Attack on Pearl Harbor (59 page)

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. 21 Sept 1945.

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Television

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Introduction: Folklore, Viewed With a Critical Eye

1
Letter from Ensign William Robinson in Mrazek, xv.

2
. Lambert and Polmar, 8. Rusbridger and Nave. Stinnett. Gannon. Theobald.

3
. Slackman, 76. Prange, 1981. 203. Slackman, 9. “Unsolved History: the Myths of Pearl Harbor.” Military History Channel, 14 November 2009.

4
. Most histories accept the “brilliant” label. See Robinson, bbc.co.uk/history/ worldswars/wwtwo/pearl_harbor_05.shtml. The only major history that questions a perfect performance by the attackers is Willmott, 1982, 134. He criticizes over-concentration on battleships. Clarke, 114. O’Connell, 314. Edwards, 14. Hone, Trent, 2003, 1107.

5
. Toland, 236.

6
. Agawa, 229.

7
. Prange, 1981, 437, 419, 338.

8
. Werneth, 109.

9
. Willmott, et al, 2001, 61.

10
. A Japanese retrospective study was conducted circa August 1942. It is included as Chapter 18, “Japanese Study of the Pearl Harbor Operation,” in Goldstein and Dillon, 1993. 278–311. This document has been little cited in general histories. The report, referred to as
Lessons
, will be discussed later.

11
. Slackman, 119.

12
. Parshall.
www.combinedfleet.com/battles/Attack_on_Pearl_Harbor
, accessed 22 July 2009.

13
. Poolman, 130.

14
. “Unsolved History: Myths of Pearl Harbor.” The Military Channel, 14 November 2009.

15
. Stephan, 27.

16
. Repeated in many places, such as Rear Admiral Grossgean (USN, ret), in “Unsolved History: Myths of Pearl Harbor.”

17
. Willmott, et al, 2001, 70–71.

18
. See McFarland, O’Neil, March 2002.

19
. Smith, Douglas, 23.

Chapter 1: Strategic and Operational Setting

1
. Drea, 102.

2
. Willmott, et al, 2001, 50, 52. Agawa, 193.

3
. Stephan, 74.

4
. Stephan, 75. Asada, 18.

5
. Pelz, 42.

6
. Prange, 1981, 33.

7
. Evans and Peattie.

8
. Burlingame, 19.

9
.
The Great Pacific War
was published while Yamamoto was serving as naval attaché in Washington. Toland, 150.

10
. Stephan, 2.

11
. Lambert and Polmar, 23. The use of Pearl Harbor as a target for raiding forces during US Navy Fleet Exercises has been misinterpreted in most histories. The Fleet did most of its exercises in the Pacific or the Caribbean to take advantage of good weather at a location remote from civilian activities (anyone who has attempted to clear a firing range of civilian shipping, fishing boats and curiosity-seekers can testify to the desire for remoteness). The fleet trained to seize and hold advanced operating bases. The war plans expected the initial objective to be the Marshall Islands, with the force based out of Pearl Harbor. This movement could be practiced over similar distances by a transit from the US west coast terminating at Pearl Harbor. At the same time, the Pearl Harbor defenses needed to be exercised, and could serve as opposition. The repeated use of Pearl Harbor as a Fleet Exercise target was more a consequence of geography than a prophecy of a surprise attack on the fleet’s base. Similarly, in 1941 the Army held large-scale maneuvers in Louisiana, but that did not mean that an invasion of Louisiana was expected.

12
. Pelz, 26.

13
. Agawa, 31.

14
. Agawa, 195.

15
. Pelz, 35.

16
. Willmott, et al, 2001, 37.

17
. Willmott, et al, 2001, 38

18
. Stephan, 73.

19
. Agawa, 175.

20
. Evans and Peattie, 2.

21
. Prange, 1981, 16. Toland, 152.

22
. Agawa, 399. Toland, 152.

23
. Agawa, 91–3.

24
. Asada, 184.

25
. Prange, 1981, 99.

26
. Prange, 1981, 34.

27
. Francillon, 350.

28
. Agawa, 71, 105–6.

29
. An obvious question is, “What else could Yamamoto have done?” The Japanese fleet had precious few reserves and was stretched thin over thousands of miles of attacks. But there were reserves—in particular, there were six battleships and two light carriers in the Inland Sea that were uncommitted, and could have been deployed to augment the two fast battleships and seven heavy cruisers in the South China Sea. The six days from the British warship’s well-publicized arrival at Singapore to the beginning of the war would not have provided sufficient time for the battleships to arrive in the South China Sea for the beginning of hostilities, but they could have arrive a few days thereafter.

30
. Willmott, et al, 2001, 83.

31
. Some historians have erroneously stated that the objective of the attack was the American aircraft carriers, such as the television program “Unsolved History: Myths of Pearl Harbor.” Carriers were indeed included in the Operations Order priority list, but as a second priority target: “The order of targets will be battleships and then aircraft carriers.” Carrier Striking Task Force Operations Order No. 3, 23 November 1941, in Goldstein and Dillon, 1993, 101.

32
. Werneth, 247.

33
. The reserve force of battleships, based out of the Inland Sea, was cruising south of the Bonins to “support”
Kido Butai
as it retired from the Pearl Harbor strike. These forces were over 2,000 miles apart, making support problematic. The battleships undoubtedly got underway as a morale measure, to avoid the shame of remaining in port while the rest of the fleet fought. After several submarine scares, the battleships cranked on knots for home, realizing that pride was not worth exposing the precious battleships to damage.

34
. Japanese battleships and battlecruisers were located as follows: off Indo China, 2: (BC
Haruna
, BC
Kongo
); Empire, 6: (BB
Nagato
, BB
Mutsu
, BB
Fuso
, BB
Yamashiro
, BB
Hyuga
, BB
Ise
); with the carrier striking force, 2: (BC
Kirishima
, BC
Hiei)
. Under construction, Empire: 4: (BB
Yamato
, fitting out, in service 5/19/42; BB
Musashi
, to be commissioned 8/5/42; BB
Shinano;
BB Hull No. 111). American operational battleships totaled 14: Pearl Harbor, 7: (BB-36
Nevada
, BB-37
Oklahoma
, BB-39
Arizona
, BB-43
Tennessee
; BB-44
California
; BB-46
Maryland
, BB-48
West Virginia
); East Coast US, 7: Casco Bay, 4 (BB-35
Texas
, BB-33
Arkansas
, BB-40
New Mexico
, BB-41
Mississippi
); Norfolk, 1 (BB-56
Washington
); Iceland, 1 (BB-42
Idaho
); Caribbean, 1 (BB-55
North Carolina
,). There were 11 battleships in the pipeline: Bremerton, 1: overhaul, (BB-45
Colorado
, completed 31 Mar 42); Norfolk, 1: overhaul (BB-34
New York
, completed Dec 41); Pearl Harbor, 1: refit, 1 (BB-38
Pennsylvania
, completed Dec 41). US East Coast, 8: under construction, 8 (BB-57
South Dakota
, commissioned 3/20/42; BB-58
Indiana
, commissioned 4/30/42; BB-59
Massachusetts
, commissioned 5/15/42; BB-60
Alabama
, commissioned 8/16/42; BB-61
Iowa
, commissioned 2/22/43; BB-62
New Jersey
, commissioned 5/23/43; BB-63
Missouri
, commissioned 6/11/44; BB-64
Wisconsin
, commissioned 4/16/44).

35
. Willmott, et al, 2001, 157.

36
. Prange, 1981, 374.

37
. Not included are the ships assigned to the Asiatic Fleet, one heavy cruiser, two light cruiser and 13 destroyers, which were in the immediate path of the Japanese advance and would likely not participate in any sorties of the Pacific Fleet from Pearl Harbor.

38
. Weinberg, 195–204.

39
. Agawa, 292.

40
. Willmott, 1982, 8.

41
. Asada, 108–9.

42
. Agawa, 196.

43
. Kinoaki, 208.

44
. SECRET letter, Chief of Naval Operations to Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, 10 December 1934.

45
. Asada, 181. Stephan, 80.

46
. Agawa, 196, 200, 202.

47
. Asada, 263.

48
. Agawa, 197.

49
. Miller, 286–7.

50
. Miller, 308.

51
. This practice also is a hint that the fuel tanks mentioned above were constructed during the war and not before.

52
. Agawa, 197.

53
. Stephan, 99. Agawa, 217.

54
. Stephan, 115.

55
. Aldrich, 64.

56
. OPNAV 16 V # A43, 2.

57
. This includes the
Yamato
class, whose bulk concealed a number of damage control flaws. According to Nathan Okun, “The anti-torpedo protection of
Yamato
was improperly designed. It used deep empty voids between the side and the innermost NVNC "holding" bulkhead (also the very thick—8" at the top and 3" at the bottom—anti-diving-shell lower belt). There was nothing to stop the concussion of the [torpedo] detonation shockwave, blast, and considerable number of high-speed fragments but a few thin bulkheads prior to hitting the innermost holding bulkhead. If even a few feet of water had been used to soak up part of the blast and almost all of the fragments, the protection would have worked better. A single torpedo hit snapped
Yamato
’s holding bulkhead off at the top where it joined the heavy waterline VH belt since it was not keyed to the belt. This led to very large amounts of flooding. This was never remedied, though somewhat reinforced later.”

58
. Agawa, 196.

59
. In the first six months of the war these ships served at the following locations:
Akashi
at Palau, Davao, Staring Bay, Ambon, and joined the Midway invasion force;
Asahi
at Camrahn Bay, Singapore, and then sunk by submarine on 25 May 1942;
Yamabiko Maru
at Takao, Balikpapan, Makassar, and Singapore;
Matsue Maru
at Truk, sunk by submarine on12 May 1942;
Urakami Maru
was evidently as much a coal transport ship as repair ship. She served a route between Truk, Kwajalein, and Ponape, delivering coal and making repairs as necessary.

60
. Agawa, 195–6.

61
. The Japanese would go to such extremes as to convert a musical instrument factory into aircraft propeller production. On the Japanese economy, see O’Neil, 2003, Cohen, Bisson, Barnhart.

62
. Prange, 1981, 298.

63
. There was another possible objective, an internal political goal within the context of war. Zenshiro Hoshima was the Secretary General of the Imperial Navy and Emperor Hirohito’s naval advisor. He argued strenuously against war with America. He “came to believe that Yamamoto, who also opposed war with America, staged the brilliant strike at Pearl Harbor not only to cripple the US Fleet, but to give the Imperial Navy parity with the Japanese Army.” Burlingame, 47.

64
. Willmott, et al, 2001, 39.

65
. Prange, 1981, 21.

66
. Agawa, 243–4.

Chapter 2: Targets, Weapons, and Weapon-Target Pairings

1
. Prange, 1981, 19.

2
. Agawa, 221.

3
. At the time of Genda’s study carriers
Shokaku
and
Zuikaku
were still fitting out. The original dates of the attack would have been before they were operational.

4
. Prange, 1981, 27.

5
. Ships put into shipyard for underwater damage repair usually also undergo overhaul and modernization, which might add months to the total duration. For example,
California
and
West Virginia
were extensively rebuilt and modernized after their damage at Pearl Harbor, and would not emerge from the shipyards until January and September, 1944, 26 and 34 months after Pearl Harbor. They were delayed by low priorities and the crush of other work in West Coast shipyards. In contrast, when Saratoga was torpedoed in January 1942, BuShips estimated she could be placed back in action in four to six weeks if necessary. The decision was made to modernize her. She had her 8-inch and 5”/25 guns replaced with sixteen 5”/38s taken from new construction ships, a hull blister installed, her flight deck widened and lengthened forward, her light AA battery augmented, new radar and gun directors installed, and was still out of the shipyard in four months. The priority of work and state of modernization of the ship had a huge influence on repair times. Friedman, 1983, 51.

6
.
German Fire Effect Tables
, 15–16.

7
. Prange, 1981, 21–22, 99.

8
. Werneth, 199.

9
. Captain Baron Tomioka from the Operations Section of the First Bureau. Prange, 1981, 104–5.

10
. Sakai, 48. The only Allied fighter at that time with “strategic” range was the P-38 Lightning, just coming into service at the end of 1941. Similar range-extending fuel conservation techniques were developed for the P-38 Lightning but were not in place in the Pacific until 1943. Lindbergh, the famed pilot who first crossed the Atlantic in solo flight, made a tour of front-line squadrons to help train the pilots and “popularize” the techniques, which almost doubled the combat radius of the aircraft.