Burma Redux: Global Justice and the Quest for Political Reform in Myanmar (26 page)

The degree to which such assistance registers as political engagement is subject to extensive debate. At one extreme, Alex de Waal in 1997 based a major critique of the aid business on the contention that “Humanitarian action
is
political action.”
⁶⁸
Echoed notably by Sadako Ogata, UN High Commissioner for Refugees 1991–2000, in the oft-cited remark that “there are no humanitarian solutions to humanitarian problems” and the concomitant implication that political issues always have to be confronted, the claim is that any transnational aid mission will have political consequences.
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At the other extreme, the International Committee of the Red Cross has always projected an image of strict impartiality. However, as David P. Forsythe writes, even ICRC policy “necessarily entails a type of politics that the rhetoric of neutrality cannot erase.”
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It is thus hard to escape the conclusion reached by de Waal, Ogata and others that reaching across a national frontier to deliver humanitarian programs does have political impacts.

Moreover, in the Myanmar context several positive instances can be cited. HIV/AIDS and maternal health programs are slowly and constructively reshaping welfare provision. Efforts to enhance local capacity through training initiatives notably in Nargis-affected areas are boosting civil society.
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Life-saving healthcare missions in eastern parts of the country, launched clandestinely from Thailand by Back Pack Health Worker Teams, are helping to sustain communities in the face of
tatmadaw
incursions.
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Peace building and conflict training programs in major cities and border zones are promoting national reconciliation.
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Indeed, away from the contentious sphere of democracy, carefully calibrated strategies of pressure and incentive have prompted considerable change in a wide range of policy sectors. In 2010, David Allan detailed variable but significant progress in areas as diverse as human trafficking, narcotics control, national disability strategy, agriculture and food security, forestry policy, resettlement issues, and public health.
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The case for engagement is then repeatedly made, with many proponents looking beyond politics to economic and social issues such as underdevelopment, ethnic division, endemic poverty, health crisis, human insecurity, and so on.
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Among Asian leaders, an additional concern is cross-border contagion. Indeed, it was above all to foster such unease that a September 2005 report commissioned by Václav Havel and Desmond Tutu labeled Myanmar under its junta a
Threat to the Peace
.
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However, this argument was never persuasive in Asia. Rather, even the limited amount of democracy embodied in the junta’s 2010 general election prompted leaders in China, ASEAN and other parts of the region to signal that the time had come for all members of international society to normalize diplomatic relations with Myanmar.
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The major criticism of engagement strategies is that they have generally had limited impact. Surveys of regional efforts routinely conclude that neighbors are unable to deliver on their policy objectives.
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China cannot exercise much leverage.
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India’s ambitions have registered more frustration than success.
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ASEAN has long been embarrassed by Myanmar and is now estranged from its bedfellow.
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INGOs are allowed only constrained political space, and can do little to reshape a society subject to harsh discipline. Indeed, even within Asia, where non-interference is generally the default position, there remains a clear sense that more needs to be done to promote gradualist reform inside the country.
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The conclusion drawn by many is thus that this clutch of policy responses has failed. While the ongoing reality of oppressive military rule means that this verdict is largely valid, there is nevertheless a small measure of grassroots success to set alongside the bigger disappointment. In particular, low-profile external action in Nargis-affected areas and beyond is slowly reshaping society from the bottom up.
⁸³

Isolation strategies

For close to 25 years since 1988 isolation strategies have been pursued by both state and non-state actors, with formal sanctions finding an array of complementary boycotts in campaigns sponsored by activist groups. However, state support is restricted to nations in the broad western camp grouped around the US, and has rarely gained endorsement from Asia.
⁸⁴
Indeed, of the major regional players only Japan, conscious of expectations placed on it by the US security alliance, has ever made even minor moves in this direction. Its policy of critical distance, devised after the 8-8-88 uprising, began to be recalibrated after only six months. By contrast, non-state backing is broad, and activist networks are energized by exiles living in the diaspora, regional coalitions, and campaigns mounted in the UK, US and other parts of the world.
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Preeminent in this domain is US government policy.
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Looking to history, this bilateral relationship was never well developed. Cady notes that “Burma was little known to Americans prior to World War II” and in the early postwar period was “regarded in Washington as a British-Indian responsibility.” For years it remained “an enigma.”
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When the democracy movement was crushed in 1988, however, the US imposed sanctions. Initially, it terminated economic aid, withdrew trade preferences, imposed an arms embargo, and blocked loans and grants from global financial institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. In 1990, it downgraded US representation in Yangon from ambassador to chargé d’affaires. In 1996, it placed a visa ban on senior military figures and their families.
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From the late 1990s, it applied the slew of economic measures that still defines its policy stance.
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In May 1997, Executive Order 13047 issued by President Bill Clinton prohibited US citizens from making new investments in Myanmar or facilitating investments by foreign persons.
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In July 2003, the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act, together with Executive Order 13310 signed by President George W. Bush, banned imports from Myanmar, blocked the assets of named entities and individuals, and restricted financial and technical assistance.
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In October 2007 and April 2008, Executive Orders 13448 and 13464 issued by Bush imposed targeted sanctions on named individuals in or associated with the regime.
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In July 2008, the Tom Lantos Block Burmese Jade (Junta’s Anti-Democratic Efforts) Act outlawed imports of jadeite and rubies from Myanmar via third countries.
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All of these measures remain firmly in place today.

Nevertheless, the election of President Barack Obama did trigger some policy change. Following a seven-month review, officials announced in September 2009 that the US would boost humanitarian aid and seek direct talks with the Myanmar junta while retaining existing sanctions.
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Although few early results were registered, Derek Mitchell was appointed special representative in April 2011 to bolster dialogue efforts in the wake of the country’s praetorian transition.
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Along the way, however, the US also signaled an interest in seeing junta members referred to the International Criminal Court for alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity.
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In October 2010, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said that she “would like to underscore the American commitment to seek accountability for the human rights violations that have occurred in Burma by working to establish an international commission of inquiry through close consultations with our friends, allies, and other partners at the United Nations.”
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In 2011, the Burma Campaign UK listed a further 15 states in support: Australia, Canada, New Zealand and 12 EU members, including the UK.
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In the background was heightened activist concern. In May 2009 a Harvard Law School report,
Crimes in Burma
, made the case for an ICC referral.
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In March 2010 Quintana issued his advice that the UN investigate this possibility. In July 2010 one of his three predecessors, Yokota, spoke out in favor.
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Pressure mounted still further when the Human Rights Council’s four-year cycle of Universal Periodic Review brought Myanmar into the frame in January 2011. In rejecting 70 recommendations from the Council, the government among other things denied that it holds political prisoners and branded the Rohingya people “illegal immigrants.”
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Among the broader alliance grouped around the US for Myanmar policy, sanctions regimes are also maintained. In 2007, Canada imposed the world’s toughest sanctions. To an arms embargo, export ban beyond humanitarian goods and aid suspension introduced in 1988 and targeted visa bans imposed in 2003, it added full embargoes on imports and new investments, and a selective asset freeze.
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In the EU, early measures comprised an arms embargo, suspension of aid and development programs, and expulsion of military personnel from diplomatic missions. Subsequently, a Common Position agreed in October 1996 introduced a visa ban for senior military officials and suspended high-level bilateral visits.
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Renewed and extended at regular intervals, EU policy currently comprises an arms embargo, visa restrictions and asset freezes for named individuals, a ban on exports to businesses operating in wood and mining sectors, an import ban on timber products, metals and precious stones, a prohibition on investment in state-owned enterprises, and restrictions on diplomatic contacts. No more than a slight loosening was announced in April 2011 following Myanmar’s shift to notionally civilian government.
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Similarly, Australia maintains an arms embargo, targeted travel bans and selective financial sanctions introduced in October 2007 in response to repression of the saffron uprising.
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Reinforcing many bilateral sanctions, the dominant role of the US and its allies in the UN and other formal intergovernmental organizations has long resulted in embargoes on humanitarian aid and engagement. World Bank and IMF assistance continue to be prohibited, and though the UN Development Programme has operated inside Myanmar since 1993 it does so on a restricted mandate.
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Other UN agencies are either missing from Myanmar or also working on a limited basis, with governance or capacity building work alongside state personnel and agencies generally ruled out.
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From within the UN system, an ILO commission of inquiry in 1998 found evidence of “widespread and systematic” use of forced labor, and imposed moral sanctions in November 2000.
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The cumulative impact of these measures on humanitarian assistance for one of the world’s most destitute countries has been considerable. One immediate result of the crackdown in the late 1980s was a reduction of ODA from $435 million in 1988 to $175 million in 1989. Until the mid-1990s, official aid flows continued to decline very nearly on an annual basis, dipping below $50 million a year by the end of the decade. Thereafter official assistance gradually picked up, and in the mid-2000s stood at around $150 million annually, rising to $197 million in 2007.
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The extreme humanitarian emergency generated by Cyclone Nargis then boosted ODA to a record high of $477.5 million in 2008.
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While allocations then fell back somewhat, they stayed above the 2007 figure.