1 There is evidence that these three men were actually mere highway robbers who were honored as militiamen after the fact as a reward for catching André.
5 Alexander Hamilton to John Laurens, October 15, 1780, in The Papers of Alexander Hamilton , ed. Harold C. Syrett et al. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961–1987), 2:467.
14 Although Part V focuses on Washington’s treatment of Americans, I include the description of Smith’s treatment in Part IV to illustrate the difference between his and André’s fate.
15 David Glazier, “Precedents Lost: The Neglected History of the Military Commission,” Virginia Journal of International Law 46 (2005): 20. Professor Glazier provides an excellent discussion of the André affair.
16 Resolution of the Continental Congress, August 21, 1776, in Journals of the Continental Congress , 5:693.
17 Washington was fully cognizant of this resolution, as evidenced by his letter to members of Congress seeking clarification on it. George Washington to Continental Congress Committee to Inquire into the State of the Army, July 19, 1777, in The Papers of George Washington, Revolutionary War Series , 10:332–37. “Written after the new Articles of War were adopted in September 1776, it confirms Washington’s understanding that the resolution on spies was not superseded by the new law.” Glazier, “Precedents Lost,” 8n97.
19 Major Christopher W. Behan, “Don’t Tug on Superman’s Cape: In Defense of Convening Authority Selection and Appointment of Court-Martial Panel Members,” Military Law Review 176 (2003): 209.
21 American Articles of War of 1776, as cited in ibid., 209n118.
22 Journals of the Continental Congress , 15:1277–78.
23 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld , 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2839n15 (2006).
24 Richard J. Wilson, “Military Commissions in Guantánamo Bay: Giving ‘Full and Fair Trial’ a Bad Name,” Gonzaga Journal of International Law 10 (2007): 65.
25 William Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents (1886), 1:731.
26 United Nations War Crimes Commission, Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals , 1 (1997), 116–17.
27 Captain Brian C. Baldrate, “The Supreme Court’s Role in Defining the Jurisdiction of Military Tribunals: A Study, Critique, and Proposal for Hamdan v. Rumsfeld ,” Military Law Review 186 (Winter 2005): 11.
28 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld , 126 S. Ct. at 2749 (quoting W. Birkhimer, Military Government and Martial Law , 3rd ed. (1914), 537–38).
29 Alexander Hamilton to William Livingston, April 21, 1777, in The Papers of Alexander Hamilton , 1:235.
33 Christopher A. Chrisman, “Article III Goes to War: A Case for a Separate Federal Circuit for Enemy Combatant Habeas Cases,” Journal of Law and Politics 21 (2005): 40.
34 J. V. Capua, “The Early History of Martial Law in England from the Fourteenth Century to the Petition of Right,” Cambridge Law Journal 36 no. 1 (1977): 152.
37 Washington to Brigadier General Preudhomme de Borre, August 3, 1777, in The Papers of George Washington, Revolutionary War Series , 10:495.
38 John Ross successfully represented “Loyalists prosecuted by [Congressman Joseph] Reed in the state courts.” Willard Sterne Randall, Benedict Arnold: Patriot and Traitor (New York: Morrow, 1990), 425–31.
39 Washington to Brigadier General Thomas Mifflin, February 14, 1777, in The Papers of George Washington, Revolutionary War Series , 8:337.
40 Hence Washington’s fixation on whether “a person who belongs to any of the United States of America . . . can be tried . . . and punished as a spy.” Washington to Continental Congress Committee to Inquire into the State of the Army, July 19, 1777.
7 Marquis de Lafayette, General Knox, and Colonels Harrison and Hamilton all gave (somewhat conflicting) accounts of Smith’s involvement in the André affair. Next, the testimony of two boatmen, Samuel and Joseph Colquhoun, corroborated Smith’s account. Despite “disgraceful means that were used to impeach the integrity of the eldest Samuel,” the two men “seemed to have much weight with the court-martial.” Finally, two militiamen testified to finding a paper on André that listed Smith’s name, to which Smith did not object since “no man was bound to say that legally which might condemn himself.” Ibid., 137.
22 This tribunal was not even a “trial,” per se. “Although Washington himself at least once referred to André as having been ‘tried,’ the Board was an advisory panel, not a ‘court’ that legally determined guilt or imposed a sentence.” David Glazier, “Precedents Lost: The Neglected History of the Military Commission,” Virginia Journal of International Law 46 (2005): 19.
23 William Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents (1886), 1:731.
24 General George Washington’s Orders, September 29, 1780, Early American Imprints, no. 30012.
25 Jonathan Turley, “Tribunals and Tribulations: The Antithetical Elements of Military Governance in a Madisonian Democracy,” George Washington Law Review 70 (2002): 649.
29 Were this in a court-martial proceeding during the present day, virtually all of the government’s case would likely constitute a violation of Rule 801 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
31 Were this in a court-martial proceeding during the present day, this would likely constitute a violation of the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment.
43 Glazier, “Precedents Lost,” 21. Glazier writes, “Washington handled André’s case more summarily than the actual court-martial that Congress had called for.”
45 Washington to John Laurens, October 4, 1780, in The Writings of George Washington , ed. Worthington C. Ford (New York and London: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1890), 8:494.
46 Joseph Dennie and Asbury Dickins, The Port Folio (1809), 509.
47 Washington to the President of Congress, October 7, 1789, in The Writings of George Washington (ed. Fitzpatrick), 20:131.