Attack on Pearl Harbor (20 page)

The fighters searched for their primary target, enemy defensive fighters in the air. After fifteen minutes of futile search most had given up hope of aerial opposition and instead transitioned into strafing attacks on any reasonable ground target, and some unreasonable ones. While there were some reports of inexpert pilots and inaccurate machine gun attacks, on the aggregate they were highly effective. Considering that many of the bombers were assigned to hit hangars and administrative buildings, it is likely that most of the American aircraft were actually destroyed and damaged by strafing fighters. Inexpert or not, the American aircraft parked in orderly, compact rows were targets that could hardly be missed.

The dive-bombers beat the torpedo bombers to Pearl Harbor. The first bomb was aimed at the southern tip of Ford Island, where there was an amphibious seaplane ramp, an aircraft hangar, and parked aircraft. Various accounts claim that it either destroyed a PBY-5 Catalina seaplane or missed the island entirely. Additional bombs followed, blasting the seaplane and the hangars, and generating a black column of smoke visible for twenty miles. Some ships immediately called away General Quarters. One, still very much in a peacetime mindset, called away their Rescue and Assistance Party thinking that a terrible accident had occurred.

The torpedo bombers were in two groups of two formations each. Murata, commander of
Akagi’s
air group, led 12
Kaga
and 12
Akagi
Kates assigned to attack the battleships moored on the east side of Ford Island. Second in overall command was Lieutenant Matsumara Hirata, the torpedo squadron leader off
Hiryu
, who led eight
Soryu
and eight
Hiryu
torpedo bombers against the carrier moorings. As the torpedo bombers approached Oahu, Murata wagged his wings to signal the shift into attack formation.

The two forces separated, with Matsumara flying down the east side of the Waianae Range and Murata down the west side. The
Hiryu
and
Soryu
carrier attack planes moved into two strings of eight, while the
Akagi
and
Kaga
torpedo bombers tried to form into a single long line of 24 aircraft at 400-meter intervals.

The formation change was poorly executed. Contributing factors were the speed change, the confusion over the flares, and the unplanned location of the formation change, all coupled with the lack of a meaningful rehearsal. Some intervals between aircraft opened out to 1,500 to 1,800 meters, about 25 seconds between aircraft.
⁷
Followers could not keep track of their leaders, and it was impossible for leaders to exert control over their formations. Some aircraft missed turns and ended up orbiting, searching for their comrades, and falling behind the rest of the attack groups.

The distances prevented communication with hand signals, and radio silence was maintained, even well after it made sense to do so–the Japanese totally ignored the potential of the voice radios that had been installed over the previous year. Japanese aviators later remarked that their radios were unreliable, and considered them of little use. Only the most basic “follow me” leadership was possible in the approach, none for the attack.

Each
shotai
(for this attack, increased to four aircraft instead of the normal three) would normally remain together, but each plane commander (who could be the pilot, navigator, or radioman/gunner, depending upon who was senior) had the authority to alter the target. Some overruled the decision of their
shotai
leaders.

Matsumura and his radioman searched the northwest side of Ford Island with binoculars trying to identify targets. The rising sun made determining ship types impossible. Nagai, leading the
Soryu
eight, became impatient. Matsumura related that Nagai drew up alongside and “urged me by hand signal to quicken the attack pace.” Perhaps thinking it better to allow Nagai to get in his attack before the dive-bombers thoroughly woke up the island, Matsumura assented. Nagai banked left and, followed by the seven other
Soryu
torpedo bombers, descended to 150 feet and headed directly for the harbor.

Matsumura turned south, delaying his approach while trying to identify the ships at the carrier moorings. Six of the eight aircraft in his formation missed his turn and ended up orbiting Ewa Town trying to get their bearings.

Torpedo Attacks:
Soryu
and
Hiryu
Bombers

Nagai approached the carrier anchorages from the northwest. Nagai’s observer tried to classify targets using binoculars, but glare from the rising sun reflecting off the water interfered with his view. Nagai, however, was able to identify
Utah
, and rejected her as a target. He saw what he thought to be a battleship moored alongside 1010 Dock, where he had been briefed that the Pacific Fleet flagship
Pennsylvania
often moored. He turned to pass south of Ford Island to get into position for an attack run, followed by Petty Officer First Class Mori Juzo. But Lieutenant (junior grade) Nakajima Tatsumi, leading the trailing half of the formation, broke away, banked left, and led three others against
Utah
.
⁸
Nakajima saw a battleship and went for it, not recognizing that the shapes over the barbettes were not turrets, but boxes covering empty holes.

Mori, following behind Nagai, could not see a target along the carrier moorings worth a torpedo. Observing Nakajima begin his attack, he thought, “How silly. Can’t they see that two of the ships are nothing but cruisers?”
⁹
Then the two trailing torpedo bombers in his own group of four broke off to join Nakajima, leaving him to follow his leader alone of the eight
Soryu
torpedo bombers.

Six of the eight
Soryu
torpedo bombers went for
Utah
, flying closely past nests of destroyers to execute their attack against targets foreshortened by the angle of approach. They attacked while the American defenses still slept. Six torpedoes hit the water, but only two hit their target, slamming into
Utah
just before its colors were to be raised at 0800. One of the first torpedoes missed
Utah
so badly it hit the adjacent cruiser
Raleigh
, according to her executive officer, at about 0755.

The other ten torpedo bombers assigned to attack the carrier moorings, spurning further waste of ordnance against a target ship and aged small cruisers, went looking for battleships.

Nagai, followed by Mori, lined up to make his run against the ships berthed along 1010 Dock, only to discover there was no battleship.
Pennsylvania
was in drydock; her prestigious berth was occupied instead by the light cruiser
Helena
with the WWI minelayer
Oglala
, flagship of the Pacific Fleet Mine Force, moored outboard. In accordance with the attack prioritization scheme,
Helena
was a valid target, a modern 10,000-ton cruiser barely two years in commission. However, Nagai wasn’t after anything as small as a cruiser. He was deceived by the backlit superimposed silhouettes of the two ships and took the pair to be a battleship. His torpedo scored, passing under
Oglala’s
keel to slam into one of
Helena’s
engine rooms.
Helena’s
engine room clock stopped at 0757.
¹⁰

Mori, next behind him, was close to releasing his torpedo:

Mori broke off his attack.

Meanwhile, Lieutenant Kadono Hiroharu, who had missed Matsumura’s turn and ended up orbiting over Ewa, observed Nagai’s torpedo hit
Helena
. He decided to go for the same target. He led five other
Hiryu
torpedo bombers towards
Helena
.

When Kadono saw Mori abort his run he also pulled off, followed by Petty Officer First Class Sugimoto. But the other four pressed their attack. More ominously for the Japanese, the defenses awakened: they had to press their attacks into the face of AA fire from
Helena
,
Oglala
, and
Shaw
. AA fire caused at least one out-of-envelope drop. One torpedo missed, destroying a power transformer station on the pier next to Helena; the others buried themselves in the mud. Four torpedoes, no hits.

Kadono’s bomber was hit by AA—a bullet nicked a fuel line, spraying gasoline into the cockpit. Kadono’s navigator wrapped a rag around the leak and held it in place by hand until they regained the carrier.

As the
Helena
attackers came out of their runs they cut across the attack route of the
Akagi
and
Kaga
bombers going against Battleship Row.

Torpedo Attacks:
Akagi
and
Kaga
Bombers from the East

Matsumura, leading 24 torpedo bombers from
Akagi
and
Kaga
, passed Ewa, ten miles west of Pearl Harbor, heading southeast. The
Akagi
and
Kaga
torpedo bombers trailed him at 500 meters altitude, trying to attain a spacing of 500 meters between aircraft with 100 meters offset to the left rear. Their formation was ragged and they were obviously having difficulty establishing their assigned intervals. Smoke from a fire on the south tip of Ford Island blocked Matsumura’s view of the harbor. He turned east to gain a position to attack Battleship Row. The aircraft following him, distracted by Nagai’s attack, missed the turn. Thus, the leader of all the torpedo bombers found himself with no one to lead.

The bulk of the formations continued south until they were over the ocean, turned left to skirt the coast, then turned left again to approach Hickam Field from the southwest while dropping to 50 meters altitude. Past the field and the Naval Shipyard, they pulled a sharp left turn to head down the Southeast Loch past the Submarine Base, dropping to 20 meters. Murata, at the head of the line, was immediately greeted by machine gun fire.

The timing of the attack can be determined from testimony of the aviators and by time-and-distance calculations tracing their route. As they passed southwest of Pearl Harbor, their view of Battleship Row was blocked by the column of smoke rising from the first dive-bomber attacks, indicating they passed after the first bombs exploded and the smoke cloud had developed. They headed south to the ocean, turned left, passed Hickam Field, and then left again to line up with the Southeast Loch, a total distance of four to eight miles. Cruising at 140 knots, the first torpedo attack against Battleship Row was delivered four minutes after the first bomb hit, and four to eight minutes after the first torpedo was dropped against the carrier moorings. Nagai made his attack run almost the same time as Murata dropped the first torpedo against
Oklahoma
.

The times can be calculated using
Helena’
s engine room clock as a benchmark.
Helena
was hit at 0757. Using relative motion, speeds, and distances traveled by Nagai and Nakajima,
Helena
was attacked probably two minutes after the first attack against
Utah
and
Raleigh
, making
Raleigh’
s XO’s report of being hit at 0755 accurate. This would time the first torpedo hit on Battleship Row at just before colors (0800).

Of the
Hiryu
and
Soryu
torpedo bombers, Matsumura, Shira, Petty Officer Third Class Oku Yasumi, and Kadono and his wingman Sugimoto, all headed to join the attackers against Battleship Row, taking different routes. They intermixed with
Akagi
and
Kaga
bombers, disrupting approaches. Some of the Battleship Row attackers were forced to abort and go around for second attempts. The torpedo bombers’ attacks would last for 11 to 15 minutes, though the majority managed to release their weapons during the first ten minutes.

The first torpedo hit a battleship as early as 0757, possibly as late as 0759.
¹²
The defenders took advantage of the precious minutes’ warning afforded by the Ford Island bomb blasts, so that when the first torpedo plane sped past the Navy Yard to hit
Oklahoma
, many AA gunners were ready. As related in the destroyer
Bagley’
s AR: