Attack on Pearl Harbor (63 page)

22
. Lambert and Polmar, 68.

23
. Clarke, 61.

24
. Arakaki and Kuborn, 16.

25
. Official AAF claims were 9 kills, 4 probable, 2 damaged.

26
. Hough, et al.

27
. Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet. “The Battle of Midway.” Report A16 0 1849.

28
. First Air Fleet’s Detailed Battle Report #6, “Midway operation from 27 May 1942 to 9 June 1942.” Reprinted in The ONI Review, May 1947. There are conflicting numbers of kills given in various sections of the report. The number used, eight kills, comes from the tally of losses from each of carriers, which has five aircraft lost to enemy aircraft, three aircraft lost to ground fire, and one lost to an unspecified cause. In addition, the report of the
Hiryu
fighters states that “nine suffered hits (of which two became inoperational).” In many other reports the Japanese tended to count aircraft as “shot down” only if they were immediately destroyed in the air-to-air combat. Aircraft that were damaged but ditched or crashed on the return flight were not reported as air-to-air kills, but using some euphemism (such as “became inoperational”). However, this could also mean that the aircraft were deemed unflyable after they had returned and landed on the carrier. Thus, this analysis will use five kills as a lower bound and eight kills as the upper bound of kills achieved by the Midway fighters.

29
. This kill ratio would be less inflated than usually seen in air-to-air kill claims, because the Flying Tiger pilots were paid a bonus for each kill, which required strict documentation of the kill, usually by recovering parts of the crashed aircraft as evidence.

30
. US pilots left training with about 300 hours. Perhaps 100 of that would be in fighter-type aircraft, mostly in older biplanes. Pilots in the groups reinforcing the Philippines were mostly taken directly out of flight school, assigned, waited for transportation, and then shipped via sea, a process which took months, during which they did not fly. Upon arrival some of them got hours in the Philippine Air Force P-36 aircraft, but most had to wait until their P-40 aircraft were unboxed and assembled. Aircraft were still being assembled and tested when the war began.

31
. Lambert and Polmar, 68.

32
.
Japanese Air Power
, 5.

33
. Lambert and Polmar, 68–9.

34
. Leonard.

35
. Prange, 1981, 228.

36
. Arakaki and Kuborn, 58.

37
. Clarke, 60.

38
. Lambert and Polmar, 40, gives 76 mobile Army guns, and an additional 8 USMC guns were at Ewa Field. There were also 16 of the new SCR-268 radar gun directors available. The calculation does not include the Ewa guns, as the duration of the attack on that field is not available. At the time of the battle, ammunition transport vehicles had to be dispatched to the central magazine at Aliamanu Crater, where each battery was issued 1200 rounds, or 300 rounds per gun. Allowing 40 minutes of driving time plus loading time would mean that resupply during the course of the action would not have been possible, particularly considering the huge traffic jam that existed at the magazine.

Chapter 10: Assessing the Folklore

1
. Slackman, 63.

2
. Slackman, 152.

3
. Burton, xiv.

4
. Belote and Belote, 3.

5
. Peattie, 31.

6
. Genda, in Goldstein and Dillon, 1993, 12.

7
. Prange, 1981, 271.

8
. Lieutenant Commander Hirata Matsumura, quoted in Werneth, 172.

9
. Goldstein and Dillon, 1993, 284–5.

10
.There are different figures given for the numbers of aircraft carried by Japanese ships. In addition to their normal operational complement, they would also carry spare aircraft fully or partially disassembled, and might also carry additional experimental aircraft or aircraft to be ferried to another location on an overload basis. The numbers might also change as the war progressed, reflecting modifications to the ship or its operational doctrine. The above numbers reflect the usual published figures for their pre-war operational capacities.

11
. Werneth, 199–200.

12
. Goldstein and Dillon, 1993, 23.

13
. The Japanese light carriers
Ryujo
,
Zuiho
, and
Hosho
went to war carrying the previous-generation A5M Claude fighter. Francillon, 346.

14
. Prange, 1981, 272. It is noteworthy that, in spite of the need for carriers to support the movement south,
Shoho
began the war in port Nagaski. She worked up a new air group for all of December and January, first becoming operational on 4 February 1942 when she transited from Empire waters to Truk. This provides an indication of how short the Japanese were of carrier qualified aviators.

15
. Willmott, et al, 2001, 58.

16
. Goldstein and Dillon, 1993, 284–5.

17
. Smith, 2005, 155.

18
. DeBlanc, 17.

19
.
www.heritage.nf.ca/law/royal_air.html
, accessed 12/26/08.

20
. Prange, 1991, 28.

21
. Willmott, et al, 2001, 77. Prange, 1981, 237.

22
. “Unsolved History: Myths of Pearl Harbor.” The Military Channel. The two luminaries were Larry Bond of Harpoon fame, and Captain Chris Carlson (USN, ret).

23
. Middlebrook and Mahoney, 40, 44, 184.

24
. In one training run Japanese level bombers scored 40% hits on the underway target ship
Settsu
, a remarkable achievement considering that the B5N Kate did not have a mechanical bomb sight. However, training against maneuvering ships had been abandoned in favor of training against stationary targets, as the US battleships were expected to be at anchor.

25
. Calhoun, 71–3.

26
. Lenton, 107.

27
.
www.history.navy.mil/faqs/faq66-1.htm
.

28
. Goldstein, Dillon and Wenger, 1991, 24.

29
. Yergin, 327.

30
. Morison, 125.

31
. Morison, quoted in Willmott, et al, 2001, 142.

32
. Prange, 1981, 550.

33
. Goldstein, Dillon and Wenger, 1991, 24.

34
. van der Vat, 21–2.

35
. Clarke, 119.

36
. Prange, 1986, 509.

37
. Peattie, 168. Emphasis as in the original.

38
. Gailey.

39
. “Myths of Pearl Harbor.” The Military Channel.

40
. Imperial War Museum web site,
www.iwm.org.uk/upload/package/25/pearl_harbor/index.htm
.

41
. Toland, 223.

42
. United States Naval Institute, 27.

43
. Prange, 1983, 542

44
. Prange, 1990, 40–1.

45
. Goldstein and Dillon, 1993. Willmott, et al, 2001, 156.

46
. Willmott, et al, 2001, 156–7.

47
. Parshall, 130.

48
. Willmott, et al, 2001. 155–157.

49
. Stillwell, 1981, 139.

50
. Parshall, 130.

51
. Willmott, et al, 2001, 155–6.

52
. Prange, 1981, 545, reports 74 damaged: 23 fighters, 41 bombers and 10 torpedo planes.

53
. The carriers had 54 aircraft spares. A few of the spares were assembled before December 8th. If 59–64 aircraft were lost or immediately unflyable, replaced by the 54 spare aircraft, then the net loss in combat power was only 5–10 aircraft (less any deficit in aircrews).

54
. Willmott, et al, 2001, 186.

55
. Most sources show the B5N Kate payload as “800 kg of bombs,” which would seem to allow the plane to carry three 250-kg bombs. However, some B5N Kates from
Shokaku
and
Zuikaku
carried two 250-kg bombs on their OCA mission against the airfields. Possibly the B5N Kate at this time did not have the mountings to carry three 250-kg bombs.

56
.
Pearl Harbor and the Outlying Islands: US Navy Base Construction in World War II
.

www.history.navy.mil/library/online/constructpearlww2.htm
.

57
. United States Strategic Bombing Survey,
Ships’ Bombardment of Japan—1945
, 4.

58
. The area of 498 acres for the shipyard given according to the official sources may include areas that were open ground for storage or undeveloped at the time of the attack. Estimates made by measurements of the area containing large buildings and warehouses from photographs taken in late 1941 give an area of less than 7,500,000 square feet. Using the same assumptions, this might result in a possibility of 17% damage to the shipyard, likely 12–15%. The conclusions remain unchanged.

59
. Wallin, 222–242.

60
. Prange, 1981, 469.

61
. Ellsberg, 1946, 134.

62
. Ellsberg, 1946, 139.

63
. Stern, 57–9.

64
. Burke, 128.

65
. Prange, 1981, 392.

66
. Prange, 1981, 549.

67
. Goldstein, Dillon and Wenger, 1991, 26.

68
. Willmott, et al, 2001, 161.

69
. Prange, 1986, 510.

70
. Prange, 1986, 509.

71
. Prange, 1981, 66.

72
. “The flash point of NSFO is above 140F and unless the bulk fuel is already at that or very close it is easy to calculate that there is simply not enough energy in a 7.7mm ball round raise any significant volume of fuel to flash point and ignite it. If the bulk fuel was already at flash point then a 7.7mm might possibly serve as an ignition source under some circumstances, but there is zero chance that those tanks were even close to that hot on 7 Dec 1941. Even if you get an ignition it is by no means certain that the fire won't sputter out, since you need to have enough energy to raise the temperature another 40F to 50F in the vicinity of the fire to sustain it, and a small initial flash may not be sufficient to do this. It would definitely take a pretty energetic source to set these tanks alight. A bomb would do it, at least if not too deep, but no other air-launched weapon available to the Japanese [would do]. Even too small a bomb might very well not work. Having watched Boiler Techs struggle to get NSFO to light off from cold iron impressed me greatly with how hard it is to get this stuff burning well.” Captain William O’Neil, USN (ret.), letter to the author.

“As to the 7.7mm solid shot projectile igniting diesel or NSFO, that is impossible. If you have been following [the Mythbusters television series], they have done much of the tests of this kind of thing and it turns out that in most cases, the chance of such a thing is so small that they give it a complete "BUST". Even with explosives, setting off such non-flammable material as these is not easy, even when they added sparks on purpose to try to enhance the chance. Some materials that would seem to be flammable are not since it is almost impossible for any small flame that is started to spread beyond the initial ignition point (only fumes can burn, not the liquid or solid material itself, unless, like black powder, it has its own oxidizer inside it).” Nathan Okun, letter to the author.

73
. Edward Rudnicki, letter to the author.

74
. Jim O’Neil, William O’Neil, Nathan Okun, Ralph Norton and Lonnie Gill provided information addressing this question.

75
. Information courtesy of Ralph Norton.

Usmm.org/sunk42a.html#anchor331462
.

76
. Potter, 7.

77
. Willmott, et al, 2001, 120.

78
. Goldstein, Dillon and Wenger, 1991, 24.

79
. Slackman, 165, 167.

80
. Ellsberg, 1949, 65–87.

81
. Dull, 15.

82
. “The Fourteen Part Message.”
http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/myths/14_part.html

83
. Slackman, 60.

84
. Prange, 1981, 554.

85
. Goldstein and Dillon, 1991, 44.

86
. Prange, 1981, 475.

Chapter 11: The Fifth Midget Submarine: A Cautionary Tale

1
. Burlingame, 60.

2
. Burlingame, 129–130.

3
. Prange, quoted in Warship International, v 46 nr 4, 2009. 316.

4
. Willmott, et al, 2001, 57.

5
. Commanding Officer, USS St. Louis (CL-49), report to Commander-in-Chief, US Pacific Fleet, dated 25 December 1941, from
http://i-16tou.com/stlou/
.

6
.
http://i-16tou.com/stlou/stlou2.html
.

7
. USS Helm Action Report, 10 December 1941.
www.history.navy.mil/docs/wwii/pearl/CinCPac.htm
.

8
. The Military Channel, 14 November 2009.

9
.
www.engin.umich.edu/dept/name/facilities/mhl/projects/televised_programs.html
.

10
. Zimm, et al, 2005.

11
. A photograph of a pre-war bombardment near Diamond Head shows shell splinters hitting the water that look remarkably like the splashes in the subject photograph. Burlingame, 148.

12
. Zimm, 2001, 24.

13
. Aiken, Director, Pearl Harbor History Associates, correspondence with the author.

14
. Credits to David Aiken for discovering the oral history evidence.

15
.
www.combinedfleet.com/Pearl.htm
includes an article on the midget submarines which cites Kirby’s theory.

16
.
www.kickasstorrents.com/pbs-nova-killer-subs-in-pearl-harbor-s37e09-ws-pdtv-xvid-ekolb-t3354799.html
.

17
. Clarke, 147–8.

18
. This is the depth that the Japanese set their Type 91 aerial torpedoes for the attack. No information is available on the depth setting of the Type 97 midget submarine torpedoes, but it is likely to be similar to that used by the aviators. Aiken, 47.