After the Sheikhs: The Coming Collapse of the Gulf Monarchies (28 page)

As with Bahrain, the internet has become a key battleground for the UAE, with the authorities paying great attention to the information viewed by its citizens and resident expatriates. In 2009 a report on internet filtering in the UAE was published by the OpenNet Initiative—a partnership of the University of Toronto, Harvard University, and the SecDev Group of Ottawa. It claimed that the UAE government ‘pervasively filters websites that contain pornography or content relating to alcohol and drug use, gay and lesbian issues, or online dating or gambling’ while concluding that the UAE ‘…continues to prevent its citizens from accessing a significant amount of internet content spanning a variety of topics…’ Interestingly, the report also concluded that the filtering scheme is now being applied to Dubai’s aforementioned free zones, including Dubai Media City, which previously enjoyed unfettered internet access. In 2010, another report claimed that the UAE was going even further than filtering, with its state-owned telecommunications company having been provided by the US-based firm CyberTrust since 2005 with the ability to fake secure connections,
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despite it being an arm of an authoritarian state. This, it has been argued, allows it to position itself potentially as a ‘man in the middle’ during web transactions between users.
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In practice, a wide range of websites and internet activities are now blocked in the UAE, including all of the categories identified by the OpenNet Initiative and those listed in a leaked memorandum from the UAE’s telecommunications regulatory authority.
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In addition, every website in Arabic or English that contains criticism of the UAE’s ruling families, or indeed other Gulf monarchies’ ruling families, is also blocked, as are websites or sections of websites that focus on human rights, prison conditions, and civil liberties in the region. On occasion even the websites of leading international non-governmental organisations are barred if they feature negative headlines or articles relating to the UAE. Sometimes the websites of major international news organisations will also be temporarily inaccessible if they are carrying a specific headline. A more recent and popular strategy has been to block access to specific articles on the websites of foreign newspapers. In 2009, for example, a lengthy essay about Dubai appearing on
The Independent
’s website was blocked,
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while in 2011 a similar article in
Vanity Fair
was also barred without explanation. In parallel to internet censorship, the UAE’s National Media Council still sometimes requires shops and newsagents to either remove pages or blackout offending articles in the hardcopy versions of these
publications.
Vanity Fair
was reportedly tampered with in this way,
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while in late 2009 an entire edition of
The Sunday Times
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was removed from the UAE’s shelves and pulped, given that it featured negative reporting on Dubai’s economic problems and a cartoon depicting Dubai’s ruler drowning in a sea of debt.

BlackBerrys have also been subjected to censorship in the UAE, with most attention being focused on its encrypted messenger system which was allowing users to communicate free from monitoring by state-controlled spyware. In 2009 the UAE’s biggest state-owned telecommunications companies began offering a ‘performance enhancing’ patch to its BlackBerry subscribers which claimed that it ‘provided the best BlackBerry service and ultimate experience’. Users reported that the patch slowed down their BlackBerrys and drained its batteries. Research in Motion—the Canadian manufacturer of BlackBerry—quickly released a counter-application to uninstall this patch, explaining that it was in fact a surveillance application designed to allow the UAE authorities to monitor BlackBerry users’ messages and emails.
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Exactly a year later, the UAE authorities’ worst fears seemed to be realised when small protests began being organised with the help of BlackBerry messenger. In particular, many UAE nationals had been using the messenger to discuss leaked correspondence showing that some government members considered themselves above paying traffic fines,
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while others were using the messenger to plan protests against the government over increased petrol prices. Although the protests were eventually called off and an eighteen year-old was arrested (because he had included his PIN in a BlackBerry message and thus revealed his identity) along with five other UAE nationals,
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the prospect of further such protests prompted the UAE authorities to announce a total ban on BlackBerrys in just one month unless Research in Motion provided access codes for the encrypted messaging system. In July 2010 the government announced that ‘BlackBerrys are operating beyond the jurisdiction of national legislation’ because they are ‘the only devices operating in the UAE that immediately export their data offshore’. Tellingly, the statement also claimed that ‘…certain BlackBerry applications allow people to misuse the service, causing serious social, judicial, and national security repercussions’.
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Placed in a difficult position, given that it appeared that access had already been granted to governments in the US, Britain, China, and Russia, Research in Motion had apparently decided that the UAE authorities should not be granted
access to BlackBerry services, presumably due to its track-record of—as described by Reporters without Borders—intimidating BlackBerry subscribers.
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Although the ban was never imposed, with outspoken UAE lawyers
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describing it as ‘unconstitutional’ and ‘…a blatant attack on freedom of expression’ in newspaper interviews,
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it remains unclear whether the UAE authorities’ demands were actually met.

Censorship in Kuwait is also increasingly revolving around the internet and new communications technologies, with arrests of bloggers and social media users now occurring. The authorities still seem to rely on making scapegoat arrests of various Kuwaiti citizens, especially journalists that speak out against the government, or—more seriously—criticise the ruling family. In one remarkable case in 2008, the editor-in-chief of the
Al-Shahed
newspaper was sentenced to three years in prison and ordered to pay a fine for having ‘insulted the ruler’ despite the ruler having previously written to him ‘forgiving him and wishing him success with the paper’. Although a member of the ruling family himself, the editor was believed to have allowed cartoons of the ruler and the crown prince to have appeared on the newspaper’s entertainment page, with captions asking readers to spot the differences between the two cartoons.
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Also involving members of the ruling family, in 2010 it was reported that three lesser members of the family had attacked a private television station which had recently aired a comedy show that was deemed offensive to that branch of the family. All parties involved were eventually released on bail, but not before the television station owner had been accused of trying to ‘overthrow the government’.
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More seriously, also in 2010 a Kuwaiti journalist was sentenced to one year in prison for supposedly ‘undermining the status of the ruler’ and slandering the unpopular prime minister who, as described, was a key member of the ruling family. Specifically, he was accused of saying in public that the prime minister was ‘incapable of running the country’
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and was also accused of inferring that Iranian intelligence agents were gaining access to Kuwaiti affairs via a prominent businessman who was an associate of the prime minister. Half way through his sentence the journalist was rushed to hospital with a heart condition, but even then he was reportedly still bound by his hands and feet to his bed.
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Accusations of insulting or undermining the ruler have not been limited to Kuwaiti nationals, and on occasion expatriates have also been arrested. In 2009, for example, an Australian national of Iraqi origin was jailed for six months for
supposedly criticising the ruler. She claimed to the international media that she was beaten, on occasion held in solitary confinement, and browbeaten into renouncing her Australian passport. She also claimed she was told to keep repeating that she was really an Iraqi.
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Shortly prior to the Arab Spring the Kuwaiti authorities had also begun cracking down on public gatherings, most notably in December 2010 when security forces attacked a group of opposition MPs and other Kuwaiti nationals that had convened a public meeting to discuss a ‘government plot to amend the 1962 constitution in order to suppress public freedoms’. At least a dozen gatherers were injured and hospitalised, prompting a fifty-two person petition to be signed by Kuwaiti intellectuals and activists that ‘expressed regret and condemned the excessive use of force against Kuwaiti citizens’. Opposition MPs also filed a motion requesting the questioning of the prime minister on the grounds that he was ‘suppressing freedoms’. The petitioners and the MPs further claimed in their statements that the Kuwaiti government had an active policy of ‘suppressing media coverage’ and linked the crackdown to Kuwait’s recent blocking of Qatar’s Al-Jazeera news network in the emirate.
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Saudi Arabia’s response to censorship more or less mirrors the UAE and Kuwait, but with a new, clearer set of internet regulations having been introduced in early 2011. Apparently to ‘protect society from erroneous practices in electronic publishing,’ the new regulations are wideranging but also ambiguous, covering all forms of “electronic journalism” from blogs to chat rooms and archives, in addition to ‘any other form of electronic publishing that the Ministry may choose to add’. Seemingly recognising the difficulty of getting bloggers and other internet activists to register their sites with the Ministry in the same way that online newspapers and other more established fora have had to, the rules instead require their ‘voluntary registration’. Crucially, under the new regulations the Ministry has the right to request details from website owners of their servers—even if outside the country—thus allowing government officials in theory to take offensive websites offline entirely if required.
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Meanwhile, much like Kuwait, Saudi Arabia has continued to arrest countless activists and intellectuals who have spoken or written in a critical manner about the government or the ruling family. In later 2010 for example, a Saudi law professor
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was seized after he published an online article that questioned the ruling family’s legitimacy and speculated about divisions within the family and what they could mean for the future of the monarchy. He was reportedly taken from his family home by four
men who did not have a court-issued arrest warrant and then held without charge.
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Of all the Gulf monarchies, Qatar has had the least to worry about with regard to censorship, given its economic circumstances and the general popularity enjoyed by its ruling family. Moreover, as the home of the Al-Jazeera network—which is widely regarded as enjoying relatively free speech—Qatar’s credentials have been further strengthened. Nevertheless, as with its neighbours, the government has ensured that it has powerful mechanisms to monitor and control most forms of media, including electronic and internet communications. A few activists and bloggers have recently been arrested, which indicates the structural similarities between Qatar and the other Gulf monarchies. The biggest problem so far seems to have been the very public embarrassment over a high profile attempt by the ruling family to brand Qatar as a regional haven of free expression. Launched in 2008 by the ruler’s wife—perhaps to allow the ruler to enjoy a little distance from the project, if need be
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—the Doha Centre for Media Freedom appointed Robert Ménard, former director of the Paris-based Reporters Without Borders, as its founding director. The Centre then established two safe houses in Doha for journalists fleeing from neighbouring countries and positioned itself to pay the legal fees of such refugees.

But only months after the launch, Ménard sent an open letter to the ruler’s wife claiming that visas to such journalists were being denied by Qatari officials and that ‘…some people close to you and others you have appointed to senior positions at the centre are obstructing its activities’. Furthermore, Ménard had fired a Qatari national at the Centre, allegedly for this reason, and he argued that Qatar’s media was operating ‘under orders’.
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Unsurprisingly Ménard resigned from the Centre shortly afterwards, and was quoted in the international media as follows: ‘How can we have any credibility if we keep quiet about problems in the country that is our host?’
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He also explained that ‘…the Centre has been suffocated. We no longer have either the freedom or the resources to do our work’ and argued that ‘…some Qatari officials never wanted an independent Centre, free to speak out without concern for politics or diplomacy, free to criticise even Qatar’. Finally, he turned attention to Qatar itself, complaining that ‘Qatar has still not ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, despite frequent promises… and the committee that was supposed to discuss a new law on the media—and on which I had been invited to sit—has still not held any meetings’.
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