1812: The Navy's War (32 page)
National honor finally forced the czar to fight the battle Napoleon craved. On August 29 Alexander gave overall command of his armies to sixty-five-year-old Mikhail Kutuzov, an immensely popular general with the troops, who were demoralized by the constant retreating and the destruction they were forced to inflict on their own people. They wanted to fight the French, and under Kutuzov they believed they had a chance to win. Influential members of the czar’s court were also urging him to fight. They, too, were angry at what the French were doing to their country; they thought honor demanded that Russia defend herself. The czar finally agreed, but only after his scorched-earth policy had seriously weakened the Grand Army.
Kutuzov made his stand on September 7 at Borodino, seventy miles southwest of Moscow. The Russians arrived on the battlefield first, and they were prepared for the French when they attacked. A horrendous bloodbath followed. Perhaps 80,000 died—45,000 Russians and 35,000 of the Grand Army. At the end of the day, Napoleon controlled the battlefield, but his army was badly beaten up. More importantly, he failed to destroy the Russian army, and in that sense Borodino was anything but the decisive victory he needed.
Kutuzov, although staggered, was able to withdraw to Moscow. He thought about defending the city but then decided to evacuate. With much of the civilian population trailing behind, he marched out of the city and established himself southeast of Moscow, where he could rest and reconstitute his army.
On September 15 Napoleon entered Moscow and established himself in the Kremlin. The next day the city erupted in flames that destroyed three-quarters of the buildings, making life for the French army even more difficult than it already was. It became clearer by the hour that, even though Bonaparte was in Moscow, he had not captured Russia—Russia had captured him. Nonetheless, he continued acting as if he were a victor and demanded the czar’s capitulation. Napoleon sent messages to St. Petersburg, urging Alexander to submit, but the czar refused. On the day the Grand Army crossed the Niemen, Alexander had pledged, “I will not sheathe my sword so long as there is an enemy within my imperial borders.” He meant to keep that promise.
Convinced Alexander would soon relent, Napoleon wasted precious days waiting. And while he did, Kutuzov’s army grew in numbers and strength, especially with the addition of thousands of Cossacks. All the while, French foraging parties, desperately seeking food, were meeting armed peasants willing to die in defense of their turf.
With his supplies running out, and the czar giving no indication he would surrender, Napoleon finally understood that he had to evacuate Moscow. He did not begin his retreat until October 19, however. By then, the start of the deadly Russian winter was only days away. His troubles were compounded by wasting nine more days fighting and maneuvering against Kutuzov south of Moscow before deciding that he had to retreat down the main road to Smolensk. Kutuzov forced him to travel along the same scorched earth he had come on.
As Napoleon sped toward Smolensk, Kutuzov harassed him constantly, but avoided a major battle. Cossack cavalry disrupted the frenzied attempts of the French to obtain food. With every mile, the Grand Army shrank. During the first week of November, heavy snow began falling. Instead of dying from heat, the French were succumbing to the cold. Bodies began appearing everywhere, thousands of them, partially covered with snow, looking like sheep huddled down in the middle of white fields. Horses in similar numbers were collapsing.
Napoleon took no notice of the sickening white lumps in the fields. He had only one thing on his mind—getting back to Paris fast. He reached Smolensk on November 9. Its supplies of food were quickly devoured. He left on the twelfth, heading for Krasnoye and then Orsha, where he crossed the Dnieper and continued west toward the river Berezina, a tributary of the Dnieper.
The czar hoped to cut Napoleon off and capture him at Borisov on the Berezina. Admiral Pavel Chichagov with 32,000 men, and a similar number under General Peter Wittgenstein, converged on Borisov. On November 26–29 the remnants of the French army—now amounting to perhaps 30,000 to 40,000—fought the Russians and suffered devastating losses but escaped destruction, crossed the river, and continued moving west. Napoleon himself crossed the Berezina at Studenkia, just north of Borisov, and avoided capture. He continued west to Smorgoni, midway between the Berezina and the Niemen. The Grand Army continued to dwindle.
On December 5, from Smorgoni, Bonaparte issued his famous Bulletin 29, admitting to the French people that there had been a dreadful calamity in Russia. At the same time he began calling up 300,000 men for a new army. He then completed conferences with his remaining generals and left secretly in the middle of the night, abandoning what was left of his army. He raced west to Vilna and then to Kovno, where he crossed the Niemen into Poland. From there he traveled by sleigh to Warsaw and then to Dresden, reaching it on December 13, accompanied only by his closest aide, Caulaincourt, Duc de Vicence.
Not wasting any time, Napoleon sped on to Paris, entering it the night of December 18, apprehensive about what awaited him. But Caulaincourt reported that “from the very first the complexion of Paris . . . looked cheering to him. His return had produced a tremendous effect.... and after the second day he felt reassured . . . ‘The terrible bulletin [29] has had its effect,’ he said to me, ‘but I see that my presence is giving even more pleasure than our disasters give pain. There is more affliction than discouragement. This state of mind will communicate itself to Vienna; and all will be retrieved within three months.’”
Napoleon’s luck was indeed holding out. He had arrived back in the nick of time; Paris had just found out about his disaster—too soon for a real opposition to form. Although he had issued Bulletin 29 on December 5, the news did not reach the capital until the day before his return. Ignoring his horrific Russian debacle as if it had never happened—claiming the weather caused it—he brazenly went to work raising another huge army, dreaming of being as powerful as ever.
The unreality of Napoleon’s world and the pretense that his reign would continue as before could be seen in an announcement printed in the
Gazette de France
on December 7, when the emperor’s Russian disaster was widely suspected. “We today celebrate that day which opens the 9th year of Napoleon’s reign; a reign preceded by 8 years of immortal glory,—brilliant to himself by the most memorable exploits, and by the most elevated acts of policy and legislation,—a reign, the fruitful activity of which, insures to our country ages of grandeur, repose, and prosperity.” The emperor’s propaganda could not wipe away his appalling reversal in Russia, however. The world knew about it, and so did the French people, who had to send more of their sons to be sacrificed to his ambition.
Gazette de France
on December 7, when the emperor’s Russian disaster was widely suspected. “We today celebrate that day which opens the 9th year of Napoleon’s reign; a reign preceded by 8 years of immortal glory,—brilliant to himself by the most memorable exploits, and by the most elevated acts of policy and legislation,—a reign, the fruitful activity of which, insures to our country ages of grandeur, repose, and prosperity.” The emperor’s propaganda could not wipe away his appalling reversal in Russia, however. The world knew about it, and so did the French people, who had to send more of their sons to be sacrificed to his ambition.
DURING THE SECOND week of December in London, the earlier rumors of Napoleon’s catastrophe were confirmed, and the British were exuberant. On December 11 the
Times
wrote, “Every day brings some fresh confirmation of the distress of the French armies, and some new instance of the disasters and defeats with which they are closing a campaign opened with so much ostentation and apparent success.”
Times
wrote, “Every day brings some fresh confirmation of the distress of the French armies, and some new instance of the disasters and defeats with which they are closing a campaign opened with so much ostentation and apparent success.”
A week later, on December 17, the
Times
announced, “Bonaparte is wholly defeated in Russia: he is conquered, and a fugitive. And what can we say more?” The British prayed the Russians would capture him, but on Christmas Eve the
Times
had to concede that, “the wretched vagabond has returned home.” The hope of ending the war with a new regime in Paris suddenly vanished. “We have scotched the snake, not killed it,” the
Times
lamented.
Times
announced, “Bonaparte is wholly defeated in Russia: he is conquered, and a fugitive. And what can we say more?” The British prayed the Russians would capture him, but on Christmas Eve the
Times
had to concede that, “the wretched vagabond has returned home.” The hope of ending the war with a new regime in Paris suddenly vanished. “We have scotched the snake, not killed it,” the
Times
lamented.
Nevertheless, Napoleon’s defeat was immensely satisfying to the British, and as his fortunes declined, their confidence grew. The distasteful necessity of making peace with America disappeared, replaced by a commitment to make her pay a steep price for her de facto alliance with Napoleon. With Bonaparte back in power in Paris, however, the Liverpool ministry would have to deal with him first before it settled scores with the United States. Although a hugely popular idea, humbling America would have to wait.
WHEN THE RUMORS of Napoleon’s debacle were confirmed in Washington in January 1813, Madison was shocked, but he did not despair. Defeat in Russia did not mean the end of the Napoleonic regime in Europe. The dictator’s fate depended on whether he reached Paris safely and could reestablish his authority, and on whether the great powers, Russia, Britain, Prussia, and Austria, allied with smaller states like Sweden and the German principalities, could form an effective alliance against him. Madison considered this unlikely. He thought chances were better that Napoleon would survive and regain his power. If that were the case, the foundation of the president’s grand strategy would remain intact. He found himself hoping the dictator held on to power.
A titanic struggle over the fate of Europe was now in the offing. The British were focused on only one objective—annihilating Bonaparte. The czar was equally adamant. The invasion and the destruction of Moscow had outraged him, and he wanted revenge. On December 12 he proclaimed, “The arm of the giant is broken, but his destructive strength must be prevented from reviving; and his power over the nations, who served him out of terror, must be taken away.”
Napoleon was rearming rapidly, however, and he still looked formidable. His enemies had a myriad of difficulties to surmount before they could hope to crush him. It was uncertain, for instance, what role Czar Alexander would play in Europe. Kutuzov, reflecting the views of many in the army, did not want to march beyond Russia’s borders, at least not until the army had a chance to recover from what had been nearly as brutal a war for them as it had been for the French. Furthermore, Britain’s small army, although doing well under Wellington, was totally occupied in Spain. And Austria was nominally a French ally and could not be counted on to join an alliance against him. Maria Teresa, the emperor’s daughter, was married to Napoleon, and the powerful Austrian foreign minister Prince Metternich had no desire to have French power in Europe replaced by Russian, nor did he have any love for England. And he was leery of a resurgent Prussia. He expected Napoleon to remain on the French throne, less powerful but still potent.
Prussia, which Napoleon had reduced to a weak state of vassalage after Tilsit in 1807, was still nominally a French ally, although King Frederick William, who hated Napoleon, dearly wanted to change sides, as did a growing number of German patriots. Already, on December 20 the Prussian general von Yorck had deserted Napoleon and declared his Prussian Corps neutral. The czar had known for a long time of Frederick William’s yearning to change sides, but the Prussian king could not make a move until Alexander decided to push beyond Russia’s western border into Europe. The Prussians did not have to wait long. The Russian army crossed the Niemen on January 12 and marched into Prussia and the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. Frederick William felt liberated; he could now join Alexander. Still, Prussia at the moment was a small country. The king could produce only a limited number of soldiers.
In the midst of these epic events, Czar Alexander offered to mediate between the United States and his new ally, Britain. He had received news of the American declaration of war back in August 1812. Not wanting London’s energies diverted by war with the United States, he proposed Russian mediation. And beyond the present conflict, the czar hoped to promote America as a counterweight to British sea power. He thought a check on Britain’s uncontrolled dominance of the oceans was necessary.
The American ambassador in St. Petersburg, John Quincy Adams, reported the czar’s offer in dispatches dated September 30 and October 17, 1812. John Levett Harris, nephew of the American consul general in St. Petersburg, brought them to Washington, arriving on February 24, 1813. The following day, the Russian chargé d’affaires, Andre Daschkoff, told Secretary Monroe that the czar was indeed anxious to act as a mediator.
On February 17, a week before he received word of the czar’s offer, the president learned that Napoleon had, as Madison had hoped, eluded Russian troops, and in a daring, suspenseful journey across Europe, reached Paris in one piece and had taken up the reins of power once more. His regime and the French army were not about to disappear. The president, who had claimed not to be dependent on Bonaparte, was enormously relieved. At the White House during Dolley Madison’s weekly levee, French ambassador Jean Serurier made an appearance, and the many Republican guests rushed to congratulate him on Napoleon’s successful return to Paris.
Since Madison knew that Britain would continue to be preoccupied with Europe, it was not urgent for him to agree to Russian mediation until the British indicated they were receptive to the idea. He could afford to wait and see what Liverpool’s reaction was. Instead, the president grasped the Russian offer as if it were a lifeline. He assumed that Liverpool and Castlereagh would have a hard time turning down Alexander, their new ally, when Napoleon was back in Paris raising another army with his usual electrifying energy.
To underscore America’s desire to have a negotiated settlement as soon as possible, Congress, at Madison’s urging, passed the Foreign Seamen’s Act on March 3, 1813. The law stipulated that upon termination of the war, all foreigners would be prohibited from service in all American ships, public or private.
The president wrote to Count Nikolai Rumiantsev, the czar’s anti-British chancellor and foreign minister, that out of his “high respect for the Emperor personally . . . [he was] not . . . waiting for the formal acceptance of the British government.” He was accepting mediation immediately.
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