Despite Barclay’s supply and manpower problems, while Perry’s 20-gun brigs were still on the stocks, the British had a significant advantage on Lake Erie. Barclay had the 18-gun
Queen Charlotte
, the 12-gun
Lady Prevost
, the 6-gun
Hunter
, the 2-gun
Erie
, the 2-gun
Little Belt
, and the 2-gun
Chippewa
, and he was constructing a 20-gun sloop of war, the
Detroit
. He also had Major General Henry Proctor’s army at Fort Malden. With these forces and a bit of luck, he could squash Perry before he got started.
The first thing Barclay did when he arrived at Amherstburg was take his fleet up to Presque Isle and have a look. He then went back and planned an immediate land and sea attack. He would need help from Brigadier General Francis de Rottenburg, the new leader in Upper Canada, who had replaced General Roger Hale Sheaffe. De Rottenburg quickly informed Proctor, however, that he would not supply the troops and provisions they needed, and Barclay abandoned his plan.
Instead of attacking Presque Isle, he imposed a blockade on the port. Barclay thought that at some point Perry would have to float his two brigs over a formidable bar, and he did not think the Americans could manage it. Even if Perry did the impossible and got the brigs over the bar, he would have to remove their guns to do it, which would make them easy targets for Barclay’s fleet. Whatever the difficulties, Barclay was certain that the Americans would try to move the brigs on to the lake. He hoped to have the
Detroit
finished in time to destroy them when Perry made his attempt.
Barclay was having problems completing the
Detroit
, however. He was also having difficulty obtaining enough men and supplies to keep the rest of his fleet going. He wrote to Prevost on July 16, pleading for more men, ammunition, guns, and stores. Prevost pressured Yeo to send what he could, but he also warned Barclay that the supplies would probably have to come from the enemy.
Perry was also woefully short of seamen. He sent urgent requests to Chauncey and to Jones for more. The secretary was now corresponding directly with Perry rather than going through Chauncey, thus setting up a separate command, which Chauncey objected to. Jones made the arrangement in order to hurry along the work at Presque Isle.
Perry became convinced that Chauncey was keeping the best seamen for his own fleet. Matters came to a head when Chauncey sent Perry sixty men from Sackets Harbor on July 16. Sailing Master Steven Champlain, Perry’s nephew, who had served under him in the gunboat flotilla at Newport, led them. Perry was desperate for men, but when he saw what Champlain brought, he did not like their quality and sent a blistering letter to Chauncey, calling them “a motley set, blacks, soldiers, and boys.” Chauncey shot back, “I have yet to learn that the color of the skin, or cut and trimmings of the coat, can effect a man’s qualifications or usefulness. I have nearly 50 blacks on board of this ship [the
General Pike
] and many of them are amongst my best men.” Chauncey insisted that the quality of the crews on both fleets was the same. Perry was unconvinced and annoyed. He got so angry he wrote to Secretary Jones requesting to be “removed from this station.” But Jones refused, counseling Perry to carry on in his own interests and those of the country. After that, Perry calmed down and shouldered on, but his resentment continued to smolder.
DURING THE GREATER part of July, Barclay remained off Presque Isle blockading it with his squadron. He was unaware that the new brigs he was so concerned about were lightly guarded at night. General Meade’s Pennsylvania militiamen refused to spend nights aboard the ships. Barclay could have sent in boats during the hours of darkness and destroyed both the
Lawrence
and the
Niagara
. He remained offshore, however, watching. Then suddenly, on July 31, he vanished. He was running low on supplies and had to travel to Port Dover in Upper Canada to replenish them. He thought if Perry tried to float the brigs over the bar in his absence, at least one of them—but more likely both—would get stuck fast aground.
Barclay’s sudden departure was just what Perry had been hoping for. His two brigs had been completed by the fourth of July, and he was waiting for an opportunity to move them onto the lake. Barclay’s blockade had stymied him until now. When Barclay’s squadron suddenly disappeared, Perry made his move, even though Barclay’s departure might have been a ruse and he could reappear at any moment.
The depth of water at the big sandbar blocking the entrance to the harbor was only four feet, but the 20-gun
Lawrence
and her twin, the
Niagara
, drew nine. Unknown to Barclay, Sidney Wright had solved the problem by devising giant “camels”—large, watertight containers attached to the ships’ sides below the water. The camels were designed to be filled with water, which would be pumped out at the critical moment, raising the ships enough to slide them over the bar. On August 4 Perry was ready. He removed the armaments and ballast from the
Lawrence
, unmoored her at high tide, lifted her by means of the camels, and floated her over the bar with surprising ease. Barclay’s squadron was nowhere in sight.
Perry was preparing the
Niagara
to be floated when Barclay suddenly reappeared.
A providential haze obscured his view, however, and Perry was able to glide the
Niagara
and his other vessels onto the lake without Barclay seeing them. When the haze cleared and Barclay saw the American fleet, he thought they were about to attack him. Believing he now had the weaker squadron, he exchanged a few shots and retreated. Perry then moved all his ships to the protection of the battery at the blockhouse, while Barclay sailed back to Amherstburg to work on getting the
Detroit
manned and equipped. Until he could, Perry would command the lake, and Barclay could no longer receive men and supplies by water. They would have to make the long trek overland through the wilderness—that is, if any were coming.
At nine o’clock that night, an exhausted but elated Perry wrote to Secretary Jones from the
Lawrence
at anchor outside the Erie bar: “I have great pleasure in informing you that I have succeeded after almost incredible labor and fatigue to the men, in getting all the vessels I have been able to man, over the bar, viz.
Lawrence
,
Niagara
,
Caledonia
,
Ariel
,
Scorpion
,
Somers
,
Tigress
, and
Porcupine
.”
Perry was still in dire need of men. On August 10 Commander Jesse D. Elliott arrived at Presque Isle with 102 sailors. Chauncey had sent them even though he badly needed them himself. Perry was happy to have the additional seamen, but he was annoyed that Chauncey had not sent more. Elliott became skipper of the
Niagara
and second in command of the Lake Erie squadron. Unfortunately, that was not good enough for him; he found it galling not to be the senior officer.
Perry lost no time putting his fleet to work. On August 12 he sailed to the western end of the lake and established a base at Put-in-Bay in the Bass Islands, thirty miles east of Fort Malden, where he could keep an eye on the British fleet while training his men. General William Henry Harrison was close by in Sandusky, Ohio, and Perry established a close working relationship with him. On September 2 he sailed the squadron to Sandusky Bay to confer with Harrison, who had a high appreciation of the importance of Perry’s mission. Harrison was happy to give him a hundred thirty Kentucky riflemen for the fleet.
With Perry in control of the lake, the British supply problem at Amherstburg became acute. General Proctor had hundreds of Tecumseh’s warriors and their families to feed, and with food running out, Proctor feared the Indians would turn on the British and massacre them all. “I do not hesitate to say,” he wrote, “that if we do not receive a timely and adequate supply of Indian goods and ammunition we shall inevitably be subjected to ills of the greatest magnitude.”
To regain control of the lake and acquire the desperately needed supplies, Barclay was compelled to engage Perry at least a month before he was ready. “So perfectly destitute of provisions was the post that there was not a day’s flour in store,” he wrote, “and the crews of the squadron . . . were on half allowance of many things, and when that was done there was no more.”
Barclay continued to be woefully short of seamen. He was forced to rely on the army to man his vessels. Of the 364 crewmen in his fleet, not more than 50 were British sailors; the rest were either soldiers or Canadians, “totally unacquainted with such service,” he wrote to Yeo. Many were French-speaking and could not understand English. Barclay also lacked naval guns; he was forced to use some of Proctor’s artillery for the
Detroit
. Barclay blamed Yeo for not providing him the seamen and ordinance he needed.
At sunrise on September 9, Barclay stood out from his anchorage with the ships
Detroit
and
Queen Charlotte
; the brig
General Hunter
; two schooners,
Lady Prevost
and
Chippewa
; one small sloop,
Little Belt
; and two other light vessels
.
The following day, at seven o’clock in the morning, lookouts in Put-in-Bay spotted Barclay’s fleet. In short order, Perry had his squadron under way and standing for the enemy. His flagship
Lawrence
was flying a banner emblazoned with the words, “Don’t Give Up the Ship.” Fully one-quarter of Perry’s men were blacks, who were determined to give a good account of themselves.
Presently, Barclay’s lookouts spotted Perry’s fleet. The wind was from the southwest and light, giving Barclay the weather gauge and an edge. Perry was forced to beat to windward. Around ten o’clock, however, the breeze hauled around to the southeast, giving Perry the weather gauge and the advantage. Miraculously, the wind remained light and steady for most of the next four hours. Because his crews were inexperienced, Barclay had planned to close quickly with Perry and board, but now, with the wind against him, he could not. Perry bore up for Barclay under easy sail in line abreast. Barclay formed a line of battle as well, so that each of his large ships, the
Detroit
and the
Queen Charlotte
, which would be in the center, could be supported by the smaller vessels, “against the superior force of the two brigs [
Lawrence
and
Niagara
] opposed to them.”
The American fleet in general was stronger. Barclay’s most powerful weapon, his flagship
Detroit
, had seventeen long guns (one eighteen; two twenty-fours; six twelves; eight nines) and two short guns, while Perry’s lead ship,
Lawrence
, had eighteen thirty-two-pound carronades and two long twelve-pounders. Barclay’s long guns were effective at a mile or less, while Perry’s carronades were not effective beyond five hundred yards. The
Queen Charlotte
mounted sixteen twenty-four-pound carronades, but the
Niagara
had eighteen thirty-two-pound carronades and two long twelve-pounders. Perry expected to take a beating from the
Detroit
’s long guns before he could bring his carronades into play, but now that he had the weather gauge, he could close with Barclay much faster and negate to some extent his advantage in long guns. Furthermore, Barclay’s long guns were not regular naval cannon but artillery from Fort Malden, whose effectiveness on the water at any range was uncertain.
Barclay arranged his ships from van to rear as follows: the
Chippewa
,
Detroit
,
Hunter
,
Queen Charlotte
,
Lady Prevost
, and
Little Belt
. On seeing this arrangement, Perry placed two schooners, the
Scorpion
(one long thirty-two and one short thirty-two) and the
Ariel
(four long twelves) in the lead, followed closely by the
Lawrence
to fight the
Detroit
. The
Caledonia
(two long twenty-fours and one short thirty-two) was behind
Lawrence
, followed by the
Niagara
, which was expected to engage the
Queen Charlotte
. The other schooners followed behind to support the
Niagara
.
Barclay opened fire at 11:45, directing his long guns at the
Lawrence
, hitting her hard and badly cutting her rigging, making her difficult to manage. Conscious of the limited range of his carronades, Perry continued straining to get within effective range, suffering for ten punishing minutes before he could bring his guns into play. Finally, at five minutes before noon, Perry, supported by the two schooners, unloaded on the
Detroit
at about two hundred and fifty yards—“canister range,” Perry called it.
The
Niagara
and Jesse Elliott, for some unknown reason, remained far to windward and far from the action. Elliott’s specific assignment was to take on the
Queen Charlotte
, and given the prevailing conditions, nothing prevented him from engaging her. Elliott’s reluctance to get into the fray made it appear that Perry did not have command of his squadron. Before the action, Perry reminded his commanders of Nelson’s famous admonition that “no captain could go far wrong who placed his vessel close alongside those of the enemy.” Elliott was ignoring Perry’s express order and endangering the fleet.