1812: The Navy's War (33 page)
Madison’s eagerness to negotiate was taken in London as a sign of weakness. The
Times
chortled, “the pressure of the war may have rendered Mr. Madison seriously anxious to extricate himself from the unpleasant situation in which he finds himself.”
Times
chortled, “the pressure of the war may have rendered Mr. Madison seriously anxious to extricate himself from the unpleasant situation in which he finds himself.”
London’s attitude would undoubtedly have been different had Madison done well on the battlefield, but the reverse was the case. With the commitment of only a few resources, the British were holding their own in Canada. The estrangement of His Majesty’s Canadian subjects, which had worried the British so much, had not happened. Canadian militiamen had responded when called and had performed better than expected. French-Canadians had not shown any disaffection either. They viewed the Americans as the enemy and were willing to fight them. In marked contrast to the neutrality they exhibited in 1775, they were now decidedly in favor of the status quo in Canada. The Roman Catholic clergy, who exercised a powerful influence among the French-Canadians, strongly supported the English king’s authority. Their antipathy to the atheistic French Revolution led them to support the Revolution’s chief enemy, Britain, and that commitment continued into 1813.
Because British arms were holding their own in America, Liverpool had no incentive to negotiate. In the winter and spring of 1813, the prevailing mood in Britain was vengeance, not reconciliation. To reach out to Madison at this point would have run entirely against the political grain in London. Anger at the United States was never far from the surface in Britain, and now it surged. “The American President was the party that struck the first blow,” the
Times
wrote on December 25, 1812. “It is a genuine British sentiment, to return a blow with interest.” The belief that America had stabbed Britain in the back during her most vulnerable moment was widespread, and the British were demanding retribution.
Times
wrote on December 25, 1812. “It is a genuine British sentiment, to return a blow with interest.” The belief that America had stabbed Britain in the back during her most vulnerable moment was widespread, and the British were demanding retribution.
On February 18, 1813, both houses of Parliament debated the American war. Even members formerly sympathetic to the United States competed in bitter attacks on Madison and his treacherous countrymen. Only Alexander Barring, America’s London banker, and Samuel Whitbread, the brewer and longtime friend of the United States, expressed any sympathy for America. The Liverpool ministry made it clear they would never give in on impressment. Earl Bathurst, the secretary of state for war and the colonies, told the House of Lords that to abandon impressment would be “sapping the foundation of our maritime greatness.” He declared that it was “essential to the interests of this country; and indirectly essential to the interests of Europe; and even to those of America herself.”
Actually, Liverpool did not believe that impressment was the real cause of the war. “Who could believe,” he asked the House of Lords, “that the right of impressment was the actual cause? . . . Amicable discussions might have reduced the whole controversy to nothing.” Indeed they would have, and Madison had asked for them, but Liverpool and Castlereagh had turned him down. If Liverpool was willing to compromise on impressment and suspend the Orders in Council, what then was the reason for continuing the war? If the prime minister wanted to protect Canada, the easiest and least expensive way was to enter into a negotiation with Madison, who clearly wanted one. Accepting the czar’s offer of mediation would have been a simple way to begin.
If the issues that started the war could be so easily settled, and with Napoleon building his strength, why would Liverpool refuse mediation? Beyond the fact that the British people were thirsting for revenge, and Russian interests as a small maritime power were more closely aligned with America than with Britain, Liverpool and his colleagues wanted to reduce the long-term threat they fancied America posed to their imperial ambitions. Liverpool contended that America’s real reason for declaring war was not the Orders in Council or impressment but the desire to demolish Britain’s power, particularly at sea.
When the Napoleonic menace was finally destroyed, which Liverpool was now confident would happen, he intended to dramatically limit the size and strength of Great Britain’s only remaining rival on the high seas. In the course of the Napoleonic wars, the navies of France, Spain, Portugal, Denmark, Holland, Russia, and Sweden had been drastically reduced. The American marine was the only force that could possibly challenge the British colossus. The notion that the United States sought to destroy Britain’s maritime power, although pure fantasy, was stated as a fact over and over again. “We ought to consider the United States as the wanton and bitter enemies of our existence, and treat them accordingly,” the
Times
wrote, reflecting the views of a great many of Britain’s leaders, including the Liverpool ministry.
Times
wrote, reflecting the views of a great many of Britain’s leaders, including the Liverpool ministry.
Thus, despite the continuing threat from a resurgent Napoleon, and despite the fact that the issues that caused the American war could now be easily resolved, Liverpool decided to turn down the offer of mediation from his most important ally. Instead, he and Castlereagh intended to propose direct negotiations with Madison when circumstances in Europe and America were favorable for them to dictate a peace that would put the upstart republic in her place.
Liverpool’s attitude came as no surprise to Republicans. Henry Clay had been convinced for years that Britain’s fear of America’s maritime potential underlay her policies. Madison and Jefferson thought the same. On December 11, 1811, Clay told the House, “you must look for an explanation of her conduct in the jealousies of a rival. She sickens at your prosperity, and beholds in your growth—your sails spread on every ocean, and your numerous seamen, the foundations of a power which, at no very distant day, is to make her tremble for naval superiority.”
UNAWARE THAT LIVERPOOL had no intention of accepting Russian mediation, Madison appointed Treasury Secretary Albert Gallatin and Federalist senator James A. Bayard to join John Quincy Adams in Russia to conduct the negotiations. Gallatin was anxious to get away from Washington. His major problem at the Treasury, funding the war for the rest of the year, had been solved for the moment by the loan he had negotiated with the bankers in Philadelphia. So he felt free to leave.
Anticipating Senate approval of their appointments, Gallatin and Bayard left for St. Petersburg on May 9, 1813, arriving on July 21. They sailed in the
Neptune
, a ship purchased by the navy from Philadelphia merchant Chandler Price, a friend of Secretary Jones. The British blockade of Delaware Bay had left Price with idle ships on his hands, and Secretary Jones wanted to buy a vessel instead of using one of the navy’s scarce warships to convey Gallatin and Bayard to Europe. The
Neptune
could not proceed to sea, however, without permission from Admiral Warren. The Russian Chargé Daschkoff sent Counselor Svertchkoff to Norfolk to request a passport for the
Neptune
to pass through the blockade. Even though the British government had not yet agreed to the czar’s mediation, Warren, an experienced diplomat, approved the arrangement.
Neptune
, a ship purchased by the navy from Philadelphia merchant Chandler Price, a friend of Secretary Jones. The British blockade of Delaware Bay had left Price with idle ships on his hands, and Secretary Jones wanted to buy a vessel instead of using one of the navy’s scarce warships to convey Gallatin and Bayard to Europe. The
Neptune
could not proceed to sea, however, without permission from Admiral Warren. The Russian Chargé Daschkoff sent Counselor Svertchkoff to Norfolk to request a passport for the
Neptune
to pass through the blockade. Even though the British government had not yet agreed to the czar’s mediation, Warren, an experienced diplomat, approved the arrangement.
On May 31 Madison submitted the names of Gallatin, Bayard, and Adams to the Senate to be the American commissioners in St. Petersburg and Jonathan Russell to be ambassador to Sweden. Adams and Bayard were approved with no trouble, but Gallatin and Russell ran into a political ambush, as Federalists, led by newly elected Congressman Daniel Webster, sought to embarrass the president over his handling of policy toward France and Britain in the months preceding the declaration of war. A fierce, often byzantine debate raged through the hot Washington summer over the nominations. In the end, the Senate rejected Russell because of supposed unhappiness over his actions in Paris as chargé d’affaires in 1811. The fact that he was entirely innocent did not matter. And in July, the Senate, moved by political animus, rejected Gallatin by a single vote, 17 yeas to 18 nays.
When the vote was taken, Gallatin and Bayard were at sea, unaware that the Senate had publicly humiliated the president by refusing to accept his envoy. Ambassador John Quincy Adams awaited their arrival in St. Petersburg to begin negotiations that the British had no intention of conducting. The peace talks that Madison had so eagerly sought appeared doomed from the start.
CHAPTER FOURTEEN
The Canadian Invasion Resumes
E
VEN THOUGH MADISON was anxious to begin peace talks, he was also planning to attack Canada again as soon as the snow and ice melted. Success on the battlefield, he thought, was the key to a satisfactory settlement with Britain. Winning a few victories would give his envoys in St. Petersburg something to bargain with. He even entertained the idea that Britain might be persuaded to part with Upper Canada and perhaps Lower Canada as well.
VEN THOUGH MADISON was anxious to begin peace talks, he was also planning to attack Canada again as soon as the snow and ice melted. Success on the battlefield, he thought, was the key to a satisfactory settlement with Britain. Winning a few victories would give his envoys in St. Petersburg something to bargain with. He even entertained the idea that Britain might be persuaded to part with Upper Canada and perhaps Lower Canada as well.
Madison ruled out attacking either Quebec or Montreal for the moment. The American army was too weak to attempt either city. It still had not reached the level of 20,000 men. As an alternative, Secretary Armstrong proposed a move on Kingston, at the eastern end of Lake Ontario, followed by York in the center of the lake, and then the Niagara area to the west. That would give the United States control of Lake Ontario and, with it, Upper Canada. After that, a twopronged drive on Montreal could be launched from Kingston and Plattsburg. The president accepted the plan, but ignoring the disasters of the previous year, he left his old friend General Dearborn in place to direct it.
On February 10 Armstrong ordered Dearborn to assemble 4,000 troops at Sackets Harbor and 3,000 at Buffalo. Working together with Commodore Chauncey, Dearborn was to use the troops at Sackets Harbor to attack Kingston, its garrison, and the British ships wintering in the harbor and those under construction. After that, he and Chauncey were to attack the capital of Upper Canada at York (now Toronto), capturing or destroying the stores and warships there. After York, Dearborn’s amphibious force was to combine with the troops sent to Buffalo and attack forts George and Erie and their dependencies in the Niagara region.
The timing of the operation depended on when the ice melted on Lake Ontario, which Armstrong thought would be around April 1. The St. Lawrence River would not be navigable until May 15. He hoped to attack Kingston, York, and the Niagara area while ice on the St. Lawrence made resupply and reinforcement from Montreal impossible.
While the administration was deliberating, General Prevost, in an uncharacteristically bold move, authorized Lieutenant Colonel George Macdonnell to attack Ogdensburg, New York, and put a stop to the harassment of British supply boats navigating the St. Lawrence. On February 22 Macdonald crossed the frozen St. Lawrence from Prescott and surprised the American post, under militia Captain Benjamin Forsyth, and captured it, thus gaining effective control of the St. Lawrence waterway. The attack on Ogdensburg added to fears that Chauncey and Dearborn had of Sackets Harbor being attacked over the ice from Kingston, only thirty-five miles away. They knew Prevost was strengthening the town’s garrison, and they feared the reinforcement was just the start of what would become a much larger British contingent at Kingston, amounting to as many as 6,000 or 8,000 men.
Actually, only about 600 regulars and 1,400 militiamen were defending Kingston. Either Dearborn or Chauncey could have easily obtained intelligence of the actual number, but they did not. Judging their troops at Sackets Harbor to be far too few, and not wanting to risk another defeat, they persuaded secretaries Armstrong and Jones, as well as the president, to change plans and attack York and the Niagara area first, and then attempt Kingston. With only 700 inhabitants, York appeared to be an easy target. They planned to leave a sufficient force to protect Sackets Harbor while they conducted an amphibious operation against York. General Dearborn would lead the troops personally, seconded by the highly regarded Brigadier General Zebulon Pike. Chauncey would command the naval contingent.
Unaware of the faulty intelligence behind the change of plans, Madison approved them. He thought the psychological impact in London of an American victory was more important than anything else. Still convinced that Liverpool was going to accept mediation, the president wanted to give the negotiators in St. Petersburg a stronger hand. Armstrong and Jones both agreed.
Jones wrote to Chauncey that the change in strategy would have far-reaching consequences. It would determine not only “the fate of the campaign in that quarter; but the character and duration of the war, and the final object of that war, an honorable and secure peace.” His words were prophetic. By not conducting a preemptive strike on Kingston—before the Royal Navy strengthened it—the president was losing an opportunity to secure control of both lakes Ontario and Erie with relative ease early in 1813. Based on faulty intelligence from two overly cautious commanders, the decision would be one of Madison’s most important—and one of his worst.
THE BRITISH WERE also focusing their attention on Kingston and Lake Ontario. Since command of the lakes was looming ever larger in the war, the Admiralty on March 19, 1813, assigned thirty-year-old Sir James Yeo, former captain of the ill-fated
Southampton
, to command naval operations on the Great Lakes and on Lake Champlain under Warren and Prevost. The Admiralty directed Yeo to maintain a defensive posture on the lakes. “The first and paramount object for which this naval force is maintained [is] . . . the defense of His Majesty’s Provinces of North America,” Yeo’s orders read. In other words, until the situation in Europe was clarified, Sir James was to avoid offensive operations—not a happy assignment for any commander.
Southampton
, to command naval operations on the Great Lakes and on Lake Champlain under Warren and Prevost. The Admiralty directed Yeo to maintain a defensive posture on the lakes. “The first and paramount object for which this naval force is maintained [is] . . . the defense of His Majesty’s Provinces of North America,” Yeo’s orders read. In other words, until the situation in Europe was clarified, Sir James was to avoid offensive operations—not a happy assignment for any commander.
Experienced seamen were the scarcest item on the lakes. Their lordships were concerned that the nearly five hundred seamen they were sending with Yeo might desert. “Their Lordships feel some anxiety on this subject . . . ,” the secretary to the Admiralty, John Wilson Croker, wrote to Yeo, “[given] the efforts which the Americans have made on as many occasions to seduce His Majesty’s subjects from their duty and allegiance.” The Admiralty never looked to the horrid conditions aboard their ships as the real reason good sailors deserted whenever they could.
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