1812: The Navy's War (66 page)
Liverpool then wrote to Castlereagh. “We have under our consideration at present the last American note of their projet of treaty [a proposed treaty], and I think we have determined, if all other points can be satisfactorily settled, not to continue the war for the purpose of obtaining or securing any acquisition of territory.
“We have been led to this determination by the consideration of the unsatisfactory state of the negotiations at Vienna, and by that of the alarming situation of the interior of France. We have also been obliged to pay serious attention to the state of our finances, and to the difficulties we shall have in continuing the property tax.”
Liverpool failed to mention the defeats at Baltimore, Plattsburgh, and Fort Erie and how they had turned the public decidedly against continuing the war. If he didn’t know before, he got an earful when Parliament opened on November 8. British debt was the largest in history. Interest alone was now £30 million a year. “After such a contest for twenty years,” he wrote to Wellington, “we must let people taste of the blessings of peace before we can fairly expect to screw them up to a war spirit, even in a just cause.”
The British negotiators at Ghent had no idea Liverpool was liquidating the war. Goulburn wrote to Bathurst on November 14, “The American projet, I think, evidently shows that we shall have no peace with America unless we accede to their proposition of placing things upon the same footing, in point of privileges as well as rights, as they stood before the war was declared, to which I presume we are not ready to accede.”
But this was precisely what Liverpool proposed to do. He would settle for the
status quo ante bellum
, just as the Americans had been proposing right along. Until this point, Liverpool had been insisting on the principle of
uti possidetis
. The American commissioners had resolutely rejected that idea, and now Liverpool was ready to accept an entirely different territorial arrangement.
status quo ante bellum
, just as the Americans had been proposing right along. Until this point, Liverpool had been insisting on the principle of
uti possidetis
. The American commissioners had resolutely rejected that idea, and now Liverpool was ready to accept an entirely different territorial arrangement.
The way now appeared open for a quick settlement, but two important issues remained. The British wanted the right to freely navigate the Mississippi, which Henry Clay was adamantly opposed to. Liverpool also wanted to end America’s right—confirmed in the peace treaty of 1783—to fish within Newfoundland’s territorial waters and to cure fish onshore. John Quincy Adams strongly opposed giving up a right his father had doggedly insisted be part of the Treaty of Paris. The American negotiators argued among themselves through several tense meetings until Albert Gallatin worked out an agreement that Clay and Adams could live with. Liverpool then accepted it, although not before proposing an alternative that might have wrecked the negotiations.
The American commissioners offered Liverpool the alternative of having rights to the Mississippi and the fisheries (as of 1783) confirmed or left out of the treaty. Liverpool responded by offering to include both matters in the treaty in return for a boundary concession. The Americans would under no circumstances agree to boundary concessions, but they did suggest omitting from the treaty altogether any boundary claims, rights to navigation on the Mississippi, and fishing rights. The cabinet unexpectedly agreed, which meant that both sides would settle these potentially explosive matters later.
The final treaty was silent not only on the Mississippi question and the Newfoundland fisheries but on all maritime issues. The territorial settlement was simply a return to the
status quo ante bellum
. The parties promised to have “restored without delay” the territory occupied by each, except for the disputed islands in Passamaquoddy Bay. Their fate was left to a commission composed of two representatives, one from each side. If they could not agree, the dispute would be submitted for final resolution to a friendly sovereign or state. As to the boundary between Canada and Maine, two commissioners would decide that as well, along with the boundary between Canada and the Connecticut River. If the commissioners could not agree, the dispute would again be settled by a friendly sovereign or state. Two more commissioners would decide the boundary running through the rivers, lakes, and land communications between Canada and the United States, and if no agreement was reached, the questions would be decided by a friendly sovereign or state. The same commissioners would determine who owned the many islands in the lakes and rivers. Prizes taken at sea after ratification were to be restored and all prisoners repatriated.
status quo ante bellum
. The parties promised to have “restored without delay” the territory occupied by each, except for the disputed islands in Passamaquoddy Bay. Their fate was left to a commission composed of two representatives, one from each side. If they could not agree, the dispute would be submitted for final resolution to a friendly sovereign or state. As to the boundary between Canada and Maine, two commissioners would decide that as well, along with the boundary between Canada and the Connecticut River. If the commissioners could not agree, the dispute would again be settled by a friendly sovereign or state. Two more commissioners would decide the boundary running through the rivers, lakes, and land communications between Canada and the United States, and if no agreement was reached, the questions would be decided by a friendly sovereign or state. The same commissioners would determine who owned the many islands in the lakes and rivers. Prizes taken at sea after ratification were to be restored and all prisoners repatriated.
So far as the Indians were concerned, Article 9 put an end to hostilities between the United States and all the tribes, provided the Indians ceased fighting. The Indians had no representation at the negotiations, and, not surprisingly, their interests were ignored. The British pretended to act on their behalf, but in the end they deserted them, as they had after the Revolutionary War and in the Jay Treaty. Since the tribes had been unable to unite, as Tecumseh wanted, they lost the war and the peace. They were left to suffer the brutal policies sure to be followed by the United States.
In Article 10 the parties agreed to stop the slave trade, which both considered “irreconcilable with the principles of humanity and justice.” In Article 1, however, the British acknowledged that slaves were private property and would be returned or compensation paid. London would never stoop to returning slaves, but after several years of wrangling, they did pay some compensation.
On December 22 Adams and his colleagues received confirmation that agreement had been reached on all matters, and the Treaty of Ghent was signed at the quarters of the British delegation on Christmas Eve. The diplomats from both countries celebrated the peace by having Christmas dinner together. Clay wrote to Monroe, “The terms of this instrument are undoubtedly not such as our country expected at the commencement of the war. Judged of however by the actual condition of things . . . they cannot be pronounced very unfavorable. We lose no territory, I think no honor.” John Quincy Adams wrote in his diary a “fervent prayer” that the peace “may be propitious to the welfare, the best interests, and the union of my country.”
WITHIN DAYS THE British public knew of the treaty, and there was widespread approval. The
Courier
reported, “Wherever . . . [the treaty] has been made known, it has produced great satisfaction, not merely because peace has been made, but because it has been made upon such terms.”
Courier
reported, “Wherever . . . [the treaty] has been made known, it has produced great satisfaction, not merely because peace has been made, but because it has been made upon such terms.”
Not everyone liked the treaty, however. The
Times
repudiated it. The editors declared that “we have attempted to force our principles on America and have failed. Nay . . . we have retired from the combat with the stripes still bleeding on our backs—with the recent defeats at Plattsburgh, and on Lake Champlain unavenged. To make peace at such a moment . . . betrays a deadness to the feelings of honor, and shows a timidity of disposition, inviting further insult. If we could have pointed to America overthrown, we should surely stood on much higher ground at Vienna.” The following day, the
Times
contended that if the New Orleans invasion went badly for the British, Madison would “rejoice in adding to the indignities he has heaped upon us, that of refusing to ratify the treaty.” The editors believed, in spite of everything Madison had done to demonstrate the opposite, that he wanted to continue the war.
Times
repudiated it. The editors declared that “we have attempted to force our principles on America and have failed. Nay . . . we have retired from the combat with the stripes still bleeding on our backs—with the recent defeats at Plattsburgh, and on Lake Champlain unavenged. To make peace at such a moment . . . betrays a deadness to the feelings of honor, and shows a timidity of disposition, inviting further insult. If we could have pointed to America overthrown, we should surely stood on much higher ground at Vienna.” The following day, the
Times
contended that if the New Orleans invasion went badly for the British, Madison would “rejoice in adding to the indignities he has heaped upon us, that of refusing to ratify the treaty.” The editors believed, in spite of everything Madison had done to demonstrate the opposite, that he wanted to continue the war.
The
Edinburgh Review
, after being silent about the war for two years, declared that the British government had embarked on a war of conquest, after the American government had dropped its maritime demands, and the British had lost. It was folly to attempt to invade and conquer the United States. To do so would result in the same tragedy as the first war against them, and with the same result.
Edinburgh Review
, after being silent about the war for two years, declared that the British government had embarked on a war of conquest, after the American government had dropped its maritime demands, and the British had lost. It was folly to attempt to invade and conquer the United States. To do so would result in the same tragedy as the first war against them, and with the same result.
CHAPTER THIRTY
The Hartford Convention
T
HE VICTORIES AT Baltimore, Plattsburgh, and Fort Erie were perceived differently in Britain and America. The British public united in opposition to the war, while in America the old political divisions widened. On the one hand, Madison was buoyed by the outcome of the battles, and so were most Republicans. They now had hope that the country could defend itself against British aggression, which they assumed would continue. Federalists, on the other hand, not knowing what the reaction in Britain would be to the victories, were pessimistic about defending the country. They did not think the battles were important. They continued to believe the war would end in catastrophe. They wanted to settle quickly with London on generous terms, including giving up substantial territory. Madison wrote to Wilson Cary Nicholas, the governor of Virginia, “You are not mistaken in viewing the conduct of the Eastern States as the source of our greatest difficulties in carrying on the war, as it certainly is the greatest, if not the sole inducement with the enemy to persevere in it.”
HE VICTORIES AT Baltimore, Plattsburgh, and Fort Erie were perceived differently in Britain and America. The British public united in opposition to the war, while in America the old political divisions widened. On the one hand, Madison was buoyed by the outcome of the battles, and so were most Republicans. They now had hope that the country could defend itself against British aggression, which they assumed would continue. Federalists, on the other hand, not knowing what the reaction in Britain would be to the victories, were pessimistic about defending the country. They did not think the battles were important. They continued to believe the war would end in catastrophe. They wanted to settle quickly with London on generous terms, including giving up substantial territory. Madison wrote to Wilson Cary Nicholas, the governor of Virginia, “You are not mistaken in viewing the conduct of the Eastern States as the source of our greatest difficulties in carrying on the war, as it certainly is the greatest, if not the sole inducement with the enemy to persevere in it.”
The bitter disagreements between Republicans and Federalists that characterized the past were even more virulent when the president called the third and final session of the 13th Congress on September 19, 1814 (Congress normally convened in November or December). Madison wanted Congress back early to assure the country that the government was functioning and to secure more men and money for the war, which looked as if it would continue into 1815 and beyond. He expected Congress to find the resources to carry on when the war was more unpopular than ever and the government was essentially bankrupt. He was hoping Congress would change its ways. Its spineless members, after all, were responsible for the fiscal condition of the government. The Republican majority that consistently supported the war just as consistently refused to enact the tax legislation required to adequately fund it. The United States had more than enough resources, despite wartime disruptions, to support a much bigger war effort, but Congress refused to raise taxes in the amount required.
When members returned to Washington, the extent of the blackened ruins shocked them. The city had become even more dismal and depressing than it had been before. Reminders of Madison’s gross mismanagement of the war were everywhere. Meetings had to be held in the only surviving public building—the Patent Office cum Post Office. Serious consideration was given to moving the capital back to Philadelphia.
The recent successes at Baltimore, Plattsburgh, and Fort Erie had offset, to some degree, the shock of defeat at Bladensburg and the burning of the capital, but few expected the victories would end Britain’s savage attacks. In his opening message to Congress Madison wrote, “We are compelled . . . by the principles and manner in which the war is now avowedly carried on, to infer that a spirit of hostility is indulged more violent than ever against . . . this country.” He accused the British of aiming “a deadly blow at our growing prosperity, perhaps at our national existence.”
The president saw little prospect for peace. He had not heard how negotiations were progressing at Ghent, but he was not sanguine about their success. He had to prepare the nation for continued sacrifice. The burning of Washington and the invasion of New England and New York had not brought the country together, as he had hoped. Instead, calls were being made by Federalists for a convention of New England states to possibly make a separate peace. Trafficking with the enemy had gotten worse, and desertions from the army and navy, after men had received substantial bonuses, was widespread. In spite of these unmistakable signs of the war’s growing unpopularity, Madison urged Congress to provide money and men for an extended conflict, something Congress had less stomach for than it had in the past.
As bleak as the situation appeared, it would have been far worse if the British had succeeded at Baltimore, Plattsburgh, and Fort Erie. The successes of American arms in these battles and General Jackson against the Creeks offset, in the president’s mind, the galling defeat at Bladensburg and the failure to defend Washington. “On our side,” he wrote, “we can appeal to a series of achievements which have given new luster to the American arms.”
The recent success of American arms had led Madison and Monroe to believe they could successfully invade Canada again and end the war in 1815. The Republican Congress, however, reflecting the mood of the country, was aghast at the notion. Federalists had always been opposed to invading Canada, and Republican support for another attempt had drastically declined. The British now had 30,000 regulars in Canada, and, as far as anyone knew, more were coming. The Royal Navy completely dominated America’s coast, and there was every reason to believe it would eventually take back Lake Erie and even Lake Champlain. Admiral Yeo’s giant battleship would soon establish supremacy on Lake Ontario.
It was not surprising that when the administration proposed increasing the army to 100,000, Congress rebelled. Madison assured members that the citizenry would “cheerfully and proudly bear every burden of every kind which the safety and honor of the nation demand,” but no one took him seriously. He proposed strengthening the regular army, rather than the militias, which had proven costly and ineffective. At the moment, the regular army had about 40,000 men; its authorized strength was 62,500. On October 17 Monroe requested that Congress raise the regular army to 100,000. Believing the army actually had 30,000, not 40,000, he requested 30,000 more regulars and 40,000 volunteers, bringing the effective total to 100,000. He also called for a conscription plan to obtain the additional regulars.
Given the government’s fiscal condition, these numbers appeared wildly unrealistic. And when Congress realized that this massive new army was for another invasion of Canada, Monroe’s requests found little support. As they had throughout the war, New England Federalists vehemently opposed invading Canada. They saw no reason to increase the army or to institute something as foreign to America as conscription. It was also hard for Republicans to see the urgency of a huge increase in spending to make another invasion of Canada. After haggling for weeks and then months, a divided Congress passed legislation late in January that authorized the president to accept 40,000 volunteers into the army and an additional 40,000 state militiamen to serve for twelve months. The militiamen, however, could be used only to defend their own state or an adjoining state. Approval of their governors was necessary before they could be used anywhere else. Madison reluctantly signed the bill on January 27, 1815. All the Federalists from New England voted against it. By this measure, Congress unmistakably vetoed any invasion of Canada. In spite of this clear signal, and Congress’s strict guidelines, Monroe continued to plan to invade in the spring of 1815.
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