1812: The Navy's War (70 page)
By 12:40 it was all over. Gunboat number 23 was the last to surrender. The British had seventeen killed and seventy-seven wounded. Jones had ten killed and thirty-five wounded. Lockyer allowed his men to plunder Jones’s boats and steal the personal belongings of his men, an indication of what was in store for New Orleans if the British were victorious. Jones survived, but it took a long time for him to heal. The musket ball remained in his shoulder for the rest of his life. Jones and his crews were eventually taken as prisoners to Bermuda, where they were released when the war ended.
Commodore Patterson could ill afford to lose Jones and his men. Nor could he afford to lose five of his six gunboats. Jones did not fight in vain, however; he gave Jackson precious time to prepare. Inexplicably, when Jones and his flotilla were crushed and removed, Jackson did not replace them with scouts. He was without effective intelligence on Lake Borgne for ten days, an egregious oversight that might have been fatal.
When the British questioned Jones and the other prisoners, they gave estimates of Jackson’s strength at 20,000. Some American deserters made the numbers much smaller, however—as few as 5,000. Cochrane had estimates from a number of sources, and in the end he overestimated Jackson’s strength, although not to the degree that Jones hoped. Regardless of what the British thought they were up against, they had scant regard for American militiamen, and this attitude would work decidedly in Jackson’s favor.
With Lieutenant Jones and his boats out of the way, Cochrane moved his army thirty miles west to Pea Island at the mouth of the Pearl River, where he set up an advance base. With almost no trees, but a surfeit of alligators and snakes, Pea Island was a barren, wet, godforsaken place halfway across Lake Borgne. Getting men from the fleet to the island was itself a monumental, backbreaking chore. Cochrane did not have enough boats to take his men across all at once. Several round trips of sixty miles had to be made. Not until December 19 was General Keane’s army finally on the island. With no tents or huts, the troops suffered in the cold rain that poured down on them nearly every afternoon.
Admiral Cochrane and Admiral Malcolm were on Pea Island with General Keane, making final decisions on how to proceed. Three possible invasion routes presented themselves east of the Mississippi. Cochrane had already ruled out the two routes to the west, as well as the Mississippi River itself. One possible route of attack was by way of the shallow, difficult Rigolets passage into Lake Pontchartrain and thence by boat to a point two miles north of the city. Cochrane did not have enough shallow draft vessels for this otherwise attractive course, and Fort Petites Coquilles, which guarded the Rigolets passage, presented an important obstacle. The second approach was to row to Bayou Chef Menteur and then to the Plain of Gentilly, where the Chef Menteur Road went from the Rigolets directly to the city. The road was narrow, however, and could be easily blocked. Jackson, aware of its attractiveness, had it well guarded.
The third potential route was by way of Bayou Bienvenue to a narrow branch, Bayou Mazant, and then to Villeré Canal, which would take the British to a point one mile from the Mississippi and seven miles south of the city. Cochrane chose this final route. Keane had little say in the matter. The entrance to Bayou Bienvenue was sixty miles west of Cochrane’s fleet and thirty miles from Pea Island.
General Keane prepared to transport 1,600 men from Pea Island to the entrance to Bayou Bienvenue. He did not have enough boats to move them all at once, so the exhausting work had to be performed three times. At midnight on December 22, eight days after the Battle of Lake Borgne, the first of Keane’s troops arrived at Bayou Bienvenue. Colonel William Thornton, the same intrepid officer who led the charge for General Ross at the Battle of Bladensburg, was in command.
It had been fourteen days since Admiral Cochrane’s flagship dropped anchor off Cat Island—precious time for Jackson to prepare. Colonel Thornton immediately captured Jackson’s post at the fishing village beside the entrance to Bayou Bienvenue. Keane then led the army up Bayou Bienvenue (one hundred yards wide) to the much narrower Bayou Mazant, which ran to the Villeré plantation at the edge of the Mississippi. Keane arrived undetected on the morning of the twenty-third. No obstructions had been placed anywhere to delay them, although Jackson had ordered them. Obstacles blocked the other invasion routes, but not this one. Remarkably, Jackson had no idea the British had a large force only seven miles south of the city. Keane’s advance party captured a small detachment of militia—thirty men led by Major Gabriel Villeré. Fortunately for Jackson, Major Villeré escaped and alerted him to Keane’s presence.
WHILE KEANE WAS moving his army unseen to within easy striking distance of New Orleans, Jackson, unaware of the danger, continued preparing for some sort of attack. When word of Jones’s defeat at the Battle of Lake Borgne reached the city on December 15, Jackson redoubled his efforts, and New Orleans panicked. Jackson called out the entire Louisiana militia and sent urgent calls to William Carroll, who had 2,500 Tennessee militiamen on the way, and to John Coffee with 1,300 men, and to Kentucky militiamen, hoping for a large contingent, perhaps 2,500 or more. He declared martial law in the city on December 16. He also did something he never thought he’d have to do—accept help from Jean Lafitte and his pirates. Jackson had some regulars, as well, from the Fourth and Forty-fourth U.S. regiments (about 600 men). He was woefully short of arms, however; Monroe had promised them but had not delivered any as yet.
Jackson had indispensable help from the redoubtable Commodore Daniel Patterson, who after Jones’s defeat was left with only the 15-gun schooner
Carolina
, the 16-gun
Louisiana
, and a single gunboat. But he had a large supply of munitions captured during a successful raid on the Baratarian pirate base on September 16. Secretary Jones had ordered Patterson specifically to attack the pirates and had sent the
Carolina
from Charleston for that purpose. She arrived in New Orleans in August. But for the secretary’s action, the
Carolina
would not have been available. She was a well-built schooner, made in Charleston and purchased by the navy in November 1812. She had five six-pounders a side and two twelve-pounders at the bow and stern on swivels that allowed them to be fired on either side. Her seventy-man crew were tough navy veterans, many of them from New England.
Carolina
, the 16-gun
Louisiana
, and a single gunboat. But he had a large supply of munitions captured during a successful raid on the Baratarian pirate base on September 16. Secretary Jones had ordered Patterson specifically to attack the pirates and had sent the
Carolina
from Charleston for that purpose. She arrived in New Orleans in August. But for the secretary’s action, the
Carolina
would not have been available. She was a well-built schooner, made in Charleston and purchased by the navy in November 1812. She had five six-pounders a side and two twelve-pounders at the bow and stern on swivels that allowed them to be fired on either side. Her seventy-man crew were tough navy veterans, many of them from New England.
The
Louisiana
was a converted merchantman, purchased in New Orleans by the navy in 1812. She was not put to use, however, until August 1814. Until then, she sat idle with no crew. She carried four twenty-four-pounders, eight twelve-pounders, and four six-pounders. Unlike the
Carolina
’s crew, the
Louisiana
’s was gathered from the streets of New Orleans—men from all nations (except England). Two-thirds of them could not speak English. After Jackson declared martial law, Patterson could impress whomever he needed. The
Louisiana
’s skipper, Lieutenant Charles C. B. Thompson, used coercion to round out his crew.
Louisiana
was a converted merchantman, purchased in New Orleans by the navy in 1812. She was not put to use, however, until August 1814. Until then, she sat idle with no crew. She carried four twenty-four-pounders, eight twelve-pounders, and four six-pounders. Unlike the
Carolina
’s crew, the
Louisiana
’s was gathered from the streets of New Orleans—men from all nations (except England). Two-thirds of them could not speak English. After Jackson declared martial law, Patterson could impress whomever he needed. The
Louisiana
’s skipper, Lieutenant Charles C. B. Thompson, used coercion to round out his crew.
Laffite’s pirates did not serve in the
Carolina
or the
Louisiana
, as many historians have supposed. Patterson and the pirates hated each other. Jackson sent the Baratarians to man the guns at the forts guarding the city—Petites Coquilles, St. Philip, and Bayou St. Jean. A few of them later manned two batteries on Jackson’s line and performed well, but that was all.
Carolina
or the
Louisiana
, as many historians have supposed. Patterson and the pirates hated each other. Jackson sent the Baratarians to man the guns at the forts guarding the city—Petites Coquilles, St. Philip, and Bayou St. Jean. A few of them later manned two batteries on Jackson’s line and performed well, but that was all.
Admiral Cochrane made no attempt to get any warships, even small ones, up the Mississippi before the main battle. The mouth of the river was 105 miles south of New Orleans. The current and the bar at Balize made it impossible for large warships to ascend and difficult for smaller ones. Jackson had made it even more unattractive as an invasion route by reinforcing Fort St. Philip, situated fifty miles from the mouth of the river at a difficult turn in the river. The swamps around the fort made a land attack impossible. Cochrane thus conceded naval supremacy on the Mississippi to Commodore Patterson, who had only two small warships and the number 65 gunboat. Cochrane’s decision was a great help to Jackson.
AT NOON ON December 23, Jackson finally was alerted to the threat from Keane’s army. He had to act fast to prevent the British from overrunning the city. Fortunately, Keane’s troops were in a weak condition, and reinforcements were not coming for a while. The normally aggressive Keane would have liked to strike unprepared New Orleans that day, but his troops were in no condition to attempt it.
Recovering quickly from his surprise, Jackson decided to attack the enemy that night. He worried that Keane’s threat was only a feint, and that a second British force, perhaps the main one, would attack the city using the Chef Menteur Road. To guard against that, he left General Carroll’s force and the city’s militia to protect the road. By a Herculean effort, Jackson mustered 1,500 troops of various kinds, and at five o’clock in the afternoon he marched to meet Keane, planning to attack with infantry (including 200 free men of color) and Major Thomas Hind’s Mississippi dragoons. Jackson believed the British force to be 3,000, or twice his own. He arrived at Villeré’s plantation around seven o’clock. Jackson’s movements had gone entirely undetected by the British sentries.
Meanwhile, Commodore Patterson and Master Commandant John D. Henley had silently brought the
Carolina
downriver to the British flank, and at 7:30 began pouring deadly grape shot into their camp. Keane’s surprised troops fired two ineffective three-pounders at her and then ran for cover. The ship’s cannon going off was the signal for Jackson to attack. Coffee charged from the left along the cypress swamp, while Jackson moved along the Mississippi with the main force and struck from the right directly at the camp, which was close to the river. The
Carolina
ceased firing when Henley judged Jackson and Coffee’s Tennessee riflemen were within range of her guns.
Carolina
downriver to the British flank, and at 7:30 began pouring deadly grape shot into their camp. Keane’s surprised troops fired two ineffective three-pounders at her and then ran for cover. The ship’s cannon going off was the signal for Jackson to attack. Coffee charged from the left along the cypress swamp, while Jackson moved along the Mississippi with the main force and struck from the right directly at the camp, which was close to the river. The
Carolina
ceased firing when Henley judged Jackson and Coffee’s Tennessee riflemen were within range of her guns.
The two armies battled in the dark singly and in small groups hand to hand. Around eight o’clock, a fog descended over the battlefield, and around ten, Jackson withdrew. He wrote, “Fearing the consequence, under this circumstance, of the further prosecution of a night attack with troops, then acting together for the first time, I contented myself with lying on the field that night.”
He rested less than a mile from the battlefield, remaining on the river road leading to the city. At four o’clock in the morning he withdrew two more miles to a stronger position in back of Rodriguez Canal. “As the safety of the city will depend on the fate of this army,” Jackson wrote, “it must not be incautiously exposed.”
Even though Keane had been reinforced during the fighting, he did not pursue the retreating Americans. Jackson had inflicted so much pain that Keane thought he was up against 5,000 militiamen. Keane lost 46 killed, 167 wounded, and 64 missing. Jackson had 24 killed, 115 wounded, and 74 missing.
As a result of Jackson’s daring raid, Cochrane committed his entire army to the confined area south of Rodriguez Canal, which meant that Jackson did not have to divide his small force and defend the city against simultaneous attacks coming from two or more directions. Cochrane was making a major strategic blunder on the spur of the moment with little thought and no consultation.
After Jackson withdrew, the
Louisiana
joined the
Carolina
, and the two ships kept peppering Keane’s camp. Their guns protected Jackson at the Rodriguez Canal and the road leading to New Orleans, although Keane was so shaken by Jackson’s surprise night attack that there was no chance he’d move on the city immediately. He ordered heavy naval artillery brought up to counteract the deadly fire from the warships, but it would not arrive soon.
Louisiana
joined the
Carolina
, and the two ships kept peppering Keane’s camp. Their guns protected Jackson at the Rodriguez Canal and the road leading to New Orleans, although Keane was so shaken by Jackson’s surprise night attack that there was no chance he’d move on the city immediately. He ordered heavy naval artillery brought up to counteract the deadly fire from the warships, but it would not arrive soon.
The following morning, December 24, Jackson began building a defense barrier at Rodriguez Canal that stretched from the Mississippi for nine hundred yards to a huge cypress swamp. The canal was twelve feet wide and four to eight feet deep. At the same time, Jackson cut a levee below the canal to swamp the British. He did not accomplish his objective, but the water was a problem for them, as were the two warships, which continued shelling Keane’s camp from time to time, keeping him off balance and thus preventing a surprise attack on Jackson. Close collaboration between Patterson and Jackson characterized their operation throughout.
ON THE MORNING of December 24, the frigate
Statira
arrived off Cat Island with thirty-seven-year-old Lieutenant General Edward Pakenham, the new British commander. Later that night, Pakenham met Captain Sir Thomas Hardy on the brig
Anaconda
, and Hardy brought him up to date on the naval battle with Jones and Keane’s fight with Jackson. On Christmas morning, Pakenham and his party were rowed to Fisherman’s Village near the mouth of Bayou Bienvenue, where Cochrane had his headquarters. Over breakfast, the admiral gave Pakenham his version of what happened the previous night.
Statira
arrived off Cat Island with thirty-seven-year-old Lieutenant General Edward Pakenham, the new British commander. Later that night, Pakenham met Captain Sir Thomas Hardy on the brig
Anaconda
, and Hardy brought him up to date on the naval battle with Jones and Keane’s fight with Jackson. On Christmas morning, Pakenham and his party were rowed to Fisherman’s Village near the mouth of Bayou Bienvenue, where Cochrane had his headquarters. Over breakfast, the admiral gave Pakenham his version of what happened the previous night.
Later that day, Pakenham moved on to the base at Villeré’s plantation. For the first time, he saw the terrible position Cochrane had placed him in, including the Americans having command of the water. In fact, a few more enemy warships would have made attacking New Orleans from Keane’s camp unthinkable. Pakenham had to immediately decide if he was going to abandon the site and develop a new strategy or make the best of what he had. He chose to stay. His regard for American militiamen was so low that he decided to press on. By now the British force had dwindled to 5,500, what with losses in the battle, desertions, sickness, and the all-black West Indian regiments finding the weather intolerable. General Lambert’s 2,200 reinforcements had not yet arrived.
Other books
The Fairy-Tale Matchmaker by E. D. Baker
The Sowing by Makansi, K.
The Hollow Queen by Elizabeth Haydon
Break Me Open by Amy Kiss
Royal Opposites by Crawford, Lori
The Victim in Victoria Station by Jeanne M. Dams
Valkyrie - the Vampire Princess 2 by Pet Torres
Wild Things: Four Tales by Douglas Clegg
Lord of the Deep by Dawn Thompson