper of the frigate
Euryalus
, up the Ferry Branch for a previously planned attack. Napier led a party of barges carrying hundreds of men—far fewer than the 1,200 that
Niles’ Weekly Register
later reported. Napier set out from the fleet at one o’clock in the morning—the same time that Brooke was preparing to retreat—and slipped past Fort McHenry with no trouble. The watch at Fort Covington, however, spotted his movements, and the batteries opened up on the barges. As soon as they did, the guns at Fort Babcock followed suit. The action alerted Fort McHenry, and Armistead started firing at the flashes from Napier’s guns. The exchange lasted for two hours before Napier withdrew. He never attempted a landing. The bloodied remains of his party struggled back to their ships.
Euryalus
, up the Ferry Branch for a previously planned attack. Napier led a party of barges carrying hundreds of men—far fewer than the 1,200 that
Niles’ Weekly Register
later reported. Napier set out from the fleet at one o’clock in the morning—the same time that Brooke was preparing to retreat—and slipped past Fort McHenry with no trouble. The watch at Fort Covington, however, spotted his movements, and the batteries opened up on the barges. As soon as they did, the guns at Fort Babcock followed suit. The action alerted Fort McHenry, and Armistead started firing at the flashes from Napier’s guns. The exchange lasted for two hours before Napier withdrew. He never attempted a landing. The bloodied remains of his party struggled back to their ships.
All the while, the bombardment of Fort McHenry continued mindlessly until seven o’clock that morning, long after the battle had been lost. For twenty-five hours the bombs fell. Cochrane’s stubborn refusal to call off the shelling seemed purely vindictive. Lieutenant Colonel Armistead estimated that between 1,500 to 1,800 projectiles were thrown. Some fell short. A large proportion of them burst overhead, however, showering fragments inside the fort. About 400 fell within the fort. But the bombardment, while spectacular, was a total failure, just as the rest of Cochrane’s operation was. The fort and the defenses outside held firm. Armistead had four men killed and twenty-four wounded. The injured all recovered.
The rockets’ red glare illuminating the night sky and the bombs bursting in air inspired an American spectator aboard the 74-gun
Minden
, Francis Scott Key, to begin a poem that later became the national anthem. Seeing the fort’s immense flag still waving in the morning filled Key’s sensitive heart with joy. He had been visiting the British fleet to obtain the release of a prisoner and was stranded when the action started. The inspiration he received that night still inspires.
Minden
, Francis Scott Key, to begin a poem that later became the national anthem. Seeing the fort’s immense flag still waving in the morning filled Key’s sensitive heart with joy. He had been visiting the British fleet to obtain the release of a prisoner and was stranded when the action started. The inspiration he received that night still inspires.
Despite the later claims of Cochrane, Cockburn, and Brooke that they could have taken Baltimore, albeit with heavy losses, the strength of the defenses had in fact convinced them to withdraw. Had they persisted, they would have, in all probability, been badly beaten and never made it back to their ships. Brooke and Cockburn were lucky to escape while they could. Cochrane refused to consider his withdrawal a defeat. He termed it a “demonstration,” which succeeded in frightening the public, undermining support for the war, and making the American government more amenable to British peace proposals. He thus attempted to turn a clear rebuff into a victory, but few in London were fooled.
On September 19 Cochrane sailed to Halifax and Cockburn to Bermuda to refurbish their ships and their men for the invasion of New Orleans, which was next on Cochrane’s agenda. With the fleet went 2,400 ex-slaves—men, women, and children. The naval facilities at Bermuda could not accommodate all of Cochrane’s ships, nor could the island house many former slaves. Cochrane had to take the bulk of his ships and nearly all his ex-slaves to Halifax. Rear Admiral Pulteney Malcolm remained with the loaded troopships and a few men-of-war to blockade Chesapeake Bay. On October 14 he sailed with the soldiers to Jamaica. On the same day, Admiral Cochrane stood out from Halifax with an impressive fleet bound for Jamaica and a grand rendezvous of the ships and men invading New Orleans.
CHAPTER TWENTY-EIGHT
Plattsburgh
T
HE BRITISH CROSSED the Canadian border and invaded northern New York at the same time they assaulted Baltimore. Plans for the attack had been finalized in London as soon as Napoleon abdicated in April. On June 3 Bathurst ordered Sir George Prevost to “commence offensive operations on the enemy’s frontier.” He had in mind “the entire destruction of Sackets Harbor and the naval establishments on Lake Erie and Lake Champlain,” as well as capturing Plattsburgh and points farther south. He was leaving it up to Prevost to decide how far to penetrate into the American interior. But he cautioned him not to drive so far south “as might commit the safety of the force placed under your command.”
HE BRITISH CROSSED the Canadian border and invaded northern New York at the same time they assaulted Baltimore. Plans for the attack had been finalized in London as soon as Napoleon abdicated in April. On June 3 Bathurst ordered Sir George Prevost to “commence offensive operations on the enemy’s frontier.” He had in mind “the entire destruction of Sackets Harbor and the naval establishments on Lake Erie and Lake Champlain,” as well as capturing Plattsburgh and points farther south. He was leaving it up to Prevost to decide how far to penetrate into the American interior. But he cautioned him not to drive so far south “as might commit the safety of the force placed under your command.”
Bathurst was covering himself in case things went wrong, as they had for General Burgoyne during the Revolutionary War. Actually, Liverpool expected great things from Prevost. Sackets Harbor and Lake Erie would obviously have to wait until Yeo regained supremacy on Lake Ontario, but marching down the Champlain Valley should not prove difficult.
Bathurst did not have to worry about Prevost marching too far. Offensive operations would be getting under way so late in the season that a man as cautious as Prevost, and as experienced as he was in the American theater, would not want to get caught in upstate New York in the middle of winter. The name of Commodore Macdonough’s flagship,
Saratoga
, was a reminder of how dangerous that could be.
Saratoga
, was a reminder of how dangerous that could be.
On September 1 Prevost marched across the border with an impressive army of 10,351, made up largely of Wellington’s veterans. General Edward Pakenham, Wellington’s adjutant general, had dispatched the troops directly from Bordeaux to Bermuda and thence to Canada. The men he sent had been fighting in Portugal, Spain, and France for seven years. They represented one-third of the total number of officers and men Prevost now had in Canada. Major General De Rottenburg was second in command, and under him were three of Wellington’s best: major generals Manley Power, Thomas Brisbane, and Frederick Robinson.
Prevost’s army was the largest on the continent, but at the same time, it was pathetically small for invading a country of nearly eight million. Liverpool and Bathurst blithely assumed the number was more than sufficient. And, if need be, Prevost could be reinforced after he took Plattsburg and gained control of Lake Champlain. Success might induce the British people to endure more sacrifice.
But that might not be necessary. The American commissioners at Ghent and their masters in Washington, disheartened by continual defeat, might give Liverpool what he wanted without Britain making any greater exertion. In any event, Liverpool expected Prevost to have immediate success, and when he did, the prime minister could judge how far south he would go from there. Reaction in Britain to the burning of Washington was so enthusiastic that Liverpool might be encouraged to push much farther. Or the army invading New Orleans might move north at a faster pace, in which case Prevost’s army could tie down the Americans while the major thrust into the interior came from the south.
Prevost marched down the western, or New York, side of Lake Champlain rather than through Vermont. He did not want to stop the flow of Vermont food that was sustaining his army. “Vermont has shown a disinclination to the war,” he wrote to Bathurst, “and, as it is sending in specie and provisions, I will confine offensive operations to the west side of Lake Champlain.” He later told Bathurst that “two thirds of the army are supplied with beef by American contractors, principally of Vermont and New York.”
Meeting scant resistance, Prevost entered Chazy on September 3 and marched unimpeded toward Plattsburgh. As he approached the northern part of the city on the morning of September 6, a few of Commodore Macdonough’s gunboats attacked his left wing at Dead Creek, forcing him to stop and bring up heavy artillery. The British gunners fired on the spirited gunboats, but heavy seas prevented them from firing back, and they withdrew.
Prevost moved on, arriving that evening on the north side of the Saranac River. The American army was entrenched on the other side. Its commander, Brigadier General Alexander Macomb, had the planks already removed from the river’s two bridges. Determined to fight no mater what the odds, he continued to prepare in the face of overwhelming numbers. He had only 1,500 regulars and an equal number of raw recruits and convalescents.
Up until August 29 there had been a strong American army of 5,500 regulars at Plattsburgh, under Major General Ralph Izard. They would have put up a stout defense against Prevost. Izard had been in command of Military District 9 since early May, when he took over from General Wilkinson. Izard had watched with growing anxiety as Prevost’s huge army assembled on the other side of the border, only thirty miles away. By August, Izard expected an invasion at any time. With his well-trained regulars, and the addition of militiamen from New York and volunteers from Vermont, he expected to do well against whatever was thrown at him. He had already built two blockhouses and three redoubts in Plattsburgh south of the Saranac. Even with Wellington’s veterans, Prevost was not going to have an easy time taking Plattsburgh, if he took it at all.
Izard was assiduously preparing for battle when Secretary Armstrong, in a letter dated July 27, ordered him to take 4,000 men and march west to the St. Lawrence River between Kingston and Montreal and threaten communications between the two towns. Izard received the order on August 10 and thought the secretary completely misunderstood the situation. He wrote to Armstrong that if he left Plattsburgh, Prevost would be in possession of the city within three days.
Armstrong wrote again on August 12, before he received Izard’s protest, giving specific orders to “carry the war as far to the westward as possible, particularly while we have ascendancy on the lakes.” On August 29, Izard reluctantly obeyed, and marched 4,000 regulars out of Plattsburgh, leaving Macomb and his troops to suffer the consequences.
Armstrong was more responsible than anyone else for the burning of Washington, and now he was handing Plattsburgh over to the British. If it wasn’t well established that he was an incompetent, one would have thought he was in Liverpool’s pay. Henry Adams wrote, “Armstrong’s policy of meeting the enemy’s main attack by annihilating the main defense never received explanation or excuse.”
General Macomb was not giving up, however; he intended to fight. He called for militiamen from New York and Vermont, and he removed the garrison and heavy guns Izard had placed on Cumberland Head at Macdonough’s suggestion and moved them to Plattsburgh. Patriotic volunteers from Vermont poured into the American camp. Federalist governor Martin Chittenden, son of Vermont’s first governor, Thomas Chittenden, would not order the militia to march out of state, but they could volunteer, and they did. New York militiamen came as well, doubling the size of Macomb’s force.
Originally, Prevost had planned to assault Plattsburgh first thing in the morning on September 7. But after the gunboat attack, he changed his mind and decided to wait for the British naval squadron to remove the threat from Macdonough’s squadron before he moved on the city. Macdonough’s ships were then in Plattsburgh Bay preparing for battle. Prevost expected the British lake fleet, under Captain George Downie—the second-ranking naval officer in Canada—to easily defeat Macdonough. Prevost planned to begin his attack on Macomb the moment Downie began his on Macdonough.
While waiting impatiently for the British squadron to arrive, Prevost sent Downie urgent, pointed messages to get his fleet under way. It wasn’t clear why Prevost was in such a hurry. Taking Plattsburgh would consume only a few hours. It was true that winter was coming, but this was only the first part of September. If Prevost intended to march farther south, he could easily reach Ticonderoga before the end of the month.
The day Prevost crossed the border, Macdonough had moved his squadron back to Plattsburgh Bay and prepared for the expected British attack. He had his flagship, the 26-gun
Saratoga
(two hundred ten men), the 20-gun
Eagle
(one hundred twenty men), the 17-gun
Ticonderoga
(one hundred ten men), the 7-gun
Preble
(thirty men), and the galleys
Allen
,
Burrows
,
Borer
,
Nettle
,
Viper
, and
Centipede
, all of which had two heavy guns. In addition, he had the gunboats
Ludlow
,
Wilmer
,
Alwyn
, and
Ballard
, with one heavy gun each. Together, the galleys and gunboats had three hundred fifty men. The
President
was twenty miles south of Plattsburgh repairing damages, and the
Montgomery
was at Burlington ferrying Vermont volunteers to Macomb.
Saratoga
(two hundred ten men), the 20-gun
Eagle
(one hundred twenty men), the 17-gun
Ticonderoga
(one hundred ten men), the 7-gun
Preble
(thirty men), and the galleys
Allen
,
Burrows
,
Borer
,
Nettle
,
Viper
, and
Centipede
, all of which had two heavy guns. In addition, he had the gunboats
Ludlow
,
Wilmer
,
Alwyn
, and
Ballard
, with one heavy gun each. Together, the galleys and gunboats had three hundred fifty men. The
President
was twenty miles south of Plattsburgh repairing damages, and the
Montgomery
was at Burlington ferrying Vermont volunteers to Macomb.
Macdonough’s squadron appeared to be weaker than the enemy’s because of the 37-gun frigate
Confiance
, Downie’s flagship, which had a main battery of twenty-seven long twenty-four-pounders, one of which was on a pivot and could be fired from either side. In addition, she carried four thirty-two-pound carronades and six twenty-four-pound carronades. But the
Confiance
had problems. To begin with, Downie had just taken command. Since the abortive attack on Sackets Harbor in May 1813, Yeo and Prevost had difficulty working together, and Prevost’s drive on Plattsburgh was no exception. Yeo decided at the last minute to remove the commander of the Lake Champlain fleet, Captain Peter Fisher, and replace him with Downie, who did not know the squadron or the men or even his own ship.
Confiance
, Downie’s flagship, which had a main battery of twenty-seven long twenty-four-pounders, one of which was on a pivot and could be fired from either side. In addition, she carried four thirty-two-pound carronades and six twenty-four-pound carronades. But the
Confiance
had problems. To begin with, Downie had just taken command. Since the abortive attack on Sackets Harbor in May 1813, Yeo and Prevost had difficulty working together, and Prevost’s drive on Plattsburgh was no exception. Yeo decided at the last minute to remove the commander of the Lake Champlain fleet, Captain Peter Fisher, and replace him with Downie, who did not know the squadron or the men or even his own ship.
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