Attack on Pearl Harbor (62 page)

28
. OEG 431, 10.

29
. Nathan Okun, correspondence with the author.

30
. 81 D3A Vals were planned, with three deck aborts.

31
. Prange, 1981, 536.

32
. Damaging near misses (DNM) are scored if the near miss required shipyard assistance to repair the damage, thus disregarding incidental fragmentation damage. The
Pennsylvania
(BB-38) DNM was on the dock off the bow which caused fragmentation damage in an area where the ship was also damaged by fire and fragments from explosions on the
Cassin
(DD-372) and
Downes
(DD-375). Not included are one near miss on
Cummins
(DD-365), which dented some bulkheads, put two holes in the superstructure, and wounded three, or those that inflicted incidental damage on
Rigel
(AR-11), multiple near misses which caused about 150 small holes in the port quarter (repaired by ship’s force) and destroyed a motor whale boat in the water, with a total of seven wounded. These bombs might have been aimed at New Orleans (CA-32) or San Francisco (CA-38) in the shipyard.

33
. Smith, 2005, 174, puts the hit percentage at “between 26 percent and 27 percent.” However, he counts as hits fragmentation damage against
Cummings
(DD-365),
Rigel
(AR-11), and
New Orleans
(CA-38).
New Orleans’
damage was similarly inconsequential, consisting of a few dozen holes in thin plating, none of which impaired the ship’s combat capability, and an easily-repaired severed aviation fuel line, with no personnel casualties. These have not been assessed as hits or DNMs as they contributed nothing to the Japanese mission objectives.

34
. Smith, 2005, 152.

35
.
Striking Power of Air-Borne Weapons
, 15.

36
. Air Operations Staff Officer, 1st Air Fleet, in Goldstein and Dillon, 1993, 87.

37
. Fuchida attested that he considered ordering an attack on
Nevada
, so presumably he felt he had the command and control to order such an attack to occur or not to occur.

38
. Stillwell, 1981, 148.

39
. Madsen, 15–16.

40
. Madsen, 17.

41
. Cohen, 112.

42
. Lord, 150.

43
. “Gedunk” was sailor’s slang for snacks such as ice cream and candy bars. This vehicle is also known as the “Roach Coach.” The traditional announcement on the 1MC, “the Roach Coach is making its approach,” is often banned by modern skippers.

44
. Slackman, 126–7.

45
. Okun, correspondence with the author.

46
. Arakaki and Kuborn, 76.

47
. Peattie, 113.

48
. Peattie, 133.

49
. Peattie, 44–45.

50
. Goldstein, Dillon and Wenger, 1991, 142–3.

51
. Prange, 1981, 533.

52
. Goldstein and Dillon, 1993, 280.

53
. Military Analysis Division, 2.

54
. Goldstein and Dillon, 1993, 290.

55
. Peattie, 146.

56
. Lord, 139.

57
. Lord, 110.

58
. Lambert and Polmar, 109–150.

59
. Some of this strafing may have been conducted by bombers, but Japanese veterans did not indicate that bombers engaged in much strafing. Some of the damage might actually have been caused by AA rounds descending from the harbor. It is impossible to separate out these actions from those of the fighters. The extent of strafing of civilian targets was much less than initially reported.

60
. Prange, 1981, 529.

61
. Slackman, 148.

62
. Wallin, 195.

63
. Washington Naval Treaty, Chapter II Part 3 Section 1.

64
. Stephen, 99.

65
. Stephenson,
www.j-aircraft.org/smf/index.php?topic=8601.1080

Chapter 8: Battle Damage Assessment

1
. Goldstein and Dillon, 1993, 135.

2
. Goldstein and Dillon, 1993, 162.

3
. Prange, 1981, 573.

4
. Goldstein and Dillon, 1993, 202.

5
. Likely
Utah
(AG-16).

6
. Goldstein and Dillon, 1993, 200–201.

7
. Prange, 1981, 579.

8
. Fuchida’s chart survived the war. It was discovered and reproduced in color inside the covers of Goldstein and Dillon,
The Pearl Harbor Papers
. Brassey’s (US), now Potomac Books, was the publisher, and retains the right to publish the chart themselves, although they do not have the right to allow others to publish it. The original map was put up for auction, purchased by an anonymous buyer, and has disappeared.

9
. Compiled by Yokosuka Naval Air Corps. Possibly August 1942.
Lessons [air operation] of the Sea Battle off Hawaii, Vol. I
. in Goldstein and Dillon, 1993, 287.

10
. Preliminary Design Section, Bureau of Ships, 9.

11
. Lord, 91.

12
. Willmott, et al, 2001, 106.

13
. De Virgilio.

14
. One aircraft in Fuchda’s group prematurely dropped its bomb due to a material failure caused by AA damage. One B5N Kate level bomber was a deck abort. Goldstein, and Dillon, 1993, 287.

15
. Slackman, 107.

16
. Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet. Report of Japanese Raid on Pearl Harbor, 15 February 1942. Enclosure C.

17
. Hone, T.C., December, 1977, 56–57.

18
. De Virgilio. Okun and Aiken correspondence with the author.

19
. Willmott, et al, 2001, 116.

20
.
Soryu
and
Hiryu
constituted Carrier Division (CarDiv) Two. The carrier division issued a consolidated report.

21
. Willmott, et al, 2001, 191.

22
. There were 30 destroyers in Pearl Harbor or on patrol in the immediate vicinity. There were another 15 on exercises in the general area, and 9 at various CONUS locations, for a total of 54 destroyers, not counting the Asiatic Fleet. Hitting three destroyers was inconsequential towards achieving the Japanese mission as compared to other available targets.

23
. Prange, 1981, 535.

24
. Werneth, 17, 274.

25
. Werneth, 43.

26
. Only one AR mentions a dive bomber attack on Battleship Row during this time frame, that of
Allen
, anchored northeast of Ford Island about a thousand yards from Battleship Row. Her AR states, “Bridge personnel observed dive bombing attacks on battleship row approaching from both east and west.” The smoke from the burning
Arizona
was between her and most of Battleship Row.
Allen
more likely observed the attacks on
Tangier
and
Raleigh
and
Nevada
and recorded them as attacks on Battleship Row. Aircraft attacking
Pennsylvania
and
Helena
, seen from
Allen’
s position, would also have lined up with Battleship Row.

27
. Slackman, 168–9.

28
. Werneth, 205.

29
. Gordon, et al, 1990, 26

30
. Olson, 43. This work erroneously says that the
Dale
was attacked by 16-inch AP bombs. By the time
Dale
(DD-353) was attacked, all the AP bombs had been expended against Battleship Row.
Dale
was attacked by D3A Val dive bombers employing 250-kg GP bombs.

31
. Commanding Officer, USS
Dale
(353). Detailed report of offensive measures taken during Air Raid, December 7, 1941.

32
. Goldstein, Dillon, and Wenger, 1991, 99.

33
. Prange, 1981, 544–47; Prange, et al, 1990, 40.

34
. Toland, 223.

35
. Prange, et al, 1990, 77.

36
. Fuchida and Okumiya, 155–6.

37
. Prange, et al, 1982, 264.

38
. Parshall, letter to the author.

39
. Parshall and Tully, 230–231.

40
. Prange, et al, 1990, 174. My thanks to Jonathan Parshall for bringing this to my attention.

41
. Correspondence with Michael Weidenbach, Curator of the USS Missouri Memorial, and Jonathan Parshall.

42
. Parshall and Tully, 135.

43
. Parshall, correspondence with the author. Parshall is a co-author of
Shattered Sword
, the definitive account of the Japanese’ side of the Battle of Midway.

44
. Prange, 1981, 542.

45
. Goldstein and Dillon, 1993.

Chapter 9: What Might Have Been: Alerted Pearl Harbor Defenses

1
. Burlingame, 32.

2
. One of the scandalous command failures was that, while junior officers of both services and the War Department wanted to make the full AWS operational immediately, Navy and Army senior officers refused to release the needed watch officers. The ownership of the system muddied the waters: the Signal Corp built the system and was supposed to turn it over to the Air Corps, but dragged their feet. The War Department issued a directive on 15 September 1941 ordering the system be activated, to which General Martin, the air commander, responded that he hoped to have the AIC in operation “within 30 days” (or, prior to 25 October 1941). The successful 27 September exercise should have been the final demonstration before full-time operation. On 24 November the joint-services AWS steering committee (with the senior Army officer a lieutenant colonel, and the senior Navy representative a lieutenant commander) tried to prod their superiors onward by recommended that the AIC should be made operational “as early as possible.” However, the senior officers decided that the system would become operational only after the war started. See Lambert and Polmar, 65–67.

3
. In a letter dated 7 February 1941, the Secretary of War informed the Secretary of the Navy that there were currently 82 3-inch, 20 37mm, and 109 .50-cal AA gun in the Army establishment at Oahu. The “total program” was to be 98 3-inch, 120 37mm, and 308 .50-cal machine guns. A date for the delivery of the additional weapons was not provided.
www.ibiblio.org/pha/timeline/410207awar.html
. The numbers on 7 December are from Hearings, 320.

4
. General Headquarters, US Army Forces Pacific, 17.

5
. Lambert and Polmar, 99.

6
. General Headquarters, US Army Forces Pacific, 19.

7
. Lambert and Polmar, 40.

8
.
www.navweaps.com/index_oob/OOB_WWII_Pacific/OOB_Pearl_Harbor.htm
, accessed 12/22/06. Lambert and Polmar, 97. Arakaki and Kuborn, 78–9 assess 10 aircraft shot down by the defending fighters, plus one that might have been shot down by Lieutenant Dains. Radar operators observed a P-40 shoot down a Zero, which might have been an engagement by Dains. Returning from a third sortie, Dains was shot down by US AA guns over Schofield Barracks and killed, so he never made a report.

9
. Not counted are three P-40 aircraft that were destroyed while taking off.

10
.
www.navweaps.com/index_oob/OOB_WWII_Pacific/OOB_WWII_Pearl_Harbor.htm
, accessed 12/18/08

11
. Czarnecki, et al.

12
. Campbell, 106.

13
. Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, October 1945.

14
. Wallin, 106.

15
. The AA fire could be considered more effective still, if six USN Dauntless dive bombers and four Wildcat fighters Blue-on-Blue losses are included in the total of kills for the ammunition expended. These aircraft were flown in from the carrier
Enterprise
(CV-6) after the attack, and were shot down by jumpy defenders. An additional tribute to the accuracy of the defender’s fire is that approximately 20 Japanese aircraft were pitched overboard after landing as damaged beyond repair, and another 35 were immediately unflyable. 111 aircraft that landed on the carriers had some degree of damage, or 36% of the aircraft that returned.

16
. Goldstein, Dillon, and Wenger, 112.

17
. Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, 69.

18
. Commanding Officer, USS
California
(BB-44). Report of Raid (Revised), December 7, 1941. BB44/A16-3, 22 December 1941.

19
. This 1946 report would not have been able to correlate data with Japanese records. A review of John Lundstom’s
The First Team and the Guadalcanal Campaign
found that USMC 90mm AA batteries tended to claim 50–100% more aircraft than were actually shot down. One cause was joint engagements, where the AA guns fired on aircraft that were later shot down by fighters. The AA batteries might see the larger bomber but not the smaller fighter, see the bomber go down, and thus claim the bomber as their kill. Many aircraft claimed as AA kills actually managed to limp home, though perhaps in the end they were good only for the scrap heap.

20
. Prange, 1981, 569.

21
. The eight rounds per minute figure was taken from the overall rate of fire of heavy AA guns on
North Carolina
(BB-55) on 24 August 1942 at the Battle of the Eastern Solomons during an intense, coordinated air attack, assuming that one half of the battery could bear on targets at a time. This appears to be a good estimate, as the commanding officer estimated that the 5”/38 guns were firing at a rate of 17 rounds per minute when they engaged, using a fuze setting dead time of 3 seconds. He specifically mentions that this high rate of fire was a product of long training hours during the transit to the battle area. While the Army gunners might not have had as much sustained practice, they also would be handling ammunition that weighed less than half that of the 5”/38 round—the 5”/38 projectile was about 55 pounds and the powder and case 35 pounds, while the 3”/50 fired a fixed round (projectile + powder and case) of 26 pounds. Commanding Officer, U. S. S.
North Carolina
. Action of August 24, 1942, report of. BB55/A16-3 Serial 0109, 26 August 1942.