After the Sheikhs: The Coming Collapse of the Gulf Monarchies (15 page)

Also providing ruling families with religious legitimacy, or more accurately allowing rulers to portray themselves as tolerant, benevolent monarchs, there has been much support for other religions in some Gulf monarchies. With the exception of Saudi Arabia—where all other religions are banned—Christianity is booming in the Gulf monarchies, courtesy of substantial Indian and Filipino expatriate populations. Churches for almost all denominations exist in the five smaller Gulf states, including even evangelical chapels. Prime land, usually donated by a ruling family member, continues to be gifted to these churches to aid in their expansion. In Abu Dhabi, an ancient Nestorian Christian monastery which had been discovered on one of the emirate’s outlying islands was even opened to the public in 2010 by the government’s Tourism and Development Investment Company
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—thus acknowledging and celebrating the country’s pre-Islamic past. Hindu and Sikh temples also exist in some of these states, as does a Zoroastrian tower of silence in Dubai, which has on occasion been the location of Zoroastrian world congresses. Although, as discussed in the following chapter, there remains a nominal boycott on Israel by the Gulf monarchies and synagogues are not permitted in any of these states, there are nonetheless some pockets of tolerance for Jews. In Bahrain for example, there exists a tiny community of Bahraini Jews. Although their number has dwindled from several hundred to just a few dozen, they are reportedly well respected and have served in the upper house of the parliament. In 2008 the king even appointed a Jew as Bahrain’s joint ambassador to the US, Canada, and Brazil.
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Environmental credentials

The Gulf monarchies rarely conjure an image of being environmentally friendly, given the centrality of hydrocarbons to the region and the various associated heavy industries, most of which rely on abundant fossil fuel. Moreover, the generous public sector salaries, the extensive welfare benefits, and the other trappings of the rentier state also lead to expectations of high consumption lifestyles for many Gulf nationals, including multiple vehicles per household and a heavy reliance on air-conditioning.
According to the US Department of Energy’s Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center, the Gulf monarchies now suffer from some of world’s highest per capita carbon dioxide emissions. In 2008 Qatar was the worst ranked country in the world, with 53.5 metric tonnes of carbon dioxide emissions per capita. The UAE was the third worst, with 34.6 metric tonnes, while Bahrain was ranked fifth, with 29 metric tonnes. Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Oman were all not far behind, being ranked seventh, thirteenth and fourteenth respectively.
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Given the rapid development in the region since 2008, especially in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE, it is likely that they remain among the world’s worst offenders—perhaps having increased their lead. Waste per capita is also believed to be very high in the Gulf monarchies, with a recent study concluding that Abu Dhabi had one of the highest waste per capita rates in the world—some six times greater than Western European countries.
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Improvements have been made across the region, but most waste is still thought to be dumped in desert landfill sites. Although vehicles per capita is a less useful measure for the Gulf monarchies, given that the rate for citizens is likely to be much higher than that for expatriates, it is noteworthy that Qatar is now firmly in the world top ten according to World Bank figures, with 724 vehicles per thousand residents, while Bahrain and Kuwait are close behind.
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Nevertheless, despite the region’s poor track record, protection of the environment has recently become a high profile policy in some Gulf monarchies. The UAE and Qatar governments in particular have transformed what was previously a liability for their regional and international reputations into something of a strength. A plethora of projects, institutions, new government departments, and other initiatives have been announced—most of which aim not only to remedy their domestic environmental crises, but also to promote international research and development into cleaner energy and other environmental clauses.
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In much the same way that wealth distribution strategies to citizens and funding of religious establishments have been closely associated with key members of the ruling families, the same has often been true with these environmental projects. The state-backed media have provided extensive coverage, often publicly linking a specific ruling family member to a development, thus winning him or her favourable domestic headlines. It has also been a policy area which has largely attracted favourable international coverage, with many of the articles being republished for domestic readers.

The new Qatar Environment and Energy Research Institute for example falls directly under the umbrella of the ruler’s wife. Aiming to ‘mitigate climate change and contaminants harmful to the environment’ and focusing on ‘Qatar’s desert and marine ecologies, plant and animal life, and air quality’, it is well financed and has thus far been lauded by the domestic media
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and further afield. A recent RAND Corporation publication focusing on the institute, for example, begins by stating that ‘Qatar’s leadership has created a vision of sustainability for the country’.
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More extensively, Abu Dhabi has set up the new Environmental Agency Abu Dhabi (EAD) and recently commissioned the Stockholm Environmental Institute in Sweden to formulate a rigorous climate policy for the emirate.
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Since 2009 there has also been the Zayed Future Energy Prize which now presents winning companies or government departments with prizes of over $4 million.
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All photographs displayed on the prize’s official website feature the crown prince in the centre of groups of high profile international dignitaries, while all text descriptions of the prize refer to the ‘legacy of Sheikh Zayed’.
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But by far the most high profile environment-related initiative in the region has been Abu Dhabi’s Masdar City. Being built by the Abu Dhabi Future Energy Company (ADFEC), which is a subsidiary of the crown prince’s Mubadala Development Company, the plan has been to create a large carbon-neutral development in the emirate’s hinterland. The broader aim is for Masdar to provide the infrastructure for a free zone that will allow up to 1,500 renewable energy and other environment-related international companies to base themselves in Abu Dhabi, or at least have their regional headquarters there. Some of these will be focused on carbon capture technologies and it is expected that they will export their services to nearby countries still relying on outdated hydrocarbon extraction technologies.
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ADFEC is also hoping to attract research and development focused companies to Masdar in an effort to make Abu Dhabi the region’s capital for green technologies.
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Similarly, Mubadala’s investment in the Finnish company WinWinD is likely to lead to a wind power joint venture in Masdar.
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In support of all these companies is a new research centre—the Masdar Institute—and several leading international research bodies are already operating there.
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Again, there has been extensive coverage by the domestic media, and although there has been some criticism of Masdar in the international media, Mubadala and the crown prince have generally benefited from ADFEC’s overall aims.

3
EXPLAINING SURVIVAL—EXTERNAL MATTERS

In parallel to their domestic ruling bargains, there also exist several strategies aimed at securing the survival and raising the status of the Gulf monarchies in the region and internationally. For many years the priority was building strong links with the rest of the Arab world, especially Palestine and those Arab states that refused to acknowledge Israel. This had the twin aims of satisfying pro-Palestinian and anti-Israeli sentiments in their own populations while also allowing the ruling families to sit more comfortably alongside Arab nationalist governments. More recently, and especially since Kuwait’s invasion by Iraq and subsequent liberation by a US-led force in 1991, the priority has been gaining influence and good standing in those states perceived as the most reliable security guarantors—namely the Western powers. Rising tensions with Iran, and a seeming impasse over its developing nuclear programme, have meant that such Western-centric efforts have continued to intensify. But there is now also the added dimension of seeking improved relations with the Eastern powers, including China, which have not only become key trading partners but may also soon offer alternative security guarantees. A third, but interconnected priority for the Gulf monarchies has been the need to forge good relations with other Muslim states and communities, including those far beyond the Arab world. Complimenting their efforts at boosting Islamic credentials and heading off domestic Islamist opposition, this strategy is also intended to deflect and counter external Islamist extremist aggression—a threat which became particularly
acute following 9/11 and the subsequent al-Qaeda campaign in Saudi Arabia.
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To some extent, the Gulf monarchies have employed conventional strategies to achieve these aims: building up military defensive capabilities with equipment primarily sourced from the West; joining regional organisations such as the Arab League; and attempts to build collective security arrangements between themselves—most notably the Gulf Cooperation Council. As will be discussed later, despite much scholarly attention having been paid to these strategies, they have been fraught with risks and their successes remain limited. Instead a number of other, subtler, policies perhaps better explain the external survival of the Gulf monarchies.

First, as a natural extension of the domestic rentier state and their popular wealth distribution strategies, the Gulf monarchies have become increasingly keen to distribute some of their resources to less fortunate neighbours, mostly in the form of development aid, charity, or gifts to other Arab, Muslim, or nearby states. Second, efforts have been made by most Gulf monarchies to use their location and resources to position themselves as useful ‘active neutrals’—either by despatching peacekeeping missions or mediating regional disputes. This strategy has usually allowed them to avoid taking sides in nearby conflicts, while also consolidating a reputation of benevolence and peacefulness in less stable or potentially threatening states. Also it has helped deflect broader Arab public opinion away from their difficult-to-disguise dependency on Western military protection. Third, there have been long-running efforts to fund museums, universities, and other cultural projects and institutions in the Western powers—and increasingly their Eastern counterparts—in order to improve recognition and opinion of the Gulf monarchies, and thus help build up their ‘soft power’ base in these influential states. In some cases even development aid has been channelled into these countries for this purpose. As with the domestic survival strategies, there are again significant divergences in these sets of policies, depending on the individual circumstances of each Gulf monarchy. Nevertheless, a pattern is clearly evident, with at least some aspects of each strategy being visible in each monarchy.

Development assistance and international charity

Since the 1970s the wealthier Gulf monarchies—notably Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Kuwait—have been among the biggest donors of development aid to the poorer Arab states in the Middle East and North Africa. More recently they have been joined by gas-rich Qatar, and their aid programmes have now reached out much further, with countless donations to communities in East Africa, South Asia, South East Asia, and even Eastern Europe. Most of the aid has been carefully controlled by the Gulf monarchies’ respective ministries for foreign affairs or by well-established state-controlled institutions such as the Saudi Fund for Development (set up in 1974), the Abu Dhabi Fund for Development (which dates from 1971 under the name Abu Dhabi Fund for Arab Development),
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and the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development (established in 1961, making it the first foreign aid vehicle set up by a developing state). However, such official development assistance (ODA) is only part of the story, given the many individual ruling family members and other state-sponsored charities in the Gulf monarchies also involved in such activities. The UAE has probably gone the furthest in trying to organise its various efforts under one umbrella, by setting up an External Aid Liaison Bureau in 2008. This was partly a response to disbelief and criticism from various United Nations representatives following a potentially accurate claim from a UAE minister that 3.6 per cent of GDP was allocated to development aid.
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Unsurprisingly, given the various rulers’ described efforts to boost their personal legitimacy, many of the more tangible results of development assistance (such as hospitals, mosques, and schools) in recipient countries are named after the monarch in question.

Overall, throughout the period 1976–2006 it was estimated that over 4.2 per cent of Saudi Arabia’s GDP or about $49 billion was devoted to development aid,
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while in the UAE, Kuwait, and Qatar it is thought that aid has often been over 3 per cent of GDP. Although this is still much less than the Gulf monarchies spend on military hardware—which is usually between 4 and 11 per cent of GDP
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—the gap does seem to be narrowing as ODA becomes an increasingly central pillar of foreign policy for these states. It is important to appreciate that Gulf ODA as a percentage of GDP is often higher than in the West, including the United States. In the Arab world, Palestine has unsurprisingly been the oldest and most generously targeted ODA destination. Over the past decade
Saudi Arabia has supplied the Palestinian Authority with nearly $500 million in aid, and in addition has channelled hundreds of millions of dollars to help Palestinian refugees through both the Arab League and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency. Today it is thought that Saudi Arabia alone provides Palestine with between $14 million and $17 million per month.
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Likewise, the UAE has supplied Palestine with considerable aid over the years and in the past decade it is thought that over $4 billion has been provided, including a $62 million residential complex built in 2004 and named after Abu Dhabi’s late ruler, Zayed bin Sultan Al-Nahyan, and the $70 million rebuilding of the Jenin Camp after its destruction in 2002.
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Crucially, despite Hamas’ surprise election victory in 2006, Gulf ODA to Palestine has not slowed. If anything, it has accelerated—perhaps best symbolised by the Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed Mosque in Bethany, named after Abu Dhabi’s current ruler. At a cost of nearly $5 million, the mosque will have the tallest minarets in Palestine when complete.
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This response contrasts with other donors such as the US—which has been reviewing its aid programme given Hamas’ ostensible ties to terror organisations.
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As such, the Gulf monarchies’ role in Palestine’s development is now unparalleled.