After the Sheikhs: The Coming Collapse of the Gulf Monarchies (14 page)

Another interesting phenomenon has been the celebrity status desired and cultivated at great expense by some ruling family members, especially in those states where political mobilisation is most limited—such as Qatar and the UAE.
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For many years young sheikhs, often those associated with horse-riding, falconry, or other manifestations of sporting prowess or activity linked to tribal heritage have been celebrated and venerated by younger sections of the indigenous populations. With the advent of new internet technologies and communications, this celebrity culture has been taken to an even higher level. No longer are images just built up by the state-backed media or by appearances at large weddings and other traditional events. Instead many ruling family members now have their own websites, Facebook fan pages, and even Twitter feeds. Most put modesty to one side and are dedicated to highlighting their various personal accomplishments, often with extensive accompanying photographs and videos. For many years the best example was the crown prince of Dubai—who became ruler in early 2006. Indeed, Muhammad bin Rashid Al-Maktoum was the first prominent Gulf sheikh to have his own website,
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and this was used extensively to demonstrate that he was not only an active politician, but also a prolific poet, a rifleman, and a champion horse-rider (winning medals at several international events).

Today, the current crown prince of Dubai—Hamdan bin Muhammad Al-Maktoum—has adopted much the same strategy, although in many ways he—or rather the ruling family’s advisors—has taken personal
image-building even further. Most of his activities still resonate with tribal heritage, such as horse-riding, falconry, and the writing and reciting of Bedouin-style poetry. But other activities are also featured to demonstrate his relative modernity (such as appearing in rap music videos), his fearlessness, and the tougher side to the personality.
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In a rare personal interview conducted in 2011 the twenty-nine year-old Hamdan stated that he ‘learned to be an effective leader through hobbies from skydiving to poetry’ and that ‘the hobbies exercised by the Crown Prince of Dubai are the hobbies of leadership in the foundation’. The interviewer summed these up as ‘…the hobby of parachute-jumping from aircraft to learn the courage and bravery and self-confidence, and the hobby of horse riding to learn leadership and a major focus, along with scuba diving, to learn patience and the search for secrets’, before concluding that ‘all of these hobbies give Hamdan bin Muhammad a major role in formulation of the outlook for the Emirate of Dubai, and paving the way for development plans in the emirate’. While on the subject of poetry, Hamdan also made clear references to taking on the role of ‘philosopher king’ having stated that ‘I have lived childhood delighted, along with my father and my mother and my brothers and I grew up in an environment that allowed me to get to know the true meaning of life, and meditate on the greatness of the Creator and the natural beauty of the desert, which gives a sense of harmony and consistency with nature, all contributed in building my character poetry since childhood, [and] on the other hand taught me and my father Sheikh Muhammad bin Rashid, from a young age that hard work guarantees conquering the impossible’.
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Heritage and history

Helping remind citizens why hereditary monarchies still exist, why some individuals are entitled to build cults of personality and promote localised nationalism, and why these monarchies enjoy special characteristics that somehow exempt them from democratic development, the Gulf ruling families and their governments have expended considerable effort and expense at creating museums, restoring old buildings, and funding other projects connected to tribal heritage and the region’s history. While such activities in themselves are not unusual, what is remarkable is the central role they often play in government planning and the vast resources assigned to them—at least compared to elsewhere in the developing
world where other priorities usually loom higher. In many cases government authorities responsible for heritage have been set up in Gulf monarchies before even departments for tourism or the environment. And in Oman, the only full minister (apart from the deputy prime minister)
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who is actually a member of the ruling family is the minister for heritage and culture.
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Although there are a few exceptions—especially in Qatar and Abu Dhabi, where more broadly focused museums are being established—most of the museums and cultural projects in the region tend to be quite narrowly focused on the pre-oil past. There is usually an emphasis on the background and history of the ruling families themselves, and it is commonplace to see giant ruling family trees adorning walls in the region’s museums. In most cases these provide a quick visual link between centuries-old founding fathers and whoever the current ruler is—the latter usually having his name printed in bold, circled, or with a larger picture than his ancestors. In the case of Qatar, this has been described as ‘heritage and history [being] mythologised to support the ruling family. It is in appearing to preserve Qatari heritage… that the legitimacy of the Al-Thani, especially the emir, is assured’.
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There is also usually an emphasis on traditional, pre-oil economy activities such as boat-building, rope-making, basket-weaving, pottery, or glass-blowing. Often these are housed in ‘heritage villages’ which are usually staffed and operated by citizens employed by the responsible government authority. Old forts and watchtowers have been lovingly restored, often at great expense, and many of these look magnificent. Some older looking buildings have, however, been built from scratch—sometimes with breeze blocks behind the façade—including forts on islands, brand new ‘old souqs’, as in Qatar and Kuwait, and dozens of newly built ‘windcatcher’ or
barjeel
towers, as seen in Dubai’s 2004-built Madinat Jumeirah development. Heritage-focused festivals, competitions, and other events have also been set up in recent years. These have included dategrowing tournaments, $250,000 heritage awards sponsored by rulers,
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falcon-hunting and sword dancing tournaments, the unveiling of world record-breaking 15 metre swords, and the staging of the world’s largest
youla
Bedouin dances.
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Well-funded camel races also take place across the region, but mostly in Oman and the UAE. Much has been written on these races, often demonstrating that they were never a traditional pursuit, and are instead examples of ‘invented tradition’
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—providing a
spectacle that can bring together ruling families and their citizens in a pseudo-traditional context, far away from the urban skyscrapers and other evidence of the oil era.

Together, these developments form part of an entire region-wide industry that seems committed to creating ‘living memories’ of the Gulf monarchies’ crucial early period of state formation.
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Or, as a recent study described of Qatar, they are ‘expensive and widely publicised attempts to showcase Qatari and Islamic culture [which] attest to the concern with the preservation of the image of cultural authenticity’.
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Given that many of the attractions are visited by nationals, expatriates, and tourists alike, the industry is in many ways helping to re-orientalise the region and its population from both inside and out. As discussed, this process has important political benefits for the surviving traditional monarchies. Significantly, the more awkward aspects of the monarchies’ state-formation—namely the relationships between the ruling families and Britain, or the region’s reaction to Arab nationalism in the 1950s and ‘60s—feature rarely in these state-sponsored projects. The massive impact of oil wealth on society and the economy also often remains out of focus, although there are notable exceptions, such as the Abu Dhabi Petroleum Exhibition, which has done much to catalogue that emirate’s transformation. In general, the school and university curricula in the Gulf monarchies also tend to shy away from these topics: in some cases local or regional history is never taught, or if it is it dwells on the pre-oil era and skirts more sensitive issues. There are, however, some exceptions, such as Qatar University, which recently introduced modules in Gulf history and society. It is likely that more of the region’s schools and universities will soon have to follow Qatar’s suit, as demand for the subject will probably grow from both young nationals and expatriates. Bahrain is also an interesting case, given the sectarian tensions discussed later in this book. School and university textbooks have been used to promote an official history of the country, which seems to have little bearing on reality. The ruling Al-Khalifa family is usually portrayed as having liberated Bahrain, rather than conquering it, and earlier periods when the island was ruled by Shia dynasties appear to be glossed over.
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Co-opting religion

Viewed as a double-edged sword, religion—and most especially Islam—has been considered both a threat and an opportunity for the Gulf monarchies.
As will be discussed later, Islamist movements—both intellectual and militant—have frequently questioned the status quo in these states. Most have highlighted the un-Islamic behaviour of the various ruling families, the slide into autocracy, the reliance on non-Islamic foreign powers for security, and rampant corruption among other matters. As such, these groups have often represented a powerful alternative and sometimes dissenting voice on the Arabian Peninsula, and in some cases have even been joined by establishment figures. Indeed, as has been noted, ‘…because Islam is a transcendent religion that can never be fully co-opted, [even such autocratic] governments must cede some autonomy to state-supported religious institutions or elites, thereby raising the prospect that elements of the religious establishment could defect to the Islamist opposition’.
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The Saudi ruling family has always been in the tightest position, given its described alliance with the Wahhabi movement, given the presence of two of Islam’s holiest shrines in Mecca and Medina, and given its hosting of millions of Muslim pilgrims each year. Since 1986 the king of Saudi Arabia even changed his official title to ‘Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques’
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—reviving a pious title formerly used by the caliphs, the Ottoman sultans, and Egypt’s Mamluk sultans. But the smaller Gulf monarchies, even though none claim such specific religious credentials, are also wary. Much like Saudi Arabia, all rely on non-Islamic powers—namely the US—for their security guarantees, with most also physically hosting such troops on their territory. And since 9/11, and the Anglo-American invasions on nearby Muslim countries—Afghanistan and Iraq—their position has clearly become more precarious.

The strategies for containing and co-opting Islam have varied in each of the monarchies, depending on their circumstances, although there are some common patterns. In a similar manner to the recently deposed leaders of the Arab authoritarian republics, loyal clerics of the Gulf’s ruling families have from time to time invoked certain Koranic passages in order to justify absolute power. As per a late-2011 statement by Al-Azhar University on the Arab Spring, this has usually been done by narrowly interpreting a verse
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which states ‘O you who have believed, obey Allah and obey the Messenger and those in authority among you’. The verse has frequently been cited in isolation, but as the Al-Azhar statement contends, it should never have been cited out of context, and especially without considering the preceding verse,
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which states ‘Indeed Allah
commands you to render the trusts to whom they are due and when you judge between people to judge with justice’.
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The Saudi ruling family has probably gone the furthest with this strategy, with the Wahhabi religious establishment and its government representatives claiming that the Al-Saud enjoy ‘rightful leadership’ or
wali al-ahd
on this very basis.

The smaller Gulf monarchies, notably Qatar and the UAE have instead concentrated on using their resources to police and fund their mosques and domestic religious establishments. Almost all clerics are government employees, and these are quite closely monitored. Most have to carry photo identification cards, and their sermons usually have to be chosen from an official list of approved topics, drawn up by the relevant government body each week. A 2006 cable from the US embassy in Abu Dhabi confirms this practice, describing how ‘UAE officials publicly and strongly condemn extremism and terrorist attacks, anti-extremism has been the focus of government-approved Friday sermons in the mosques’.
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As well as providing generous salaries to clerics, thus slotting them into the rentier state’s giant public sector, wealth in these monarchies has also been used to build large and often lavish mosques, religious schools, and other institutions. Unsurprisingly some of the biggest mosques in the world are now in the Gulf monarchies—such as Abu Dhabi’s Sheikh Zayed Grand Mosque, which was built by the government and can accommodate 40,000 worshippers. Taking several years to complete, it cost more than $540 million and is the burial place of the late Zayed bin Sultan Al-Nahyan. Although there are some exceptions—such as Qatar’s largest mosque, which is simply called ‘Qatar Mosque’ or ‘Fanar’,
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and the proposed new Al-Farooq Mosque in Dubai—most of the largest mosques in the Gulf monarchies usually carry the name of a key ruling family member, despite invariably having been built using state funds. There are of course countless other projects connecting Islam to the largesse of the ruling families or the state, some of them highly innovative and often winning positive headlines for the sponsors. In the UAE, for example, the Dubai International Holy Koran Award Committee has begun planning and designing a holy book collection or
mushaf
named after Abu Dhabi’s ruler—the ‘Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed Al-Nahyan Mushaf’. The aim is to produce a million of these volumes which will then be freely distributed ‘under orders of the prime minister’.
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Set on its own island and designed by the same architect as the contemporary section of the Paris Louvre, Qatar’s enormous Islamic Arts Museum is another powerful
example; one closely associated with the ruler and his high-profile wife Moza bint Nasser Al-Misnad. It opened in late 2008 and has been featured in dozens of international newspapers and magazines.