500 Days (89 page)

10
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12
: Some details of Qahtani’s arrival at the Orlando airport and his questioning from the January 26, 2004, testimony of José E. Meléndez-Pérez (Meléndez-Pérez testimony) to the 9/11 Commission, and “Charge Sheet: Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Walid Muhammad Salih, Mubarak Bin ’Attash, Ramzi Binalshibh, Ali Abdul Aziz, Ali Mustafa Ahmed, Adam al Hawsawi, Mohamed al Khatani” MC Form 458, submitted to the Convening Authority for the military commissions held at Guantanamo on February 11, 2008 (KSM charge sheet).

12
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14
: Some details of the investigation of Moussaoui and the subsequent interrogation from an August 18, 2001, electronic communication from Harry Samit to Joe Marang of the ITOS/Iran Unit, titled “Moussaoui, Zacarias, aka Shaqil, IT—Other”; an August 24, 2001, FBI Electronic Communication from Harry Samit to Michael Maltbie, headed “Moussaoui, Zacarias; IT—Other”; an unsigned application from the same day headed “Mossaoui [
sic
], Zacaria; IT—Other,” seeking a search warrant from the Foreign Intelligence Security Court (FISA); an FBI Electronic Communication of the Field Office to Samit and Maltbie, headed “ZACARIAS MOUSSAOUI, AKA SHAKIL; IT-OTHER; 00:MP; an affidavit by Hussein Ali Hassan al-Attas, dated August 17, 2001, headed “Record of Sworn Statement in an
Affidavit Form, Affidavit-Witness”; a September 6, 2001, FBI Electronic Communication from Samit to Maltbie, with most of its heading blacked out as classified; an undated translated copy of al-Attas’s will; Samit’s testimony of March 9, 2006, in
United States v. Moussaoui;
a single page of notes written by Samit during an August 17 interrogation of Moussaoui; and the 2004 FBI-OIG Report. Also see the hearings before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, “Events Surrounding September 11,” September 24, 2002.

13
: The concern about Moussoaui at the Pan Am Flight Academy from the March 9, 2006, testimony of Clancy Prevost in
United States v. Moussaoui,
criminal case no. 1:01cr455, in Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Also see testimony of that same day by Shohaib Kassam.

14
: Some details of Jones’s call with Maltbie from Samit’s March 9, 2006, testimony in
United States v. Moussaoui;
the 2004 FBI-OIG Report; and the September 24, 2002, Joint Intelligence hearings.

15
: Some details of Massoud’s assassination from
“Onderzoek naar Betrokkenheid Dood Massoud,” NRC Handelsblad,
October 19, 2001;
“Verband Rotterdam en 20ste Kaper,” de Volkskrant
(Amsterdam), October 20 2001;
“Terroristenlijst,” NRC Handelsblad,
December 29, 2001; Michael Elliott, “They Had a Plan,”
Time,
August 12, 2002; Emerson Vermaat, “Bin Laden’s Terror Networks in Europe,” a report released by the Mackenzie Institute, a Canadian research group; Matthew Campbell, “How They Killed the Afghan Lion,”
Sunday Times
(London), September 23, 2001; Joseph Fitchett, “Did Bin Laden Kill Afghan Rebel?”
International Herald Tribune,
September 17, 2001; and Thomas Harding, “Blast Survivor Tells of Massoud Assassination,”
Telegraph,
October 26, 2001.

16
: Some details about the ritual cleansing from an FBI 302 from an interview with a housekeeper at the Days Hotel, taken on September 11, 2001, and numbered 315-280350-302-4160. Record, Boston, Massachusetts, Summary, February 2, 2004.

16
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17
: Some details of Jawahir’s experience with Hamza and Ahmed al-Ghamdi from the FBI 302 of her interview on September 11, 2001, for file no. 265D-NY-280350.

17
: Information about the gate for United 175 from “Staff Monograph on the Four Flights and Civil Aviation Security,” 9/11 Commission, September 2005.

19
: The phrase “a war of unknown warriors” is derived from a speech delivered by British prime minister Winston Churchill four days after the Battle of Britain began. His exact words were:

There are vast numbers, not only in this Island but in every land, who will render faithful service in this war, but whose names will never be known, whose deeds will never be recorded. This is a War of the Unknown Warriors; but let all strive without failing in faith or in duty.

The allusion should be clear. The fight against terrorism is one built on intelligence and secrecy, and the identities of many of those who joined in the battle will never be known.

21
: The timing of the unofficial White House evacuation from the live CNN broadcast on 9/11. The formal evacuation of the executive mansion, called for by White House security, began at 9:45
A.M.

21
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22
:
Some details about Mineta’s experiences from his March 23, 2003, testimony before the 9/11 Commission.

22
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23
: Some details of Cheney’s trip down the tunnel to the PEOC were first reported by Dan Balz and Bob Woodward, “America’s Chaotic Road to War,”
Washington Post,
January 27, 2002.

23
: Most details about Moussaoui’s learning of the 9/11 attacks from his March 27, 2006, testimony in
United States v. Moussaoui.

25
: Some details of Canoles’s experiences from two sets of handwritten notes from a government interview at the FAA on March 25, 2004. Also see Alan Levin, Marilyn Adams, and Blake Morrison, “Amid Terror, a Drastic Decision: Clear the Skies,”
USA Today,
August 12, 2002.

25
: Timing of events inside the PEOC from the Secret Service log maintained by an agent stationed at the center.

25
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26
,
27
: Some details of the conversations between Mineta and Belger from Mineta’s testimony before the 9/11 Commission, and Belger’s June 17, 2004, testimony before the group.

26
: Details of the speed of flight 77 and the events immediately preceding and after its crash into the Pentagon from American Society of Civil Engineers,
The Pentagon Building Performance Report,
Structural Engineering Institute, January 2003.

26
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27
: Some details of Sliney’s experiences from 9/11 Commission Memorandum for the Record, “Interview with Benedict Sliney,” May 21, 2004; “Written Testimony of Benedict Sliney to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States,” June 17, 2004. Also see Levin, Adams, and Morrison,
USA Today,
August 12, 2002.

27
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28
: Some details of Rumsfeld’s departure from the Pentagon and his efforts to help responders from a contemporaneous video at the site; Andrew Cockburn,
Rumsfeld: His Rise, Fall, and Catastrophic Legacy,
Scribner, 2007; and Steve Vogel,
The Pentagon: A History,
Random House, 2008.

28
,
29
: Details of the engineering elements that led to the collapse of the two towers from the Federal Emergency Management Agency,
World Trade Center Building Performance Study,
May 2002.

29
: Some details of Bush and Cheney’s conversation from the 9/11 Commission Report; Bill Sammon,
Fighting Back: The War on Terrorism—from Inside the Bush White House,
Regnery Publishing, 2002.

29
: The location of the limousine’s arrival at the Sarasota Airport from a Secret Service log from that day. The proximity of that spot to Jones Aviation from direct observation.

29
,
30
: The timing of Cheney’s arrival in the PEOC from a Secret Service log.

30
: The final moments of United 93 were revealed in the 9/11 Report.

31
: Some details about the marine barracks attacks in Beirut from Robert McFarlane, “From Beirut to 9/11,”
New York Times,
October 22, 2008.

32
: The dialogue between Cheney and the military aide was recounted by Norm Mineta in his testimony before the 9/11 Commission. Also see excerpts from handwritten notes of Lewis “Scooter” Libby taken in the PEOC on 9/11. Some details of Bolten’s discussion with Cheney also from Libby’s notes; notes from an April 5, 2004, interview with Bolten by the 9/11 Commission; and the 9/11 Commission Report.

34
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35
: The dialogue between Rumsfeld and Cheney from an edited recording played for the author. The conversation was also contained in the 9/11 Commission Report.

38
: Some details about Yoo’s background from University of California at Berkeley, “Faculty Profile,” undated. Background of his writings from Yoo, “Foreign Affairs Federalism and the Separation of Powers,” Boalt Working Papers in Public Law, 2001; and Yoo, “Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and the Original Understanding,”
Columbia Law Review
99 (1999).

38
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40
:
Some details of events on Bush’s flight from Florida from a press pool report compiled by Judy Keen of
USA Today
and Jay Carney of
Time;
from Lynn Spencer,
Touching History,
Free Press, 2008; and from the Secret Service log maintained at the PEOC.

40
: Details of the Dougherty conference room from direct observation. Bush’s statement from
Public Papers of the President, George W. Bush 2001,
Vol. 2, United States Government Printing Office, 2003.

40
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41
: Some details of Blair’s experiences on 9/11 from contemporaneous diaries written by Alastair Campbell, the prime minister’s director of communication from 1997 through 2003 (
the Campbell Diaries
). Also see Tony Blair,
A Journey: My Political Life,
Knopf, 2010; and the January 29, 2010, testimony of Blair before Iraq Inquiry chaired by Sir John Chilcot (
the Chilcot Inquiry
). The formation of the inquiry was announced by Prime Minister Gordon Brown on June 15, 2009.

42
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43
: Some details of El-Maati’s experience at the border, as well as his background, from the Canadian report, “Internal Inquiry in the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Abdullah Almalki, Ahmed Abou-Elmaati and Muayyed Nureddin,” written by an official government commission led by the Honorable Frank Iacobucci (
the Iacobucci Report
); “Report of the Events Related to Maher Arar, Factual Background,” Vols. 1 and 2, from the Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar, led by Dennis O’Connor (
the O’Connor Report
); Stephen J. Toope, “Fact Finder’s Report” for the Arar Commission (
the Toope Report
); the August 27, 2001, letter written by Ann Armstrong, a manager at Highland Transport; a telex from the U.S. embassy in Ottawa to the secretary of state, “Canadian Media Reporting on Alleged Terrorist Activities,” August 4, 2002 (
State Department August 4 telex
); and a copy of the map carried by El-Maati that day.

42
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45
: The El-Maati story is somewhat complex. The inclusion of El-Maati on lists of suspected security risks in both the United States and Canada was completely reasonable. His presence in Afghanistan for five years, his involvement with the faction of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, and the intelligence labeling his brother, Amr, as a threat were more than sufficient to raise concerns about him.
   However, the evolution of his portrayal by the intelligence agencies—from a person of interest to a primary member of a Canadian terrorist cell—was not reasonable. The Iacobucci Commission concluded that labeling El-Maati as an imminent threat, terrorist, and associate of bin Laden was inaccurate, unreliable, and lacking an investigative basis. The Canadian Parliament’s Public Safety Committee voted to issue an apology to El-Maati and the others, and give them compensation. While the Canadian prime minister has not done so, the vote in itself underscores the poor quality of the intelligence labeling El-Maati and the others as terrorist threats.
   Several items here must be addressed. There is a great deal of public misunderstanding about Muslims who traveled to Afghanistan to join in the battles there. In essence, there are multiple groups—those who traveled there from the late 1980s to 1990, those who joined bin Laden’s Afghan Arabs, those who arrived in 1991 through 1995, and those who traveled there after 1996 to join with the Taliban. The differences are attributable to the chaotic nature of Afghanistan itself—in the early years, the mujahideen and the Arabs were fighting the Soviets, and America backed them; the ones who traveled there in the early 1990s could be there to help the war-ravaged country, join with the government, or wage war alongside the mujahideen who had turned on their own countrymen for power. And, of course, those who arrived after 1996 were, for the most part, dedicated jihadists.
   El-Maati was in the second group, traveling to Afghanistan in 1991 and leaving in 1996. In doing so, he was in the company of Muslims worldwide.
   “The perception among Muslims was that these people fighting in Afghanistan were victorious over the Soviets by God’s aid and a lot of learned people and students started
flocking there,” said Khaled Abou El Fadl, a professor at UCLA School of Law who was appointed by President George W. Bush to the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom. “Afghanistan in the early 1990s was becoming a mecca for a lot of Muslims who wanted to attain true Islamic knowledge.”
   In this instance, the bottom line is that there was a reasonable basis for suspicion of El-Maati, but it was not tempered with a sophisticated understanding of the perception of Afghanistan among young Muslim men in the early 1990s.

43
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45
: Some details of the El-Maati interrogation from the Iacobucci Report. Also see the Arar Report and BC Civil Liberties Report, “Ahmad Abou El Maati: A Chronology.”

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46
: Details of the Offutt videoconference from notes of the meeting read to the author.