An Afghanistan Picture Show: Or, How I Saved the World (25 page)

In his pamphlet
What Type of Struggle?
(whose cover bears as its device a shining Qur’an nested between swords and wreaths), Professor B. Rabbani, the head of Jamiat-i-Islami Afghanistan, writes the following (September 1981): “…  manners and behaviours should be selected very carefully. For instance; where preaching can be a mean
[sic]
for invitation (to the Way of Allah), implication of arms is not concordant with the wisdom of Islamic teaching. On the other hand, if expression and persuasion is not able to penetrate through the closed doors of contumacy and deviation or arguments and reasonings do not influence proudness, and if invitation is faced with inimical resistance of vanity, then non-implication of weapons (conduct of armed struggle) is idiocy and ignorance.”
^g

Oh, how nice it would have been if the Mujahideen had appeared spontaneously following the Russian invasion! It would still have been almost perfect if they had come into being after Taraki’s coup in 1978, because THAT was probably bad, too, but if Rabbani and Gulbuddin and the rest of them had begun as creatures of the Pakistanis, then they
were
bandits, as the Soviets called them; they
were
terrorists. —It was very difficult for me to accept the tainted origins of necessity.

The National Uprising that the Reliable Source was paying homage to occurred in July of 1975. It was called the Panjsher Insurgency. Everyone
agrees that the rebels were led by the mullahs. And who trained them? Pakistan, of course, denied that it had had anything to do with it. The Afghan population failed to join, and the government helicopters came quickly, shooting the rebels down; they captured ninety-three and found all but sixteen guilty, and then Daoud went on with his business.

But does what some of the groups
were
matter now? Was the Young Man right to feel that the Afghan Resistance was tainted by its origins? —I think not—not at present. I think that the effects of the Soviet presence in Afghanistan have been appallingly evil. Resistance is justified no matter where it comes from. Then, too, if we do accept the Reliable Source’s account, can we say that Daoud was right in his efforts to modernize the country? That (thank God for small favors) is a matter now so laughably academic…

Comparing politics to a chess game, as the Reliable Source loved to do, is, of course, trite in our own mass society, where we expect our politicians to play, and if necessary cheat, for our well-being, while the newspapers glowingly explain the moves for us—for the comparison is trite precisely because it is so valid. The Reliable Source’s use of the phrase was equally justified. —It was the British who first began to speak of the “Great Game” between their empire and Russia’s; and Afghanistan was at the center of the board.
^h
Every new development was less a willed decision than an inevitable crystallization, for the Game was so Great as to be playing the players rather than the reverse. —“In the natural process of civilized and civilizing Powers which I have already dwelt upon,” wrote Lord Lytton on September 4, 1878 (they were invading

Afghanistan again that year), “wherever we leave a vacuum, Russia will assuredly fill it up.” In the last few years before the Soviets gave Afghanistan their Christmas present, as the Reliable Source saw his anxieties congeal and solidify into real monsters, the Game continued, subject to the same pressures of cosmic law: Each of the players made his move because the dynamic equilibrium of the Game forced him to; he was only trying to hold his own, you see. More years fell by the wayside; we spoke of the requirements of Containment when we fought Soviet bogeys in Central America; while
they
explained that progression from one social arrangement to another occurs only on a one-way escalator, so that feudalism in Afghanistan MUST give way to socialism as a result of Economic Laws, and all the U.S.S.R. was doing was protecting and implementing and developing. Both players advised their pawns to relax and continue down the slaughter chute.
—
“
Under the banner of the great April Revolution,
ⁱ
forward along the path toward full unity of all the national and progressive forces, toward the final victory of the national democratic, anti-feudal, anti-imperialist revolution, for the creation of a new proud, free and independent Afghanistan!
” screamed Babrak Karmal after being airlifted into office. (Naturally, it is not in my interest to quote a U.S. counter-example; for if I were so principled as to insist that we help the Afghans for their own sake, not because they are anti-Soviet, whom would I have left to advance their cause with me?) —History shows that the Game has always gone on, no matter who the players are; so if the world must indeed be run in this rotten way we should not blame the Reliable Source, but honor him for his honesty. How ludicrous, how foully ludicrous, when a player pretends not to be playing (though that is part of the Game, too), as when, for instance, the Soviets insist that they uphold the quaint ethnic strictures of backward countries: In the
Moscow News Weekly
No. 24 (June 21–28, 1981), a column entitled “The Home Hearth: From Our Correspondent in Kabul” has the Elder of the Pashtun Tribe say, “The U.S.S.R.’s military help to Afghanistan is in full accord with the code of honor of the Pashtun tribe, the Pashtunwali. It says that if an enemy has attacked your
country you can appeal to your neighbors to help oppose the enemy.” —As the Persian proverb runs, “If the king says at noonday, ‘It is night,’ the wise man says, ‘Behold the stars.’ ”

“Did the Mujahideen groups accept and trust you and President Bhutto?” asked the Young Man.

“They basically trusted us. And that is why they remained with us from when they first came, in October 1973.
^j
I would say that there were various periods when we were more or less happy or unhappy with each other in the sense that from October ’73 until about November ’74 they were very happy with us because I was here, and I was looking after them.” —The Reliable Source sighed. —“Then, fortunately or unfortunately, my successor who came, he thought he was a soldier, and should not dabble in this political business. So he then deprived us … He, let us say, went slow on it. It was a question of policy. It was not a question of personality. The result was that there was a little relaxation in the manner of support.”

“It must have been a very tricky job for you,” the Young Man said.

“Why?”

“Well, you must have been worried about Mr. Daoud.”

“No, at that time they were playing their games with us. So the fact is, when one side is trying to play a game according to its own rules, then you also set your own set of rules. We lost Habib Raman, but we brought a very major change to Daoud’s mind. He was compelled to come and talk with us.
^k
He was compelled also to understand the nature of those changes, and that is why he requested us, in 1977, ‘Please postpone your election on the elder tribal franchise basis, in the tribal
area, for one year.’ He said, ‘You give me some time, so I can bring about a certain amount of reform, so that otherwise, they would rebel against me.’ Because you could see people feeling the change over here.”

How desperate was Daoud by the time he talked with Bhutto and the Reliable Source? Did he have any suspicion of what his end, what his country’s end, was going to be? And did the Reliable Source feel less enmity toward him during that meeting, simply by virtue of his precarious position? For however much he disliked Daoud, I imagine that he cared for Taraki somewhat less.

“Now what was the reaction in Afghanistan and in those political groups when Bhutto was replaced by General Zia?” asked the Young Man.

“You see, that is when the split amongst the group came. At the time when they were looked after, they were undoubtedly controlled in a certain manner, in the sense that they remained in one group.”

“What form did that control take?”

“By—
understanding
,” said the Reliable Source. “They understood and we understood that we and they had a common program, with the result that we were supporting them to the extent that they required. And they understood, too, that we were using each man according to his ability. Now, this fellow Gulbuddin, he is a militant; Khalis is militant; Nabi
^l
 … they are all militant. Rabbani, on the other hand, he is one who would like to carry it out through a program of education. He was a preacher in Scandinavian countries. He came to us toward the end of ’76.† So we told him that he was doing an adequate job in Scandinavia, and he should continue over there; no need for him at the moment, because all the other groups were here, and they were united … But they were all agreed on wanting Zaher Shah back. That is why their representatives went and met with him at end of ’76, early ’77, and
he agreed to come and lead them, because they also needed a central leadership.”

“So why isn’t Zaher Shah here coordinating things now?”

“Ah, that is because General Zia got cold feet, I suppose.”

“You think all the major factions still want Zaher Shah?”

“Not today. You see, Khomeini had come by then, and that was one reason; and secondly I told you that after July ’77
^m
they became a rabble; they became a disorganized group for lack of support. Everyone started looking around. Someone went to Kuwait, someone went to Saudi Arabia and so on, because they were not getting the support they wanted or desired within Pakistan.”

“So where are they getting their support now?” asked the Young Man.

“Now? From the Americans.”

“From the C.I.A.?”

“Yes.”

“General Zia isn’t—?”

“That—that is, my own impression is that, because, uh, there are so many things one cannot say directly,” cried the Reliable Source. “If you turn this tape recorder off, I will tell you …”

The recorder was shut off for ten minutes.
ⁿ