After the Sheikhs: The Coming Collapse of the Gulf Monarchies (29 page)

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MOUNTING EXTERNAL PRESSURES

Although the external survival strategies employed by the Gulf monarchies have generally succeeded in securing their position in a volatile environment and boosting their status and influence in more powerful states, they remain prey to pressures and weaknesses that are either byproducts of these relationships or that result from the mismanagement of external forces impacting on the region. Among the latter are efforts to diversify their economic bases away from hydrocarbons that have precipitated the development of new economic sectors geared towards foreign investors, tourists, or simply an increased number of expatriates. In many cases this has led to economy-driven, top-down changes and relaxations in the Gulf monarchies’ societies, especially with regard to cultural and religious practices. Already these are leading to mounting frustration and resentment from some sections of the national populations, especially those who believe that their governments and ruling families are not doing enough to preserve their values and traditions. In turn this is eroding the monarchies’ legitimacy resources, especially relating to traditional authority and Islam.

Also imposed on the broader population with seemingly little consultation have been the Gulf monarchies’ efforts to deepen their security ties with the Western powers. This has led to the establishing of many Western military bases on their soil in recent years, including several discreet installations that most citizens remain unaware of. It has also led to increased spending on Western armaments, with many Gulf monarchies
now assigning a huge proportion of their GDP to such expenditure in what now resembles a protection racket, rather than a legitimate attempt to build up indigenous defensive capabilities. Closely related to this expensive militarisation of the region, Gulf nationals are also becoming concerned over the now rampant hawkishness of many of their governments, especially with regards to Iran. Despite shared economic histories and the historic efforts of many ruling families to position themselves as active neutrals, it seems that a new generation of Gulf monarchs are now more willing than ever to publicly antagonise their powerful neighbour.

Notwithstanding the region’s track record of boycotting and limiting contact with Israel in support of the Palestinian question, and despite having national populations which mostly continue to oppose recognition of Israel, many Gulf rulers seem willing, indeed keen, to strengthen economic and political relations with Israel as part of a dangerous, multipronged strategy to appease Western backers and further isolate Iran. The lack of any meaningful collective security or in some cases even basic cooperation between the Gulf monarchies is also a growing concern, not least due to these new, high stakes policies on Iran and Israel. More than thirty years after the founding of the Gulf Cooperation Council the six member states remain at loggerheads over many issues, including border disputes and other long running territorial arguments. In some cases grievances are so strong that diplomatic rifts develop, violence erupts, or one monarchy interferes in the domestic politics of another, sometimes even stirring or sponsoring coups in an attempt to re-arrange power within neighbours.

Welcoming foreigners and eroding legitimacy

In some Gulf monarchies, and especially those that have made the greatest efforts to attract foreign direct investment and tourists, or present an inviting visage to expatriates, there have been several noticeable relaxations in recent years,. While these measures have certainly been viewed as beneficial or necessary for economic development, it has often prompted strong criticism from more conservative elements of the national populations, many of whom have focused their anger on the apparent indifference of ruling families to their religious and cultural sensibilities. By far the strongest example is Dubai, where, as shown, a considerable attempt has been made to transform the emirate’s economic base by
building up free zones, tourism, a real estate industry, and a financial sector. In addition to requiring considerable economic liberalisation such as rulings that allow foreigners to purchase freehold property, the emirate’s government has also striven to ensure that its massive expatriate population and legions of foreign investors and tourists feel as welcome and comfortable as possible. Given that many of Dubai’s newcomers are now either non-Muslim or share very few of the historical and cultural linkages with Dubai that were enjoyed by the earlier immigrants from Persia, India, or other parts of the Arab world,
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the relaxations have usually revolved around Islamic values and traditions. In Abu Dhabi, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman the same phenomenon can also be observed, although to a lesser extent.

One of the most obvious relaxations in the region relates to alcohol consumption, as (apart from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait) up until recently alcohol could only be purchased in hotel bars and restaurants or in specific and very discreet stores if a resident could prove their non-Muslim status to the police and had been provided with a ‘liquor consumption licence’. Now almost anybody can purchase alcohol, especially in Dubai and Bahrain, as licences are rarely checked and hotels are non-discriminatory. Moreover, in Dubai’s case, and in violation of the original Trucial States alcohol regulations that date back to the mid-1950s,
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over the past decade it has become possible to consume alcohol during Ramadan and on Islamic holidays. Many of its hotels serve alcohol after 6pm during Ramadan, and bars no longer close on the eve of major holidays or during mourning periods for deceased members of the ruling family. This also now applies in Abu Dhabi and other parts of the UAE. Nor is there any real prohibition on the daytime consumption of food during Ramadan in Dubai. It is now almost acceptable to walk down a busy street eating a takeaway meal, and indeed major fast food chains remain open for this purpose—in the recent past a policeman or offended national would have remonstrated at such a sacrilegious act, but now, with all year round tourism and an increasingly culturally insensitive expatriate population, such protests have become rare.

Remarkably, in early 2011 it was reported that the Gulf monarchies had some of the highest alcohol consumption growth rates in the world. Dubai’s growth rate was believed to be between 26 and 28 per cent during the boom years of 2006–2008, while since then Abu Dhabi has taken the lead with an estimated growth rate of 28 per cent. Indeed, regional
distributors point to the emirate’s rapidly expanding tourism and entertainment industry and expect the demand for alcohol to grow even faster. At present, the region’s beer industry is dominated by Dubai, with a joint venture between the state-backed Emirates airline and Heineken International enjoying a two-thirds market share in the UAE and with its products also being the market leaders in Oman, Bahrain, and Qatar.
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Meanwhile, the spirits industry is dominated by imports, with Scotch whisky being the preferred liquor and described as the ‘mainstay choice of the region’. According to research conducted in 2010, Euromonitor International concluded that the UAE is now the world’s biggest consumer of Scotch, with its volume sales having grown by 9 per cent in 2010 to reach a total of 10.2 million litres, enough to push France into second place. One of the main distributors also claimed that the ‘increased investment from global drinks giants [in the UAE] would lead to the country retaining its importance in the future’ and ‘[with] the persistently lacklustre figures coming from developed core markets, the UAE should stop raising eyebrows and become the focal point of rising [alcohol consumption] expectations in the region’.
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With regard to officially dry Gulf monarchies such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, alcohol consumption growth has also been very high, but has been harder to measure. Industry insiders believe that margins are getting higher, with the average black market bottle of whisky now selling for about $150. Much of the smuggled liquor is believed to originate from alcohol stores that operate in the UAE’s poorer northern emirates. These undercut the licensed outlets in Dubai and Abu Dhabi, and it is estimated that more than half of the alcohol sold to traders in these emirates ends up being smuggled into Saudi Arabia.
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Also seen as eroding the status of Islam, and in particular Islamic holidays, has been the shopping mall-backed rise of the commercial and secular Christmas. In the 1990s Christmas trees were rarely seen in public places in the Gulf monarchies, but are now featured prominently in many retail outlets, hotels, bars, and restaurants, especially in the UAE. While in the past government-sponsored
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and national day street lights and decorations were always dismantled shortly before Christmas, so as to avoid any confusion, they now often remain in place throughout the Christmas period, especially if Ramadan is late and finishes in December. On occasion, the UAE’s high spending on Christmas has caught out the establishment. In late 2010, having spent approximately $10 million
assembling a giant 43 foot tall Christmas tree festooned with diamonds, Abu Dhabi’s most prestigious hotel, the Emirates Palace, was forced to admit that it had ‘taken the holiday spirit a bit too far’ and removed the tree following a large number of complaints. In its defence, the hotel—which is regularly used for high level government conferences—explained that it was simply an effort to ‘…boost the holiday mood for its guests, based on the UAE’s values of openness and tolerance’.
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Further to the changing status of holidays, even the Muslim Sabbath day is now considered to be under threat, given that in late 2006 the UAE’s official public sector weekend changed from Thursday and Friday—as it had been for thirty-five years—to Friday and Saturday. Ostensibly to bring the UAE more in line with other Middle Eastern states
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(including Kuwait, which had already switched), the real reason was to provide government departments and state-backed companies in the UAE with an extra day of contact and trade with their internationally based counterparts and colleagues. There is now a fear among some UAE nationals that the country will soon fully follow the western weekend, especially given that many private sector employees are already following such a schedule.

While gambling remains a fragile taboo, with no lawful casinos in operation, some Gulf monarchies have nevertheless legitimised such thrills by allowing lottery-style tickets at horse-racing events and, in the UAE’s case, by recently introducing prize-carrying ‘national bonds’ which offer savers the ‘chance to win 41,750 rewards [per annum]’.
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Perhaps most controversially, as part of the aforementioned overseas investments strategy, some of the Gulf monarchies have been investing in Western companies that focus on gambling. In 2007, for example, the state-backed Dubai Holdings acquired a $5 billion, 9.5 per cent stake in the Nevadaheadquartered MGM Mirage Corporation—the world’s second largest gaming group and the proprietor of the Monte Carlo, the Bellagio, Caesar’s Palace, the Luxor, the Mirage, and several other extravagant casinos on the Las Vegas strip. At the same time it was also reported that Dubai Holdings had bought a 50 per cent stake in MGM Mirage’s $7 billion residential and leisure CityCenter project.
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And in 2008 it was reported that Abu Dhabi’s Mubadala Development Company was setting up a joint venture with MGM Mirage.
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This has resulted in the building of a $3 billion MGM resort in Abu Dhabi, including a 600 bedroom MGM Grand hotel.
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Prostitution is also on the rise in the Gulf monarchies, with Dubai and Bahrain having long stood out as major centres in the region’s sex
tourism industry, and with the authorities in Abu Dhabi and Qatar increasingly turning a blind eye to the activity. Almost all demands appear to be catered for, with many hotels in these cities—including luxury establishments—being awash with high class escorts in the evenings, while in Dubai there are also many streetwalkers in certain areas. Although there are occasional crackdowns, usually preceding Ramadan, in practice the police rarely intervene and soliciting and kerb crawling is usually left unchecked. Most prostitutes arrive in the Gulf monarchies on tourist visas, or are initially employed as hostesses or waitresses in hotels and restaurants. In many cases they are separated from their passports by their sponsors or employers, and often end up trapped in a debt cycle, where they have to find ways to pay off the cost of their visas and accommodation. While some originate from other parts of the Arab world and Iran, a large number come from much further afield, including Central Asia, East Asia, and Eastern Europe.

The exact routes into prostitution in the Gulf monarchies tend to differ, varying from country to country, but in general it is either a story of entrapment or human trafficking. Entire books have now been devoted to the subject, especially regarding the women who end up in Dubai.
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In most cases it is a story of economic deprivation, misery, human rights abuses, and a disregard of the values and traditions that the indigenous populations of the Gulf monarchies are supposed to uphold. Commenting on the situation from the perspective of a major supplier country, an Iranian military officer has explained that ‘…notorious women used to identify young women and girls from [Iranian] families with financial difficulties, then under the pretext of happiness for these girls in Persian Gulf countries, they offered a ransom to the families and in a matter of three weeks they transferred these girls to Dubai. After arrival in Dubai, through their network, they introduced these girls to Arab businessmen. Each girl was sold for $5000 profit for their families and ten times the amount for the traffickers. The buyers used these girls for their sinister business’. Providing another example, he explained how men masquerading as taxi drivers would drive around Tehran identifying runaway girls, and then report them to traffickers who would then arrange for their visa and passport to go to the Gulf monarchies. The travel details were described as ‘…taking no more than a month, and were arranged under the pretext of tourism. While waiting for passport and visa, these girls were promised a better and prosperous life and marriage to Arab Sheikhs.
However, after entering UAE, the ring members handed these girls over to brothels and prostitution networks’.
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