Battle Story (10 page)
Authors: Chris Brown
Withdrawal to Singapore, 24–31 January 1942.
The plan to engage the Japanese in a ‘main battle’ in Johore gained general acceptance among the commanders; the problem lay in the fact that the Japanese advance was too rapid to allow the Allies to concentrate their forces. Air superiority made movement by day dangerous and poor communications made movement by night very difficult. In fact, the Japanese were not able to make the best use of their air power because their ground forces had very little communication with the air arm. Once the RAF had been defeated, Japanese pilots were mostly limited to seeking targets of opportunity. With better integration between aircraft and troops the campaign would have been even shorter. With precious few aircraft at all, the Allies were unable to make any impression on the fragile Japanese lines of communication. A small number of modest raids were staged from the sea, but little was achieved.
The main battle in Johore never really materialised and the Allies staged a withdrawal to Singapore in the last days of January 1942. Percival believed that the island could withstand a siege – it was, after all, described as a ‘fortress’. The term was, however, misleading. In British military parlance ‘fortress’ was an administrative term used to describe an area with a large concentration of troops. It did not imply that there were extensive fortifications, but understandably this was a distinction that meant nothing to almost everybody concerned.
The coastal batteries had not been designed to provide fire plans to deter a crossing of the Johore Strait and the defensive positions on the northern shore were too far apart to support one another or to provide a continuous line of strongholds. The installations were vulnerable to isolation and to a great extent the Japanese knew where they were. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s Japan had mounted a major intelligence operation in Singapore. Agents working as bar girls, photographers, barbers and in a host of other occupations had provided a steady stream of information relating to military works and developments of all kinds. Even before the battle for Singapore had started, morale had become a serious problem. Troops were losing confidence in the commanders and in the prospects for relief. Large numbers of deserters could be seen in downtown Singapore or in the harbour areas trying to board ships for Australia, India or the Dutch East Indies.
Events on the mainland, the swift, relentless Japanese advance, forced Percival to order the withdrawal to the island rather earlier than he had planned, to avoid his forces there being overrun and defeated in detail.
The situation was actually even more precarious than Percival realised. Although he was not aware of it, the Japanese were making very good progress and believed that there was a real possibility that the entirety of Heath’s III Corps could be cut off from the rest of Malaya Command and be forced to surrender, which would greatly reduce the strength available to protect
the island once the withdrawal was complete. Percival held a conference at Heath’s headquarters and a programme for evacuation was agreed which would see the last troops cross the causeway to Singapore on 31 January.
31. Coastal gun emplacement, Sentosa, Singapore. (Author’s collection)
33. A 15in coastal gun on Singapore.
The remaining searchlight and anti-aircraft assets on the mainland were promptly removed to the causeway area to give as much protection as possible to the withdrawing troops. An outer perimeter was also set up in and around Johore Bahru to ensure the security of the north end of the causeway and, hopefully, to gather stragglers heading away from the battle to the supposed relative safety of Singapore. In one of the few examples of a successful operation by Malaya Command, most of the troops in Johore were able to make their way to the causeway without being snarled up in traffic jams – no mean feat given the large
numbers of men and vehicles involved, and the fact that so many had become detached from their units. By good fortune – and because the exhausted Japanese were in no condition to follow up as quickly as the Allies could retreat – the operation was completed by about 0600hrs on the 31st and the outer ring of the perimeter, consisting of 22nd Australian Brigade and the Gordon Highlanders, was able to withdraw through a final defensive line around the causeway held by the Argylls, now reduced to less than 300 all ranks. Shortly after 0800hrs the Argylls were played across by their last two pipers and the causeway was blown as soon as the last man had crossed over to Singapore.
34. Japanese infantry storm into Johore Bahru.
Planning for the defence of Singapore followed the same general pattern as the policy that had already failed in Malaya. In an effort to provide some strength everywhere, the troops were spread thinly all around the island. Singapore was divided into three coastal sectors and a reserve area.
The Western Area Command under General Bennett extended from a point just west of the mouth of Sungei Jurong on the south coast to a point half a mile east of the causeway then due south from there to Bukit Timah. Bennett’s command included
his own 8th Division, including three field artillery regiments, three anti-tank regiments and nearly 2,000 newly arrived reinforcements from Australia. The latter had only been in Singapore for a little over a week and were far from being battle ready. The same applied to 44th Indian Brigade, now assigned to Bennett’s command. They had arrived on 22 January, only partially trained, unaccustomed to the climate and less than fully fit after a lengthy voyage.
Singapore Island dispositions, February 1942.
Heath’s III Corps took responsibility for the Northern Area with the addition of the British 18th Division, most of which had only arrived on 29 December and without most of their vehicles, equipment and ammunition, which had been lost in a ship sunk by the Japanese. Southern Area, stretching eastwards along the coast from Sungei Jurong to a point 5 miles west of Changi at the eastern tip of the island, was entrusted to Major General Keith Simmons with a force made up of 1st and 2nd Malaya Brigades
and Straits Settlements Volunteers. The 12th and 15th Indian Brigades were held as the command reserve in the Reserve Area, which stretched from Bukit Timah to Paya Lebar and included the vital Pierce and MacRitchie reservoirs.
The general state of confusion and disintegrating morale prevented any concerted effort to organise defences properly. It was now virtually impossible to find civilian labour at any price and most fortifications were being constructed by the troops who would be fighting in them. The work was hard, but not always effective since much of the terrain was not suitable for trenches and a lot of the positions that were erected consisted of breastworks with barbed wire, when it could be made available. Breastworks, if well made, can be effective against small arms fire but are of limited value against artillery and bombing, and are often vulnerable to attacks in the flanks or the rear. Much of the work that did continue had to be conducted at night, as did any major troop movements, for fear of Japanese air attacks; a great deal of the northern part of the island was now under direct observation from high ground and tall buildings in Johore, including the sultan’s palace.
Air raids had diminished for a period after the start of the campaign as the Japanese concentrated on targets on the mainland, but started again in earnest on the night of 29/30 January. A force of fifty-one Hurricane fighters had arrived in January with a complement of twenty-four pilots, but however determined their efforts – and those of the few surviving Buffalo fighters’ pilots who now had to struggle to familiarise themselves with a new aircraft – there was little they could do to prevent attacks. A second group of Hurricanes were dispatched from the carrier HMS
Indomitable
between 27 and 29 January and were dispersed to operate from airfields in Sumatra, but several of these were destroyed on the ground by Japanese bombing raids and others in engagements with Japanese fighters in the first couple of days after their arrival. From 12 January onward, the Japanese could mount bombing raids by day at little risk.