A History of China (10 page)

The founding of the Eastern Zhou coincided with the virtual disintegration of the king’s power. The nobility was autonomous and no longer felt obliged to provide military service and tribute to the Zhou ruler. Nor did nobles appear in person at the Zhou court to be invested with authority. Some formed their own states that were not controlled by the king. The proliferation of such states engendered fears of strife. Thus, in the seventh century
BCE
an overlord or hegemon (
ba
), supported by lesser leaders, sought to impose order with the blessing, for whatever it was worth, of the king. Five rulers in succession assumed the role of hegemon and are credited with stemming disorder for a time, but interstate hostility intensified throughout this era.

The principal states were in the Central Plain, which was surrounded by so-called barbarian groups. These states comprised Jin, Lu, Qi, Wei, Song, and Cheng while the states on the fringes of what was perceived to be Chinese civilization consisted of Qin (the westernmost of the states), Yan (which included the area around modern Beijing), Wu (along the eastern coast, near modern Shanghai), Yue (directly south of Wu), and Chu (in the southwest). In general, the states on the periphery were in more advantageous positions because they had room in which to expand and could avoid conflict until they themselves were prepared to do battle. However, until the third century
BCE
, these states waxed and waned depending on their conditions at particular times, for each had unique strengths and weaknesses. Qi, for example, had reserves of iron and salt, perhaps facilitating its construction of weapons and enriching itself through sale of its precious salt. It also had the advantage of the administrative reforms introduced by Guan Zhong (ca. 720 – 645
BCE
), the influential counselor to its lords and the author of an important work of ­political philosophy, the
Guanzi
. Jin, on the other hand, controlled much of the territory around the bend of the Yellow River.

A precarious balance prevailed among these states throughout the seventh and sixth centuries but it eventually collapsed late in the fifth century. Hegemons, marital alliances, and conferences between potential belligerents all averted chaos and warfare during what became known as the Spring and Autumn period. The states of the Central Plain often joined together in fear of the “barbaric” Chu in the southwest, and the state of Jin, in particular, checked the power of that state. However, in 453
BCE
, internal conflicts within Jin led to its breakup into three smaller and more vulnerable states. Earlier in the ­century, Yue had conquered Wu and had initiated the deterioration into the Warring States period. Peace conferences and interstate alliances could no longer maintain the peace. For the next two and a half centuries, intermittent warfare plagued the central core of Chinese civilization. An authoritarian state with policies that conformed to the Legalist philosophy (to be considered later), Qin began a seemingly inexorable drive toward conquest and unification of China in the third century
BCE
. In 256 it overthrew the last remnants of the Zhou kingdom and over the next three decades destroyed one state after another, so that in 221
BCE
it was the uncontested unifier of China.

Though violence and brute force characterized the politics of the Warring States period, momentous technological and cultural developments occurred. The implications for China’s history of this volatile period cannot be overstated. Wars themselves resulted in undeniable changes. The scale of warfare increased throughout this era so that, by the time of the Warring States, battles involved much larger numbers of troops, entailed attacks on populous towns and cities, and were fought over a much broader expanse of territory. The resulting casualties were substantial, and the number of prisoners who were executed, enslaved, or, on occasion, incorporated into the victorious army was equally sizable. With the advent of larger confrontations and battles, warfare changed from struggles between a limited number of aristocrats to encounters between masses of people. Infantry began to supplant the chariot as the most important component on the battlefield. Chariots were, in any case, ineffective in mountainous, uneven, or rutted terrain. Moreover, learning to drive a chariot and to shoot a bow and arrow from a moving chariot required considerable time, expense, and effort. Thus, hand-to-hand combat, which inflicted heavy losses on both sides in battle, tended to replace the more “gentlemanly” fighting associated with chariots. Despite the decline of the chariot, the value of the horse actually grew. There is no doubt that the use of cavalry was introduced by the nomads on China’s northern frontiers, and this offered them the ­tactical advantage of mobility. They could engage in hit–and-run raids, with impunity, on China’s borders, fleeing on their steeds to the steppe lands in order to elude pursuing Chinese forces. Archers who could shoot accurately while riding at full speed gave a decided advantage over armies that did not have a cavalry.

The Chinese themselves began to make use of the horse in warfare, which, together with the development of the crossbow, strengthened the military. The threats posed by the nomads, who were more adept on horseback than the Zhou, also prompted some of the northern Chinese states to build walls to deter attacks from the pastoral peoples. Nonetheless, the need for horses continued to increase, as did their uses. They could facilitate communications within China, contributing eventually to unification. Horses also hastened travel between various parts of Asia, leading to the introduction of innovations from west Asia in China and vice versa. Speedier travel would pave the way for commercial and cultural relations throughout Asia, and technological innovations and ideas would flow into China from the Indian subcontinent, central Asia, Persia, and west Asia. Finally, horseback riding influenced Chinese dress. It necessitated the use of functional outfits rather than the long and more cumbersome traditional robes. Trousers, boots, and belt buckles were developed to enable the cavalry to ride with ease. The horse thus had a pervasive influence on Zhou culture and would continue to affect China until recent times.

The scale of warfare and the resulting value of able military tacticians and strategists altered the Chinese social structure. Rulers and ministers who lacked military skills or were incapable of adjusting to the new types of military conflict lost influence. Because the much larger engagements meant more loss of life, opportunities for social mobility increased. Nobles and military commanders died, paving the way for men of lower-class origins to rise quickly up the social ladder. Even without the deaths of the old aristocrats and rulers, the new warrior groups attained higher status because the various states, desperate for any means to bolster their power, recruited them with ever more lavish inducements. Competent military men of uncertain or varying social backgrounds became dominant figures, as the aristocrats no longer monopolized power and sons of rulers did not automatically succeed their fathers. The group that profited the most from the turbulence and changes of the Warring States period was the
shi
, a class that might tentatively be described as part of the lower nobility. Literate and conversant with the sacrifices and ceremonies of the time, the
shi
were trained in the military arts, giving them the opportunity to step into power if the aristocrats faltered, died, or simply needed their expertise.

The states that emerged victorious in these struggles grew large and acquired new characteristics. Control over a much larger area required greater concentration of power in the hands of the ruler rather than the old “feudal” structure, which had resulted in a dispersal of authority. In turn, the ruler needed to recruit a corps of competent experts (rather than aristocrats who could perform the proper rituals) to help him with the more ­complicated governmental apparatus for his new state. These new officials, many of whom derived from the
shi
class, had to have training, mostly from master tutors, that would qualify them for positions guaranteeing wealth, power, and rank. Tutors would offer them practical exercises but would also use the essays and treatises written during this great period in Chinese ­philosophy to instruct their charges. The Warring States period thus ­benefited and offered mobility to this new group. Competence rather than birth often determined the staffing of positions.

The economic transformations derived, in part, from the more fluid social system. With the decline of the old aristocracy, new patterns of land ownership evolved. The earlier manorial system in which peasants tilled the land granted by the ruler to the nobility gradually shifted to a system of private ownership. Peasants could now own land previously in the hands of the hereditary aristocratic families who had suffered as a result of the conflicts. The peasants’ lot did not necessarily improve because the various state governments now imposed stiff taxes on them, and many of them eventually had to sell or give up their land to local landlords or usurers. Tenancy increased, and land became increasingly concentrated in estates owned by the new elite. Paradoxically, ownership of land and the relative ease with which it could be purchased and sold did not generally lead to better conditions for the peasantry. Large landholders benefited most from the transition to private ownership of land. Many peasants continued to till the land but now as tenants. A few who were deprived of their land became floating vagabonds, at times cooperating with bandits or potential rebels, which naturally exacerbated the turmoil afflicting China ­during this era.

The scenario described above characterized many periods in Chinese ­history. Stiff taxes, heavy corvée demands, encroachments by landlords, and high, burdensome rates of interest charged by moneylenders harmed many peasants, compelling some to sell or entrust their land to landlords, who had managed to achieve a tax-free status. The recurrence of such patterns has given rise to the concept of dynastic cycles – that is, each dynasty went through a regular ebb and flow, with the same factors as in preceding dynasties leading to its rise and eventual collapse. However, though certain patterns seem to be similar, scholars now question the idea of a “dynastic cycle” because there were just as many, if not more, differences contributing to the growth and decline of individual dynasties.

Another paradox was that agronomy and trade actually developed during this period of warfare. Better irrigation systems and new farming techniques led to greater food production. The conflicts prompted the construction and repair of roads, which naturally facilitated trade. The individual states gained control of more territory, with the result that, when peace prevailed, merchants could travel unhindered in a larger expanse. As contacts with other states increased, demands for new or previously unknown products developed, and merchants sought to fill these demands. Bronze money appeared to facilitate commerce. Money in the shapes of knives and spades came into wider circulation, particularly in the cities, which proliferated and now became more populated and more market oriented. Merchants could aspire to higher social positions because social status was not as fixed as it had been in the Western Zhou dynasty. Using their newly won gains, they could buy land or a government office, easing their way into the elite.

Commerce fostered exchanges of all sorts and led to the introduction of new products and new technologies, not to mention new ideas. Even before the Eastern Zhou, developments in areas to the west influenced China. For example, the chariot probably entered into China from modern Kazakhstan, where it likely originated as early as 2000
BCE
. The ox-drawn plow, which was invented in west Asia, appeared during the Eastern Zhou. Central Asia, where many animals had been domesticated, was in touch with China, judging from the introduction of camels and donkeys toward the end of the Zhou. Along with the horse, the arrival of these two beasts of burden marked an important economic advance because they facilitated transport and commerce.

Economic vibrancy also culminated in domestic innovations and inventions. Iron started to be substituted for bronze (but did not entirely supplant it). Agricultural implements such as shovels, plowshares, sickles, hoes, and rakes were the most common tools, and the use of iron plows permitted greater efficiency in farming, enabling peasants to work previously uncultivable land. The use of oxen as draft animals allowed peasants to farm larger plots of land. Hammers, chisels, axes, knives, and other iron tools were also plentiful, as were items of daily usage such as cups, nails, and belt buckles. Unlike bronze, iron was not generally used for the production of ritual and ceremonial vessels. Bronzes continued to be produced in large quantities and with some new ­features. More elaborate designs, including new motifs of intertwined dragons or snakes, characterized some of the bronzes. The Eastern Zhou rulers also lavished more attention on bronze weapons because of the unstable and strife-torn conditions, and bronze mirrors appeared in larger numbers than in the past, particularly in the state of Chu. Distinctive lacquered objects, including drums, cups, and boxes, have been found in Chu tombs. Musical instruments, utilitarian vessels for food and drink, and mortuary objects, all made of ­lacquer, have been excavated and were highly valued, as evidenced by their positions in tombs. Gold and silver bowls and jade ornaments revealed a high level of craftsmanship, and their placement in graves indicates the great value accorded to these objects. All of these luxury goods, in addition, attest to the existence of a prosperous elite that could afford them.

Perhaps even more significant for Chinese civilization was a profusion of new ideas and philosophies that generated the so-called Hundred Schools of Thought, an outburst that coincided with a philosophical flowering in many of the great civilizations of the era. The development of new and vastly influential philosophies in Eurasia during this time is astonishing. In the sixth century
BCE
, Zoroastrianism developed in Iran, Shakyamuni described the path to Buddhist Nirvana, and (at approximately the same time) Isaiah and Jeremiah prophesied mostly manifold disasters; in the fifth century, Socrates took part in the dialogues that gradually but inexorably revealed his metaphysical and ­epistemological views; and, from the sixth to the fourth centuries, Chinese philosophy flourished. Pervasive theories about direct links between these intellectual developments have proliferated, resulting in unverifiable and occasionally absurd speculations. According to such often-ill-informed hypotheses, Daoism was an east Asian version of Buddhism, and the Buddha was actually Lao Zi, the alleged founder of Daoism, who moved to India after completing his mission in China. A chance overlapping in chronology led to such unsubstantiated and incredible assertions. It is true that comparisons between the various philosophies and religions that originated at this time may prove instructive, but direct links and influences are more difficult to establish.