Burma Redux: Global Justice and the Quest for Political Reform in Myanmar (21 page)

Second, looking to Alexis de Tocqueville but again focusing on modern empirical work, cultural theorists argue that social factors are critical. They particularly highlight rich associational links, long viewed as the foundation for democracy in America.
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In 1993, when Robert D. Putnam investigated the Italian case, he focused above all on the sense of civic community generated by dense networks of secondary bodies. His analysis was not comforting for would-be democrats in tough contexts, for he unearthed major historical constraints on social development. “Where norms and networks of civic engagement are lacking, the outlook for collective action appears bleak. The fate of the Mezzogiorno is an object lesson for the Third World today and the former Communist lands of Eurasia tomorrow.” Nevertheless, even in a context of binding path dependence, his final words on the Italian south indicated that cultural supports remain indispensable. “Building social capital will not be easy, but it is the key to making democracy work.”
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In a later study, he lamented the collapse of civic engagement in America, and considered how to revive it.
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Third, a strand of debate emerging only in recent years examines the contribution of political institutions to successful democratization. Mansfield and Snyder argue negatively that “the chance of war arises mainly in those transitional states that lack the strong political institutions needed to make democracy work.”
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As positive requirements, they list an effective state, the rule of law, organized parties competing in fair elections, and professional news media. Arguing that democratization must be correctly sequenced (a contention they attribute above all to Dahl), they prescribe a three-step process.
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At the outset, political leaders must “define the boundaries of the nation in a way that has broad legitimacy.” If problems arise, “national legitimacy can only be achieved by constructing effective state institutions that begin to meet a people’s needs for security and create for them a shared fate even if they do not share nationality.”
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Implied in this are state capacity and a constituency, probably from the center-right, prepared to invest in democratization. Next, leaders must work to enhance popular participation. Only when these tasks have been accomplished can attention finally turn to unleashing mass political parties.
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Whether Myanmar’s reformers choose to take an incremental or radical approach, these issues are worth examining. On the one hand, the country’s history from the long 1950s conforms closely to the preconditionist dystopia: “a failed and violent transition may leave a legacy of nationalist ideology, militarized institutions, undemocratic rules, and foreign enmities that will hinder further democratic consolidation.”
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On the other, dismal contemporary conditions of economic, social and political underdevelopment also direct attention to preconditionist analyses.

Heading the agenda is a national identity congruent with state borders. Here the chance that political transition will fragment the state must be acknowledged. Indeed, post-communist experience in East-Central Europe provides ample evidence of disintegration through democratization as central control erodes, multiple political arenas emerge, and power shifts from core to periphery.
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In Myanmar, however, this possibility looks less likely now than in the immediate postcolonial period, not least because the region is dominated by established states that abhor irredentism. Thus, while territorial splits cannot be ruled out, it is necessary to consider how nation building might take place within existing borders. Further primary tasks require the state defensively to do all it can to contain ethnic conflict, meaning in Myanmar that the
tatmadaw
must stop intimidating individuals and communities and that militias should also be restrained. Constructively, humanitarian programs must address the worst forms of suffering, economic programs must stimulate national development, and social programs must embed cultural diversity and respect within a unified national community. The overarching aim is to create a civic safety net articulated around one nation, within which subsidiary ethnic identities and commitments can be couched. At the same time, a powerful political constituency believing democratization to be in its interest must be built. This would almost certainly mean reaching into the
tatmadaw
, one of only two institutions alongside the Buddhist
sangha
to span most of the country.

Once progress has been made on these fronts, the second step is gradual enhancement of democracy. Critically, the advice is to desist at least as much as to act. Democratic institutions should be filled out only when the first stage in the sequence is complete. Moreover, an important rider concerns the type of system to be put in place. Andrew Reynolds and colleagues advocate a polity institutionalizing power sharing mechanisms and protections for minority groups, and hold that this mandates a parliamentary system based on proportional representation and asymmetrical federalism.
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South similarly argues for a consociational democracy comprising a grand coalition of elites, minority vetoes, and segmental autonomy.
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While federal states are not always free from conflict, many analysts broadly concur.
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Others add that it is necessary to prevent the formation of a dominant ethnic core, such as the Bamar heartland in Myanmar.
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Still others argue for a multiparty system with a vigorous opposition and limited opportunities for rent seeking.
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Finally, as a third step, once progress has been registered in this domain, and constitutional engineers have created a robust set of democratic institutions, mass political parties can be given free rein. First nation building, second democratic enhancement, third mass participation is the pattern prescribed above all by Mansfield and Snyder.

Considered in the context of contemporary Myanmar, this counsel has many unsavory aspects. The general analytical thrust points not to dramatic political change and quick-fire democratization, but rather to the kind of pacted transition seen in Southern Europe and Latin America in the 1970s and 1980s. After 50 years of oppressive
tatmadaw
rule, however, a big tent approach embracing former tyrants is hard to defend, especially when tyranny is under attack the world over. Moreover, the extent of the reformist task becomes clear when lessons from pacted transitions are examined. In a comparative study, Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter found that splits in the regime were always the point of departure. “Conversely, no transition can be forced purely by opponents against a regime which maintains the cohesion, capacity, and disposition to apply repression.”
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From Dankwart Rustow they drew the notion of democratization “on the installment plan” as collective actors with distinct objectives agree to a series of compromises.
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From Dahl they took the concept of a “democratic bargain.”
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Overall, they noted the “extraordinary uncertainty of the transition,” and held that pacted transitions are most successful if parties of the right are “helped” to do well, though not too well, in founding elections.
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While Myanmar’s 2010 election triggered hope that reform might move in this direction, rigid military control imposed on the 2011 polity indicated that it may take a long time for significant installments to feed through.

Furthermore, much evidence from fourth-wave East-Central European transitions in the late 1980s and early 1990s points in a very different direction.
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Across nearly 30 countries, a sharp break with authoritarianism was generally most productive, popular mobilization was broadly positive in its effects, and even nationalist action could work for the benefit of democracy.
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In these cases, however, the key success factor was a strong opposition movement able to dictate the terms of transition. By contrast, in countries where despots retained great power, dictatorship was generally the outcome. In situations of relatively balanced power between regime and rebels, unconsolidated, unstable, partial democracy was the result.
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Contemporary Myanmar, with a dominant military machine and a weak and divided opposition movement, does not appear to be well placed.
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Pulling all this together, comparative experience generates perhaps three main lessons for Myanmar. One is that there is a fundamental need to invest in the underpinnings of sustainable democracy. However political change comes about, the chances of long-term success are almost certain to be enhanced by economic and social development. Moreover, the possibility of triggering political reform also then increases. Many analyses converge on this point. The second is that within this general context there is a specific need to bolster forces that can broadly be considered part of the political opposition. The central lesson of post-Cold War East-Central European transitions is that success comes to vibrant civic movements. The third is that though undeniably distasteful, the sequencing argument remains relevant. By any measure, Myanmar is an unpromising candidate for democratic reform, and taking the right steps looks to be critically necessary. Certainly the possibility of a false move harming long-term prospects suggests that a cautious approach is advisable.

In contemporary debate of the Myanmar case, such themes have a growing resonance. The need to build robust social foundations for political reform through broad-based investment has many adherents.
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The requirement to address the structural weakness of the opposition movement is strongly supported.
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The advice to embrace key political forces through inclusive dialogue focused on nation building for democracy is endorsed by all major dissenting groups. In this latter regard, calls from across the full span of opposition for a re-examination of the modern nation’s founding myth in fresh discussion of the interethnic accord struck at Panglong in 1947 are centrally relevant.

National reconciliation

The issue of national reconciliation focuses attention on a major problem leaders in both the democratic camp and ethnic nationality groups have with Myanmar’s 2011 polity: its limited capacity for constructing a true nation beneath the state formed by disciplined democracy. While the National Convention co-opted some opposition figures in both 1993 and 2004, it did so strictly on military terms and in very small numbers. The NLD was first marginalized and then excluded, and ethnic nationalities were represented only patchily. Furthermore, the entire process did little to generate a political solution to low-grade civil war partially suspended through cease-fire agreements in the 1990s, but never resolved.
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While the new political system is neither wholly undemocratic nor totally centralized, there is thus a firm belief that it functions on a militant Bamar basis, giving opposition forces little choice but to fall in line. Indeed, sponsoring inclusive talks in a spirit of national reconciliation appears to be entirely absent from military thinking shaped by the core
tatmadaw
doctrine of “One blood, one voice, one command.”
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Rarely have dialogue initiatives been taken seriously by the governing elite.
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Across the complete span of opposition, all-embracing national reconciliation is thus fiercely promoted. Aung San Suu Kyi has long made this a key part of her platform.
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On her first full day of freedom in November 2010, she renewed her commitment: “I’m going to work for national reconciliation.”
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Among ethnic nationality leaders it has always been a staple of political discourse, and remains vibrant today.
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Democratic parties that successfully contested the 2010 election acknowledge the importance of broad-based dialogue.
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On rare occasions that ordinary citizens are given a chance to speak, they express similar commitments.
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In addition, this is the position regularly endorsed by the UN General Assembly since 1994.
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Standing behind this procedural demand is a history of complex and often disintegrative ethnic relations shaped by a plethora of factors.
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Understandings of the past are deeply contested, and in all probability always will be.