1812: The Navy's War (35 page)
Instead of going after Vincent’s much smaller force, the confused Americans fell back. On June 7, Major General Morgan Lewis of the New York militia arrived to take command. He no sooner appeared on the scene, however, than Yeo’s fleet and a contingent of Indians harassed him enough that Dearborn ordered him to return to Fort George. At the same time, Dearborn withdrew all his forces on the Canadian side of the Niagara to Fort George, allowing Vincent to return. When Lewis reached Fort George, he was ordered to Sackets Harbor, leaving Brigadier General John P. Boyd of the regular army in charge at the fort and the immediate vicinity. By then, the elderly Dearborn was too sick to lead.
To protect his position at the fort and to keep the British off balance, Boyd dispatched Lieutenant Colonel C. G. Boerstler to attack a British advanced post at Beaver Dam, seventeen miles south of Fort George. The hapless Boerstler wound up surrendering all five hundred forty of his men without a fight to a force that was a bit smaller than his own, composed mostly of Indians. Afterward, Dearborn, disheartened by one fiasco after another, asked to be relieved of command, which Secretary Armstrong and the president agreed to in July.
JUNE ALSO BROUGHT disaster for the Americans on Lake Champlain. Lieutenant Macdonough had moved his base from Burlington, Vermont, across the lake to Plattsburgh, New York, and while his flagship, the sloop
President
, was laid up for repairs, he sent Lieutenant Sidney Smith and Sailing Master Jairus Loomis out to patrol for enemy gunboats. They had Macdonough’s other large vessels, the 11-gun sloop
Growler
(Smith’s boat) and the 11-gun sloop
Eagle
, under Loomis. At daybreak on the third of June, Smith’s lookout spotted some British gunboats on the lake, and he decided to go after them. He signaled Loomis, and they both tore after the enemy.
President
, was laid up for repairs, he sent Lieutenant Sidney Smith and Sailing Master Jairus Loomis out to patrol for enemy gunboats. They had Macdonough’s other large vessels, the 11-gun sloop
Growler
(Smith’s boat) and the 11-gun sloop
Eagle
, under Loomis. At daybreak on the third of June, Smith’s lookout spotted some British gunboats on the lake, and he decided to go after them. He signaled Loomis, and they both tore after the enemy.
Smith knew that chasing fleeing gunboats back to their base at the Isle aux Noix could be tricky. His pilots had warned him, but even if they hadn’t, he was experienced enough to appreciate that with the breeze from the south, if he stood down the lake and got too close to the Isle aux Noix, he would not be able to haul his wind and beat back, the width of the channel being only one hundred yards. For this reason, Macdonough had ordered him to stay on the American side of the international boundary and not cross over into Canada during his patrols.
Nonetheless, seeking to distinguish himself, Smith plunged ahead, chasing the gunboats across the Canadian boundary, until he was within two miles of the Isle of Noix. Suddenly realizing he was losing room to maneuver, he hauled his wind and tried to beat back, but he became trapped. Three gunboats from the British base, supported by three hundred men on shore, attacked him, and after a three-hour fight, Smith surrendered both the
Growler
and the
Eagle
. That was enough to give the British command of the lake. It was a crushing blow to Macdonough, who immediately afterward received orders from Secretary Jones to regain command of the lake as fast as possible. That would not be easy. The British would no doubt try to use their newfound superiority to destroy the fleet Macdonough was building. His first priority would be to protect it.
Growler
and the
Eagle
. That was enough to give the British command of the lake. It was a crushing blow to Macdonough, who immediately afterward received orders from Secretary Jones to regain command of the lake as fast as possible. That would not be easy. The British would no doubt try to use their newfound superiority to destroy the fleet Macdonough was building. His first priority would be to protect it.
In the meantime, Smith was taken to Quebec as a prisoner and incarcerated in a bestial prison ship, where his health swiftly deteriorated. While there, he witnessed the British routinely taking Americans out of the ship, claiming they were British subjects, and sending them to England for employment in the Royal Navy. If they resisted, they could be hanged for treason.
During the course of the war the British captured around 14,000 American naval personnel—about 14 percent of the total number of seamen employed in the navy and private vessels combined. It was a very high percentage. How many of these men were forced into the Royal Navy is impossible to say, but it was probably a significant number.
MEANWHILE, COMMODORE CHAUNCEY continued his efforts to gain undisputed control of Lake Ontario. When the
General Pike
was completed on July 22, Chauncey made it his flagship and sailed out of Sackets Harbor with twelve other vessels in search of Yeo’s fleet. He could not find it immediately and decided instead to destroy a large deposit of stores near Burlington Bay at the head of the lake. Brigadier General Boyd and Colonel Winfield Scott accompanied him with a detachment of two hundred fifty infantrymen.
General Pike
was completed on July 22, Chauncey made it his flagship and sailed out of Sackets Harbor with twelve other vessels in search of Yeo’s fleet. He could not find it immediately and decided instead to destroy a large deposit of stores near Burlington Bay at the head of the lake. Brigadier General Boyd and Colonel Winfield Scott accompanied him with a detachment of two hundred fifty infantrymen.
When Chauncey discovered that the supplies he was after were heavily defended, he called off the attack and turned his attention to York again, arriving there the afternoon of July 31. Colonel Scott landed unopposed with a party of soldiers and marines and proceeded to destroy or carry away all the munitions, boats, and food he found, which were considerable. These supplies were destined for Commodore Barclay at Amherstburg on Lake Erie. He desperately needed them in his arms race with Oliver Hazard Perry. After Scott completed his work, Chauncey withdrew. Neither General Boyd nor Chauncey considered occupying York and cutting the line between Kingston and the British forces in the Niagara area.
After leaving York, Chauncey went to Fort Niagara and debarked eleven officers, including Lieutenants Jesse D. Elliott, Augustus H. M. Conkling, and Joseph E. Smith, along with one hundred sailors, sending them to Perry at Presque Isle, where they were critically needed. Afterward Chauncey returned to Sackets Harbor, planning to meet Yeo at the earliest opportunity.
Chauncey did not have to wait long. Yeo had already sailed from Kingston on July 31 to challenge Chauncey. A major battle was in the offing. Placid weather kept the fleets apart, until the seventh of August, when they met near the head of the lake, not far from Fort Niagara. Unfavorable winds separated them until the morning of the eighth, when a sudden squall overset Chauncey’s
Hamilton
and
Scourge
and sank them. Chauncey judged that Yeo now had the stronger fleet. Continuing light wind made maneuvering impossible until the evening of the tenth, when Yeo bore down on Chauncey and captured the schooners
Julia
and
Growler
. Chauncey had now lost four schooners, and as he was low on provisions, he decided he was too weak to fight and returned to Sackets Harbor, “distressed and mortified,” as he told Secretary Jones.
Hamilton
and
Scourge
and sank them. Chauncey judged that Yeo now had the stronger fleet. Continuing light wind made maneuvering impossible until the evening of the tenth, when Yeo bore down on Chauncey and captured the schooners
Julia
and
Growler
. Chauncey had now lost four schooners, and as he was low on provisions, he decided he was too weak to fight and returned to Sackets Harbor, “distressed and mortified,” as he told Secretary Jones.
SOON AFTER SEIZING the sloops
Growler
and
Eagle
on Lake Champlain, the British used their newfound supremacy to unleash a series of attacks that became known as Murray’s Raid. Governor General Prevost sent the crew of HM sloop of war
Wasp
(then at Quebec) to help man gunboats, and under the command of Lieutenant Colonel John Murray, Lieutenant Daniel Pring, and Commander Thomas Everard, an amphibious force of eight hundred men sailed south.
Growler
and
Eagle
on Lake Champlain, the British used their newfound supremacy to unleash a series of attacks that became known as Murray’s Raid. Governor General Prevost sent the crew of HM sloop of war
Wasp
(then at Quebec) to help man gunboats, and under the command of Lieutenant Colonel John Murray, Lieutenant Daniel Pring, and Commander Thomas Everard, an amphibious force of eight hundred men sailed south.
Macdonough knew they were coming, but he was powerless to stop them. He did move his base of operations back to Burlington, however, consolidating as much of his operation as possible. He had support from the new army commander in the region, Major General Wade Hampton.
Between July 29 and August 3 Murray attacked, without opposition, the military installations at Plattsburg, Champlain, and Swanton. He also appeared off Burlington on August 2 with two sloops and a row galley and began bombarding what was left of Macdonough’s fleet. Macdonough fought back, keeping Murray at bay, using shore batteries and his ships, which were moored with springs on their cables so that they could fire their cannon from both sides without having to use their sails. The heavy fire eventually drove Murray off. Macdonough wanted to go after him, but he lacked the men and officers and had to just watch as the British disappeared. In spite of his troubles, Macdonough was promoted to master commandant on July 24, an honor that was long overdue but highly gratifying to the modest recipient.
IN THE NORTHWEST, meanwhile, General Harrison’s operations continued to be stymied. Without command of Lake Erie, his army was forced to remain on the defensive. Back in April, Major General Henry Proctor, still commandant at Fort Malden and still hated by the Americans for the massacre of Kentucky militiamen at the River Raisin, sailed up the Maumee and laid siege to Fort Meigs with 500 regulars, an equal number of militiamen, and 1,200 of Tecumseh’s warriors. Harrison’s ranks had been seriously depleted when Virginia, Kentucky, and Pennsylvania militiamen had gone home earlier, after their six months of service were up.
Proctor dragged twenty-four-pounders and some smaller artillery to the heights overlooking the fort and opened fire on May 1. Harrison stoutly defended the fort, and he was heartened when on May 4 he saw 1,200 green Kentucky militiamen approaching. Half of them attacked the British batteries at great cost, while the rest scrambled into the fort with few casualties. With Harrison now strengthened, some Indians began drifting away, but many remained. Proctor, however, gave up the siege on May 9 and returned to Fort Malden, much to the disgust of Tecumseh. Harrison had lost far more men than Proctor, but he held the fort. The casualties he suffered made him less inclined to try retaking Detroit and capturing Fort Malden, unless the navy could establish supremacy on Lake Erie—at the moment an unlikely scenario.
Harrison would not have to worry about attacking the British, however, for he was soon on the defensive again. Proctor made another, halfhearted attempt on Fort Meigs two months later but failed again. He then decided to attack Harrison’s supply depot at Fort Stephenson on the Sandusky River in Ohio—this time without Tecumseh’s support. Twenty-one-year-old Major George Croghan was in command at Fort Stephenson with only a hundred sixty men and a single piece of artillery. The fort was decrepit, but Croghan intended to make the most of what he had.
Proctor sailed into Sandusky Bay and then up the river unopposed, landing eight hundred men on August 1, near what is today Fremont, Ohio. On the same day, Croghan received an unambiguous order from Harrison to evacuate. Harrison thought the fort was too vulnerable. Aware that Proctor had already landed, Croghan decided to stay put. He told Harrison that evacuating would be more dangerous than fighting. All the while, Croghan was preparing as strong a defense as he could. He had already evacuated the women, children, and sick, and he vowed to fight to the last man. “The example set me by my Revolutionary kindred is before me,” he wrote to a friend. “Let me die rather than prove unworthy of their name.” Croghan had inspired similar sentiments in the men who stood with him against seemingly impossible odds.
Proctor attacked Fort Stephenson on August 2 and unexpectedly ran into stiff opposition. Croghan’s defenders put up such a ferocious fight that the British and Indians were forced back with heavy losses. Not wishing to endure more casualties, Proctor gave up and returned to his boats humiliated, sailing back to Fort Malden, where his supply problems were mounting. Harrison, who had been furious with Croghan for being insubordinate and had actually relieved him, was forced to restore him to command when the country hailed him as a great hero. Congress awarded Croghan a gold medal. He was the only bright spot in Harrison’s dismal performance during the first seven months of 1813.
The failure to achieve any success against Canada during these months, except for the raids on York, shattered Madison’s overall strategy. Accepting the advice of Dearborn and Chauncey to attack York and the Niagara region before moving on Kingston had proven a terrible mistake. It allowed Lord Liverpool to avoid negotiations while he and his allies dealt with Napoleon, who was still very much a threat.
CHAPTER FIFTEEN
The
Chesapeake
and the
Shannon
Chesapeake
and the
Shannon
W
HILE THE BRITISH were frustrating Madison along the Canadian frontier, the American blue-water fleet was running into difficulties its senior officers had long anticipated. Before the war began, Commodore Rodgers expressed a view generally held by his colleagues, that the navy would have the most success in the first months of the war. After that, the Royal Navy’s overwhelming numbers would drastically curtail American naval operations. At the start of the war, the light regard in London for the naval prowess of the United States helped the navy achieve a series of remarkable victories, but they in turn caused the Admiralty to deploy additional resources to the American theater, which made life even more difficult for the navy than Rodgers had anticipated.
HILE THE BRITISH were frustrating Madison along the Canadian frontier, the American blue-water fleet was running into difficulties its senior officers had long anticipated. Before the war began, Commodore Rodgers expressed a view generally held by his colleagues, that the navy would have the most success in the first months of the war. After that, the Royal Navy’s overwhelming numbers would drastically curtail American naval operations. At the start of the war, the light regard in London for the naval prowess of the United States helped the navy achieve a series of remarkable victories, but they in turn caused the Admiralty to deploy additional resources to the American theater, which made life even more difficult for the navy than Rodgers had anticipated.
The British public clamored for the Royal Navy to destroy the maritime power of the United States, and the Admiralty kept pushing Admiral Warren to tighten his blockade along the coast. Their lordships pointed out to him that his failure to stop America’s warships and privateers from putting to sea forced the Royal Navy in the first weeks of 1813 to deploy two line-of-battle ships, two frigates, and more sloops of war around St. Helena and a similar assortment of warships in the neighborhood of Madeira and the Western Islands. The Admiralty demanded to know why Warren, with all the ships he had, allowed the
Constitution
, the
President
, the
United States
, the
Congress
, the
Argus
, and the
Hornet
to come and go as they pleased from Boston Harbor. On March 20, 1813, Croker wrote to Warren emphasizing again that all the American warships must be blockaded. If they were allowed to roam, the problem of finding them would be nearly impossible, making the convoying of merchant fleets far more difficult. Furthermore, if privateers by the hundreds were allowed to prowl, they would add an even greater hazard. A tight blockade of the entire coast was the only remedy. The Admiralty insisted that Warren include a 74-gun battleship in every blockading squadron outside an American port.
Constitution
, the
President
, the
United States
, the
Congress
, the
Argus
, and the
Hornet
to come and go as they pleased from Boston Harbor. On March 20, 1813, Croker wrote to Warren emphasizing again that all the American warships must be blockaded. If they were allowed to roam, the problem of finding them would be nearly impossible, making the convoying of merchant fleets far more difficult. Furthermore, if privateers by the hundreds were allowed to prowl, they would add an even greater hazard. A tight blockade of the entire coast was the only remedy. The Admiralty insisted that Warren include a 74-gun battleship in every blockading squadron outside an American port.
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